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ABSTRACT
This thesis subjects the relation between professional 
theory and everyday practice to examination. It inquires 
into the social reflexivity of theorising and practical 
action, and their essential engagement. The areas of 
practice which are inquired into are as follows: The 
construction and use of ideal-typical constructs as central 
elements in coming to terms with subterranean meanings. This 
is carried out in relation to the establishment of sexual 
relationships through 'contact magazines'. The behaviour of 
pre-school, nursery children is examined in relation to 
their abilities for and use of language. This is with 
reference to situations which are organised by adults, and 
situations organised by the children themselves. The production 
of a charge by the police, and the subsequent outcome in 
court is inquired into in respect of the attitude of professional 
theorising.
The thesis redefines these areas of practice in terms of 
the theoretical competence displayed and required there. They 
are seen as areas which are populated by practical sociologists 
and which produce sociologies themselves. It is taken that 
these areas of practice display theoretical competences which 
professional inquiry ignores, takes for granted, and uses yet 
which are of fundamental importance to inquiring into the social. 
Professional theory's ideals of clarity and superiority are 
discussed in relation to the work of T.S. Kuhn and Plato, as 
being based upon occasional and irregular methods which 
accomplish for all practical purposes its serious intentions.
Through the continuous use, discussion, and examination 
of the work of Harold Garfinkel - most notably the use of 
the concepts of indexicality and reflexivity - the thesis 
recommends a deeper and more fundamental understanding of 
human practical action. This is through the establishment 
of a reflexive sociology, which locates and documents the 
grounds of creativity and artfulness whereby theory and 
practice are constituted.
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INTRODUCTION
At every turn, it [this text] denounces any
possible confusion. It rejects its identity,
\
without previously stating: I am neither this 
nor that. It is not critical, most of the time; 
it is not a way of saying that everyone else is 
wrong. It is an attempt to define a particular 
site by the exteriority of its vicinity; rather 
than to reduce others to silence, by claiming 
that what they say is worthless, I have tried 
to define this blank space from which I speak, 
and which is slowly taking shape iri a discourse 
that I feel to be so precarious and so unsure.
[M. Foucault, 1977]
As an Introduction, this section of the thesis seeks 
to escape itself. Why? Barry Sandywell has written [1975] 
that introductions are "tantamount to the provision for the 
social construction of worlds.". They are the last sections 
of a writing to be written, yet appear first in that work. 
The purpose is to provide a set of instructions for the 
reader for a 'way of seeing' what follows. Yet the given 
nature of accounts and their reflexivity makes it difficult 
to see this feature;, [i.e. providing instructions and a 
'way of seeing'], as belonging only to introductions. A 
consequence of this awareness of the reflexivity of lay and 
professional accounts, is that this Introduction and the 
chapters which follow seek to examine it as a topic as well 
as use it as a resource. In this sense this Introduction 
seeks to escape its conventional role by making clear and
addressing-, -the problem of constituting and making observable 
situations. Because of this the focal, point for. the.
Introduction is the genesis of the thesis as a piece of practical 
reasoning. In order-to do this it is necessary to discuss it 
in terms of, professional., sociological theorising as method 
and' tradition1 and everyday, practical actions as reflexive 
biography.
Sociology as Method and Traditions In’ becoming interested in 
sociology I was concerned with the sociability of people; with 
relations, purposes, and intentions. Yet I found that am 
increasing immersion in the. professional, programme of sociology 
tended towards an insular attitude; a moving away through
t
professional, concepts and methods from the .connected, human 
facet of social, relations towards, relating ’’objects* to ’objects*.
It was within this situation that the- project of phenomenology, 
aimed at understanding human existence, first appealed to me.- 
Hbwever its philosophical, perspective places iit withini a specific 
historical tradition which requires the mundane and routine 
happenings of everyd^1 life1 as-uninteresting as practical, 
activities. Phenomenology places the act of inquiry (my act) at 
another level of existence and consciousness.(i.e. a transcendental 
level). Its consequences as method results in a similar 
distancing from actual, practical activities as following a 
conventional, sociological practice* (_e.g. functionalism). As a 
result, of following a certain sociological, tradition the inquirer 
has no interest in the reflexive relations he has with others im 
constructing their daily and professional sociological worlds.
The writings of Harold CFarfinkel. (1963, I9&7) are a tremendous 
exception to the disinterest which professional inquirers display 
towards the.character of practical actions and the constructive
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method which without an awareness of. refl'exivity, following a 
tradition Tarings (cf. P. Attewell, 1974!. Menmell, 1975» B* 
McSweeney, 1973). • Also, "because of the reflexive interest which 
(Farfinkelrs writings display-they pose a problem of understanding 
and comprehension. In? becoming involved irn Garfinkel*s theoretic 
notions, I became aware of the possibility of examining my owm 
surroundings and relations and how I myself, made sense of. them.
The thesis provided the opportunity for> am examination of the 
relations, and connections between? lay and! professional theory 
and,practices, through the use and discussion of Garfinked*s ideas. 
Consequently they pervade the thesis.
the? thesis also attempts to follow Garfinked*s recommendation 
about not quarrelling with or seeking to correct practical1,, 
sociological, inquiries. Because- of this the thesis continually 
seeks to use- ideas, activities, and arguments in terms of development 
and progression; towards revealing methods and practices which 
accomplish practical actions, this formulation is different to 
that of.conventional, sociological practice where the discussion 
of forms of professional argument amounts to a sign, or token of 
professional practice itself, and commitment to some particular 
school of thought.. Professional sociology approaches its work as 
methodical tradition rather than a form of biographical-description 
which is reflexively produced.
The- Thesis as Biographys The actual process of beginning and. 
.building the thesis was not a-well-planned, professional process.
I consistently attempted small pieces of inquiry into areas of 
social, life which.impinged on me, according to two concernsr 
firstly*’ the exposition of areas of action which were mot,well, 
documented-in the sociological literature; secondly,' the inquirer*s 
engagement with these situated conducts in terms of their theoretic
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character. This latter feature is not seen as a matter exclusively 
for professional inquiry, hut rather a social process for making 
sense, •understanding, and connecting with others. In other words 
the thesis regards theory as practice.
The* sections of the thesis follow the development of my thoughts. 
The order in which they appear1 is the order in which,they were 
written, and in this way they are biographically reflexive. Section 
I concerns the establishment of sexual relations through the use 
of contact magazines which I first encountered while working in a 
factory. At about the same time I was taking my daughter to a 
day-nursery and became interested in the nature of adult-child 
interactions. This topic occupies Section’ll. While researching 
these areas of experience, I was involved with the police and 
subsequently had to attend court. It is this encounter with the 
legal, process which is dealt with in Section H I .
In the examination of these topics it became apparent that in 
each a high level of sophistication was required in terms of 
knowledge and methodicity. This awareness resulted in a reading 
of T.So. Kuhn’s "The' Structure of Scientific Revolutions" which 
sought to locate the social means which underpinned and were 
integral to his theorising about the progress of science. This 
account forms the first part of Section IV, which treats 
theorising as an occasion of social practice. As such a paradox 
is revealed for to be truly professional, theory must epistemologically 
separate itself from more mundane inquiry. In the second part of 
Section IV, an examination of how Plato approached and accomplished 
this separation for his theorising is presented. The final part 
of Section IV seeks to.locate the central, and vital element which 
unites theorisings and practices, both lay and professional1, 
described in the preceding sections. This is the resource of
reflexivity.
. The Tdea of Reflexivity? T first became aware of the idea of 
reflexivity through reading Ciarfinkel’s "Studies in Ethnomethodology".
He claims that the way3 in which people make sense of and describe 
their surroundings and actions are constitutive of the scenes which 
they make observable, and’ that this way of proceeding is inescapable:.
"am essential, reflexivity" (1967). Garfinkel further believes that; 
people rely upon. the reflexivity of, their accounts and utterances 
im accomplishing the rationality of their actions.
Edmund Husserl, was clearly aware of the existence of social 
reflexivity in formulating his phenomenology and addressing the 
problem- of the relation between the objective content of knowledge 
and the acts of meaning or knowing. In seeking to demonstrate that 
thex objective world was dependent and inseparable from- an intentional 
object-constituting consciousness, he fully faced the topic of 
reflexivity. Husserl reveals this in' a negative manner when he 
states that a phenomenon "is no ’substantial' unity; it has no 
'real' properties, it knows no real, parts;, no real changes, and no 
causality." (1965) • lore positively Husserl, in discussing the 
meaning of a word, regards it as residing in "that; which is being 
grasped and ’seen’ there” (ML Douglas, ed1., X973. My emphasis.).
The intentions of consciousness as objectivities for Husserl 
"belong to the; same stream of consciousness as themselves." (1967)»
That is, phenomena as meaningful, entities are- constituted in 
themselves through themselves, in a reflexive manner.
Though Husserl was aware of the existence of social reflexivity, 
in his commitment to revealing the presuppositions underlying 
knowledge he subscribed to the development of the general, method 
of a transcendental, phenomenology. Here the use of the phenomenological 
reduction and the suspension! of knowledge about the life-world were
seem as enabling- the single ego to rise above its owm subjectivity 
to account for knowledge in general. However the completion of this 
transcendental- programme was Husserlrs stumbling block. Alfred 
Schütz, though following Husserl closely, departed:, from1 him at this 
point. He? sought rather to establish a constitutive phenomenology 
of the social, world. (1962), which would clarify the methods and! 
assumptions of the cultural sciences.
Husserl and Schütz were both interested in- the constitution of 
knowledge, yet both disregarded the constituting character' of 
practical activities in favour of a more generalised perspective as 
a tradition. Schütz combined Husserl*s phenomenology with Weberiam 
sociology im order to effect his interpretive sociology, while 
Husserl, attempted to establish his transcendental phenomenology as 
the first philosophy. Tm doing this Husserl, transgressed one of 
his owm dietumss "Tt is the business of theories to confront data."
(1967}• What he did do was neglect the practical nature of his and
others*' actions} the ways in which he and others in fact confronted 
"data”. The effect, for .both Schütz and' Husserl, of seeking to 
establish and follow 3 professional1 tradition of inquiry was to 
neglect social, reflexivity as a practical activity.
More recently some theorists have become interested in focusing 
upon reflexivity as a central topic for sociology, though there are
differences between them on the part it plays both in sociology and
in everyday life. Alvin Gouldner ClST'O) calls for the establishment 
of a reflexive sociology. By this he means a sociology which "is 
concerned with what sociologists want to do and with what, in fact, 
they actually do im the world." (l970). As such Gouldner is not 
concerned with social reflexivity but with the production of1 a 
sociology- of sociology. Johm 0'ITteill who has criticised Gbuldnerts 
approach (1972), has himself suggested that social scientific?
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knowledge should1. adopt a notions of a limited reflexivity within a 
phenomenological, frame in order to he aware of the limits of such 
knowledge. - This view obviously owes much to the work of Husserl. 
and1 Schütz. O ’Feil'l. seeks to regard’ reflexivity as a social, 
institutions- "as tied to the textual, structures of temporality and 
situatiom through which subjectivity and objectivity are constituted 
as the intentional, unity and style of the world.** (1972).
Hie mosft comprehensive treatment of reflexivity as a topic for 
sociology has come in the writings of Harold (Tarfinkel. These have 
been the sour©©1 of inspiration; of a rich and varied collection of 
writings. Though those who have followed Garfinkel1,ls ideas have, 
for the most part, remained faithful to the central topics of 
reflexivity and indexicality they have diverged according to their 
own sets of relevances. For example Zimmerman and Pollnem (I9T0) 
have remained consistent with the1 idea of reflexivity in their 
notion, of an occasioned corpus of. knowledge?- "The features of 
socially organized,activities are particular, contingeit accomplishments 
of the production! and recognition work: of parties to the activity.". 
Others however, such as Clcourel (1973) and Hacks (unpublished), have 
Sought: generalised answers to reflexivity and indexicality in the 
deep structures of interpretive procedures and the invariant 
structures of conversation.
In discussing- reflexivity here, it is seen as the basis of all. 
social accomplishments and productions. A consequence of this is 
that this thesis, and indeed this Introduction, attempts to treat 
itself as an occasion of reflexive sociology; of presenting the 
features which in engagement in actual, practical, activities 
result in a particular outcome. Accordingly I have attempted 
to document the movement of the thesis as a development of ideas 
about the social which progressed through the thesis and can be
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found there. Firom this perspective the' thesis is an occasion 
which seeks to understand situated, practical1 activity, 
professional theory, and itself im terms of a reflexive sociology. 
!Ehi:s is to resist invoking a professional .tradition of inquiry in 
order to separate this inquiry from more mundane detective work, 
while regarding- understanding (my-understanding) as biographically 
representative of a form of life ("my life). To regard given 
understandings as documents of particular, situated! conducts is to 
hegim to.treat the processes of accounting, understanding, and 
formulating histories as practically constituting events rather than 
pre-given, objective categories generally applicable across all 
situations, m  becoming interested in and dwelling upon the 
artful, ways in which the organisational characteristics of daily 
life are produced and maintained, the thesis focuses upon reflexivity 
as a topic.. In regarding this topic as central, and crucial to its 
very own inquiry, as well1 as residing.’out there»1, is to proceed 
to the heart.of a reflexive sociology. The study of social practices 
(reflexive ways of making sense) is seen not only as applying to 
situations of interest, but to be shared between lay and professinel 
sociology. What this means is that all professional sociology relies 
upon the- resource of'social reflexivity, just as lay sociology does, 
to accomplish its outcomes. A reflexive sociology recognises this 
social engagement:, and seeks to examine- it in social situations and. 
its own inquiry.
SECTTOF X
Practices — The- Construction Of Ideal Types In. 
Relation1 To Sexual Contact Magazines
, This -thesis is dedicated: towards reaching am understanding 
of the; relation, between and complementarity of theory and practice. 
T t 'is a quite general, assumption that theory and practice are 
clear-cut; and1 discrete areas of life. Withim this assumption 
theory is characterised by exactness, clarity, complexity, 
superiority, or some: such indicator of professional, inquiry; of 
the ability to locate the »truth*. Practice and its associated 
reasonings on the other-hand, are regarded as vague, loose, and 
imprecise; as mere opinion which is available for- the inquiry and 
reordering of theory. One of the devices for doing this, is the 
synthesis of elements of practice into a logical, whole. : This 
performs the function for theory of measuring the rationality of 
particular practices. Tt is the use of this device in relation to 
the establishment of sexual contact through magazines that Section 
X  examines.
The use of the ideal! type is most commonly associated with Max 
Weber. However- though this method of proceeding was central to 
Weberns interpretive sociology it is not confined to that, order- of 
inquiry. As Alfred Schütz continually pointed out, typicality is 
a common means for- the ordering of daily experiences according to 
expectancies and relevances. We all ih a routine- way use, construct 
change and develop a whole; range of typologies in. dealing with 
everyday experiences. Their- construction and use depends upon 
our relevances and' expectancies, and in the sense of forming a 
base for relevance and expectancy, they help constitute them.. As 
a means for our common orientation towards events and actions,
typicality presents to the theorist a range of factual1, existent 
structures which he can re-order according to his professional 
commitments. Hhfortunately the process of.typifioation is left 
unexamined in this second' order- construction. The assumed division) 
"between theory and prqptice is formally replicated in the workr of 
theorising, while it relies upon the common ground of everyday 
reasoning.
The routine construction, and use of typologies is relied upon 
and.left unexamined "by theory; the implicit recognition of phenomena 
for ’what they;are* and their unity and difference with ’other* 
phenomena are the crucial1 grounds for texturing theory’s tracts.
Yet this intersubjectivity is of little interest to professional 
theory. Why? It is a nexus which is not open to quantification.
It: is a sharing "between men which is thoroughly social. A 
consequence of this is that intersubjectivity does not readily.fit 
with the strictures concerning theory’s formal and structural 
pronouncements about'the state of the world and the place of man 
within it. Also the topic of intersubjectivity requires that the 
inquirer cease treating- his investigations as forays into situations 
where he is an independent, unbiased, force. It forces theory to 
focus upon its own process of understanding, and.in this way can 
place? it in an ’Uncomfortable’ positiom in relation to its formal, 
methodological programmes.
This Section seeks to approach this area of commonness between 
theory and practice via an examination, of the construction and use 
of a typology of sexual actors. The structure of the Section as 
such seeks to perform two purposes. Firstly it aims to present the 
findings of* an investigation into sexual, contact magazines.
Secondly the opportunity is taken to examine the shared methods 
and practices for the creation and development of typologies. This
latter feature of the Section? is seen? as a more general, contribution 
to an examination of the methods used im sociological investigation, 
both layr and professional.
Iffy first .encounter; with contact magazines came while X ’was 
. working at a factory. They had been-brought.into the canteen by 
someone as, r suppose, a source of interest, speculation, and 
amusement for the other-workers. Prion to seeing these contact 
magazines X had heard about them, but treated what I heard with some 
doubt. However when X saw them during a morning’s tea-breakr X was 
amazed. This feeling changed’ to an interest in how people could 
and did put themselves up fear sexual, use and the social processes 
involved. Accordingly X decided! to attempt to find out more about 
the world of contact magazines and the people involved. Aften a 
period of seeking out contact magazines and answering advertisements 
T  reairsed that I could recognise advertisements for what they were 
*at a glance»' and possessed a typology of contact actors. This 
realisation was heightened by the fact that others, such as my 
workmates who as far as X knew hadno contact involvement, could 
also bring some set of types into play for the interpretation of 
advertisements. But how could such recognition be done, and how is 
a typology of contact actors produced? This Section addresses 
these questions.
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CHAPTER ONE 
CRACKING THE CODE
Do you take me for such a fool to think 
I'd make contact with one who tries to 
hide what he don't know to begin with?
[Bob Dylan, "Positively Fourth Street"]
In his novel "Cannery Row", John Steinbeck sets down 
the story of the more or less imaginary inhabitants of a 
community. These people are "as the man once said, 'whores, 
pimps, gamblers, and sons of bitches', by which he meant 
Everybody. Had the man looked through another peep-hole he 
might have said: 'Saints and angels and martyrs and holy 
men', and he would have meant the same thing." [1967]. 
Steinbeck's juxtaposition of two possible accounts of the 
inhabitants of "Cannery Row" focuses upon the process of 
making sense.
This process has its place in the creative relation 
between 'the typical' and 'the essential'; between the 
Everybody of "Cannery Row" and its various constituting 
essences such as "a poem, a stink, a grating noise, a quality 
of light, a tone, a habit, a nostalgia, a dream." [1967].
In everyday life the engagement between the typical and 
orderly, and the constituting essence is to be found in 
coming to terms with experience. It is upon this basis of 
social practice that types and essences are created, 
constructed, and constituted.
This chapter will present a description of thb 
interpretive negotiations which occur in the use of ideal
typical constructions for understanding experienced events.
The area in relation to which this will be done is that of 
'making contact'. Here, action revolves around contact 
magazines which present a range of advertisements of a sexual 
nature, from which possible sexual partners can be selected. 
Though this selection is defined by the biographical situation 
and details of the advertiser and reader, fundamental to the 
selection process is the problem of understanding. This 
problem is raised by the features presented by advertisements 
which require interpreting. This first chapter on making 
contact will consist of an introduction to the subterranean 
world of contact magazines, and suggest how a major type of 
advertiser can be recognised: the prostitute.
CONTACT MAGAZINES: The interest in inquiring into contact 
advertisements is twofold. Firstly it enables the presentation 
of knowledge on an area which is socially subterranean and 
recent in appearance, though one which has a historical 
progression. For example "The Matrimonial News" in the 1870's 
had a similar form to modern day contact magazines [lists of 
advertisements with box numbers], but with a different content 
of meaning. The emphasis was upon locating people for 
matrimony rather than for sexual relationships [R. Pearsall, 
1971]. Secondly the topic of making contact provides the 
opportunity for an examination of the ways in which people 
make sense of and understand experiences at both the level 
of membership and professional inquiry.
I
As a viable enterprise making contact requires certain 
basic materials. A knowledge of the contact process is 
needed, .which depends on the availability of contact 
magazines. Some 'girlie' magazines, commonly available in
- 1 0 -
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newsagents [e.g. "Private", "Weekend Sex", "New Direction", 
"Sexpert"], have a contact section. These magazines also 
contain classified advertisements for more specialised contact 
magazines which are made up entirely of contact advertisements 
[e.g. "Rendezvous", "Linkup", "Aquarius", "Pathway"].
The sexual acts portrayed in both types of contact 
magazines are parallel to their availability. In the 
'specialist' magazines more deviant or specialist sexual forms 
are to be found [e.g. transvestism, humiliation, bondage, 
slavery]. The specialist magazines however, like the popular 
type, consist in the main of advertisements from prostitutes, 
couples, single females, and single males who seek less radical 
forms of sexual relationship [e.g. a client relationship, 
wife-swapping, seeking 'genuine' partners of the opposite sex].
As the type of contact magazine mirrors the deviance of 
the acts portrayed there [i.e. general or specialised], so a 
similar reflection is cast upon the population of contact 
makers. In its logical consistency, this reflection is formed 
as a continuum of the possibilities of contact involvement.
At one extreme stands 'the outsider' who has little or no 
knowledge of making contact, and at the other 'the insider'.
A corollary of this picture is that it is along this logical 
and typical continuum that 'the outsider' must pass in a 
career of contact involvement [E. Goffman, 1970], Whether 
careers follow this ideal conceptual construction is another 
matter.
The presentation of advertisements and the administrative 
organisation associated with it is similar in both popular and 
specialised magazines. Advertisements are listed, often 
according to sex [e.g. females, males, couples], and given box
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numbers. Some advertisements are accompanied by a photograph 
of the advertiser, generally in some stage of undress or 
naked. Often the face of the advertiser is hidden or 
covered. Along with the presentation of advertisements, 
magazines supply instructions on how to make contact.
Repliers have to send their letters to the magazine with the 
box number of each advertisement replied to written on the 
back of the envelope. All replies then have to be placed 
together in an envelope and sent to the magazine with the 
correct forwarding fee [e.g. twenty five pence for each 
letter, one pound for five]. The magazine then forwards the 
replies to the advertisers who then have the choice of 
contacting the replier directly.
Magazines also specify the cost of advertising. Females 
advertising for males do so free of charge. Couples are 
charged one pound for twenty words, iextra words being charged 
at six pence per word. Males are charged two pounds, with 
the same charge for extra words. These prices are taken from 
the specialist "Rendezvous" magazine, and represent the basic 
charge for advertising in the contact world. Other magazines 
charge more.
For example, for a male to advertise in "Sexpert", a 
'girlie' magazine, costs five pounds for twenty words.
However, if the advertiser wishes his advertisement to appear 
in the four other magazines which are associated with 
"Sexpert" the cost is fifteen pounds. Females' advertisements, 
though sent only to one magazine, often appear in other 
associated 'girlie' magazines without the advertiser's consent 
or permission. For example, one female placed an advertisement 
in "Sexpert" which appeared in four other magazines. Not only
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was her permission not sought, but the advertisement appeared 
month after month even after she had written to complain.
As a supplement to enable the clear reading of 
advertisements, magazines provide a list of abbreviations 
of contact argot:
AC/DC - A male who likes sex with
male or female, or a female 
who likes sex with female or 
male.
£ - Oral sex by the mouth.
CP - Corporal punishment with whips, 
canes, etc. Bondage is similar.
Transvestite - One who dresses in
clothes of the opposite 
sex.
Voyeur - One who likes to watch sex 
by others.
DIY - Do it yourself. Some use vibrators, 
dildos, etc.
ALA - All letters answered.
SAE - Stamped addressed envelope.
WE - Well endowed, large where it 
matters. ["Rendezvous"]
The above is the knowledge which this chapter takes as a 
beginning for analysis, together with a more formal and 
logical ideal typical structure of sexual actors:
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TVPOLOGY OF CONTACT ACTORS:
REPLIERS SOUGHT ADVERTISERS
PAYMENT NONPAYMENT
Male Female Male Female Couple
Males **** P #*** G 3
Females **** **** G L 3
Couples **** **** 3 3 S
Females/
Couples **** **** G3
AC/DC
3
AC/DC 
3 S
Males/
Couples **** ****
AC/DC 
T V G3
AC/DC 
3 S
Males/Females/
Couples **** ****
AC/DC 
T V
AC/DC 
3 G
AC/DC 
3 S
Key: **** _ Classifications not available.
P - Prostitute.
G - 'Genuine', heterosexual, non-client association.
3 - Three-some; sex between three people.
AC/DC - Bisexual.
L - Lesbian.
TV - Transvestite.
S - Swapping sexual partners.
This typo logy is drawn from some readi ng of contact
magaz ines , which was based in and mad e pos sible by commonsense
knowl edge o f sexu al matters. The genesis of the typology is
as yet untrac ed except to the extent that it in some way
satis fies Dur kheim ' s dictum for the constr uction of types:
"a certai n number of species should be det ermine d according
to their resembla nces and dif ferences ." [ 1 970]. The definite
natur e which the typo logy por trays ascribe s a ru le-like
quali ty to the actors . This defining char acteri stic of
ideal typ es requi res actors to be non othet ic acc ording
V
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to a constant characteristic [A. Schütz, 1972].
In a typology of contact actors one important defining 
factor is the payment of a fee. This factor is central to 
the type 'prostitute', whereas its inapplicability is a 
constitutive part of other types. In actual instances of 
contact behaviour [e.g. reading advertisements], this broad 
differentiation resulting from the feature 'a fee' is 
problematic. The payment of a fee is not a clear cut issue, 
but is involved with other elements of portraying work.
The existence of ideal types however, indicates that 
problematic areas of experience such as making contact can 
be resolved for a person's practical purposes and thereby 
discovered to have 'objective' features. The resolution of 
what an advertisement 'is' or what it means lies in the 
interaction between typical knowledge and new experience.
This engagement is grounded in and through interpretive 
negotiations as an occasion of discovery. 'Discovery' is thus 
a task faced by the reader of advertisements. For the 
advertiser it is portrayal. These two elements are features 
of language which imply one another: to account for a 
discovery entails examining language for documents of meaning, 
which can then be expressed through language [i.e. a re-portrayal 
of what 'was' portrayed].
In order to reach some understanding of the interpretive 
work which occurs in making contact, it is necessary to 
examine the argot of making contact as a resource for portrayal 
and as a topic for discovery. This examination is into the 
use of members' language and the methods for portraying and 
discovering contact or "telling the code" [D. L. Weider, 1974].
The interpretive problematic presented by contact 
advertisements is the rules by which they are to be coded.
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This problematic does not rest upon the existence [thatness] 
but upon the essence [whatness] of advertisements. The 
resolution of the problematic as the location of essence 
depends upon coding the features presented by advertisements. 
This process has as a basis the assumption that behaviour has 
a 'feature-laden' status. This status amounts to the belief 
that behaviour is meaningful - it is not mere behaviour but 
is social action - and that this meaning is signified in the 
behaviour itself [cf. the documentary method of interpretation, 
H. Garfinkel, 1967].
Features constituted in this way, as aspects of an 
underlying pattern, demonstrate the availability and 
plausibility of that pattern for reportage. The problem 
presented by advertisements therefore is: What is the code 
which enables the accomplishment of object status, and what 
are the features which signify this status?
THE FEATURES OF PROSTITUTES' ADVERTISEMENTS: The majority 
of advertisements in contact magazines are placed by 
prostitutes. Their advertisements present various 
interrelated features which amount to a description for the 
recognition of the advertisements 'for what they are'. In 
detailing these features here, use will be made of two 
prostitutes' advertisements, A and B:
A: Xmas is coming gentlemen, so why not treat 
yourself to a little extra goody. I'll cater 
for your every whim. I'm 23, highly sexed and 
totally uninhibited. So make your Xmas wish 
come true with this rather attractive young 
lady. Will guarantee reply to all SAE's. Any
age. Cheshire.
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Bs Attractive 22 year old blonde, 36-24-36, 
would like sexy gents to visit me in my 
comfortable home. I will bend over 
backwards for the right type. Write soon 
I am waiting, s.a.e. for same day reply.
Lancs.
An obvious feature of these advertisements is the 
portrayal of a possible sexual relationship which specifies 
those to be involved. This feature is not unique to 
prostitutes' advertisements, for it is constitutive of any 
advertisement within the contact domain. It does however, 
mark an initial judgemental beginning for differentiating 
out forms of advertisements and advertisers. Having thus 
located the gender form of an advertisement, as in the above 
cases female advertisers seeking male repliers, it is then 
possible to move on to an examination of the advertisement 
for evidence of it belonging to a specific pattern of 
behaviour.
Prostitutes' advertisements are also persuasive literary 
compositions. Like 'the portrayal of a sexual relationship', 
this feature is not unique to prostitutes' advertisements. 
Persuasion can be seen to be a required feature for any contact 
advertisement because making contact depends upon inducing 
readers to become part of the portrayed relationship. Because 
of this, persuasion, just as much as any concrete feature, is 
constitutive of the scenes in -which it is to be found.
The feature 'persuasion' is especially important to 
prostitutes' advertisements, and in locating them, because 
they must handle the issues of illegality and delicacy. The 
illegal nature of being a prostitute is a concern which 
requires a low-profile and non-blatant management of that
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status. The issue of delicacy is a concern because of the 
dominant rule 'a fee' and its connection with sexual 
relations. The normal and expected form of a description of 
sexual relations is in non-client terms [e.g. marriage, romance, 
courtship]. The establishment of a client relationship in 
relation to sex removed from normal and expected situations 
of meaning raises the possibility of ’shock’ on behalf of the 
reader. It must be noted however, that this shock has its 
place at 'the outsider' end of the contact continuum which 
lessens in the move towards 'the socialised member'. Persuasion 
functions in two senses according to the degree of socialisation. 
Firstly, for the new member it minimises the possibility of 
a shock reaction. Secondly, for all members persuasion stands 
as an inducement to choose one advertisement rather than 
another.
The central function of persuasion is that it is a means 
for managing the client relationship without emphasis upon the 
payment of a fee. As an occasion of exchange the prostitute 
and client formulation is informed by persuasion which at the 
same time subsumes that formulation under a more general and 
unspecific one [e.g. fantasy]. The starkness of the cash 
nexus is transformed into a shimmering image of willingness 
and submission [e.g."I'll cater for your every whim. I'm 23, 
highly sexed and totally uninhibited."]. Persuasive 
composition is a token which permits the formulation of a 
client relationship as an expected outcome of a reading.
Such a formulation is connected to a reading in a very mundane 
way. Persuasive composition draws forth the tautological 
assertion that an advertisement is 'professionally done'.
This comments upon the reflexive nature of the form of an
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advertisement in revealing its originator.
Persuasion is a method for managing being a prostitute 
seeking clients. Because of this it occupies the position 
of sales-language. Constituting sales-language through 
persuasive composition sets prostitutes’ advertisements in 
relief from others which portray the 'girl seeks boy' 
gender form. The emphasis of sales-language is objectified 
outside itself; it is concerned with an 'objective' social 
formation rather than the sexual formation which it proposes. 
Prostitutes' advertisements thus lack specific social and 
sexual determinations for contact [e.g. specifications of 
age, sexual relationship, social relationship], other than 
the most vague.
This vagueness is an essential ambiguity which is part 
of the message of sales-language. The location by a reader 
of ambiguity as a necessary requirement for the composition 
of an advertisement focuses attention to the reasons for that 
ambiguity [e.g. prostitution]. Vagueness is necessary because 
of the need to manage a problematic composition [being a 
prostitute seeking clients], and is a direct consequence of 
the social foundation of prostitutes' advertisements. As 
this foundation is to be found in the material relations of 
value and commodity, prostitutes ground their proposals in 
vague hints on the status of the male sexual partner [e.g. 
"kind", "generous", "considerate", "appreciative"].
For example, advertisements A and B present portrayals 
of the advertiser and possible replier. What connects these 
portrayed statuses are the specifications "treat yourself",
"a little extra goody", "cater" [A], "visit me in my 
comfortable home", and "will bend over backwards for the
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right type" [B]. These hints place the possible relationship 
outside normal interaction [e.g. "a little extra goody" and 
"visit me"]. As these terms place the contact outside 
everyday affairs and into the management of a professional 
relationship, so they also designate the type of domain from 
which the advertisements spring. In "treat yourself", "cater", 
and the juxtaposition of the sexual allusion "bend over 
backwards" with "the right type", advertisers are presented 
for use according to hinted at means.
Through essential ambiguity and vague hints, advertisers 
stand as commodities for use within a contractual domain. 
Simply, advertisers formulate themselves as commodities 
through pair-relating value ["treat yourself", "the right 
type"], with use ["every whim", "bend over backwards"]. As 
Lefebvre has described it, within the contractual domain of
the prostitute-client relationship formulated in
/
advertisements [A and B], "money holds sway over human 
beings" [H. Lefebvre, 1972]. The reflexive character of 
commodity relations is also pointed out by Lefebvre. He states 
that these formations only exist through the interrelations 
of people, yet they exist apart from them and modify their 
relations: "reifying the latter and making them abstract." 
[1972].
PROSTITUTES' LETTERS: The advertisements from A and B 
were replied to. In doing this I attempted to 'pass' as a 
newcomer to making contact seeking instructions on how to 
act [see: 'Advertisers', Chapter 2]. The reply from A,
Janie, was as follows:
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Thanks for writing. The only things I need to 
know about you really, are your tastes in sex, so that 
I may satisfy them fully. I am a very passionate, 
lustful young girl, and although I charge a fee I 
adore most forms of sexual pleasure [NO CP or 
Bondage please]. Why not phone me details soon 
and let me satisfy your desires.
Passionately Yours,
Janie
Rather like the reply from Janie, that from B, Sylvia, 
was concerned to present details on herself, state that she 
charged a fee, and arrange a meeting:
I am an attractive 22yr. old blonde 36. 24. 36. 
Very sexy and uninhibited and my fee is £15 for a 
Good session of up to two hours. I am free evenings 
and Weekends and I am very clean and discreet. Thank 
you very much for my letter from you.
Hope to hear from you soon.
Phone or write soon.
Love Sylvia
Both letters state that the relationship proposed in the 
advertisements and which is still possible, is to be regarded 
under the rule of payment. However the ways in which Janie 
and Sylvia do this are different. The kinds of context which 
they make observable in their accounts derives from their 
practices for doing so. Stating the rule of payment thus 
cannot be separated from 'how' this is done [H. Garfinkel, 
1967].
Janie formulates her account euphemistically. She seeks 
to provide for the feature of 'payment' in a way that renders 
it of little interest; as inconsequential. This is done by
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emphasising her sexual character, and seeking to present this 
as unconnected to the feature of 'payment'. Janie states 
in-so-many-words that "although" she is a prostitute, her 
enjoyment of sexual practices [possibly with the replier] is 
not connected to this.
In contrast with Janie, Sylvia presents a narrative which 
formulates the essential strands of the client relationship.
She formulates 'who' is available, 'what' is available [being 
"sexy and uninhibited"], and 'hnw' this is available ["a Good 
session of up to two hours."] These three features of 
Sylvia's availability rest on the fundamental understanding 
of exchange-value as a means of carrying out sexual relations.
It is probable that the persuasive form of Janie's and 
Sylvia's letters stems from the request for instructions from 
a newcomer. For example, a reply was sent to an advertisement 
which sought to 'pass' as a competent member by stating that 
the replier was in the advertiser's area regularly and requested 
a meeting: "Thanks for replying. To discuss further details 
and arrange a meeting, phone me anytime. My number is [ ]."
This number was called, and discussing "further details" 
consisted of being told the price, and being asked when I 
could attend a meeting.
THE CODE: The above features are a code for the recognition 
of prostitutes' advertisements. As a code they move into 
themselves in ever greater detail from 1 ] the portrayal of 
the 'girl seeks boy' relationship, 2 ] persuasive composition,
3 ] sales-language, A] essential ambiguity, 5] formulations 
as hints of a client relationship, 6 ] pair-relating use with 
value, to 7] a possible sexual relationship as a commodity for 
exchange. The actual written words which the developing code 
structures are separated, related, and interrelated in deeper
- 2 3 -
moves which attempt to reveal the foundation [origin] of those 
words. The interpretation of advertisements as 'prostitute' 
and the code which accounts for that outcome, depends upon 
what Halliday in discussing the sociology of literature has 
called the immediate thesis [e.g. making contact], and the 
underlying theme [i.e. the meaning of an advertisement]
[M. A. K. Halliday, 1973]. The theme [e.g. prostitution] 
generates the form of the thesis [e.g. the above features], 
through which both theme and thesis are realised.
To locate advertisements under the category 'prostitute' 
and construct the required code in that location for 
accounting purposes, requires formulating advertisements 
according to their commodity-for-use-and-exchange basis. This 
is in terms of evidence and experience. A deep assumption 
for the accomplishment of such a project is that the processes 
of reading and writing provide an objective form of life. In 
the process of typifying, the determining knowledge consists 
of ideas on definite social relations. Similarly, the 
accomplishment of a type requires the people and actions 
experienced as 'things'; it makes them definite objects. Thus 
constituting a code for the recognition of advertisements as 
belonging to prostitutes reveals the material social relations 
between people. A prostitute's advertisement depends for an 
adequate reading upon capturing the materiality of the 
proposed relationship [i.e. people as commodities], through 
the development of a codified structure which reveals the 
"material relations between persons and social relations 
between things" [K. Marx, 1976].
The relationship between readers and prostitutes is that 
between the products of theoretical and practical labours; 
interactants are material objects defined by the utilities
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of use, value, and exchange;. The meeting- in reading is not; 
between. people hat between theoretical, products which reflect 
the social, relation of' the producers. This reflection cromes 
about through the act of interpretation.. Features are 
located1, as above, by the use of' a guiding- rule and’ 
fore-knowledge-; the knowledge- is known to testify to- the 
order being revealed. Such a ’correct* schema however, for 
locating- the meanings of contact advertisements is not; 
needed. An occasioned rule and guiding set of' assumptions 
would enable the categorisation, of advertisements as of 
’some kind’. The suitability and relevance of that; 
categorisation would be informed upon by the actions based 
on it and their consequences.
In situations, of choice, interpretation! uses am occasioned 
searching rule which produces feature® which are characteristic, 
with that; rule. This is not in any case of' searching- with a 
rule; a rule os either relevant, to actual material or- it is 
not. It is in the engagement: between experience and prior- 
knowledge that the occasion of interpretation- is to- be found, 
as. a procedure for matching rules and material. In this 
occasion, the rule which reasonably encompasses the experience 
is the rule that guides. The relational1 bridging between 
knowledge and experience, between occasioned rules and 
material, tta be interpreted, results in the resolution of the 
problematic as a characteristic of' the rule (i.e. the 
accomplishment testifies to an. underlying pattern.). Features 
constituted in this way are located as a. codified scheme 
available for use in further interpretation.
fhe code which enables the location! and typificatiom of 
advertisements is generated by the quest to ’find out’ in 
relation to> practical ends (i.e. as specified by lay or
- 2 5 -
professional interests]. This does not happen in any 
immediate sense. A structure of interrelated rules does not 
appear 'at one', but is in continuous development and 
disintegration [i.e. as occasioned]. Rules are variously 
adopted and dropped depending upon their practicality in 
situations [cf. D. Roy, 1970]. The task of interpretation 
consists of locating evidence for some general structure or 
idea with which to assemble advertisements into a structural 
order. In this assembly work, evidence simultaneously 
becomes the beginning of a structure with which t.o_. codify 
the encountered and [judged to be] relevant material. A code 
is thus developed for interpretation in interpretation.
The code for the recognition of prostitutes' advertisements 
depicted here dissects the contact domain into two different 
orders according to the rule of and evidence for payment.
Though advertisements of a non-payment kind may never have 
been encountered by a reader, their possibility and patterned 
texture can be anticipated as a function of the structure of 
knowledge constructed and occasioned in past experience [i.e. 
knowledge of objective social formations]. Hand in hand with 
the construction of the code goes an awareness of its 
practicality as situated logic-in-use for the recognition and 
ordering of prostitutes' advertisements. The prostitute 
recognition structure in providing situated-logical 
expectancies generates the following list of features which 
advertisements of a non-payment kind can be anticipated to 
have:
1: Non-payment advertisements are portrayed 
according to reciprocal use and not for exchange.
2: Non-payment advertisements pair-relate 
constituent elements [e.g. physical attributes - sexual
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acts], but not in material terms of value.
3: Non-payment advertisements formulate their 
nature in terms suggestive of a relationship other than 
a professional-client one.
• 4: Non-payment advertisements may be ambiguous, 
but they are not necessarily so; ambiguity is a 
consequence of the limited nature of the message and not 
a function of it.
5: Non-payment advertisements are attempts to 
locate specific personnel; they seek to locate rather than 
to sell.
6: Non-payment advertisements may be 
'girl seeks boy'; other portrayed types of gender relations 
are certainly of a non-payment kind.
This latter implied element of the code consists of a 
differentiation of gender relationships according to the 
conventional notions about prostitution [e.g. prostitutes are 
female]. It is thus not expected that any other kind of 
relationship than 'girl seeks boyr will have to be read 
according to the payment rule. The six expectancies as a 
whole establish the counter nature of non-payment as a wholly 
sexual-physical matter.
A reader in possession of [some of] the prostitute 
recognition code can thus expect non-payment advertisements 
to be expressions of the need for satisfaction [or enjoyment, 
or pleasure, etc.], aimed towards reciprocal use. Non-payment 
advertisements can be expected to depend for their essential 
nature upon [the advertiser presenting and the reader locating] 
the distinction between use-value and exchange-value. Though 
ordering the contact domain in this way depends upon a
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distinction, there is common ground between payment and 
non-payment forms. This is the commodity form of language; 
or at least the commodity expressiveness of written language. 
This divorces itself from the mundane world [man's practical 
activities] through a concentration upon a monothetic 
object; upon a 'thing'. In the case of non-payment 
advertisements this is use-value; in the case of prostitutes' 
advertisements it is exchange-value. This commodity feature 
of language is an integral feature in interpreting the contact 
domain. That notice of it is required to enter into making 
contact marks this commodity feature as, to use Cicourel's 
term [1973], an interpretive procedure. It is a property 
which allows meaning and categorisations to be assigned to 
events in a practically definite way.
The commodity feature of language [the reciprocity of 
exchange-value and use-value], interlocks with a procedure 
described by Cicourel. This is the normal form, where 
interactants assume that each other possesses similar 
knowledge and recipes of what constitutes normal appearances 
[1973]. Through the use of such a procedure as the reciprocity 
of exchange-value and use-value in language, meanings and 
definite structures are made available by and for those 
engaged in making contact. However the availability of such 
meaning and structure is largely unstated, being provided by 
the background expectancies awakened in orienting to an event 
through such a procedure. Thus, advertisements 'say more than 
is written'.
The feature of 'saying more than is written' can be seen 
from the 'results' of two 'test' advertisements, which were 
placed in the same issue of a contact magazine. The 
advertisements read:
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X200: Young lady, 38-24-36, seeks kind and 
considerate gents for evenings of 
beautiful bliss. Cheshire.
X108: Attractive female graduate, 26, wishes 
to meet sincere and genuine males for 
friendship and fun. No fees.
Cheshire.
The impact which each advertisement had was different. To 
advertisement X200, there were fourteen replies; to 
advertisement X1D8 there were ninety five replies. The form 
of these replies also connected with this differential 
response. For example, a typical reply to advertisement 
X200 read:
Dear Advertiser,
I read your advert in Rendezvous and would 
very much like to meet you. It would be alright 
cash wise.
On the other hand, replies to advertisement X108 were 
much different:
Dear 108,
Your advertisement in Rendezvous was 
refreshingly different from all the others, and 
I should very much like to hear from you. I am 
interested in beauty in many forms - images, 
people, music, making love, conversation.
Please write and tell me about yourself 
and if you have a telephone, perhaps we could 
have an initial beautiful conversation.
For readers, as the above examples demonstrate, the 
orientation which advertisements express through commodity
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language establishes 'the market'. The establishment of the 
market situation comes about through the provision of the 
means for making contact by the producers of contact magazines. 
However it is only through advertisers' orientations to 
those means in commodity language [the language of the 
market], that those means continue to be re-produced.
Similarly, the establishment and re-production of the market 
depends upon the sense of.social structure employed by those 
who participate. Participation via commodity language leads 
to the construction of the situation according to a sense 
of social structure which shapes the forms of the possible 
social relations [e.g. exploitation].
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CHAPTER TWO 
ELABORATING THE CODE
Chapter One has accounted for the availability of the 
category 'prostitute' through the commodity form of language 
as a procedure for portraying and recognising exchange-value.
It remains to describe and account for the remaining categories 
in the typology of contact actors, and locate the means for 
the portrayal and recognition of non-payment [i.e. as a 
defining property of contact categories other than that of 
'prostitute ' ] .
GENDER FORMS AND SEXUALITY: The non-payment area of the 
contact 'market' is greatly defined by gender forms and their 
interrelations. The most ambiguous possibility available is 
that which consists of the same gender make-up as prostitutes' 
advertisements ['girl seeks boy']. This is because it lacks 
the definiteness which other types of gender make-up possess. 
The 'girl seeks boy' formulation could well correspond to the 
normal form 'prostitute', whereas 'couple seeks couple' or 
'girl seeks girl' awakens other ideas with which to populate 
the possible course of making contact in such gender relations. 
Payment is not one of them. The 'girl seeks boy' case is 
further complicated by the mixture of gender forms found in 
contact magazines. The normal form analytic approach has to 
contend with the concrete collection of a large number of 
advertisements from females. This can be seen in Table 1
below:
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TABLE 1: The number 
of advertisements 
contained in contact 
magazines, and their 
constitution in 
relation to gender 
form.
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As Table 1 shows, there are a large number of 
advertisements in contact magazines which are portrayed as 
coming from females [i.e. 'girl seeks boy']. This is both 
within individual magazines [those in Table 1 range from 
23.5?o to 78.7?o], and between them [the female category makes 
up 50.92?i of all advertisements in Table 1], The large 
number of advertisements from females can be seen to result 
from advertising being free when females advertise for males. 
The only exception amongst those magazines listed in Table 1 
is "Exposed" which offers free advertising to both females 
and couples.
Fundamental to the process of interpreting and typifying 
advertisements are classificatory and relational devices. The 
set 'gender' is a prime classificatory device for those 
involved in making contact. The set is oriented to as an 
invariant, basic means for the ordering of advertisements. 
Based upon this prime classification is the relational device 
of 'specific sexuality' whereby gender classifications become 
relevant. This is because of the relational connections 
established between advertiser and reader by the sexual 
nature of the advertisement. Gender thus provides for a 
basic classification of contact advertisers, and the specific 
acts which are portrayed further differentiates them according 
to the sexual relevances of the reader.
The classificatory and relational connections between the 
set 'gender' can be seen in the tables below, which further 
breaks down the advertisements in the five magazines reported 
in Table 1 by gender and the formulated nature of the 
advertisements:
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GENDER SOUGHT RELATIONSHIP EXPOSED 
NO 18
PATHWAY 
NO 77
CONSORT 
NO 17
TURN ON 
NO 6
RENDEZVOUS
APRIL
TOTAL
MALE
Entertain 29 77 18 94 251 469
Modelling 6 14 5 28 41 94
Friendship 8 10 8 32 27 85
Escort 2 4 6 4 23 39
C/Punishment 1 5 5 5 22 38
Voyeurism 2 8 5 14 16 45
Transvestism - - 1 1 3 5
Three-some -1 1 1 1 22 26
Rubber Fetish - - - 1 - 1
AC/DC 1 - 2 - 3
Oral Sex - 2 - 3 1 6
Massaqe 1 3 - 7 3 14
Striptease - - - 1 - 1
FEMALE C/Punishment - - 1 - 1 2Bestiality 1 - - 1 2 4
COUPLE/MALE/
FEMALE
C/Punishment 2 8 5 14 16 45
Massage - 2 2 1 - 5
AC/DC - - - 2 3 5
Friendship 1 4 - 6 8 19
Three-some - 1 - - - 1
TOTAL 204 32 53 132 436 877
ADVERTISERS 
BY GENDER - FEMALE
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GENDER SOUGHT RELATIONSHIP EXPOSED 
NO 18
PATHWAY 
NO 77
CONSORT 
NO 17
TURN ON 
NO 6
RENDEZVOUS
APRIL
TOTAL
FEMALE
Female Love - 2 - - 6 8
Friendship 3 - 1 13 17
AC/DC 11 9 2 8 29 59
Lesbian - - - 1 - ■ 1
Lesbian - AC/DC 3 2 - 2 8 15
Oral Sex - DIY - - - - 6 6
Girlfriend - - - - 2 2
COUPLE AC/DC - Three-some 1 - - - - 1
FEMALE Oral Sex - 1 - - - 1
TOTAL 11 18 3 14 64 110
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Swapping 59 3 4 14 82 162
COUPLE C/Punishment - 1 - 2 1 4
Voyeurism - 1 - - 1 2
FEMALE Three-some 3 - - 1 3 7AC/DC 7 1 - - 8 16
MALE Three-some - 6 - 2 3 11ac7dc - - - - 2 2
male/female Three-some 3 - - - - 3
CÖUPLE/FEMALE Swappinq/Three-some 6 1 - 4 ■ 9 20ac7dc 10 - 1 3 4 18
COUPLE/MALE/
FEMALE
Swappinq/Three-some 17 2 3 1 24 47
Voyeurism 2 - - 1 - 3
Bestiality - 1 - - 2 3
COUPLE/MALE Swappinq/Three-some 2 - - 1 2 5
TOTAL 29 109 8 16 141 303
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GENDER SOUGHT RELATIONSHIP EXPOSED 
NO 18
PATHWAY 
NO 77
CONSORT 
NO 17
TURN ON 
NO 6
RENDEZVOUS
APRIL
TOTAL
FEMALE
Friendship 28 50 12 11 141 242
Modellinq 4 6 - 1 7 18
Oral Sex 5 4 1 - 10 20
Striptease 1 - - - - 1
AC/DC 1 - - - - 1
DIV 1 - - - 1 2
C/Punishment - 13 2 1 17 33
Rubber Fetish - 2 - - 3 5
Massaqe - 2 - - 5 7
MALE Homosexual - - - - 4 4
COUPLE Three-some - - 1 - 7 8
couple/female Friendship - 10 - 2 27 39
C/Punishment 1 - - - - 1
Transvestism 1 3 1 - 8 13
"ac/dc - 2 1 - 11 14
Bestiality - - - - 1 1
MALE/FEMALE AC/DC - 1 - - 1 2C/Punishment - 6 1 - 14 21
TOTAL 42 99 19 15 257 432
TABLE 5: 
ADVERTISERS BY GENDER - MALE
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Tables 1 and 2 show that by far the largest number of 
advertisements come from females. This would appear to 
signify that those seeking females on a non-client basis 
would have a greater range of choice than among other gender 
formations. This is not so. Free advertising and national 
distribution provide prostitutes with a low cost - high 
coverage means of obtaining clients. For example, in the 
issue of "Rendezvous” above, only 6 , 6 6 %  of female advertisers 
seeking males portrayed themselves on a non-payment basis 
[e.g. 'no fees'], while 6 7 , 6 5 %  provided such ambiguous terms 
as 'entertain' and 'cater'.
For a male replier seeking a female on non-payment basis 
this means that he is confined to the minority of advertisements 
which specify the inapplicability of the payment rule. All 
other advertisements which do not specify this are under doubt. 
The situation is further complicated in that not all 
advertisements from females are of the 'girl seeks boy' kind. 
They may include couples, females, or all three gender groups. 
This complication is further extended by the introduction of 
specifically sexual formulations. Some limit the reader's 
possible involvement to a service relationship [e . g .'modelling, 
'escort'], while the feasability of others depends upon the 
degree of sexual involvement [e.g. 'Corporal Punishment',
'AC/DC'].
Amongst the sexual categories of Table 2, the 'entertain' 
and 'escort' categories account for 5 7 . 9 2 %  of the total. When 
the other categories which almost certainly involve payment and 
are of a service kind are added to these two main ones [corporal 
punishment for males, massage for males, modelling, and 
striptease], the percentage of the total rises to 74.68?i. This
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is compared to 9 . 6 9 %  of the total who seek males for 
'friendship and sex'.
In Table 5, listing types of advertisement placed by 
males, the situation is reversed: 56.01?o of male advertisers 
seek females for 'friendship and sex', while a further 9.02?o 
formulate this relationship for both females and couples. 
Advertisers seeking female models make up 4.161 of the total, 
while one advertiser offers himself to females as a 
striptease artist ["Healthy young man, mid thirties, will strip 
at private parties. No fee but sorry ladies I am not impudent 
enough to reveal all,"].
Advertisements from bisexual females centre around the 
formulation 'AC/DC' or variations on that theme [e.g. 'female 
love', 'friendship and enjoyment', 'girlfriend']. In a 
minority of cases, as with the other tables, the sexual 
formulation consists of the portrayal of explicit sexual acts 
[e.g. 'oral sex', * DIY']. The term 'lesbian' is often used 
interchangably with 'AC/DC'. For example: "Lesbian or AC/DC 
female to teach joys of love to 29 year old, 34-24-36, my 
husband to participate if desired.". Purely lesbian 
advertisements are in a minority, and when encountered provide 
their own argot as a token of membership. The form of 
language formulates 'lesbian' as a more precise form of 
sexuality which excludes males: "Young attractive butch wanted, 
preferably camp, must have car.".
Among advertisements placed by couples peaks occur along 
the sexual parameters of swapping and troilism. For all 
genders these two categories make up 84.15?6 of all 
advertisements from couples. Another two categories were 
formulated according to bisexuality, seeking both couples with
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a bisexual wife and bisexual females, or bisexual females 
alone. Four categories [corporal punishment, voyeurism, 
bestiality, and male bisexuality], made up k . 6 2 %  of the total.
ADVERTISERS: The descriptive figures in the above tables
will be further illustrated by instances of actual contact. 
Although it would be preferable to document each sexual type 
of advertisement and advertiser, the nature of making contact 
makes this impossible. People engaged in this aspect of life 
are not open to formal methodological approaches; they are 
secretive. Also, locating the substance of an advertisement 
depends upon replying to an advertisement and 'passing' that 
off as an appropriate reply, and the advertiser choosing to 
'get in touch'. Accordingly, the process of making contact 
is problematic.
The success rate for the research in making contact was 
quite low; approximately three successes for every ten 
advertisements answered. The strategy which was adopted in 
order to make contact, was an attempt to 'pass' as a newcomer 
to making contact who sought instructions on how to act. To 
do this a 'standard' letter was sent to a variety of types 
of contact advertisement. The letter was:
Dear [Box number],
I/We have just read your advertisement in 
[ ], and am/are more than interested in it.
However, as this is the first time I/we have 
replied to an advertisement I/we are not sure 
what you would wish to know about me/us, or 
what would be expected of me/us if we meet. I am/
We are [personal details relevant to advertisement - 
age, looks, height, marital status]. Perhaps you
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could write back giving me/us more information 
and details on yourself and your interests.
Yours faithfully,
In replying to advertisements it became clear that there 
was an order of availability; 1] prostitutes and males in all 
sexual categories [e.g. from the major category of 'friendship 
and sex' to the minority categories of 'CP' and 'TV'];
2] couples; 3] bisexual females; 4] females seeking males on
a non-payment basis. Members of each of these groups were 
contacted, as Table 6 shows;
ADVERTISERS BY 
GENDER
GENDER SOUGHT RELATION CONTACT WITH
Male [Couple/FemaleJ Male.
TV, CP, Bondage, 
Oral Sex. Freda
Male [Female]Couple
Domination, 
Bondage,Torture, 
Slavery.
George
Male Female Friendship Mike
Male Female CP Ron
Bisexual Female Female Female love. Emily
Bisexual Female Female Mutual pleasure Carol
Bisexual Female Female Oral sex. Veronica
Couple [Female/MaleJ Couple
Bit of fun. 
Oral sex.
Mildred and 
Jim
Couple [Couple/Female]Male Three-some.
Charles and 
Marjorie
Couple LCouple/Male]Female
Stimulating
experiences.
Sue and 
Brian
Female Male Would like to meet. Joyce
Female Male Would like to meet.
Eve
N/B: 'Passing' letter were set according to the gender
outside the brackets.
From Table 6, it would appear that the order of 
availability is similar for all gender categories. This is 
not so. The listed four male contacts have been selected to 
illustrate the gender relationships available [male-male, 
male-couple, male-female/'friendship ' , male-female/specific
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sex act]. However, actual contact with males numbered ten.
A similar approach has been adopted in the case of couples, 
from a contacted number of eight. The selected contacts with 
female bisexuals, from a number of five, show the patterned 
texture of a career in making contact. In the case of females 
seeking males without payment the two stated cases represent 
the sum total contacted out of a possible fifteen [excluding 
those advertisements portrayed in the 'entertain' or 'cater' 
style ] .
FREDA; Freda's advertisement covers the whole range of 
gender relationships except female bisexuals:
Discreet T.V. would like to meet sexy 
couples, ladies, gents, over 30 for 
mutual pleasure, 0, mild bondage, C.P.
The advertisement formulates both the gender and sexual 
class of the advertiser. The indication of transvestism does 
not carry any gender with it as such, but is available in a 
reading as stating the male gender. This is because the 
advertisement appeared in a section of male advertisements, and 
because it appears that it is an expectation that transvestites 
are male [e.g. "the love affair with a chemise can lead into 
the man wearing it" - R. Pearsall, 1971]. Brown [1971] has 
stated the everyday assumption that the "boy who acts like a 
girl is a sissy; the girl who acts like a boy is a tomboy.". 
Brown's portrayal of the male-female stereotypes is in a sense 
replicated in particular sexual argots in contact magazines.
For example, "T.V." refers to the male gender, whereas "butch" 
[above] refers to the dominant partner in an exclusively 
female relationship. The everyday adage which Brown notes 
is thus changed in the contact world: males who dress as girls
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are T.V's.; girls who act like men are butch.
Freda specifies the population of readers which he seeks 
to make contact with. This population have to satisfy the 
specification of an age limit and possess the quality of 
being "sexy". Having established with some qualifications 
the gender relations which are acceptable, Freda sets down 
the specific relational connections which provide and seek to 
search out relevancy ["0, mild bondage, C.P."].
Written language as an interconnected whole, reflects 
meanings between its structural parts. A stimulating 
demeanour [e.g. being "sexy"] has its sense in the relevance 
of situated particulars [e.g. oral sex, bondage, corporal 
punishment]. In linking himself with these situated particulars 
Freda transforms the normal gender group [male-female-couple] 
which he seeks into a specific sexual group. The boundaries 
of this group lie at least in an interest in the sexual acts 
which the advertisement lists. At most they lie in actual 
sexual participation with Freda.
The meaning of Freda's advertisement resides in the 
formulations of who placed the advertisement, those which it 
seeks, and what it proposes sexually. This dependant structure 
is based upon [and is also a case of], 'saying-in-so-many-words' 
what is to be done [H. Garfinkel and H. Sacks, 197G], Freda's 
advertisement is grounded in "mutual pleasure" as a reference 
to reciprocal use-value; a kind of vice-versa, parasite-host 
relationship.
Freda made contacts
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Thanks for your letter, but you tell me 
so little please write telling me more about 
yourself and if possible please send a photo,
I am enclosing a couple of myself which I hope 
you will return, are you T.V. most of my friends 
are, I am most discreet and I live at the above 
address, its my own house so you don't have to 
be shy.
Hoping for a quick reply 
Yours truly 
Freda xxx
My surname is [ ] .
Together with this letter were two photographs of a man 
wearing a dress, high heels, wig, and make up. The letter 
is a negative response to the covert research request for 
instructions. In the context of this report the passing 
letter can easily be seen as a sociological quest to obtain 
information. However, in the context of placing an 
advertisement and receiving a reply, it is an unaccomplished 
response; it does not fulfill the normative requirements in 
the process of entering into a clandestine sexual relationship.
A more extreme example of this reaction was received from 
another advertiser, who returned the original passing letter 
and wrote on the back:
Not enough information supplied. Sorry cannot 
make arrangements.
P.S. Please enclose SAE when you answer adverts 
or else you will get no REPLY.
Freda's letter seeks to realign i n t e r action within the terms 
stated in the advertisement. He requires more
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information ; the sexually non-specific research reply 
["interested"] and the sexually specific advertisement are 
opposites, and result in the advertiser knowing 'who' the 
replier is but not 'what' is sexually possible. 'More' is 
a request for sexually specific details. Within this form of 
interaction knowledge has to be gained from non-vocal, long 
distance encounters. Nevertheless, such documentary 
interaction allows participants to elicit details of one 
another, to convey definitions of themselves, and to manipulate 
the images which are deemed relevant for attention. In his 
letter Freda does this by linking "more" with his sexually 
formulated self and that of his replier ["Discreet T.V.", and 
"are you T.V. most of my friends are"].
The possibility of a meeting between Freda and the replier 
is dependant upon the establishment of a situated definition 
of sexual interaction through serious discussions. Just as the 
unaccomplished response of a 'new' replier brings about the 
request for more information from Freda, so it also brings 
forth reassurances on entering into such a sexual relationship. 
Both in his advertisement and letter, Freda stresses his 
careful and secretive nature in managing a sexual affair, to 
the extent of providing a glimpse into the future establishment 
of a meeting ["its (sic) my own house so you don't have to be 
shy"].
In seeking information, providing information, and 
asserting a focus for the interaction Freda seeks to 
constitute a situation for making available sexual 'things' 
for mutual consumption. The provision of such a situation 
moves, as Heidegger has written, "in the manner of guaranteeing 
calculation and valuation." [1975]. Freda seeks to establish
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and locate reliability and the comparative value associated 
with being used by the other, while using that other.
GEORGE: Freda's advertisement displayed a literary 
structure of formulations as a revealing and unfolding story.
A similar simple narrative is to be found in George's 
advertisement:
Male slave, 34, would like to meet ladies 
and couples for domination, bondage, 
torture, slavery. No fees, just fun.
Like,Freda, George states 1] both his gender and sexual 
status, 2] the gender population which is sought, 3] the sexual 
interests he has as a means of relating to some part of the 
specified gender group, and 4] the 'kind' of relationship 
envisaged. This latter element of the structure ["No fees, 
just fun."], ties together the separate formulations. The 
coming together of advertiser and possible replier is cast in 
terms of 'enjoyment'. Normally the linking together of 
opposites [e.g. pain - enjoyment], is regarded as an oxymoron. 
However in the case of sado-masochism there is a connection 
between pain and enjoyment which is compatible, and which is 
a revision of commonly accepted conventions about sexual 
fulfillment.
However, this connection and compatibility has to be 
produced; it cannot be taken for granted and left unstated. 
While normalising the proposed sado-masochistic relationship  ^
through "fun", George links it with "no fees". The use of 
this term forms a positive-negative pairing with "fun", which 
produces emphasis upon the reason for and meaning of the 
advertisement. George states that he is not a trader providing 
a service, but seeking to meet others on a sexual basis for 
mutual pleasure. The term "no fees" is also double edged.
- 4 5 -
It both states that the advertiser does not provide a service 
for which he requires payment, and that prospective repliers 
should not be professional providers of sado-masochism.
Contact with George provided five thematic relevances: 
l]a concern for secrecy; 2] an attempt to locate the exact 
sexual nature or composition of the possible relationship;
3] a concern with normalising sexual identity, or what 
Garfinkel has called "being able to give good reasons" [1967];
4] a summary of sexual experience linked with 2] above, which 
states 'what do you want to do?', 'this is what I have done.';
5] a brief physical description.
George's letter:
Thank you for answering my ad in Rendezvous,
I must ask you to treat anything I write here with 
complete discretion, we are as you can see from the 
address living quite close to each other so I'm sure 
anything we arrange must be kept to ourselves I hope 
you agree.
I on my part will not try to contact you in 
anyway until you say so nor will I roam anywhere 
near where you live, as I yet do not know what you 
want of me or whether you just answered my ad just to 
see what would happen.
I am not perverted or queer its just that C.P. and 
Bondage and being a slave to ladies and couples 
gives me a thrill, its just like someone playing 
football, fishing, gardening, etc they get a certain 
satisfaction out of it.
I hope I haven't put you off its just that I 
like to be careful hope you understand.
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I would if possible like you to give me some idea 
as to what you like so that we both can enjoy a mutual 
friendship.
I have had some experience at being a slave to a 
couple in Crewe, where I had to cook a meal and serve it 
and serve drinks, all this was done in various states 
of undress so that anything I did wrong was punished by 
recieving the cane or strap across bare buttocks.
Well thats roughly about what I like, Oh by the 
way Im 35yrs old tall and dark blue eyes, if I'm not 
suitable please destroy this letter and forget it OK.
Well thats it for now hope to hear from you soon.
Yours sincerely,
George
P.S. If by chance you do know me in any way I would 
appreciate if all this was kept confidential OK?
George
Much like Freda, George seeks to locate what ideas the 
replier [a fictional couple] proposes in sexual terms. He also 
captures the uncertainty of making contact and its form of 
'blind' interaction ["whether you just answered my ad to see 
what would happen"]. Much more dramatic however are the 
interrelated themes of secrecy, the normality of being 
identified with a specific sexual interest, and the relating 
of experience within this interest.
George's concern with the establishment of secrecy 
reveals two facets of excluding knowledge from others. The 
secret produces what Simmel called "an immense enlargement of 
life", and yet brings with it "the consciousness that it can 
be betrayed" [1964]. George is aware of both the enlargement 
and the threat brought about about by making contact. George’s
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awareness of secrecy as an issue is related not only to the 
threat of detection, but also to normalising the correspondence 
between his self and a sexual deviation. For example, after 
accounting for the texture of the sexual practice ["C.P. and 
Bondage"], George connects being "put off" with being "careful". 
He would seem to be aware of the multiple nature of reality, 
and the necessity of guarding against the 'shock' of revealing 
details of a domain to an outsider.
George presents the intelligible character of his 
activities by grounding them in and comparing them to 'normal' 
activities and sensible motives [P. McHugh.et al, 1974]. • 
Though recognising the situated feature of his sexual practices 
["I am not perverted or queer"], by connecting them with 
"football, fishing, gardening, etc.", George presents them as 
understandable, sensible, and rational. This normality is 
based in George's experience which makes observable the 
situation for the accomplishment of "a thrill". Likewise, 
this related experience is to be regarded under the already 
formulated rule for the normality of George's sexual activity.
George's language in providing the motives for his 
interests, has relevance and importance not as a description 
of a state of affairs but as a procedure for the reciprocal 
treatment of the parties involved. The establishment of a 
social relationship based upon use-value lies not just in 
surface expression, but comes from the background expectancies 
which language evokes and a reader ascribes, such that a 
context assumes its own situated normality.
Postscript: Meeting George Face-To-Face George's letter 
contained an address but not a telephone number. However an 
examination of local telephone directories provided this. This
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raised the question of why it was not included in the letter, 
given that George hoped "to hear from you soon". Made aware 
of the possibility of George concealing the features of his 
contact activities, the telephone number was called. A woman 
answered. She said that George was not in, asked who it was, 
and was there any message. I replied with my first name, said 
that I had only recently"come into contact" with George, and 
that I wanted "a few words with him". I also said that I 
would call when George was at home; the woman said that he 
"worked shifts". Later that evening I had a caller.
There was a knock on the door. It was George. He was 
tall with dark greasy hair, unshaven, and looked grubby. He
was wearing what looked to be work-clothes. He said: "My 
name's George and you 'phoned my home.". I answered that I 
had, to which he replied that his wife did not know who I was 
or "what's going on". I then told George who I was and what 
I was doing, and I asked him to help with the research by 
providing me with information on how he became involved in 
making contact and his experiences and impressions of it.
George said that he would have to think about it. 
A c c o r dingly I provided him with certain times when he could 
call on me if he was interested in p r oviding such information. 
If he was not, I told him to d i sregard the contact so far.
The next morning George called again, and I asked him if he 
was willing to help. He replied: "But I don't exactly know 
what you want." I then provided him with evidence of being a 
sociologist belonging to a university, and of research carried 
out. I then again stated my particular interest in him as a 
source for providing contact knowledge, and further asked him
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if his wife knew about his contact involvement. George said 
that she knew how he felt, but did not want to "know about it". 
He then said: "But what is it that you really want?" George's 
emphasis upon "really", it appeared to me, was an expression 
of his knowledge of the existence of different language-games 
[L. Wittgenstein, 1972]. Not only that, but rather like 
Garfinkel has noted [1967], interest was upon the kind of 
language-game.
George's question sought to locate the relevant basis 
[for him, sexual] of a speech. However, that speech was not 
located in a sexual interest, and produced confusion. Because 
my speech was not and could not be located in a sexual 
language-game, it was for George senseless. It breached the 
expectancies with which George was armed [i.e. that 'this' 
speech was somehow sexual], and produced a state of anomie.
The production of such a condition of confusion may be settled 
by re-defining the social reality or by "leaving the field"
[H. Garfinkel, 1963]. In answer to George's question I 
restated my research interest. He replied that he "wasn't 
sure", and that he would "have to think about it". George 
then left, never to be seen again.
MIKE AND RON: The cases of Freda and George present 
insights into different sexual realities. Freda is immersed 
in a sexual twilight world populated by people who appear what 
they are not. In comparison to Freda the sexual interests 
which George manifests in making contact have a place in a less 
sexually socialised world [i.e. in terms of sexual morals], 
judging from his report of only one case of being a slave.
These degrees of sexual e x perience are expressed in their 
polarity in the gender relation of males seeking females.
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The minority of advertisers in this group are highly 
specific as to their sexual intentions. The majority of 
advertisers however formulate their advertisements according 
to the heading of 'friendship and sex' or some variation of 
it. For example:
Clean young man, 21, seeks female for sexual 
pleasure. No fees. Photo appreciated.
The structure of Mike's advertisement is similar to both 
those of Freda and George. Indeed, the basic task of composing 
an advertisement is briefly indexing the relevant features 
of an advertiser's social world and their orientations to it. 
Advertisement structure is not merely an uninteresting 
consequence of communicating a message, but demonstrates the 
accomplishment of a version of social structure.
Mike's advertisement is brief, without the sexual 
specificity demonstrated by both Freda and George. It is 
interesting to note that specifying "female" rather than 
'females' is unusual. Male advertisements seeking females 
are generally cast in polygamous rather than monogamous 
terms. The relational connections between "clean young man" 
and "female" are non-payment and "sexual pleasure", thereby 
establishing the reciprocal texture of the advertiser's 
intentions. However, the use-value to be traded between 
advertiser and replier is left unstated; what "sexual 
pleasure" actually or really consists of is left open, subject 
to the ad hoeing of commonsense, sexual knowledge by a reader. 
This non-specific element of the advertisement was explicated 
when Mike made contact:
Many thanks for your letter, sorry 1 haven’t 
written, before but, I ’m a long- distance lorry driver 
and I’m not here nruch during- tha week.
Do- youi know I ’m only 5’2,r that, puts most girls 
off, this is one: of the reasons I ’ve not been1 around 
much, r have been married1 ones, but not for long, I 
have: two boys, you1 might be wondering why so-> 
inexperienced, r only know the basic, and my ex wife 
didn’t: like' it much, she1 was the1 first one so I 
didn’t know much myself.
Yes if your still willing to meet me r 
wouldh’t mind! at all. Sorry it’s a short letter.
Yours,
Mike
What is outstanding about Mike’s reply is its elliptical, 
and troubled character-. Rather than being concerned with the 
establishment of sexual ties with the replier, Mike’s letter 
is a case of what it talks about1. As a letter about sexual 
inexperience it testifies to the inexperience. Ubt once 
during the letter- does Mike: mention), anything- about sex in 
explicit terms, yet the letter is based in a wholly sexual, 
context. The reciprocity of commitment in a sexual act, 
particularly in making contact where sex is the initial basis 
for interaction, is rendered inapplicable by Mike’s; depiction 
of his situation. Mutual sexual, usage- depends upon having 
something to trade. Because of his sexual, inexperience Mike- 
has nothing to trade with, and so experiences dissonance 
betweemhis self-conception and his wish to make contact for 
"sexual, pleasure".
The plaintive remark of "if your still, willing to meet
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me I wouldn't mind at all", has an echo in a note made by 
Eliot Aronson: "if a person conceives of himself as a 'schnook', 
he will expect to behave like a 'schnook'." [1972], Because 
of his professed sexual inexperience, Mike is unable trade off 
members' sexual and contact knowledge, and thereby with it.
The consequence of this is that he occasions and trades off 
a different set of background expectancies concerning 'personal 
life'. Mike demonstrates for the sociologist, the serious 
problem which the management of life in general and sexual 
life in particular presents. On the other hand, for a genuine 
member in making contact Mike's reported situation 
distinguishes itself as something other than "sexual pleasure". 
Because making contact depends upon some form of exchange, be 
it monetary or sexual, Mike's position is like that of a 
beggar in a market.
Mike's position can be compared to Ron's artful trading.
His advertisement read;
Male, 23, seeks ladies 18/30 interested in 
spanking, CP, give or take. No fees.
Ron's reply was:
I was very pleased to get your letter in\
reply to my advertisement in "Rendezvous", and 
let me first of all put your mind at rest.
I am sure that once you have experienced 
C.P. you will want more and more, and I can 
assure you now that you have nothing to fear at 
all.
C.P. is administered on the bare bottom and 
either with the hand by way of spanking or with a
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cane, strap, etc., but as a new comer it would only 
be administered lightly until you were more 
experienced, unless you were naughty or disobedient 
when you would be more severely punished.
I live in [ ] and can easily travel to meet
you in [ ], as I am often there, but you don't say
if you go to work or not.
I can meet you most days and evenings, and can 
arrange to be in quite a safe place and perhaps even 
at my own home after first meeting you.
I am confident that after being punished you 
will have a weakness at the knees, and want to be 
made love to, or perhaps have an orgasm during 
punishment, but anyway you will benefit both 
sexually and financially.
I should love to meet you soon, and to 
know more about you, such as what kind of pants do you ! 
wear [although I should no doubt find out when I 
spank you or cane you] - perhaps you don't wear any, 
and whether you are slim or plump [if that's 
the right word].
Can I suggest therefore that you phone me on 
Tuesday next [between 9.0am and 11.30am] or anytime 
Wednesday between 8.30am and 5.0pm so that we can make 
arrangements to meet.
My telephone number is [ ]. This is the
number where I work, and should any one else answer the 
phone, please tell them that it is a 'personal' call 
..and you will get me immidiately. Anyway darling I 
will try and answer the phone so you will have no
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trouble, and you can reverse the charges if you wish.
So darling try and ring Tuesday if you can as I 
am very eager to meet you. So be good and take care.
i
All my love,
Ron
Ron specifies the gender and age group at which the 
advertisement is aimed. The sexual relation between 
possible repliers is established as an interest in reciprocal 
corporal punishment. The non-payment rule is also stated. In 
Ron's letter the dominant theme is the sexual practice of 
"C.P.". This is cross-cut by details concerning the 
establishment of a meeting.
Unlike other people who were contacted such as Mike, Ron 
provides no personal details other than those which are directly 
related to arranging a meeting. His quite extensive details 
on corporal punishment are directed towards someone inexperienced 
in such a practice. Interlocked with this is Ron's pervasive 
method of persuasion. He does not merely provide details on 
corporal punishment, but sketches in sexual 'highlights' and 
shades of fantasy. The artful enthusiasm of Ron produces an 
enigma. In his advertisement he specifies "no fees". In 
expressing his enthusiastic and committed drive to his sexual 
theme in the letter however, Ron states that the replier will 
benefit in financial terms. This enigma can be resolved by 
regarding it as connected to expectancies concerning sexual 
value. In making contact there is an either-or requirement 
about exchange-value and use-value. If an advertiser or 
replier is not a case of one, he or she is a case of the 
other.
When use-value, which turns on a reciprocal axis, is in
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question the contact situation becomes problematic. In 
dealing with a new-comer, Ron has to stress the enjoyable and 
beneficial character of the sexual practice which is being 
spoken about. Because he is dealing with a new-comer he has 
to be artful in an attempt to persuade participation in an 
unexperienced sex act. Such methods attempt to establish 
the value of being used. The implementation of such methods 
is based in the knowledge of the possibility of failure; that 
a new-comer might view punishment as a non-sexual, deviant 
practice. Ron cannot rely upon the value of use. As a 
continuance of his persuasive methodology he raises the 
possibility of exchange as another alternative value for 
involvement. Compared with Mike, Ron is an experienced 
trader of his wares.
EMILY, CAROL, AND VERONICA: The case of females seeking 
other females enables an idea of what a career in making 
contact looks like to be presented. In the illustrative 
instances here, though there are differences between them 
juxtaposition and comparison results in a fairly complete 
conception of the changes and developments which occur over 
time within the course of action of making contact.
The three advertisements which will be examined are:
Emily housewife in her AOs wishes to be loved and
love another woman my place only. Husband to 
watch or join in all letters answered. First ad.
Carol Attractive lady 30s wishes to meet young ladies
for mutual pleasures, some experience, love 0, 
husband if required, very good looking.
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Veronica Lancs lady aged 45, would like to get in touch
with the female sex. I am blonde, blue eyed, 
have a lovely 40in bust, very pleasantly plump.
I love 0, love all types of sex fun. Very highly 
sexed. Experienced lady only. Quick reply, your 
place only.
All three advertisements formulate who they are seeking.
For Emily this is in individual terms ["another woman"], 
whereas both Carol and Veronica use more general terms ["young 
ladies", "the female sex"]. Though the function of the two 
types of term is similar in that they will apply to a certain 
element of readers, they are indicators of different degrees 
of experience; different stages of a career. Emily's 
formulation of "another woman", "to be loved and love", is in 
terms of a first time experience. The stating of "First ad.", 
tells not only that the advertisement has never appeared 
before, but that the advertiser has never advertised before.
This is a testimony to a lack of experience. The advertiser 
is a 'first timer'. The term "First ad." and the advertisement 
are icons of the advertiser. In conjunction with stating her 
inexperience Emily specifies that a meeting is geographically 
strictly limited ["my place only"]. The first time experience 
would appear to necessitate all possible control over the course 
of a meeting, if not for full sexual advantage, then for safety 
reasons. There are alternative cases to the specification of 
"my place only", where perhaps because of situated particulars 
[e.g. other people], advertisers stipulate "your place only".
Whereas Emily is a 'first timer', Carol is by her own 
formulation at an intermediate stage ["some experience"].
Unlike Emily's general sexual theme ["to be loved and love"],
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Carol grounds heir advertisement more; specifically in sexual, 
use; ("mutual, pleasure") and specifies a sexual preference 
£ "lover. 0")» In distinction to "both Emily and Carol, Veronica 
indicates her experience; by the; type; of person she seeks 
("experienced ladies only"). Veronicars advertisement i's 
more extensive than the otheir two. Emilyrs advertisement is 
an icon of a new member, and CaroI*'s of an intermediate 
member. Veronica's is an icon of an experienced! member. She 
presents a physical and sexual description of herself, her 
sexual, nature' ("highly sexed"), and sexual, likes. Emily 
specifies; that the meeting she wishes to arrange must take 
place at her'home. Veronica specifies "your place only".
This, requirement expresses the possibility of some; biographical 
details which make it inappropriate for the meeting place to 
be in Veronica*® control. It is also am expression based! upon 
the assumption of the ability to discriminate and judge 
between replies; of the ability to locate froim documentary 
evidence places which are suitable.
Emily and Carol both formulate a triadic, bisexual 
relationship. For Emily it is a requirement ("husband to 
watch or joiminf’), while for Carol it is a possibility. 
Veronica does not mention any male involvement. This could be; 
related to her specification of "your place only"'. For example 
Veronica may be married, but unable to practice her sexual 
interests because of disapproval on the part of her husband.
In. this hypothetical situation Veronica’s focus would be 
towards fulfilling the female segment of her' sexual interests
i
fronr within her marital, situation. This imagined texture 
however, is only one of a possible number.
An important term in respect of the question, of male
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involvement in the female-female type, is Carol's "if 
required". It widens the possibility of possible repliers to 
include both those who are willing to become involved with a 
couple, and those whose involvement is limited strictly with 
females. Emily is confined to those who are prepared for 
some kind of a sexual relationship with her husband. Veronica 
however, is a single female; this is in contact terms, though 
in marital terms she may not be. Her population of possible 
repliers is wider than either Emily or Carol because of this. 
Veronica is the type of person Emily and Carol are seeking.
As well as seeking similar repliers as Emily and Carol,
Veronica is in the position to receive propositions for 
involvement from couples.
Though there are these differences between the three 
advertisements, they have a common thread running through 
them. All three describe reciprocal use, though the ways in 
which this is done are consonant with ideas on stages of 
experience. Emily expresses reciprocity of use through "be 
loved and love", while Carol states "mutual pleasures". 
Veronica's advertisement is more complex. The reciprocity 
of use is formulated through the juxtaposition of the advertiser 
as a physical and sexual object with the possible repliers 
having | to meet the terms of experience and meeting place.
This depicted situation is organised for and according to 
"sex fun".
The similarities and differences produced by comparing 
the three advertisements are extended in their letters:
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Thank you for your letter I am Emily, I am 
44 years old 5ft 2ins tall, I have not got a big 
bust but I must be honest with you I have not 
been with a woman before I hope you wont be upset 
because of this but I am very interested in doing 
it with you, I have got a 10in vibrator all-so a 
dildo with straps what my husband got for me, he 
does not mind me going with you, he is all for it 
I have a family but they dont know this its better 
that way, if you like we could have a night out 
then go back to our place then we can take it from 
their by the time you get the letter I should get 
my periods then we should be alright I am in all 
day if you want to phone me during the day my phone 
number is [ ] but if you phone at night theire
is to many in to talk so its better to phone in the 
day time so please wrrte back to me I hope you like 
the photo of me let me know when you want to come down 
I must tell you that I might be a bit shy at first but 
I suppose thats what sex is about so please get in touch 
with me as soon as you can and we can go out for a 
drink.
Yours
lots of love 
Emily
P.S. SORRY THIS is THE only PHOTO I hAVe of me THiS
IS THE BEST ONE
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Carol
Veronica
Thank you very much for your reply to my ad.
I hope the photograph is good enough to interest you 
[I don't take a good photo but let's face it who does?[.
I am 31 years of age, married with two children,
I go out to work [in charge of a wages office]. I am 
5ft 2inch tall with blue eyes, auburn hair. I have had 
a little experience with women and enjoy it very much,
I also had some experience in a threesome with my 
husband [Tom] and that was just fantastic, if you 
would like to meet don't be afraid of telephoning me,
Tom doesn't mind if you prefer to meet me alone, we 
have a car so travel is no problem and if ypu can 
make it during the day time we can use our house or 
where ever is convenient for you, you will agree 
everything cant be explained in a letter so please get 
in touch as soon as you can by letter or by phone and i ■ 
maybe we can get together [VERY DISCRETLY] the two 
of us or if you prefer the three of us I don't mind 
which the choice is yours.
Hope to hear from you soon,
Love Carol
I have received your lovely letter and its 
content carefully read well I am 45 years old blond 
blue eyed and I am very pleasantly plump well I love
0 being given to me and I also love a big clit has
1 love rubbing one before I use the dildo I will love 
your whole body lick and suck you same time has you 
are licking me out I am oversexed I have a lovely 
40Bst hope you nipple bite and I love my bottom
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played with I also love enamus and being whipped until 
I cry for love please send photo YOUR PLACE ONLY I shall 
want my travelling expenses sending an I could come next 
Friday after tea by Rail only I would expect you to meet 
me at Station please I do appreciate you writing to me 
I'll send you a photo if you decide to answer.
Veronica
In their letters Emily and Carol present descriptions of 
themselves and their personal lives.Emily describes her new 
membership and views this inexperience as a possible problem. 
The other orientations which Emily presents are towards 
arranging a meeting and establishing discretion and secrecy. 
Carol confirms her intermediate career position which was 
stated in her advertisement. However, there is a difference 
between her advertisement and letter. The main purpose of 
her advertisement was to seek females for sexual interaction 
with herself, with the possibility of the participation of her 
husband. In her letter, Carol reverses this situation by 
pointing out the benefits of a three-some and contrasting this 
with her involvement with women ["just fantastic", "enjoy it 
very much"]. Carol recognises the importance of being 
persuasive; the problem to be overcome in making people 
interested. This is shown well not only in the 'open' 
nature of the arrangements which she attempts to make, but 
in comparing the remarks made by Carol and Emily in regard to 
their photographs.
In her postscript, Emily apologises for her photograph 
and states "this is the best one". The photograph had been 
cut up; it was one of a group, and the other people had been 
cut out to reveal Emily alone at a table. Rather than being 
aplogetic Carol's method is to provide a means for maintaining
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the possibility of interest no matter how the photograph, a 
holiday 'snap', is regarded. She states that she hopes the 
photograph is "good enough to interest you", and then casts 
doubt on the image catching process itself. Effectively this 
says that if interest is not aroused by the photograph, this 
is nothing to do with the person in the photograph but the 
photographic process itself.
Veronica's letter provides a contrast to both Emily and 
Carol. Her letter constructs her experience. Unlike Emily 
and Carol she provides no biographical details. What she 
does present are deeply sexual details on the practices she 
wishes to engage in. She also specifies the details of 
arranging a meeting.-As well as specifying time in a homely 
way ["next Friday after tea"], she states that she would 
expect to be met. The other two elements which Veronica 
includes in arranging a meeting could be more problematic.
The place of the meeting is emphasised above all else. This 
again brings with it the possible expectancy of unstated 
biographical details which may be problematic for Veronica. 
However, together with the requirement of travelling expenses, 
this feature of Veronica's letter could produce doubt in a 
reader.
It is a possibility that Veronica is engaged in fraud, 
small though it may be; extracting travelling expenses 
without any intention of attending the arranged meeting. If 
this were the case her plan would only succeed if she had to 
travel to meet her replier. This part of the
letter can be read according to various possibilities; as such 
it is uncertain as to outcome and meaning. Another enigma is 
raised by contrasting the'brutality of-,the majojrity of' the
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letter with the almost tender nature of the opening and 
closing remarks. Viewed in this way the letter becomes 
paradoxical and questionable. Are the features of tenderness 
and sexual brutality aimed at establishing an intimate 
relationship, or are they being used as part of a 'play' to 
'con' the 'mark' [E. Goffman, 1972]. These questions 
unfortunately cannot be answered here. However, part of their 
significance lies directly in the fact that they are available 
as possibilities in populating Veronica's documentary production 
with meaning.
Whether Veronica is engaged in a 'con' or not, through her 
language she establishes the texture of the sexual nexus 
where the sole and primary value is the distribution of sexual 
action in relation to physical attributes. For Carol this 
reciprocity is of singular importance, given that she 
formulates two possible relationships: couple-female; 
female-female. Because she is uncertain whether the replier 
will engage in sexual interaction with her and her husband 
though favouring this [the enthusiastic "fantastic" and the 
disappointed "wouldn't mind"] Carol must engage in establishing 
reciprocity. As an individual and as part of a marriage 
team, Carol offers the choice of which is to be used to the 
sexual preferences of the replier. Use is not in doubt; 
the value attributed to different kinds of use is.
For Emily her own use-value is seen as a problem. She 
connects inexperience with "upset".in the replier. The 
conception, of the replier being "upset" at a new member makes 
problematic the reciprocal nature of the proposed interaction. 
Emily may not be able to provide what is sexually expected 
of her because of her inexperience. In this way, the value
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of the meeting may be diminished for the replier. The fact 
that the ’passing' letter stated that the replier was also 
inexperienced is not mentioned by Emily. This butting 
together of inexperience may have added to Emily's problems, 
placing the onus of directing the sexual focus upon her when 
she is unable to accomplish it. The way in which Emily 
proposes handling the meeting, and thereby settling the uses 
which each participant will have of the others, is by 
delegating such negotiation to another social occasion. 
Negotiations are left open, subject to the loosening and 
elevating effect of alcohol.
Emily, Carol, and Veronica in one way or another express 
the reciprocity of use. This expresses non-payment. It is 
an expression of the reproduction of use, distinct from pure 
exchange. In another gender form [e.g. female-male] the focus 
of sexuality brings with it the requirement of specifying the 
kind of relation [e.g. 'cater'-'no fees'] as well as using the 
form of language to portray this relation. The absence of the 
possibility of pure exchange, as in the case of females 
seeking females, negates such a requirement. Though there is 
no need to specify 'no fees' because of taken for granted 
conventions concerning sex [female-female prostitution does 
not exist], reciprocal use-value has to be stressed by Emily, 
Carol, and Veronica. At a general level the commodity form 
of language can be seen as expressing [continually reproducing] 
and an expression of social relations in a materialist society; 
it is the dominant form of language and is ,thus ;t_he language.
At the level of making contact a lay theorist's concerns 
are practical ones, unconcerned with an analysis of society 
or the social construction of their own actions. This would
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require some kind of radical consciousness [cf. H. Garfinkel, 
1967]. Though commodity language and its use-value form may 
be virtually inescapable, for Emily, Carol, and Veronica it 
has the purpose of persuading at the sexual level. It is 
'saying-in-so-many-words1,that pleasure will result from 
interaction with the advertiser; that the involvement is not 
one-sided. Use-value language is a means of attempting to 
secure and satisfy interests by proposing the satisfaction 
of some other's interests.
MILDRED AND JIM: The advertisement placed by Mildred and
' l
Jim was written to as from a couple:
Couple AO and 50 wish to meet couples 
for a bit of fun, also threesomes. Men 
or women or both. We love oral so don't 
be shy, come and see us, everybody made 
welcome.
The advertisement applies to couples, males, and 
females "or both"; presumably individual males and females 
meeting Mildred and Jim at the same time. By negating the 
barrier of selectivity and extending an invitation to all, 
the advertisers convey a friendly and experienced attitude to 
their subject. This is a sexual meeting with couples or 
individuals "for a bit of fun". A meeting with a couple or 
having a "threesome" is not described in any detail. It is 
left unstated what "a bit of fun" consists of. The replier 
must both wait and see what the outcome of contact will be 
and meanwhile impute a history to the document to make 
provisional sense of it. This feature of locating documentary 
evidence is relied upon by advertisers; at a moral and 
sanctionable level they assume that they will and should be 
understood [H. Garfinkel, 1967].
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The obviousness of "a bit cf fun" as a situated and 
contexted piece of understanding, vague in particulars though 
it is, can be seen in the first sentence of Mildred and Jim's 
letter:
you don't say whether you've swapped before 
but it is a simple thing to do the only thing that 
you have to do is not let jelousy creep into your 
lives and be very broadminded, the only thing I can 
tell you is that our names are Jim who is 50 - 5ft 
9in broad quite considerate and love making love 
also love doing oral sex with any ladies but also 
I do not like hurting anyone otherwise I am just 
a ordinary man my wifes name is Mildred 40 5ft. 1in 
loves any kind of sex as long as there is no 
whipping or violence we love making friends we have 
been in the swapping game 5yrs find that it is a 
bit of fun and find that it has helped our marriage 
but as I said be open minded and no jelousy and you 
will find that you can enjoy trying out new things 
and different people there is no two people alike so 
if you would like to ring us we would be pleased to 
hear from you our phone number is [ ] and we will
talk to you.
Hoping to hear from you soon 
Mildred and Jim
It is taken as obvious, as far as a reply from a couple 
is concerned, that the advertisement was about swapping 
partners. Mildred and Jim indicate that they are very 
experienced at the "swapping game", and furnish instructions 
upon how it is to be successfully carried out. This refers 
not only to different sexual preferences and their sexual
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negotiation ["there is no two people alike...we will talk to 
you"], but to the finer emotional requirements for constructing 
the boundaries of sexual contact within marriage. These 
instructions are designed to enable a new couple to enter 
into previously unexperienced sexual relationships. However 
the dimensions of the sexual realm of Mildred and Jim's world 
are unknown. Their advertisement indicates that these - 
dimensions are at least in intention quite extensive judged 
by the gender population which they formulate.
i
An interesting insight was gained into the life of 
Mildred and Jim when a 'female seeking males' advertisement 
was answered:
Young lady wishes to meet gents also 
husbands approval for 3-somes. No 
inhibitions looking for a good time.
Gents or ladies.
The advertisement states that a "young lady" wants to meet 
males for an unspecified reason, and that males and females 
can engage in a three-some with her husband. Rather than 
being the simple situation which the category 'girl seeks boy' 
evokes, the advertisement is full of puzzles.
The letter from this "young lady" was as follows:
Please bring me a nice gift not chocalates 
my number is [ ].
Mildred
From the signature and telephone number it was found that the 
two Mildreds were one and the same person. The differences 
between the two letters and forms of formulated gender relation 
are enormous. In place of instructions on handling emotions 
are the specification of a gift and the provision of a 
telephone number.
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When the telephone number supplied by the "young lady" 
was rung, a woman answered; it was Mildred. She was told that 
a contact advertisement had been answered, and that a reply 
had been received from her. "Oh yes," she said, "and there 
was a thing on the bottom that said about a gift.". This was 
confirmed and Mildred asked: "What do you think?". I stated 
that this would be alright, and asked what kind of a gift she 
required. "Oh anything really, but not chocolates.". When 
asked what she liked she replied: "You get fat on that.". I 
again asked what she would like and she said that I could pay 
something towards the telephone bill "if you like". I agreed. 
Mildred then asked when I would like to visit her, to which I 
inquired when would be "best". She said that she did not "have 
anything before Sunday". I suggested Thursday, to which 
Mildred was heard to say: "What about next Thursday, Jimmy?".
A man's voice was faintly heard, and then Mildred said that 
Thursday would be fine. She instructed me to telephone on the 
Thursday morning to check that everything was alright, and to 
receive directions on how to reach her house. The conversation 
then ended.
It is a puzzle whether Mildred is to be regarded as a 
prostitute. She certainly extracts some form of payment from 
single men. Whether this occurs when the male replier suggests 
including her husband in the situation is unknown, as is the 
situation concerning single girls. On the other hand, it is 
clear that Mildred does not charge 'a fee* or carry out her 
interests on a professional basis. Having made contact with 
Mildred and Jim together and Mildred alone, the two facets of 
their contact lives which were revealed suggest the following 
organisation of contact activities.
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For Mildred and Jim contact with couples is on a mutual, 
'fun' basis. Similarly for single females, because of their 
short supply-in demand status, a welcome would be extended 
under the terms of 'mutual pleasure'. Both these types of 
involvement involve Mildred and Jim. That which involves 
Mildred alone however correlates with the largest group of 
reader-repliers; males. Because the supply of males is 
greater than either couples or single females, the demand for 
and bargaining power of this group is low. Consequently 
Mildred, who in contact terms is in short supply, can ask 
for a gift in order to share her favours. The probable sense 
of this is to finance the activities of getting in contact 
with those groups in short supply. The gifts from males pay 
for advertisements, correspondence and telephone costs.
Mildred pushes the bounds of use-value through reciprocal 
sexual satisfaction and into instrumental use.
CHARLES AND MARJORIE: What happens in sexual acts is a 
cause for concern for the participants both in terms of what 
they want to happen, and what they do not. In the process of 
making contact this concern assumes further importance because 
biographical details are at a minimum [even the surname or 
address might not be known], and yet intimate details have to 
be discussed. The extent of this discussion is limited, 
confined to an 'enough for now' rule rather than a complete 
exposition of all the relevant details. An important and 
related strand in this concern for what is going to happen 
when contact is made is the safety of the participants' 
interests against unwanted sexual practices.
Charles and Marjorie propose a "threesome". The gender 
formation which their advertisement specifies, females-male, 
males-female, makes a bisexual event possible. However, the
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interests of Charles and Marjorie do not extend that far: 
Housewife, 33, wishes to meet gents or 
ladies for threesomes with husband, 
strictly heterosexual, also couples to 
swop. Phone number for quick reply.
The sexual interests which a couple, female, or male 
have in any meeting with Charles and Marjorie are to be 
directed towards the opposite sex. Apart from this sexual 
qualification and the sense of enthusiasm imparted by "quick 
reply", the advertisement is succinct in marking out the 
people to whom it applies and stating who placed it. Like 
Emily, and to a lesser extent Carol, Marjorie's literary style 
describes an individual before introducing the other marriage 
partner. This form, at least in Marjorie's case, may be 
related to persuasion and the inhibition which people may have 
in entering into sexual discussions and relations with strangers 
In formulating herself first, Marjorie forces her husband 
into the shade; she appears as the central figure in the 
advertisement. Any contact, whether by female or male, will 
be with her; it is her advertisement. Such a portrayed 
appearance may be less inhibiting to repliers; negotiations 
take on the gender structure male-female and female-female 
rather than the more inhibiting male-male and female-male.
This focus upon Marjorie's style was gathered after coming 
into contact with her, first being noticed in the 
conversational arrangements through which she attempted to 
embed a stranger in her marriage and home life.
Where the advertisement conveyed that Marjorie was the 
advertiser, or at least the central figure, her letter 
continued this:
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many "thanks, for your reply -to- my advert 
Mb 9^51» r would he pleased if you could give 
me1 a ring anytime between 12 o'clock or 5 o'clock -
6.30 if these times are no good anytime' after
10.30 at night, it doesn't matter-how late.
Tours- im anticipation 
Marjorie
Thoughi the letter comes from a coupler as the advertisement 
makes clear, it is written as; if from an individual. Whether 
or not this strategy is the result of contacting- am 
inexperienced member in an attempt to socialise him into the; 
contact world is; unclear. However the similarity between the 
letter and the advertisement i'm creating a textured scenario 
suggests, that Charles and Marjorie employ specific methods to 
establish a "minor world" with it's own conventions, and suspend 
the "serious" world as im a game (F. Garfinkel, 1967).
Telephoning Mar jorie revealed, further her and her husband's 
ability to conduct someone- im a 'strange;' situation. This 
artfulness requires the suspension of everyday norms of conduct 
(such as rsexaal conversations do not take place between, 
strangers'), which are replaced by devices for the management 
of" the practical, enterprise of making contact. Because this 
and arranging a meeting have; a strictly limited temporal, span, 
the use of these devices is temporary. The protracted nature 
of making contact (the time between placing an advertisement., 
receiving replies, and arranging a meeting), requires that: 
such management devices are om call.
When, the telephone number which Marjorie gave was called 
a man answered. H4e voice was hardly audible due to crackling 
om the telephone line, r said that; I would call back because 
of this, but he saids "Ho, dom't. I'll get Marjorie.".. Whem
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Marjorie came to the telephone I told her that I had answered 
her advertisement, and had received a reply. I also said that 
because of hardly being able to hear her I would telephone 
back. Marjorie said that she would "take it upstairs".
On calling back, Marjorie elected to tell me "something 
about us". She said that Charles and herself had been doing 
"it" for three years and found it helpful and beneficial to 
their marriage. Details on children, residence, employement, 
and interests were also stated. Marjorie then asked if I 
wanted to visit her, said that I could stay the following 
weekend, and that "Charles will pick you up at the station".
When I said that this was possible but that I would have to 
confirm it later, Marjorie stressed the importance of making 
arrangements and keeping them: "If you can't come someone else 
can". Having arranged this provisional meeting, Marjorie 
asked: "Do you want to speak to Charles?".
Charles began by saying: "It's alright, I'm not queer.".
He then asked about sport and interests, stressing non-sexual 
matters as important in a meeting: "You've got to have something 
to talk about."; "Some of the lads have been great for 
Marjorie, but we couldn't get on. Nothing to talk about.".
The relationship between their sexual activities and marriage 
was characterised by Charles as "spice to the marriage", and 
open to them both; females for him, males for her. He then 
asked whether I was likely to be meeting them, told me 
something about the area where they lived, and then gave the 
telephone to Marjorie again.
Marjorie asked if everything was alright. She then told 
about the way in which the central sexual element of the 
meeting might be handled. It was stressed that any sexual
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involvement depended upon "if you like what you see". There 
was to be no obligation, and if sexual involvement was decided 
against "we have a spare room so you can sleep there". Here, 
truthfulness about feelings was stressed: "One lad who came 
up from Bristol left to get some petrol and didn't come back.
He did put pen to paper later though.". If sexual involvement 
was decided upon, what generally happened Marjorie said ["What 
most of the lads do."], was for her and the male to go to bed 
together and then to be joined by Charles later. The place of 
these events within the home and marriage, and the relevance 
of keeping them from the children was emphasised: "The first 
consideration is the kids.". The outside partner in the 
"threesome" was to act like and be accepted as "a friend". 
Marjorie confirmed that I would inform them later about 
whether I was to meet them that weekend, and the conversation 
ended.
The telephone conversation with Marjorie and Charles 
revealed further their ability to conduct someone into a 
'strange' situation. This artfulness requires the substitution 
of contact methods [e.g. the 'opening' of the conversation by 
Marjorie, the 'get to know you' by Charles, and the final 'is 
everything alright' by Marjorie], for everyday norms. Because 
making contact and arranging a meeting breach these norms, 
contact devices are required to maintain everyday obligations 
and to manage and accomplish a sexual liason.
Postscript: Eighteen months after the above data was 
collected I again contacted Marjorie; Charles was "out". I 
told her that I had been in touch with her previously, and that 
I was a sociologist carrying out research. When asked to 
provide information on their contact career and experiences
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she said that I would have to talk to Charles. However she 
said that "one thing I will tell you something about is 
jealously". They had "swapped" twice, but Marjorie had not 
wanted to b>nd did it "because of Charles". Marjorie said 
that she became very jealous, and that it was bad for their 
marriage. As to making contact in general, she said that it 
would have to stop because their eldest child was fifteen and 
"might put two and two together". Marjorie said that she 
would tell Charles I had telephoned and if he was willing to 
talk to me he would call. No call was received.
SUE AND BRIAN: Sue and Brian do hot seek either couples 
or malies, but bisexual females. In this respect they are 
similar to Carol. A difference is that the advertisement 
which they placed is portrayed as coming from a couple:
Happily married couple 32/35, attractive 
and discreet seek AC/DC females for 
stimulating experiences.
Sue and Brian point out the amicability of their marriage, 
their good looks, and their care in handling contact relations 
Like many advertisements, Sue and Brian's does not specify 
what sexual contact will consist of other than ideas which are 
conveyed by relating female bisexuality with "stimulating 
experiences".
Whereas Sue and Brian's advertisement is different from 
Carol's, their letter is similar:
We are V432, I ain Sue and my old man is Brian. 
Thank you for answering our ad. We would both 
be very pleased to meet you.
You ask what would be expected of you, well,'that 
rather depends on you. If you could come down and
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meet us you could see for yourself if you fancied 
either one of us or both of us. We should watch a 
few films and as I said if you fancied both of us, 
all well and good. My husband enjoys watching two 
girls and also joining in at the end.
We have had a couple of threesomes before, and 
I have also had a couple of experiences on my own 
with girls. We don't set out specifically to have 
threesomes we just take things as they come.
We have a 4 bedroomed house so if you would 
rather be with just one of us or if for some reason 
you didn't fancy us we sould still put you up for 
the night in a room of your own.
If you would like to telephone us on an evening 
at [ ], and any questions that you have could be
answered.
We look forward to hearing from you.
Regards,
Sue and Brian
The letter revolves around the theme of participation 
and decisions on sexual involvement. Carol's letter followed 
a similar course, but the emphasis there was upon the 
inclusion or exclusion of her husband. Sue and Brian 
recognise the negotiable character of participation for both 
of them. and the possibility of no participation at. all; 
Making a decision about entering into a relationship is the 
prime problematic to be settled. If the decision is negative 
then the third party would be "put ud for the night". A 
positive decision however, is less well described by Sue.
She does emphasise the preferance for a threesome, but is
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vague about what that would include.
The unspoken nature of sexual interaction is referenced 
by Sue after describing the sexual events which she and Brian 
have experienced. Negotiations on whether the relationship is 
to be constituted as a three-some or only between Sue or Brian 
and the contacted female, appear relatively unstated: sexual 
understanding without words. In relation to Carol it was 
suggested that the topic and resource of use-value was used as 
a persuasive practice. Carol's letter, and Sue and Brian's in 
particular, demonstrates that sexual use is a negotiated 
process according to relatively unspoken and probably 
unspeakable tenets. The contact with Charles and Marjorie 
indicated the levels of concern and awareness for managing a 
meeting. However, those concerns are very much external to 
the central sexual theme which Charles and Marjorie, like the 
others, left 'open'. Presumably what would take place after 
a replier had '-gone up” with Marjorie, to be joined by Charles 
later, would be accomplished through some form of verbalisation; 
it may be easier to whisper 'likes' and 'dislikes' during a 
sexual act than to write them down on paper or state them over 
the telephone. But since none of the contacted advertisers 
was met as a 'genuine' replier, it is unknown what discussions 
are carried out prior to sexual engagement, or during it.
j °ycE ,A.ND..FVE; So far in presenting this report, a career
perspectiveKhas been invoked ad hoc. It has been made use of 
when it appeared helpful, and has been unstated as a background 
to my remarks. The idea of a career, far from belonging to 
industrial or occupational sociology, seems embedded in' 
everyday conceptions. For example, it is implicit in 
expectancies on ageing [I. Illich, 1977], leisure activities
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such as card playing [L. A. Zurcher Jr., 1973], and the 
management of and opinions upon political involvement [W. F. 
Whyte, 1969], In such areas the career perspective is not an 
explicit topic, but is an implicit resource for practically 
viewing activities.
This occurs in making contact. Participants view themselves 
arid others according to biographical particulars which, though 
incomplete, impart a sense of history to their involvement and 
limit the horizons of their future participation.
It has already been noted that non-payment advertisements 
from females seeking males are the most difficult to locate.
This difficulty is complicated by the idea of a career of 
contact involvement. Once a likely non-payment advertisement 
has been located it seems that all there is to do is to reply 
in the hope that the advertiser chooses to 'qet in touch'.
Yet doubt is produced by the mere fact of locatinq a possible 
non-payment advertisement. For a person, particularly a 
woman, to be in a position to place a contact advertisement 
and to carry out what is proposed in that advertisement shows 
that the person must have a biographical history sympathetic 
with that decision and proposal. The advertiser, by the very 
act of advertising, is placed outside typical interaction.
The normal and conventional pathways towards obtaining sexual 
partners are in such cases either unsuitable or inapplicable. 
Thus, the location of a possible non-payment, 'girl seeks boy' 
advertisement is problematic by what it leaves unsaid.
Because of ideas on the developments and changes which must 
have occurred in a female's life-history to engage in making 
sexual contact, doubt exists as to the social context in which 
an advertisement is grounded. Pieces of probable biography 
are set in relief by existent knowledge, while what is known,
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used and interpreted according to what can reasonably be 
assumed to have previously happened [H. Garfinkel, 1967],
In the two cases of 'girl seeks boy' advertisements to be 
presented here, both when made contact with displayed signs of 
a problematic biography. In regard to the effects which such 
problems can have on the sexual side of life, contact 
magazines provide a focus which is wholly relevant. The 
conventions of courtship, romance, or seduction are 
suspended and communication concentrates on sexual matters 
and purposes.
The first female contacted was Joyce. Her advertisement 
read:
Attractive well built lady 35, nymp, 
would like to meet gents 28-60 at their 
home. Will travel. Send S.A.E.
Joyce s advertisement could have come from a prostitute, 
given that there is no indication of non-payment. However, 
there is no token of prostitution either; no hint at a client 
relationship. Instead there is an insight into non-payment 
and a problematic biography provided by "at their home. Will 
travel.". Joyce is not concerned to 'entertain' the people 
she seeks in her 'comfortable home', but rather the opposite.
As evidence for the inapplicability of the prostitute code, 
this feature makes it likely that Joyce does not require 
payment. It also raises the question as to why Joyce specifies 
"their home" without saying something about not being able to 
provide a meeting place of her own. From this the expectation 
can be built up that though Joyce may not be a prostitute, she 
is in possession of problems which have made this particular 
form of making contact relevant both in terms of motivation 
and interpretation.
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Though the awareness of the possibility of a problematic 
biography may be no more than a lurking doubt to a reader, 
this doubt may dispel the 'hoped for' expectancies which more 
properly belong to the realms of fiction and fantasy. Such 
expectancies are generated and sustained by the world of 
fantasy fiction which 'girlie' and obscene magazines produce 
and picture in their photographs. For example, the magazine 
"New Direction" has a feature titled "Contact Made" which 
describes experiences of people who have engaged in making 
contact. One such article describes a meeting between an 
older female advertiser and a male replier: "I was bowled 
over when I saw her. She'd dark hair cascading onto her 
shoulders. Her body was so well proportioned she could have 
been ten years younger. I couldn't think why she was bothering 
with me.". Or again: "I noticed she was wearing stockings.
The bottom of her dress kept riding up and she rubbed her legs 
against mine. The dress had a very low cleavage. She kept 
leaning against me and I saw right down into her bra. The brown 
of her nipples was showing!".
Such articles elevate the sexual experiences they describe 
from the temporal, spatial, and problematic groundings which 
they have in everyday life. Fantasy produces sex as the mere 
satisfaction of lust; the ideal of use-value. This to a lesser 
extent can be seen in contact advertisements. Yet this level 
of discourse crumbles into making arrangements over the time 
and place of a meeting; wrangles over time, place, intentions, 
and fears.
For example, in terms of fantasy, Joyce formulates her self 
as being sexually insatiable; she states that she is a 
nymphomaniac ["nymp"]. This formulation directs attention to 
Joyce as a sexual object, and as a user of others as sexual
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objects. Yet it need not be the case that Joyce's description 
is accurate. It is enough that she conveys her sexual 
availability and need. In this sense, formulations of fantasy 
are devices of persuasion and enthusiasm. Joyce's letter reads
I am 35 years old 5ft 4i.n, Black long hair 
Brown eyes, 44 Bust 38 waist 48 hip. 
as I said in my adv. nymp.
I would like to visit you if possible when you 
like I am not working at the moment so can travel 
any time. Let me know how old you are? and if I 
could visit you for a weekend.
Write soon
Mrs. [ ]
P.S. My first name is Joyce and my husband has 
left me for good for another women.
Joyce
The first and most striking impression about Joyce's 
letter is its fragmented and inarticulate construction. It 
also confirms that the advertisement's formulation of "nymp" 
rather than 'nymph' was not a misprint. Aside from thoughts 
which the formation of the letter provokes about the person 
who wrote it, information is provided on four levels. Joyce 
states her physical attributes, her sexual disposition, what 
she would like to do, as well as making an inquiry about the 
replier's age. These features are an expansion of those 
contained in the advertisement. Yet Joyce does not provide 
any reasons for the importance she places on the replier 
providing the meeting place. The reasons for that are unknown.
What is new and illuminating in Joyce's letter is the 
postscript. After signing the letter with the formal title 
"Mrs.", Joyce attempts to become more intimate by stating her
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christian name. The fact that her initial signature indicates 
her married status raises the question of the involvement or 
whereabouts of her husband. Consequently she reveals that she 
is estranged. Far from being a living fantasy, Joyce is in 
the grips of reality and social existence. Her husband has 
left her and she is unemployed. Rather than being involved 
in face-to-face interaction with a man in the name of friendship, 
courtship, or seduction, she is willing to sexually submit to 
a perfect stranger. Not only that; her desperation is so acute 
that she is enthusiastic about that possibility.
Whereas Joyce's problematic situation was revealed by 
self-reporting, Eve's documented situation is more uncertain.
Yet her reasoning depends upon reasonable expectations 
concerning problem as a method to gloss what she plans to do.
Her advertisement read:
Sexy young lady would like to meet 
well endowed men, loves giving and 
receiving 0. No fees but likes 
outings, open to suggestions, 
husband approves.
As well as engaging in the usual contact practices of 
formulating her self, who she wants to meet, and what she wants 
to do, Eve states her non-prostitute status. She also 
transforms the purely sexual nexus of use into a social occasion 
and inviting propositions in relation to that occasion. Eve 
further reveals that she is married. How is this reported 
situation to be understood? Eve formulates a sexual 
relationship, yet tempers use with sociability. Is she an 
exception to the dominance of exchange and use? The existence 
of a marital partner complicates the situation. Even though 
"husband approves", to what extent can any friendship develop
-Bl­
and in what forms? These questions were answered by Eve in 
her letter:
Thank you for answering our advert. From 
your reply you sound the exact type of person that 
we would like to meet, and you also sound very 
sincere.
I can't add much more about myself that I 
put in the advert only to explain a little about my 
husband and I. Up until a couple of years ago 
we had a perfectly happy sex life, when my husband 
had an illness, since which he hasn't been able to 
take a very active role in our relationship, so with 
his consent and our mutual pleasure I have taken 
lovers, but now we are looking for a more permanent 
friendship with one person, who I would like really 
to care for.
The one problem at the moment is that we have 
to meet away from home as children are involved, when 
we do meet the right person, and are sure then they 
will have to gradually except him as my husbands 
friend.
The address on this letter is of a very good 
friend, as I don't want to get involved until I feel 
safe about who I meet, I hope you understand.
I will leave it up to you to arrange a meeting. 
I can furnish a phone number at short notice if you 
wish when I hear from you.
Yours
Eve
Eve presents a problematic situation which she and her 
husband are attempting to resolve. Though the problem is
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sexual, she wants to resolve it by forming a stable 
relationship. Like Charles and Marjorie, Eve describes her 
concern for managing the establishment of this relationship 
which begins from sexual premises. She tells of her concern 
to locate the "right person", and to integrate that person into 
her family as an acceptable part of it. Because of this 
concern initial and introductory meetings are to be held 
outside the matrimonial home. The similar reason of not 
getting "involved until I feel safe about who I meet", is 
given for Eve keeping her address secret. Any meeting with 
Eve would consist of her appearing incognito, and no doubt 
unless the meeting was with the "right person" she would 
disappear into her concealed background.
Eve engages in justifying and giving 'good reasons' for 
her actions. She also presents a definite description of a 
situation. To accomplish some part of that description she 
engages like all advertisers, in the practice of glossing. 
Glossing consists of relying upon the knowledge that the 
distinctness of a situated description lies not in the past 
which it purports to describe, but in its consequences. Eve 
glosses her address. The address presented in the letter does 
not belong to a "friend", but is Eve's. It is also probable 
that the furnishing of "a phone number at short notice" would 
result in Eve's own telephone number. Her address was checked 
by consulting local telephone directories; the telephone 
operator said that her telephone number had been changed and 
made ex-directory.
That Eve glosses this part of her letter raises the 
question about the story and the 'good reasons' which she 
has presented. Eve could be protecting herself from unwanted 
intrusion, or be engaged in deceitful sexual use. Whatever
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Eve's intentions, her description and the situation which this 
makes observable conform to her glossing practices. Here, 
essential features of the situation are masked or made false 
provision for in a planful way. This is crucial if the 
description is to be a description of a situation which Eve 
wishes to make observable, rather than some other situation. 
Engaging in providing false details and hiding others enables 
the interaction to be controlled and guided towards Eve's 
practical ends. Whether Eve's situation is as problematic I 
as she describes, or is a mere mock up, is uncertain. Her 
practical ends however are not. Like Joyce who presents a 
somewhat tragic account of her personal life, Eve is basically 
concerned to establish a relationship which is grounded in 
mutual sexual activity.
THE ADVERTISERS REVIEWED: Joyce and Eve's advertisements 
illustrate the methods employed for constructing and 
establishing sexual use. Each advertisement illustrated, 
expresses different concerns and emphases in relation to this 
guiding topic. Freda and George showed how constituting use 
depends upon providing mutual sexual information as a basis for 
judgement and assessment, and engaging in a process of 
discussion which develops an understanding against which sexual 
activities have 'good sense'.
Mike and Ron showed the differences which sexual use and 
interest can have. Though Mike was involved in making contact 
in order to be in a position to use someone sexually and be 
used, in his description he provided elements of his social 
existence which set in relief the value element of use. As a 
contrast, Ron concentrated upon creating in an artful manner 
the high value of his particular sexual interest. The bisexual 
females displayed various degrees of membership and experience
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in their particular sexual interests. Yet all stressed 
sexual use as a need and an attraction.
The depth and extent of becoming involved in making contact 
was seen in the case of Mildred and Jim who had evolved a 
mutually ramifying system of measured use-value according to 
demand. Charles and Marjorie focused most clearly upon the 
management of persons and domestic affairs in securing sexual 
use. Both they and Sue and Brian demonstrated the largely 
unspoken area in making contact, which is the point of the 
contact itself: sexual use.
IN CONCLUSION: The prostitute recognition code has 
consequences for its opposite, non-payment. These consequences 
can be seen in actual cases of non-payment advertisements and 
in contact with the advertisers. In contrast with prostitutes' 
advertisements, non-payment advertisers emphasise reciprocal 
use, relate specific attributes of possible repliers to that 
use, formulate the possible relationship in terms of quality, 
and specifically set out to contact gender populations who are 
given accredited membership because of sexual interests. The 
effect of becoming familiar with the procedures and processes 
of making contact is that the contact domain can be marked out 
quite spefically and definitely. By locating and adopting the 
interpretive dichotomy of payment/non-payment an account of 
advertisements and advertisers can be provided, such as the 
typology in Chapter One.
Any account of making contact however, has its sense in 
the code which provides for it, or some version of a code which 
is invoked by a reader of such an account. Above I have 
attempted to document the code which provides for an 
understandable reading of the area of experience which the 
typology of contact actors glosses.
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The central point in using a cede or body of rules to 
make a domain observable is that the rules are representations 
of the socially ordered ways of the domain. This means that 
the user of a code has to know the order which the encountered 
activity conforms to, prior to coming into touch with that 
activity. Through experience, once a reader can get an idea 
of the constitution of such an activity as making contact 
then the coding of the material can be extended.
In making contact such an idea would consist of the main 
structures of payment/non-payment, the classifications of 
gender, and the relations of sexual type. This code is 
intended as a plausible model of how those who experience 
contact advertisements make sense of them. As an example of 
cracking a code it is not merely descriptive about the area 
of contact, but in fact exhibits it [cf. L. Weider, 1974].
This is in the same way that the materials that have been used 
to illustrate contact themselves exhibit that domain. This 
method of 'exhibiting-in-the-telling' applies both to the 
productions of sociologists and those of people engaged in 
making contact.
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CHAPTER THREE 
USING THE CODE
The real is not entirely rational, nor is 
the rational entirely real.
[A. Camus, 1975]
Differences between our 'practical theorist' 
and 'academic theorist' may all but disappear 
when both describe everyday activities. The 
observer-researcher must rely upon interpretive 
procedures when subsuming 'recognised' 
behavioural displays under concepts derived 
from his scientific vocabulary.
[A. Cicourel, 1973]
In the previous two chapters, a version of the world of 
making contact has been presented. That world has been 
described in its various constituting forms. The code for 
the apprehension of such forms and thereby that world has 
been suggested. An important question remains. What is the 
status of this code? This question might at first be seen as 
inquiring into the rational structure of social action, but 
perhaps it is more accurate to regard it as seeking an 
examination of the structure of rationality itself.
From this perspective rationality ceases to be a measure 
of practical actions [cf. S. Lukes, 1973], and becomes its 
product. At the same time rationality as a unified concept 
crumbles into various contexted and often competing versions 
of 'what Anyone should know' [cf. D. Zimmerman and M. Pollner, 
1970]. In respect of making contact, I shall show below how
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members can use a situated code in order to fabricate a 
rationality [i.e. to invoke and rely upon 'what Anyone should 
know' in order to further their own practical ends].
THE RESEARCHER AND HIS RESEARCH: The exposition of the 
code by which members who make contact sustain versions of 
what they are doing brings with it a need for an examination 
of the place of the researcher and the process by which he 
comes to terms with actions and produces his 'professional' 
account. From Durkheim's "all preconceptions must be 
eradicated" [1964] through to the much different 
"ethnomethodological indifference" of Garfinkel and Sacks 
[1970], sociologists have sought to 'bracket' their beliefs.
But as Merleau-Ponty recognised, the lesson of bracketing is 
the impossibility of it being done in any complete sense [H. 
Spiegelberg, 1965,].
The relation between the researcher an& his research is 
not one of indifference, nor should it be glossed over by 
saying that it is outside examination. The linguistic relation 
between the sociologist and his subject needs examination. It 
is this relation which enables the professional researcher to 
interpret the area of study and present findings upon it. It 
is suggested that the means for understanding and accounting 
for actions are similar for those making contact and those 
doing sociology, though the latter formalises these essential 
linguistic links.. Later in this chapter a description of the 
similarity between sociology and everyday reasoning in 
recognising and locating features for interest will be 
presented. This latter concern grounds members' practices 
and the code which they produce and through which they are 
expressed, in artful language.
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Though sociologists and those involved in making contact 
share the level of practical reasoning, they address different 
concerns and seek to answer different sets of questions.
Because of these different involvements, different domains of 
discourse are constituted. Without the recognition of the 
shared character of practical reasoning and the problematic of 
translating and formalising members' utterances and activities, 
sociologists must inevitably transform and distort the areas 
which they study. Where this recognition does occur it will 
result in an interest in how both lay and professional members 
manage their different interests.
INDEXICALITY: In his approach to the study of sociological 
methods Harold Garfinkel focuses upon one of the problematic 
and constituent phenomena of doing sociology. This is the 
indexicality of expressions and actions. Bar-Hillel in 1954 
wrote that the majority of utterances could only be understood 
when who or what they referenced and the context and time of 
production was known.
The import of this for Garfinkel is that both lay and 
professional sociological method, in coming to terms with 
practical actions, has as its problematic the substitution of 
'objective', context-free for occasional, context-bound 
expressions. This substitution is only possible through a 
scheme of proceedings which for all practical purposes allows 
a particular demonstration of accounting for an action to 
stand as adequate. This 'adequacy' is according to socially 
sanctioned ways of accounting.
In studying practical action it is taken for granted that 
the inquirer 'knows' the scenes of operation under 
investigation. This is in order that the adopted way of
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proceeding can be seen to account recognisably for the 
encountered features of scenes. In conjunction with this it 
is assumed by people that accounts are constituent features 
of the scenes which they present [H. Garfinkel, 1967], These 
embodying assumptions of accounting are extended in everyday 
life by the sanctionable properties of indexical expressions. 
Garfinkel reports that people refuse to let each other know 
clearly what they are talking about. Instead they view the 
indexicality of language [occasionality, vagueness, 
retrospective-prospective sense, waiting until later to see 
what was meant], as presenting a background of taken for 
granted features against which accounts can be produced and 
seen as recognisable and adequate. These properties of 
indexicality are a sanctioned backcloth which enables people 
to claim that they know what they are talking about and 
that they should be understood [i.e. 'what Anyone should know'].
These remarks on indexicality and the embodying character 
of accounts provides a sketch of the assumptions and 
expectancies which contact readers, advertisers, and other 
practical theorists are armed with. Such background features 
are engaged with particular knowledge of the contact domain 
which they help to generate and constitute. The centrality of 
these features of accounting has been introduced here because 
as resources for making scenes observable they also permit 
non-existent scenes to 'come alive'. They are available as 
management devices for the fabrication of rationality for 
all practical purposes.
In order to illustrate people's reliance on the properties 
of indexicality, a description of a series of 'experiments' 
which were carried out will be given. The purpose of these 
exercises was to discover how people would locate types of
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advertisement. People were presented with advertisements [in 
a public house], and asked what they were about and who they 
were from. After a list of answers had been compiled, the 
respondents were told what the advertisements were 'in fact' 
about. These explanations were deliberately different from 
the respondents' answers.
This was done in an attempt to see how strongly and in 
what way people would defend or change their judgements. The 
compiled lists of answers were made up of such terms as 'kinky', 
'a pro', 'a nympho', and 'a lesi'. In respect of sexual factors 
the compiled lists were accurate. However they did not 
differentiate strongly between an advertisement which required 
no payment, but which did not state this, and prostitutes' 
advertisements; answers portrayed all female's advertisements 
that sought males as 'pros'. When respondents were told that 
all their answers were wrong, they reacted with blankness. To 
produce a further reaction, people had to be questioned. Again 
there was little reaction, consisting of such as: "Well it 
doesn't say that.". When it became clear that this was the 
end of the 'experiments' people were disappointed, saying "is 
that all?", and "I thought there was more to it".
The function of these 'experiments' was initially seen as 
enabling an examination of everyday sexual knowledge. They 
were used to distil out and separate everyday from contact 
specific knowledge. It was thus possible to see how everyday 
members typified advertisements according to broad sexual 
categories rather than the fine and specific ones used in the 
contact domain. The device of providing explanations contrary 
to the responsents' own answers was a failure, if it is viewed 
as a means of adding to the description of the contact domain. 
However the 'failure' itself threw some light on practical
reasoning-.
In the question and aswer situation: I was not an- 
interviewer, r was someone who was well or little-known with 
a right to he im that situation. The features of "Is that, 
all?" and1 "more- to it" indicate what was happening in the 
©overt interview situation. People do not go about 
questioning- what something is when there is no need to. That 
I did this was taken as a display of' 'something going onr that 
could not immediately be seen. It was a case of waiting untilb 
later- to see what; was meant-. When it was found that the- point 
of the: questions and answers lay in themselves and not in 
some to-be-revealed purpose, people were disappointed.
This was clarified by one man who, when X began to tell 
him the ’answers' saids "He’s going-to put it together- now.
When told of the purpose of the exercise he saidr "Oh is that 
all? X could have done- that Correctly typified advertisements). 
He then said that he thought I was performing some trick. This 
has; two consequences. The blankness or vagueness which was 
experienced cannot be called, asj-it might, ’confusion at being 
wrong*. Xt was rather am indication of a reliance upon the 
retrospective-prospective quality of’ language; that; what ’was’ 
meant will, become clear ’later’ . Secondly this wait-and-see 
factor is related to the indexicality of expressions, where 
there is knowledge that the provision of' different contexts 
results in the display of different rational properties. For 
example, people know that ’a trick* consists of presenting and 
establishing an ’objective* description, of eliciting reactions 
to that description, and then changing the ’objectivity*. An 
instance; of this is a partially folded letter which can he read 
as concerning sexual matters. But when it. is unfolded it
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becomes quite innocent. For dealing with verbal and 
behavioural displays people rely upon the properties of 
indexicality. Though they might be experienced as problematic 
in that they permit no final clarity, these properties are 
resources for the management of practical affairs and 
understanding what others are doing.
DECODING ADVERTISEMENTS: In what follows we will return 
to the previous chapters. Advertisements will be presented and 
examined in the light of remarks made there and the 
standardised code which was produced. In this sense the 
advertisements will be looked at as representing in some 
degree the main parameters of contact judgement. The code acts 
as a collection of rules for allocating advertisements to 
specific, pre-constituted socio-sexual types. Harvey Sacks 
has called such a procedure a membership categorisation device 
[197A]. As a means for ascribing membership to a certain 
type the contact code categorises features of individual 
advertisements. These features, individually and as a whole, 
amount to 'belonging' to a specific sector of social reality; 
they are taken as 'showing' the grounds from which an 
advertisement springs.
In this way the application of a code rule is as a 
transformation rule. By remedially approaching indexicality 
through incarnate language these rules developmentally 
change advertisements from mere strings of words into 
understandable reports. These transformations depend upon two 
things. Firstly rules of 'what things look like' and 'what 
things go together'. Secondly the selection of individual 
features of advertisements as conforming to these rules. In 
a reading the contact code selectively organises the materials
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presented in advertisements in order to locate them in some 
position in the unit 'contact advertisement-actor'. An idea 
of what this process might look like, at least on paper, is 
presented below. Because of the dominance in interpretaion 
of the payment rule, for comparison the process of the 
transformation of an advertisement into 'payment' is
included.
Firstly the advertisements:
A: Young, beautiful, blonde housewife
would like to meet couples or 
female/male singles for pleasant 
evenings together. Has husbands 
active approval. Please include 
photograph, all returned.
Bs Attractive, passive TV wishes to meet
any frustrated males for fun in the 
privacy of own home. Bondage, loves 
0 and accepts A.
C: Girl student, 22, bisexual, seeks
similar attractive girl-friend for 
a sincere lasting love relationship.
All letters answered. Photos appreciated.
X: Petite, sensuous, brunette, 43-23-37,
loves receiving 'O' and having her body 
massaged and admired. I welcome all 
generous mature gentlemen over 30 please 
to my home where we can relax. SAE for phone no.
These advertisements can be ordered and organised 
according to four reading rules: 1] each advertisement states 
an advertiser; 2] each advertiser states the repliers sought;
3] each advertiser states a specific sexual purpose; 4] each 
advertiser states the general character of the future encounter. 
Such rules are the response to the indexical texture of the 
advertisements and seek to answer the basic questions of 
'who?', 'what for?', and 'why?'. The establishment of such 
bases invokes general and contexted4specific knowledge which 
fills out this remedial approach to indexicality. The four 
advertisements with which we are concerned here, when 'worked 
up' and 'filled out' so as to provide for a definite category, 
look like this:
A: 1 + 2 x 3 x 4 ; Non-payment, 'wife-swapping/threesome' 
relationship.
B: 1 + 2 x 3 x 4 = Non-payment, male/transvestite 
relationship.
C:1 + 2 x 3 x 4 =  Non-payment, female bisexual/homosexual 
relationship.
X: 1 + 2 x 3 x 4 = Payment, male/female heterosexual 
relationship.
The reading rules organise each advertisement into four 
main and relevant parts: who the advertiser is; those sought; 
what this is for; and why. The typicality of each 
advertisement comes from the juxtaposition of 'what for?' and 
'why?'. The ascription of type, the form of the possible 
relationship, and the location in structural reality of the 
advertiser and possible repliers comes through the judgemental 
interaction of the materials located by reading rules 3 and 4. 
For the reader these rules are the tools for doing 'recognising
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a description' and also the means ascribed to the advertiser 
for 'doing a description' [i.e. if 'what for' and 'why' can 
be found then a description has been located - cf. H. Sacks,
1974].
The problematic posed by 'recognising a description' is 
the repair of indexicality for the practical purposes of a 
reading. This is linked with ad hoeing in various background 
knowledge. The attempted repair of indexicality in 
advertisements brings with it the notice that some activities 
are tied to particular categories [e.g. the activity 'dressing 
up in women's clothes' belongs, for a male, to the category 
'TV'], whereas others are not [e.g. oral sex]. In the case of 
advertisements A, B, and C, though some activities will 
certainly be tied into the types "housewife", "TV", and "girl 
bisexual" the formulated sexual features ["pleasant evenings", 
"Bondage, loves 0 and accepts A", and "love relationship"] are 
not.
The case with advertisement X, from a prostitute, is 
different. The norm which connects advertiser and replier with 
the sexual feature is presented by the character relation ["I 
welcome all generous mature gentlemen"]. This relation informs 
that the activity is category bound, by 'hinting' that it is 
subject to the category requirement of payment. The location 
of a proposed activity as category bound has consequences for 
other formulations in an advertisement. In reading an 
advertisement according to the category 'payment', the advertiser 
and possible repliers become certain types of people; 'a 
prostitute' and 'clients'. The relationship becomes one of 
'exchange'. Where an activity cannot be found to be category 
bound, some wider set of relations must hold. The formulated
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character relation in the advertisements A, B, and C are in 
terms of mutual sexual use, as are the sexual features. Thus, 
though there are differences of sexual type between these three 
advertisements, most obviously sexual, they constitute members 
of the unit 'mutual sexual use' because of the presence of 
non-payment indicators.
Typification does not come a b o u t  o n l y  through seeking 
answers to the 'why?' question. The gender of advertiser, 
repliers, and the sexual features make the possibility of an 
activity being category bound more relevant in the case of some 
advertisements than others. An advertisement which formulates 
a female seeking males for sex can be searched for indicators 
of category bound status. Other formulations such as a couple 
seeking all gender groups, a transvestite seeking males, and a 
bisexual female seeking "a girl friend" make category bound 
relevance and search less likely.
The typification of advertisements A, B, and C is an 
application of the contact code. Its central element of use 
is the notion that some sexual activities are bound to the 
category 'prostitute' by the norm of payment; that the occupier 
of such a category is female; and that this category bound 
status is formulated in contact advertisements. Where a 
formulated sexual activity cannot be found to be category 
bound it thereby belongs to the unit of 'mutual sexual use' 
which can be assembled according to sexual similarities and 
differences, rather like Wittgenstein's family of resemblances 
[1972]. The foremost token in organising this unit is 
evidence of use-value.
THE LETTERS: The letter from B was a response to the 
'passing' letters described above. The reply to C sought to
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'pass' as a competent member; stating contact experience and 
asking for details of the advertiser's biography and situation. 
A 's letter is the o n l y  response to a series of ten ’ambiguous' 
letters. These stated that the advertisement had been seen, 
requested a meeting, and gave 'a department of sociology' 
address rather than a private one. A had scribbled through her 
letter and substituted the epithet "Sorry I only model". Her 
letterread:
Thank you for your letter in reply to my ad, 
although it does not seem to be written for my 
services as a photographic model, which is what the 
ad was for. If you do want to meet me as a model 
please write back and we can fix an appointment one 
evening. I will only see any one by appointment.
The other possibility is that this is an 
exercise in sociology, if this is the case do not 
bother to reply.
If your reply is genuine and written in 
answer to the terms of the ad please send further 
details, and a photograph as requested.
The immediate thing of notice is that there is no obvious 
matching between the advertisement, letter, and typification. 
The formulation "pleasant evenings together" and the 
typification "non-payment, wife-swapping/threesomes" turns out 
to be 'evenings of photographic modelling'. The juxtaposition 
of advertisement and letter produces such a discrepancy that 
it could be suggested that they are not from the same person. 
However, A returned the 'passing' letter with her reply 
written on the back of it. On this was the box number of the 
above advertisement.
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A's letter presents a description of a situation to a 
possible "genuine" male replier. Though this description is 
affected by the confusing 'passing' reply, it is possible 
that some sort of arrangement like this would normally be 
proposed by A to a single male rather in the style of Mildred 
above. Also like Mildred, a change in gender in the replier 
may elicit a different response and description [further 
replies were sent to A in different styles and formulating 
different gender forms, but there was no response]. It is also 
possible that A's use of "model" is a cover for prostitution.
A also reacts to the 'department of sociology' address, 
seeing a possible intention in the letter of "an exercise in 
sociology". This is contrasted with being "genuine" and 
making contact "in terms of the ad". It is obvious that A 
experiences the same difficulties with the 'passing' letter 
that her reply presents. This confusion can be seen to be 
occasioned by certain features of the reply which she 
received: 1] no substantive expression of sexual interest in 
her advertisement; 2] the address; 3] the request for a 
meeting before the intentions of both possible interactants 
had been made clear. The consequence of these features is a 
breach of contact expectancies of saying 'who', 'what for’, 
and 'why'.
For A the specification of 'who' and 'what for' was 
problematic because it was not contexted in a 'why' interest. 
Though the properties of indexical talk are sanctionable, a 
lack of concern for indexicality itself is a breach of everyday 
forms of action. Such a lack of concern in the 'passing' 
letter results in it being atypical, causally indeterminate, 
and specifically senseless for A [H . Garfinkel, 1967]. All
\that A can do is to review the available possibilities for the 
letter. A's reply, her renunciation of it, and the substitution 
of "Sorry I only model" is an indication of a lack of trust 
[cf. H. Garfinkel, 1963. J. Henslin, 1968]. Because the reply 
which she received breached contact expectancies, A was unable 
to act towards the proposed activity [a meeting] in a way 
which would produce that event as in accord with the basic 
rules expected in normative orders of such events. This was 
because she could not be sure what 'kind' of activity was 
being proposed.
A's reaction to the 'passing' letter illustrates three 
kinds of approach to confusion, and is similar to those 
adopted by players of disrupted games. A firstly attempts to 
normalise the possibilities which the letter presents and 
specifies which possibility is appropriate. Secondly and in 
relation to the possibility she endorses, she attempts 
further investigation. The final element in A's reaction 
is to completely revoke the interaction [i.e. what has been 
established or suggested]. She withdraws her account, 
coming to the understanding that her basis for making contact 
and the replier's are different. The "Sorry I only model" 
statement means that there is no practical purpose, A has 
decided, to be served in any further discourse between herself 
amd the replier because they are attending to different orders 
of events. As such, A decides to leave the field of play.
B's reply was not as confusing as A's. However it was 
no less surprising:
- 9 9 -
- 1 0 0 -
Many thanks dear, for your nice letter. I'm 
sorry for the delay, but I've had a lot of letters 
to answer, but also I've been away too. I hope you 
liked the photo of me in the magazine. The hair is 
my own, and not a wig, also my eye brows are 
plucked by a beautician friend of mine, but I've 
learned make-up my self.
I try to give a nice service to any one who 
visits me, and while I don't wish to seem like a 
whore I think I'm worth a fee of £10. After all, 
it would probably cost a lot more to visit a 
call-girl, and then probably be thrown out after 
h hour, but if you visit me time doesn't matter, 
any evening would suit me, but I would expect 
you to keep an appointment, as its not nice to 
be let down is it! Any type of sex pleases me, 
and I don't mind mild C.P. but not too severe!
I don't have any bondage items yet, but I do 
intend getting some, but one could always use rope,
I like being tied up, then I've got to please, yes!
I'm sorry I haven't a full length photo to 
send you, but while I'm not too slim, I think I have 
a fair figure when I wear my tight-laced corset, my 
legs are very good, better than some real girls! I 
hope I don't sound very vain, dear, but I'm sure 
you will enjoy visiting me. It's funny really, but 
I don't think of myself as queer, I like female 
company, but I've never had sex with one, but I do 
enjoy the attentions of a nice male.
Anyway dear, if you think I sound interesting
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enough, please let me know, then we can arrange a 
date, it would have to be about 7.30pm, as I said 
any evening as I have to get changed etc.
I hope to hear from you soon.
Love
'Mavis'
Whereas A's letter was varied and confused, Mavis's is 
quite explicit. Like A's letter however, it undermines the 
previous typification. Although the available relationship 
does conform to "transvestite/male homosexual relationship", 
the prediction of non-payment is refuted. The dominant and 
guiding idea that prostitutes are exclusively female is 
invaded. The above reading of Mavis's advertisement took 
"fun" and used it as an indicator of mutual sexual use.
However Mavis's letter makes it clear that the most relevant 
part of the advertisement was "frustrated males". This term 
references not merely a gender population but one which in some 
way or another is unsuccessful sexually [i.e. the basic cause 
of being "frustrated"]. Added to this, a reply received by 
Mavis from a male informs him that the replier is in such a 
position that he is either desperate enough to engage in 
a sexual relationship with another male, or that he is so 
sexually disposed. It also informs Mavis that the replier 
is likely to be unable to gain access to such sexual activities. 
So by merely receiving a reply Mavis is in touch with someone 
who is likely to pay for sexual services. In this way the 
gloss "frustrated males" states 'males who are either desperate 
enough or so sexually disposed to pay another man for sexual 
services'.
There is no knowledge or indication of how successful
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Mavis is in establishing a clientele. Because he charges a 
f e e  for his services, he must face the problem that "frustrated 
males" can pay for a "real girl" rather than an illusion of 
one. Like female prostitutes Mavis has to engage in practices 
of persuasion. This is occasioned not only because the replier 
purports to be inexperienced, but also because of Mavis's 
inter-sexed position; a male seeking to charge for what is 
commonly accepted as a female's services. As well as 
establishing and managing a service relationship, Mavis has 
to handle his particular form of inter-sexuality. With the 
female side of his character belongs the stigma of payment; 
with the underlying male side of his 1 character belongs the 
stigma of homosexuality. Mavis presents and is faced by norms 
and expectancies resulting from the enmeshing of two different 
stereotypes. He approaches these problems by emphasising the 
value of his "nice service" for exchange and by attempting to 
consolidate the illusion of female gender by the adoption of 
female mannerisms. Both these forms of practice are designed 
to accomplish sounding "interesting enough". Mavis is in 
competition with prostitutes not as a man, but as another 
prostitute giving a better service for less money.
Like the letters from A and B, the one from C is most 
surprising:
I wouldn't have written to you if you hadn't 
written 'you can't be too careful can you and I want 
to be sure of your sincerity'. I feel awful about this, 
really terrible. I want to apologise to you, but I don't 
think I deserve to be forgiven. All I deserve really 
is for you to throw this letter away at once. I would 
hope that we might become friends despite it all, but
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such a deception as this does not seem the best basis 
for friendship. As it happens, please believe me that 
deception is contrary to my nature: I am sincere and 
couldn't contemplate pretending that I'm not.
So why did I place the ad?
A few months ago I went through a period of total 
despair, which I'm not yet out of. I need love 
desperately. I've never had a girlfriend. I've always 
been female identified as well as attracted to females. 
At various periods of my loneliness [i.e. inability to 
externalise my love of femininity in the normal way] has 
made me want to dress up as a girl. My ad was a stupid 
mistake, prompted by the feeling that a bisexual girl 
might be the only sort of girl who could accept me. I 
want to be cured and never dress up again, but I'm 
afraid. I hate those clothes now. I placed that ad 
because girls can advertise free, because I felt most 
of the ads were false anyway, and because I was out of 
my head with hopeless depression. I regretted doing so 
immediately afterwards. I have no wish to be a girl, to 
fool gay women for the sake of boosting my ego. I'm 
sorry, truely am, that I deceived you.
Often I fall into very deep depressions, but I 
know exactly what is wrong with me: loneliness. I need 
a girl-friend so badly. Being over-sensitive to the 
female point of view I've never had the confidence to 
believe any girl might be remotely interested in me.
I have little hope of ever finding a girl-friend, 
though there is no particular tangible cause for my 
permanent rejection and solitude, it is the way I
- 1 0 4 -
have always been forced to live, so however much I 
may long for someone to share my life with, it is 
difficult for me to imagine how it might be, like 
a crazy dream come true.
Please write back, if only that we might 
become friends.
Yours very sincerely,
Martin
It is not immediately clear what the writer of the letter 
is aplogising so profusely for apart from stating that it is 
some kind of deception. It is only through sections of the 
letter and the signature that the gender of the writer is 
revealed as contrary to that formulated in the advertisement. 
The typification "female bisexual/homosexual relationship" was 
a false one. However Martin made the same false assessment 
of the reply received by him. This attempted to 'pass' as a 
bisexual female who was competent in both the contact situation 
and that form of sexuality. This was expressed by enthusiasm 
for the advertisement ["really excited by your advert"], 
references to contact experience ["I have made other friends 
through answering ads"], and an esoteric element which 
justified a brief letter. In order to do this the letter 
referred to the dangers of "being found out" by "telling too 
much" and stated that "you can't be too careful can you, and 
I want to be sure of your sincerity".
Martin's account can be regarded as a strategy for the 
practical accomplishment of locating someone in particular; 
ofmaking contact "for a more lasting relationship". The 
organisation of such a strategy is in terms of the expression 
and demonstration of a story that is situated. For its teller
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the story is a practical task as an attempted repair of the 
indexicality o f  situated conduct. It is made in relation to 
a biographically determined plan. This consists of typical 
knowledge and expectancies. The possibility of such a plan is 
viewed in relation to scenes of action which are seen as 
specific, partly unalterable, and obvious [A. Schütz and T. 
Luckmann, 1974]. Martin's interest in the 'passing' letter 
can, in this way, be seen as plan-determined. This practical 
interest prescribes a level of adequacy for an outcome which 
ranges from "a more lasting relationship" to "if only that we 
might become friends".
The operational structure of Martin's plan is a 'deceptive' 
one. Because of this not only does he have to offer information 
and details relevant to making contact, but also reasons for 
telling the story as reasonable action. The deception becomes 
part of the story which is set against a background of situated 
events which produce that deception. Thus, someone I showed 
Martin's advertisement and letter to commented that it was 
"tragic" but perfectly "understandable" in view of his 
situation.
Three reasons are given by Martin for the adoption of the 
strategy of deception. Firstly because financially it cost 
little; because of situational problems* such as "needing 
love desperately"; and lastly because of doubt about 
advertisements being genuine. Martin does not explicate the 
third reason any further, but it is the basis for the other 
reasons. It is also interesting in that his comment applies 
to his advertisement as well as "most" other advertisements. 
Because he regards contact advertisements as "false anyway", 
he must review the possibilities for locating and meeting
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someone who conforms with his ideas of the type of person who 
could help produce "a more lasting relationship". One type of 
possibility is the placing of an advertisement. Formulating 
this advertisement in terms of a bisexual female comes from two 
considerations. Firstly it is attractive financially, because 
no advertising costs are incurred. Secondly it is relevant 
because of what Martin sees as his personal problems: "My ad 
was prompted by the feeling that a bisexual girl might be the 
only sort of girl who could accept me".
Martin could have advertised as a male seeking a bisexual 
female, but this would have involved the cost of advertising.
It would also probably not have been as successful as the 
formulation of a female bisexual advertisement. This is 
because of the limited supply of such sexual actors, and the 
emphasis which this sexual form has upon the female gender and 
the exclusion of the male gender. As a male advertiser Martin 
would also only have a limited opportunity to explain his 
reasons for seeking a bisexual female. In his letter on the 
other hand, Martin's related reasons present an explanation 
for his actions in terms of the available means and his 
desired ends. The ends which he seeks are biographically 
determined [e.g. "I've never even got as close as kissing a 
girl"]« His biography involves remnants of other substitute 
solutions such as transvestism. Martin does not argue that his 
transvestism is understandable or natural. He does not attempt 
to justify it. Instead he condemns it: "I want to be cured and 
never dress up again".
The other elements of his problem, loneliness and 
depression, are treated differently. They are seen as 
understandable conditions which can be solved: "I know exactly
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what is wrong with me: loneliness* I need a girl-friend badly". 
The problems are topics which are subjects for discussion and 
resources to argue with in the direction specified by the plan. 
In this way Martin seeks to accomplish his plan through 
establishing his strategy as 'reasonable' for the adequate 
solving of his problems.
»WE ARE ALL PUPPETEERS AND H0M0NCULI': This report on 
contact magazines has produced a structure of typifications, 
instances of that structure, and suggested the code through 
which that structure was produced. As a sociological account 
it adopted practical rules for the social standardisation of 
understandings in order that it appear as a 'normal' report
I
[A. Cicourel, 1973]. A consequence of this is that the texture 
and effects of the actions of those making contact conform to 
standardised expectancies. However, the cases of Mavis,
Martiny and the unknown A could have been left unexamined and 
this report would then have claimed for itself some authority 
in describing what occurs in the world of making contact.
Cases contrary to sociological standardisation reveal the 
fallacy of formal categorisation, and when experienced prompt 
a revision of that structure. In everyday terms this revision 
consists of 'what' was really meant when the advertisement was 
first read and selected. The appropriate modifications, which 
may take on an anecdotal quality, can then be made to the 
original typification. Such a narrative of experience gains 
its sense by being set against the norms which are expected 
and assumed to apply in making contact. Though the judgement 
made by the use of this code is revealed as inappropriate, the 
code survives more or less intact as a recipe for interpreting 
advertisements. Advertisements which fabricate one sense of
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understanding only to reveal another, whether intentionally 
or not, do not invalidate the code. Because of the 'wait and 
see' quality of actions it is assumed that appearances may be 
deceptive. That deception is an accomplishment of 
inappropriate social and linguistic practices which rely upon 
code expectancies and assumptions. Thus the code itself is 
not at fault, but the users of it.
The revision prompted by contrary cases for sociology can 
be pursued in two way. Firstly and perhaps more generally, the 
creation of another structure or category in a theory or 
description in order to encompass deviant cases. Further or 
new types may have to be included, typologies extended, and 
more description or cases studies included. To some extent 
this has been carried out above, where advertisements A, B, 
and C were examined in the light of what the letters revealed. 
Perhaps this is a pervasive pheneomenon in doing sociology: 
occasions of contact with other interactants requires a revision 
of previous description, theory, or thought. Secondly, 
contrary cases can be a beginning for a deeper sociological 
question, and that is how they are made possible. A discussion 
of how people's actions 'outwit' sociological predictions or 
descriptions forges a link with already encompassed cases [i.e. 
those which appear to conform to the sociologist's account].
If the means whereby a prediction was 'hoodwinked' can be 
located, it also locates a constituent ground in the already 
standardised understandings of the people studied and in the 
production of the sociologist's report.
The contrary cases of Mavis, Martin, and A serve to show 
the reciprocal typification which commonsense reasoning 
accomplishes. It is not only sociologists who make use of the
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process of typification in producing accounts, but also 
commonsense members. As one aspect or form of reasoning the 
normative description of those involved in making contact 
transformed living people into judgemental dopes or puppets 
[A. Schütz, 1964. H. Garfinkel, 1967], This is by investing 
them with attributes, needs, and characteristics which are 
required by the particular relevance system which the 
sociological problem prescribes. The underlying effect of 
this is that the people involved in making contact are 
supposed to act 'as if' prior agreement existed over topical 
or routine matters, rather than agreement and understanding 
being worked out temporally in engaged practice. Just as the 
sociologist tacitly uses the concept of the judgemental dope 
in order to accomplish his studies, so do everyday members in 
seeking to secure their practical ends and in judging the 
outcome of actions. Armed with different relevance systems 
advertisers and repliers in making contact attempt to predict 
actions of those whom they seek to interact with. In doing 
this they expect others to act in accord with their judgements. 
However, as they are dealing with real people and real outcomes, 
unlike the sociologist who more often than not is dealing 
with theoretical outcomes, experience teaches that such 
judgements are only approximations which may work.
TYPIFYING: Organising and assembling people and actions 
into standardised orders is commonly termed typifying. This 
process occurs somewhere between being able to produce fairly 
abstract types of social actor and the codes or structures 
of rules which support such categorisation. A most important 
questions remains. What does this process consist of?
Between the act of meeting something and being able to account 
for it as 'one of a kind', governed by rules, there appears
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to be an unseen process at work. It is rather like watching 
a magician produce cards from 'nowhere'. This must be done in 
some understandable way, but how?
In looking at the production of types and their practical 
relation with codes, a model of practical reasoning will be 
presented. It is suggested that the actual practice of 
sociological and mundane reasoning may be underpinned in such 
a way. And that it is by using something like this model that 
the sociologist and the everyday member 'magically' produce 
their artful accounts. By way of introducing this possible 
way of constructing types and codes some remarks by Alfred 
Schütz on the process of typification will be discussed.
These remarks are to apply both to s o ciology and everyday life, 
but not to the formal m e t h odological statements which 
s o c i o l o g i s t s  present about their ideal type use [e.g. J.W.N. 
Watkins, 1973]. The process of t y p i f i c a t i o n  to be discussed 
here is seen as enabling such sociological discourse.
Schütz dichotomises the concept of "ideal type of human 
behaviour" [1972]. The two elements in this dichotomy are the 
ideal type of another expressing himself in a certain manner 
["the personal ideal type"], and the ideal type of the 
expressive process itself ["course of action type"]. The 
personal ideal type is constructed from the objective context 
of meaning of the course of action type. An objective 
context of meaning is made up of separate events which are 
collected into a synthesis which becomes an "object" within 
consciousness [1972].
The construction of a personal ideal type concerns the 
issues and elements involved in perf o r m i n g  a personal action. 
U n d e r s t a n d i n g  is derived from the course of action type which
has "been laid down "by experience and produced by means of' a 
synthesis of recognition. (A. Schütz, 1972). Experienced! 
behaviour is interpreted in relation' to objective accounts 
of' meaning^ the sedimented course of action type. The: 
purpose of ideal, typical understanding- is the deduction of the- 
in-ord®>-to and because motives of behaviour- as social’ action. 
This is by the elucidation of the characteristic-, and constant, 
features and goals of' actions. Through this process a picture 
of the persona who typically performs a typical’ aot can be 
formed. This is the personal ideal, type.
Schütz reasoned that because the personal, ideal type- was 
dependent upon the course of action type it was always 
determined by the interpreter*s point of viewr "It is a function 
of the: very question it seeks to answer. It is dependent 
upon the objective context of meaning-, which it 
merely translates, into subjective terms and then personifies" 
(T972). This personification is an attempt to capture-the 
certainty of actions. What the outcome of a predicted action 
will be) however, remains problematic because of the occasioned! 
nature of the ideal, typical, construct, the situated nature 
of action itself, and the complexity of interactants* mutual, 
typifi cat ions of one? another according to- differing practical, 
aims.
The course of actiom type, the sedimented body of 
experienced events, is engaged with factors of commonsense 
socialisation. The maim elements: in such, a socialisation of 
knowledge have a relation with a course of actiom type as 
aspects of it and", as parameters for its use. Parameters are 
formed from ideas which constitute an event and the problems 
associated, with it, and further define the conditions of
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'complete1 or 'adequate' description [H. Garfinkel, 1967], 
Commonsense socialisation has three main components. The 
first is structural, where people assume that if places were 
changed with another, the world would be experienced in much 
the same perspective. Secondly it is assumed that knowledge 
is culturally derived and organised. The third component is 
the limited nature of accumulated experience in its relation 
to the social distribution of knowledge and the experiences 
of others [A. Schütz, 1964].
The ideal type and the expressive process are transformed 
by these elements of commonsense socialisation. From being 
a mere collection of limited experiences the course of action 
type is constituted and expanded into a series of expectations. 
Though these are concerned with specific topics [e.g. why 
advertisements are placed], they are made viable by and based 
upon expectancies derived from commonsense socialisation.
The ascription of object categories is made possible because 
candidates for a category express some particular cultural 
form through language which can be seen as appropriate for 
a personal ideal type which it occasions. The adequacy of 
this ascription though based squarely upon evidence of 
approximation between a perceived event and accumulated 
experience, is also located in the expectation that knowledge 
is always incomplete. Any change which renders an 
ascription inappropriate [e.g. Mavis, Martin, or A] will not 
be met with a great deal of shock. This feature enables the 
selection of a particular category to be sanctioned as 
appropriate 'on the evidence'. Lastly and perhaps most 
importantly, it is expected that categorisation when carried 
out will be approximate to the 'real' event; that actions
ttan Be- understood as others experience-- them;.
Labelling- theory- has taken up the topic; of tiles ascriptiom 
of’ typifications. It. sees social, events as "a consequence of 
the application- (by others) of rules"- (ht„ B’eckery 1963) * Butt 
as Pollmer (1974) has- indicated there has heeir confusiom 
Between commonsense and sociological1, models. Commonsense 
models have Been used, as- a means for analysis- rather- than 
regarded as am integral characteristic for the construction! 
of situations; By members and sociologists. In this way,. 
rather1 than explaining1 social, phenomena sociologists1 
explanations stand as similar and! competing accounts to those 
of everyday members themselves. This is Because Both- forms 
of explanation rely upom some; commons ense mo die 1 as "am 
autobiographical, conception! of itself* (M. Poll’ner,r974) •
Though Both-sociologists; and everyday-members constrict; 
their settings,, am. integral feature of such work is th© 
conceptiom that settings are independent of that constituting 
work and can Be objectively apprehended. Though labelling 
theory espouses the maxim- that a certain type of Behaviour 
is; Behaviour that people so- label, it neglects how it can 
itself present descriptions and explanations which reside- 
outside this maxim-. In other words, it neglects to examine 
the social practice of typification while tacitly relying 
upom that, practice. This, is Because it Belongs to a 
particular form of life. To Be involved, in sociology-is 
to take part, in the normative constraints of some particular 
method, derived, froim some formal, structures which are seen as 
constituting ‘professional inquiry*. Such- veridical 
methodology reinterprets an area of study im language other 
than that which Belongs to and constitutes that area for- those- 
who are immersed im it;. Within everyday forms- of life a
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particular- methodology is not dominant;, and! the tenets of 
scientific; practice are inapplicable-.
Schut'zr has written that the structure of relevances held 
hy soocdall scientists depends both upon the formulation of the 
scientific problems and the corpus of knowledge which; 
constitutes that discipline. The social' scientist takes for" 
granted, that he can define his data independently of any 
non-scientifi® constituting work. However the only way in 
which ana observer can grasp subjective meaning structures is 
to proceed in a way similar to* the everyday member while 
being guided! by a different! systemi of relevances (A. Schütz, 
1973).
Elsewhere Schütz has written that scientific work 
"constitutes the archetype for rational, interpretation and 
rational, action" (1953). A problem is raised for sociology 
if the ideal, of rationality is not a feature of everyday life. 
This problematic is occasioned because of the "complete 
nature of the knowledge required for an actor to behave 
rationally". To seek: the repair which this problematic 
raises, sociologists must interpret their chosem subject, 
matter in practice (like everyday members) and then reinterpret, 
it according to their formal, methodological, or scientific 
rationalities (A. Schutz, 1953. HI Garfinkel, 1967)0
These reinterpretations are carried out; according- to a 
language which does not have its grounds in the context which 
it attempts to speak about'. For sociological, language the 
concerns of science exist independently of particular, 
contexted! action. However such concerns are constitutive 
o f  the contexts which they make observable (of. J. Heap, 1974). 
The relation between sociologists, their course of actiom
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types, the documentary signification of those types, and the 
understanding of sociological reports depends upon and 
consists of both sociological methods and the use of everyday 
social practices.
The connection between the course of action type and 
the construction of the personal ideal type has, in this 
description of making contact, been termed a code. In Schutz's 
work the criticism can be made that he leaps between concepts 
without grounding his reasonings in anything other than 
hypothetical and imagined situations, and consequently is 
involved in nothing more than a special kind of story 
telling [B. Hindess, 1972], In a sense this is certainly 
true, but the form of questioning in which he engages conforms 
with his programme of examining the constituting function in 
relation to meaning [1972]. Though the relation between 
meaning and the construction of social reality is a core 
matter, the interest here is more direct and specific. This 
is the specific and pragamatic connections in the constitution 
of social phenomena. Code has been used in this respect as 
a heurism for locating these connections and to present the 
relevant knowledge to account for particular judgements.
These connections however can be made more specific as actual 
social practices.
A NODEL OF PRACTICAL REASONING; Schütz argued that the 
modern view of functionalism in sociology is not derived from 
the biological concept [1964. cf. A. Ryan, 1970]. Function 
rather refers to the "socially distributed constructs of 
patterns of typical motives, goals, attitudes, personalities, 
which are supposed to be invariant" [1964]. These typical 
elements are used in functional analysis to interpret and
k
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represent 'the social system'. The way in which functionalists 
constitute items for analysis is comparable to locating and 
understanding the contact order. From this view the 
procedural process of doing functionalism, of locating items 
for analysis and regarding them as accounts and reports on 
the social system', is taken as a model for the reading of 
contact advertisements. Though there are gross differences’ 
between being a functionalist and a reader of contact 
advertisements, it is suggested that whatever the focal point 
of attention [e.g. 'the social system' or 'females for sex'], 
the ways in which phenomena are encountered [i.e. judgementally 
produced] are basically similar.
Merton has presented a paradigm for functional analysis 
in sociology. His first element concerns the "item[s] to 
which functions are imputed " [1971], In order to locate an 
item upon which to work it is necessary to decide which 
characteristics ["the kinds of data''] of those available are 
to be focused on. Merton states that if existing functional 
analyses are examined for their "kinds of data", it will be 
found that description "involves a report of who is variously 
involved in the pattern of behaviour. And the description of 
the participants [and onlookers] is in structural terms, that 
is, in terms of locating these people in their inter-connected 
social statuses" [1971]. In discussing the items to which 
functions are to be imputed, Merton offers procedural maxims 
for locating and describing these items.
Maxim_1_: Describe items according to typical knowledge of 
"inter-connected social statuses". This provides clues as to 
the nature [function] of the particular item in question and 
its relation to 'the social system'. Here description
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consists of locating and producing clues which foi'mulate the 
total nature of the context in which they are found. In this 
way Maxim 1 begins with pre-existent knowledge which, it is 
assumed, makes available an item for description. For example, 
in reading contact advertisements [describing them according 
to typical knowledge] it is assumed that they consist of the 
statuses 'advertiser' and specified 'replier'. These two 
statuses as distinct descriptions are connected and qualified 
as sexual. The maxim thus leads to a redescription of 
advertisements, where it is through interpretation of the 
encountered materials as indicators of 'structural reality' 
that advertisements are located within 'structural reality.
Merton's first maxim results in finding out the kind of 
item being dealt with. In functionalist terms it is then 
possible evaluate the described item and to regard the 
validations of occasioned and typical knowledge as 
contributing to the upkeep of the theoretical superstructure 
of society. For making contact, 'finding out' is related to 
sexual predilections and preferences of a reader as a basis 
for choice. To both enterprises the materials which accomplish 
Maxim 1 are activated as worthy of attention by practical 
matters and constituted through interpretation. The 
accomplishment of this mode of description as a pre-analysis 
and pre-choice condition depends upon resolving experienced 
events with pre-existent knowledge occasioned by those events
in terms of the dominant practical interests.
/
Maxim 2: Indicate the alternatives which Maxim 1 excludes. 
The first maxim involves and implies the second one. By 
invoking the mode of alternative comparison, this enables 
further enlightenment of "the structural context" of the item
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and the validation of Maxim 1. The second maxim is both 
integrated into and a method for justifying Maxim 1. In the 
process of formulating, the events to be interpreted evoke a 
range of possible but limited outcomes. As in making contact 
the context is sexual, such outcomes involve both categories 
of sexual act and actor. The engagement between these 
categories and the problematic event to be interpreted involves 
both positive [Maxim 1] and negative alignments of 
characteristics, where the location of 'a clue' excludes 
certain categories.
Conceptions of alternatives help to produce an item, where 
the focus is concentrated upon the specific linkages as of a 
probable kind. As well as helping to produce a decision upon 
an event, Maxim 2 also consists of accounting for the 
accomplished description in terms of 'good reasons' [i.e. 
what an alternative action entails and why it does not 'fit' 
the action in question^.
Maxim 3: Describe the regularities of items. These may 
not be recognised by participants, but nevertheless these 
"unwitting regularities" provide further clues to the typical 
position of the items [R. Merton, 1971]. The distinction 
between unwitting and known regularities [fairly constant 
features] belongs to the basic process of formulating the 
adopted programme. The importance of this distinction lies 
in its place in accomplishing the pragamatic interests from 
which the programme originally springs [e.g. doing functional 
analysis or making contact]. It does not matter whether 
awakened features 'reallyare' generally shared. What is 
important is that they can be seen to occur in that form.
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A feature's importance however is lost as soon as the general 
aim of the activity is no longer secured. This provisional 
character of judgements is perhaps more commonplace in 
everyday courses of action ,thani professional studies 'because 
'real' outcomes have to be dealt with or secured rather than 
theoretical ones.
In finding out that an advertisement conforms to the 
category 'prostitute' it is not necessary that the significant 
features which enable that location should be recognised by 
a possible replier. What is necessary is that any judgement 
should self-fulfill itself. When this does not occur the 
resulting outcome causes the reinterpretation of the original 
evidence in order to normalise the surprising outcome. Making 
decisions and judgements in everyday life has a provisional 
nature. Those involved rely upon waiting to see both what an 
outcome will be and what the situation consisted of when an 
interpretation was made.
Maxim 4 : Distinguish between the reasons for an item and 
the typical mode ["objective category of behaviour"] in its 
relation to 'the social system' [R. Merton, 1971], Individual 
motivations do not prove problematic or fragment the typical 
patterns of interpretation, but may prove useful in abutting 
that pattern. This maxim allows for the individuality of 
particular configurations of meaning in order to ensure the 
applicability of the adopted typical mode. Individual 
instances breath life into typical abstractions. However to 
the extent that these instances confound abstractions as 
adopted pragmatic means, they can be "discounted" as singular 
["psychological" motives], rather than collective ["social" 
motives]. Thus, though individual actions may not conform 
to the typical mode, by distilling out singular and collective
- 1 2 0 -
elements both the difference and unity of experience can be 
accommodated. This provides for the accomplishment of a 
programme through finding out, while recognising and 
minimising the varied nature of the instances which constitute 
such a programme of action. For example the differences 
between "cater", "right type", and "just fun" as contextual 
events may be manifest. The modes 'payment' and 'non-payment' 
have to come to terms with them as forms of typical expression. 
Contexted differences are recognised through the typical mode 
and unified as collective documents for it. A "present" and 
"a fee" may be very different things, but reviewed through the 
mode of 'payment' they can be constituted as a unity.
Maxim 5 ; Describe the meanings of items for members.
Merton glosses this maxim in two sentences, stating that its 
accomplishment suggests "appropriate lines of functional 
analysis". Similarly for the reader of advertisements, the 
attainment of this maxim suggests appropriate lines of contact 
choice. However in being stated, the maxim presupposes the 
accomplishment.of description, the achievement of finding out, 
and the understanding of meaning.
Merton's gloss passes over the highly problematic nature 
of this maxim; it does not directly address 'how' the 
ascription or location of meaning comes about. A fundamental 
characteristic in this process is the form of language through 
which making sense or inquiry proceeds. The linguistic 
connections between sociologist and data, between reader and 
advertiser are taken for granted grounds for the accomplishment 
of actions. This unrecognised ground as Gadamer has written, 
fails "to see in the object the counterpart of itself and hence 
understand both" [1976], It is perhaps because of this that
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Merton glosses the relationship between sociology and the 
members studied [a.g. "as will become evident"]. He does 
not recognise that the accomplishment of Maxim 5 comes about 
through at least the other maxims which he details. The 
maxims are not so much rules for locating and describing social 
phenomena, but are practices which are dominantly linguistic 
for constituting phenomena. Events and experiences are 
intelligible according to their accounting-reporting character, 
yet are found to be so through the work of interpretation 
whereby they are constituted.
IN CONCLUSION: Regarding Merton's suggestions on how to 
locate items for functional analysis as a model of practical 
reasoning, we are led to a basic programme for accounting 
for occurrences and events. This programme is remarkably 
similar to that which the above chapters on making contact 
have imputed to contact actors, and which I found myself 
using in reporting the contact domain. And on reflection, it 
is the programme which I instituted in initially experiencing 
contact magazines and contact actors. In this way the practical 
programme gives rise to a relevant code [i.e. the code 
produced by a functionalist and a contact actor would be 
different] for interpretation and establishing a corpus of 
knowledge.
As a means for accounting-reporting, the practical 
programme consists of: 1] accounting for an occurrence by 
establishing its significance in relation to other events and 
experiences; 2] accounting for an occurrence by showing 'how1 
it can be adequately recognised and described through presenting 
opposite and alternative forms; 3] accounting how occurrences 
•fit in' with pre-existent knowledge as expected formations or 
outcomes; 4] accounting for the uniqueness of an occurrence in
relation to what 'was' known; 5] accounting for an occurrence 
by saying what 'was' meant by use of the accounting devices 
1 - 4.
The devices of establishing relevance, comparison, unity, 
and difference in the accounting-reporting of meaning produces 
an occurrence or event as understandable. They permit the 
production of codes for the routine recognition of phenomena 
for 'what they are' through accounts, and the construction of 
more formal structures of types of activity and actor. This 
form of practical reasoning however, also permits those codes 
and structures to be confounded. It makes possible the 
presentation of 'reasonable' accounts and reports which are 
only later discovered as mock-ups and fabrications. There are 
other occasions of language-use which distort actions and 
utterances, one of which will be examined below.
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Practices - The Part Played %■ Competence Xm The 
Conversational Patterns Of Pre-School • Children
SECTION7' TT
Section T  has demonstrated the ways in’, which a typology of 
contact actors can "be established, developed, and changed by events 
which were not as they appeared. These fabrications of a 
rationality may at times confine the professional, sociological 
theorist, to becoming a judgemental-dope. To take benefit of 
Harold G'arfinkel»s writings (1967), the sociologist becomes the 
mam in the everyday member*s society "who produces the stable 
features of the society by acting im compliance with pre-established 
and legitimate alternatives of actiorn that the common culture 
provides.”. Section TT follows this notion of the replication of 
the social, structures of society in relation to pre-school children, 
and seeks to evaluate the part played by practical activities and 
theoretical considerations.
As theory casts doubt upon the competence of everyday inquiries, 
and subjects itself to the danger- of becoming a judgemental, dope, 
adults view the activities of children in a similar manner. To *be* 
a professional1, theorist involves the use of the conception of the 
type * everyday member* j to ’be* an adult, involves the use of the 
conception) of the type ’child’. These conceptual! types provide for 
*ways of . seeing*. Events, people, and.places are, regarded with 
reference to them and thus ’appear* that way. However without an 
awareness of this very constituting process itself,.this important 
function is lost to sight; it is not only a social, world which is 
given to- me by others, but a means for creating that world with- others 
Without this insight the practical nature of the world for the 
theorist and child’s world for the adult appear ’just so’j as 
natural- facts. An awareness of the intersubjectivity of our
realities results in "being able to locate the shared features of 
situations, embodied in language, which give rise to a differentiated 
and structured »social system»', this phenomenological perspective 
views the existence of theory and practice, adults and children* 
as situated accomplishments of people in interaction1 rather than' 
brute facts.
While researching into contact•magazines and becoming aware of 
the existence of a whole range of knowledge and methods which 1 
tapped into without being aware of it ini interpreting ’present» 
events, X stumbled onto another area which was familiar to me yet 
which appeared on reflection to consist of a largely unrecognised 
social1 organisation* My daughter was attending a day-nursery to 
which I took her each morning. On some occasions while .there I 
observed meal-time activities where adults would question children’s 
responses- to their inquiries. Xt appeared as a normal, adult 
activity to question the utterances, and actions of childrens X 
found- myself becoming aware of the times: when I did it.
Yet. this questioning and doubting- process raised what seemed to 
be a fundamental question«- if children could not under st and-Uftat 
was said to them to the extent that adult questioning insisted, 
would not adult-child interaction consist of chaos?- On the other 
hand, if children were more competent than adults took for- granted, 
what features were present to account for this situation? Section II 
addresses these questions, seeking their resolution in a discussion 
of both historical features and’ situated practices. It; is-, an 
assumption of the; Section that an. examination of the adUIt-child 
relation, is-, analogous to the theme- embraced in each sections the 
relation, between theory and practice*
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CHAPTER FOUR
LANGUAGE-USE AMONG PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN 
CHILDREN AND COMPETENCE
When I was a child I spake as a child,
I understood as a child, I thought as a 
child: but when I became a man I put away 
childish things.
[I Corinthians 13:11.]
This chapter and the one which follows it will seek 
to build upon the practical report and theoretical discussion 
of the above chapters. Their subject is language-use among 
pre-school children. This will be based in an examination of 
a day-nursery and the interaction which takes place there 
between staff and pre-school children [Chapter Five], This 
chapter will examine the relation between children and the 
concept of competence, which is crucial in any interaction 
between adults and children.
It will be argued throughout that the child is not totally 
subservient to -physical development- and the simultaneous 
process of 'socialisation' for making sense of his surroundings 
and producing socially perceptive remarks about them. Though 
children are certainly under constraints [e.g. being unable to 
walk, not knowing the phrase ’socially perceptive-], it is 
suggested that the concept of -the child- is socially produced. 
Moreover, this production distorts the actions and utterances 
which it seeks to approach and label. The unique event of 
being a person occupies only a marginal interest in the 
language of object production.
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A RESEARCH NOTE: There is certainly an irony in calling 
into question the use of the word 'child* and the taken for 
granted practices and knowledge which accompany it. This is 
because while casting doubt upon its use, 'child' is used in 
just this ordinary way here. Beginning with this irony 
however makes topical the ways in which children are treated. 
Attention is drawn not only to descriptions of interaction 
which occur between adults and children and the predominant 
subjects around which they are organised, but also to the 
reflexive nature of acting socially which constitutes 
interaction and those subjects. The focus of study falls 
upon the reflexivity of members' constructs. This has 
importance not only for the substantive topic of inquiry, but 
also for doing research and producing sociological reports.
Courses in sociology more often than not contain a 
programme entitled 'research methods' [cf. D.L, Phillips, 1973] 
The emphasis here is upon the statistical approach to social 
phenomena. The recognition of a phenomenon for examination and 
study by statistical method, and how the sociologist interacts 
with those from whom he has to compile his data, are topics 
which are only dealt with in terms of the programme itself 
[e.g. significance, error, rejection]. Non-statistical 
methods, generally combined under the title 'participant 
observation' are sadly neglected.
It appears that though statistical methods need to be 
taught, descriptive methods require little examination. The 
reason for this is the assumption that such descriptions can 
•somehow' be done without much reflection upon the underlying 
process. Further, this assumption would also seem to be 
connected to the belief that non-statistical methods are
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'less' scientific or 'less' precise than statistical methods. 
This is because they cannot produce the conclusions of 
statistical inquiry such as verification and prediction, 
though the 'true' status of these concepts and their relation 
to the contexts about which they claim to have authority 
would seem to be in doubt [cf. A. Cicourel, 1964. On participant 
observation cf. D. Silverman, 1972, S. Bruyn, 1966],
The emphasis upon professional expertise which can somehow 
be done is not confined to courses in sociology. It may well 
be that it pervades most areas of life; a neglect of the common 
environment in favour of expert knowledge from professionals.
For the •would-be' sociologist interested in how people proceed 
in their daily lives rather than tables of statistics, the 
production of a report [seen as ’inside knowledge’], presents 
peculiar problems. The topic for study can easily be selected; 
indeed it often seems to present itself. But having decided 
upon the subject how does the sociologist proceed? Does he 
keep research diaries? Use tape-recorders and video equipment? 
Or just sit, watch, and listen? Whichever approach is used, 
a more basic question is what is to be observed?
The answer appears to be easy: action that is informed 
upon by participants' speech. However in virtually any 
situation the richness and complexity which these phenomena 
present overwhelms the observer. The research method which is 
invoked at this point is that of selection; filtering out the 
elements which are essential to the domain iri question in 
relation to the researcher's system of relevances. Such a 
system controls the construction of a descriptive picture of 
'what it is like' to be part of a particular kind of action. 
This filtering process remains for the operating sociologist
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unexplicated; it is uninteresting. The sociologist emerges 
with a product which details the characteristic features of 
the area which has been studied. Yet the bedrock of social 
life [speech and action] which constituted the world under 
study and enabled the production of the sociological report, 
is left in the shadows. Others have made this point, stressing 
the need for the contexts and grounds of sociological 
explanation to be examined [cf. T.P. Wilson, 1970. D.L. 
Phillips, 1971. M. Phillipson, 1972].
Before entering the nursery as 'a researcher' in order to 
collect 'data', I had decided to focus upon the filtering 
process. Reflecting upon adult talk about children as objects 
[e.g. talking about a child in his presence as if he were not 
there], it appeared that there were separate and discrepant 
linguistic areas: adults' talk in relation to children; 
childrens' talk in relation to adults; childrens' talk in 
relation to themselves. Normal sociological practice would 
filter social reality from among these areas of everyday talk 
without giving them recognition as the producers of everyday 
scenes. From this basis I decided to concentrate upon specific 
instances of talk in order to examine the fragmentary character 
of speech, and the social mechanics by which 'complete' or 
'satisfactory' accounts and outcomes of action are produced.
By the adoption of this particular research method I sought 
to display not only 'inside knowledge' of the daily routine 
of a day-nursery, but also the speech practices whereby that 
knowledge was constituted. This interest is a sociological 
one; for those involved in these speech practices the 
reflexivity of their accounts is treated with a "passing 
matter of fact" [H. Garfinkel, 1967].
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CQMPETENCE: As a preamble to an examination of actual 
events within the nursery [Chapter Five], I want to address 
and make explicit an assumption which is central to the 
formulation of this chapter. This is the status afforded to 
the idea of competence. More particularly this is in relation 
to: children and their demonstrations of competence; everyday 
ideas on competence; and the resulting negation of the 
possibility of children's competence when it is exhibited in 
commonsense situations. In order to do this competence will 
be examined in both practical and theoretical terms.
A Practical Examination of Competence: This makes 
problematic a child's claim to knowledge. It poses the 
problem: what constituent factors are there which warrant an 
utterance as understandable? As an occasion to approach this 
problem I 'heard' my daughter, Vicki, reading a book. The 
book was concerned with three participants: Peter, Jane, and 
Pat the dog. The section which was being read concerned 
Peter and Jane "paddling in the water". This was how Vicki 
accounted for the pictured activity; the book referred to 
"having fun" and "liking water". Each description in the book 
[e.g. "Here is Peter."] was placed opposite a picture; the 
written text making reference to the pictorial representation. 
These written descriptions are not definitive; they do not 
rule out other interpretations of the pictorial form.
One must agree with Wittgenstein that a picture is a model 
of social reality, and that it is also a fact. But when he 
contends that the elements of a picture are related in a 
determinate way, and that this indicates that "things" are 
related in the same way, he overlooks the situation of 
interpretation. For the early Wittgenstein, pictorial form 
mirrored and corresponded to reality, "like a measure" [1971].
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It was only later that Wittgenstein adopted the view that 
understanding depended upon the situation of use of a particular 
grammar [1972].
In hearing Vicki read, my procedure was to ask questions 
concerning the pictures in the book. By being insistent upon 
a sense of definiteness the conversation developed into an 
examination of the reasons for regarding a representation in 
a certain way rather than another. The conversation».
A: What are they doing in that picture?
B: Erm, playing in the water.
A: What's Pat doing?
B: Watching.
A: What's he watching?
1: B: The...Peter and Jane in the water.
A: What are Peter and Jane doing?
B: Paddling.
A: Paddling. And what's Peter doing?
B: Playing with a ball in the water.
A: How do you know it's a ball?
B: 'Cause I do, 'cause it's round.
A: Well, the sun's round.
B: No. But look. That. [Points to 'ball'.]
A: 'Look that' what?
B: Round, red thing.
A: How do you know it isn't an apple?
B: 'Cause it isn't an apple.
A: Why not?
B: 'Cause it isn't.
A: Why?
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B: 'Cause it isn't.
A: Well apples are red and apples are round.
B: Yer.
A: He might have been eating an apple and dropped it. 
B: Yes.
A: Is he? [Vicki nods her head.] He is?
B: I think so,
A: Well you said he was playing with a ball.
B: Yer.
A: Well, what's he doing? Playing with a ball or 
eating an apple?
B: Playing with a ball.
A: Why?
B: 'Cause I know he is.
A: Tell me how you can tell? How do you know?
B: 'Cause some balls are red.
A: But apples are red.
B: I know, but little balls could be all red.
A: Well apples are all red.
B: Oh, can't we get on with it?
A: O.K., but can you tell me how you know that that's 
a ball and not an apple?
B: 'Cause there's not apple trees. [Begins reading 
another page.]
A: What is it? [Points to picture.]
B: Apple.
As How do you know.
B: 'Cause...I don't know if it is an apple or not.
A: Is it an apple or is it a ball?
B: A ball.
A: How do you know?
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Bs »Cause Pat's "ball, ils red»
As Maw do you know Pat,»a Ball iis red?
Bs: 'Cause I do »cause I seem it in another Book.
As Let»s se® if we can find this Ball, again. (Turns 
over pages..)
Bs It is a Ball.. You're wrong- and! I was right.
As Mow do you know?
Bs Look. (Points to picture.) Pat»s going to catch it.
The conversatiom has Been separated into* three- different 
parts*’, I) the Beginning of the questioning procedure and the 
emergence of the topi© »a Ball»? 2) the comparative questioning 
of »Ball* andl »apple»? 3) the resolution! of the topi© »Ball or 
apple?». In an essential, sense; this conversational structure 
is different to those found in the mundane world!.. It Belongs 
to- a special order- where turn taking of questions and answers 
is expected? having a reading test at school; Being questioned 
By the police? having an interview for- a job. Im relation to 
children)» adults use the question and answer- procedure im order 
to- maintain- Both practical, and theoretical, dominance» This 
procec&are Both directs actions; and demonstrates and maintains 
the grounds, of that direction (parent-adult authority).
Carl Werthman has written im a paper on juvenile delinquency 
that; omafi young people question, the grounds of the organisation 
of actions (which thereby demands an account of such 
organisation), they face- a choice as to their orientation- to 
that ordTer. For Werthman it is in such decisions that th® 
essence of delinquency lies (l97r). Before such a point is 
reached however, the adult»s questioning procedure continues 
in a fairly orderly way. Perhaps the only difference Between 
the above dlata and »natural' adult-child conversations is the
3s
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emphasis placed! upom a- claim, to a piece of knowledge ini 
relatiom to the activity being crarried out (reading-words).
This disjunction between the overt purpose of the activity and 
the disruptive effect which the questioning- has uporr this, 
cam be seem in Yloki’s reactiom of "Oh, can’t we get om with 
it?'*.
Part: Is The first part of the conversation! concerns 
questions upon the activities which are represented by the 
pictures in the book:. Descriptions of such activities have to 
have an element: of correctness about them, but this is im 
relation to a background of assumptions concerning cultural1, 
knowledge. Once: the major categories of aotors and activities 
have been appropriately selected and agreed’ upon in interaction 
the notion of the correctness of description© is specified by 
the background, assumptions and not *independent* facts.
Harvey Sacks has said that children acquire- social", 
categories in interaction with other-members of society. These 
categories identify and select particular- people or groups as 
of a particular kind; they produce an orderly sense- of social, 
structure and appear as part of" * the natural order*; as 
•»natural, groupings of categories'*. Such groupings are termed 
by Sacks »»membership categorization! devices'*, which consist; of 
categories, and rules of" application to actual, situations.
Sacks has noted the difference between devices which are 
adequate for- the classification of any set of people- and those 
which are not. For example, all people can be classified by 
the device »sex* and its categories »male* and ’female»", but 
not, all. people can be classified by the device ’occupatiom* 
(1974, 1972).
The description- of the picture by Ticki rests upom the
- 1 3 2 -
use of such general and multiplex devices in tackling the 
problem of categorisation. General devices help to establish 
and maintain an orderly cultural background. Because of their 
generality [i.e. their specific application to everyone], usage 
can be judged as either correct or incorrect, though this can 
be problematic [cf. H. Garfinkel's discussion of the 
transvestite Agnes's management os sexual status, 1967]. For 
example, the use of the device 'sex' and the category 'boy' 
underlies the recognition of Peter.
A memory for past interaction further maintains and 
occasions a particular corpus of knowledge. In the above 
conversation the participants are approached in terms of 
"they" and personal names. These individuals are remembered 
from the past, and their factual texture comes from the 
attention directed towards them under the maxim 'regard them 
in that way'. This, as an ongoing process, constructs an 
orderly body of knowledge. It is not stable however. If 
participants wish to forget or reconstruct knowledge then they 
can [cf. D. Zimmerman and M. Pollner, 1970]. The 'correct' 
recognition of a person or activity depends upon being able 
to direct attention towards the social nuances and emphases 
being used by participants in interaction.
Against this background of obvious, occasioned knowledge, 
multiplex devices form the foreground of description. They 
formulate the particular mode of expression with which the 
interaction is to be regarded, detailing in specifics persons 
and activities. In the conversation, the device 'playing' was 
selected by Vicki in order to convey the sense of the occasion 
portrayed in the picture. In her rendition this device at 
least contains the categories 'paddling' and 'playing with a
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ball in water'. Also allied to the device 'playing' is the 
category 'watching'. This is integrated into the sense of 
the picture as seen by Vicki: Pat the dog is watching Jane 
paddle and Peter play with a ball.
Part 2: The second segment of the conversation is 
concerned with the criteria for the recognition of 'ball' 
and the suitability of the application of another criterion. 
Vicki begins by stating a criterion for identifying a ball: 
"'cause it's round". In response to repeated questioning she 
affirms the obvious character of the object ball: "No. But 
look. That"; "Round, red thing". Her conviction of the 
suitability of the interpretation 'ball' is then apparently 
swayed by the comparison of the object in the picture to an 
apple. In response to the question of whether Peter has been 
eating an apple she says: "I think so". Further questioning 
on the status of the object in the picture centres around its 
use; either for play or to be eaten.
No further criteria are introduced to distinguish between 
an article for play and an article of food. Rather Vicki 
stands by her original interpretation of 'ball'. Her answers 
to the questions treat the pictures situation qua situation, 
rather than an occasion for a demonstration of analysis. She 
is inductive, supporting the selection of 'ball' for the 
object in the picture by the possibility that other balls in 
the world share similar features. This reasoning contrasts 
with the questioning, which uses abstract features [shape, 
colour], in order to examine the particular object.
In an examination of the approaches to insanity, Coulter 
has suggested that differences in interpretation are the result 
of different judgemental procedures; that the attainment of
- 1 3 4 -
some concensus in interpretation results from the adoption of 
similar styles of judgement, depending upon context [J. Coulter, 
1973]. The disparate gap in communication which the use of 
different sets of procedures brings can clearly be seen in 
Vicki's exasperated answer to a comparison of the roundness of 
both a ball and the sun: "No. But look. That". In accounting 
for a pictured scene of activity, Vicki makes sense of the 
observed objects and reports upon them as an interrelated 
structure of meaning. Because of this, introducing the subject 
of the sun is a total non-sequitur. It has no place in the 
structure of Peter, Jane, Pat, play, paddling, and ball. The 
sun cannot be played with or held in the hand. It is more or 
less beyond words: "No. But look. That".
The second section has two different, though in terms
of the conversation similar, parts. The first is the agreement 
by Vicki that the object in question may indeed be an apple.
The second, the forthright "Oh, can't we get on with it?".
One is acquiescence; the other exasperation. However, both 
appear similar as procedures for reformulating the interaction 
in terms of its original purpose; to drop the pointless topic 
of 'ball' and resume 'a parent hearing his daughter read'.
Part 3: The final section of the conversation continues 
the 'apple-ball' topic. In response to these questions Vicki 
introduces two new features for justifying her selection. The 
first is relating 'apple' to "apple trees", implying that the 
adoption of apple for the pictured object would be unfounded. 
This is followed by another change of mind by Vicki, and the 
selection of 'apple'. However she is unable or unwilling to 
relocate the pictured activities and interactants in terms of 
'apple' and reverts back to 'ball'. The second new feature
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is the remembering of prior knowledge about the interactants 
and the object in question: "'Cause I do, 'cause I seen it in 
another book"; "'Cause Pat's ball's red".
Vicki demonstrates that the object in question has an 
owner.,; which is based upon a claim to prior knowledge. By 
locating Pat as the owner of the red object Vicki further 
clarifies her case. Just as 'mother' and 'baby' "go together" 
[H. Sacks, 1974], so do 'dog' and 'ball'. Connecting 'dog' 
and 'apple' does not seem natural. The conclusion to the 
conversation is related to this 'going together' of categories. 
A picture showing Peter's arm extended, a red object in the 
'sky', and Pat below it resulted in Vicki saying: "It is a ball 
You're wrong and I was right". The categories 'throwing' and 
'catching' go together with 'dog' and 'ball' under the device 
'play'. It is interesting to note Vicki's awareness of the 
temporal span of the conversation, and the uncertainty of 
judgements: "You're wrong and I was right". This is what 
Garfinkel has called waiting until later to see what was meant 
[1967]. She contrasts the 'present' with the 'past'. Though 
throughout the series of questions and answers Vicki's 
judgements were uncertain and possibly unfounded in relation 
to the nature of the interaction, the instances of 'throwing' 
and 'catching' validates them.
The examination of the question and answer session with 
Vicki reveals what it is for an utterance to be understandable; 
to be competent. Wittgenstein said [1972] that a game does not 
only have rules but also a point. In the context in which she 
found herself, Vicki had to locate the point of the 
language-game in 'reading with daddy'; it was obviously not 
»reading correctly'. The point of the language-game involved
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adequately describing the meaning of a pictured situation, 
upon which turned the status of objects. These two tasks are 
fused together; the accomplishment of one depends upon the 
recognition of the other. The conversation shows that to be 
understandable and competent depends upon the negotiable and 
emergent character of interaction. It depends upon the use of 
procedures for the selection and elaboration of selected 
devices and their categories; a background assumption of 
culturally specific knowledge; the invocation of prior 
knowledge; the imputation of motive as a reason for a state 
of affairs [cf. P. McHugh et al, 1974]; and finally, upon 
the claim to be a bona-fide member of a situation with a right 
to the assumption of adequate knowledge [e;g. "I was right"].
A Theoretical Examination of Competence: In the course of 
everyday affairs 'knowing what one is talking about' is a 
sanctioned property of discourse. Within conversational 
settings such competence is an assumption whereby discourse 
is maintained as orderly and ongoing. As soon as this 
assumption is called into question, conversational settings 
break down [cf. H. Garfinkel, 1967]. There are other occasions 
when elements of competence are withdrawn from participants 
in a conversation in an orderly fashion. For example, the 
mutual establishment of locations by conversational 
participants shifts from an occasioned 'commonsense geography' 
towards 'giving instructions' or 'inside knowledge' when a 
stranger is involved in conversation [cf. E.A. Schegloff, 1972].
The stranger concentrates upon the competent knowledge 
assumed to be held by others, whether it be to gain instruction 
for reaching a location or, like the sociologist, cultural 
knowledge of a group. Alfred Schütz constructs his conception
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of a stranger as: "an adult individual of our times and 
civilization who tries to be permanently accepted or at least 
tolerated by the group which he approaches" [1971 ]. Though 
Schütz specifically excludes people with only transitory contact 
with a group, for the present purposes his definition of a 
stranger will be sufficient.
In order to be recognised as a stranger, and be accepted 
or tolerated at that level, depends upon a formulation of an 
expected lack of knowledge [e.g. coming from another city].
The asking of a question in this case provides the dual features 
of topic [the subject of the question] and resource [how to 
formulate an answer in terms of 'who' the questioner is]. 
Schegloff notes for example, that asking for a certain place 
may elicit a question concerning knowledge of the area.
Depending upon the answer is a choice of routes and the place 
references contained in the selected route [1972]. That 
remarks formulate more than they appear to do enables 
strangers and others to gloss their surroundings and 
experiences when in interaction, even if only for the sake of 
conversation [cf. "Rose's Gloss", H. Garfinkel and H. Sacks,
1970].
The stranger provides a good example for a demonstration 
of a lack of competence which does not evoke sanctions or 
derision. Being a bona-fide stranger however is a contingent 
matter, depending largely upon the obviousness of what is 
strange and how this is portrayed. For example, a man with 
brain damage has provided an account of seeking directions:
"When someone passed by, I asked him how to get to Kazanovka.
But he just smirked and walked on, since the settlement was 
right there - you could see it through the hedges. I still 
couldn't believe it and asked another person. 'Look for
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yourself', he said,'it's right here!"' [A.R. Luria, 1975].
Seekiny directions depends for its accomplishment not just 
upon demonstrating a manifest lack of knowledge. Though the 
above account relates the difficulties experienced by a 
brain-damaged person, it also displays the appraisals which 
people make of utterances. In the above example if the 
questioner had asked 'is this?' rather than "how to get to", 
the responses may have been different. Such a part of speech 
as 'is this?', reveals that the questioner has recognised the 
possibility that the immediate surroundings may have relevance 
for him. The questioner requires instructions on how to 
regard his surroundings in relation to his system of relevances 
and not how to recognise them as in the above example. .Failure 
to exhibit situated understandings and problems [e.g. 'I'm 
lost', 'I don't know the area'] as a condition for being 
understood places the assumption of interactional competence 
and further conversational interaction in doubt.
When in the position of a stranger a person must demonstrate 
not only that he lacks the requisite cultural knowledge, but 
also that he has the social skills to use knowledge. A 
bona-fide stranger's dilemma is the search and retrieval of 
appropriate knowledge. For a none bona-fide stranger however 
[i.e. one who is unable to carry out everyday affairs 
without interference], because by definition the means are in 
doubt the dilemma is one of recognition and thereby identity. 
Those who are seen as incompetent are thereby produced as 
lying outside the specific, socially constructed world. Because 
of this production process, in interaction there ceases to be 
'a world in common' [cf. P.L. Berger, 1971],
In this situation one or more of four validity claims have
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come into question. Conversely, where competence is an 
assumption this accomplishment recognises these claims as a 
background resource. The claims involved are: understandability; 
the truth of statements; the sincerity of a speaker; and the 
appropriate placing of a speech. In general it appears that 
interactants do not dwell upon these features of competence.
They are unstated claims which speakers mutually expect they 
can perform and satisfy. As both a resource for framing an 
entry into and sustaining a position in a collective world 
they form a model of pure communicative action [T.A. McCarthy,
1976], There is however, little fit between the ideal nature 
of this model and actual situations of talk. The ideal model 
of communication cannot be totally fulfilled. Yet people let 
this pass. On some occasions however, elements of this model 
do become an issue. This can be demonstrated by another 
situation: prison.
On a broad level people committed to prison are branded as 
morally incompetent, because they have not abided by the legal 
rules of the society. At the more particular level of language 
in interaction between prisoners and warders - and no doubt 
within both these groups - there are different forms of verbal 
address, exchange, and appeals to rules as exhibiting a 
particular social order [cf. L. Weider, 1974]. In looking at 
talk among and between such institutionally differentiated 
groups, the idea of universal understanding [i.e . a model of 
pure communicative action] becomes problematic. Some forms of 
life [e.g. being a prisoner] presuppose other forms which are 
seen as antagonistic and which are reacted to in a like manner. 
Because of this interaction between the two cannot trade off 
a mutual assumption of competence. Relations between 
anatagonistic forms of life characterises "not the language
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used by discourse, nor the circumstances in which it is 
deployed, but discourse itself as practice." [M. Foucault,
1977]. In this situation the assumptions of the universal 
naming ability of language and the face value of environments 
are negated. Instead, attention is paid to language as means 
of constructing and producing appearances.
On a mundane everyday level discourse as practice has 
inherent in it the model of pure communicative action as a 
unifying element. The institutional recognition of moral 
incompetence however results in doubt being thrown on at least 
two of the components of this model: truth and sincerity. This 
doubt concerning the competence of remarks is reciprocated 
between both warders and prisoners. Weider for example relates 
that an element of the convict code is "do not trust staff". 
Staff also used a version of the code in order to connect 
prisoners’ actions to a possible goal: "By seeing the potential 
code relevance of the act as an attack on staff, the staff 
member identified ’the’ specific meaning of the act." [1974]
In a similar way, prisoners relate to warders' utterances 
and actions, forming and transforming them into an array of 
objects understandable in terms of the discursive relations 
imposed by the difference of formations. Jimmy Boyle, a 
prisoner, has described the kind of attention and interpretation 
which is paid to warders' actions: "Larry and I had the 
Inverness trial to attend, so we spoke in whispers to each 
other about it. We had someone to watch out for the screws 
while we searched our cells for listening devices. We would 
come up with endless permutations as to what the game was. A 
screw would mention something completely innocent, and we 
would pounce on it later when alone, dissect it and interpret
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it in all sorts of different ways." [1977].
Boyle describes the somewhat secret life of prisoners in 
respect of the attention which they pay to the organisation of 
a prison, the intentions of those within the authority 
structure as a vocabulary of motives [cf. C. Wright Mills,
1971], and the background of understandings which are brought 
into play in order to constitute interpretation. The 
provisional nature of interpretation is recognised by Boyle.
This also demonstrates the type of communication engaged in 
between warders and prisoners, and the assumptions which are 
used.
Central to Boyle's description is a scepticism of what 
warders said. The reciprocal doubting of truth and sincerity 
of utterances which can be seen to occur between warders and 
prisoners results in a form of pseudo or distorted communication 
[cf. J. Habermas, 1976]. Though for Habermas, distorted >
communication produces misunderstandings which are not 
recognised as such by the participants, in Boyle's case it 
would seem that he fully recognises the form of language-game 
in which he was engaged. That because of organisational 
constraints [i.e. the very form of language-game], he was not 
trusted and could not trust his keepers as well [cf. S. Cohen 
and L. Taylor, 1972].
Because of the lack of situational or cultural knowledge 
the stranger is seen to be incompetent. The prisoner is one 
who has not abided by the legal rules of society, and who 
because of this becomes involved in a form of distorted 
communication where words and actions are doubted. Amongst 
none of these theorised groups is the assumption of competence 
doubted per se; in interaction competence is always a facet of
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a stock of knowledge. For the stranger it is assumed that if 
he had 'inside knowledge' he would be able to use it 
competently. For the prisoner, that he could be competent 
[truthful and sincere] if he wanted to be. However when that 
universal group of people located by age and known as children 
is addressed, this is not the case.
Throughout early life the adult power and authority 
structure removes from young people the semblance of competence. 
Unlike the stranger who openly elects to portray his lack of 
competence in knowledge as a condition of membership, or the 
prisoner who has competence wrenched from him, the child is 
taken to have no competence. Rather than being an assumption 
as it is in the majority of situations, for children the 
demonstration of competence is a condition of admittance to a 
different language community, and consequently to different 
forms of action. Without this demonstration [e.g. acting one's 
age] and rite de passage, conditioned to a great degree by the 
appearance of 'age', the young person remains in an inferior 
position vis a vis adults.
The word 'child' has a history. It can be found that in 
medieval society our generally postulated difference between 
the child and the adult did not exist. As soon as the child 
could live without constant care then he belonged to adult 
society. Whereas in medieval times the definition of the word 
'child' was loose and wide ranging, in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries childhood was marked out by a 
specialisation in dress and a change of attitude towards 
children. Rather than being part of adult society the child 
was set apart. Because of his innocence he was a source of 
interest and amusement to adults. At this time teachers and
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moralists emphasised another view of childhood which dismissed 
adults' amusement as indulgence. They stressed discipline 
and rationality. The innocence of childhood had to be 
protected, particularly by the Church, against being spoiled 
and corrupted by adults. Childhood was an extended period of 
time brought about by subordination and bound up with ideas of 
dependence. Childhood ceased with independence. Among less 
dependant classes an awareness of age as a stable, measuring 
principle sprang up, developing into the stages 'child' and 
'youth' [P. Aries, 1973].
The moral and rational ideals of subordination to adults, 
the Church, and the family developed and persisted into the 
nineteenth century. These ideals were rooted in the middle 
classes and played out in the development of education [e.g. 
the development of the public school system]. For the working 
classes the necessity to work, the hours and conditions of 
work, and the dominance of industrialisation meant that 'the 
home' and 'the family' were only fragmentary concepts [cf.
R. Fletcher, 1967], The development of education at this 
period was related to these two classes, where working class 
children were expected to be educated and working at around 
ten years old. H. G. Wells referred to this as educating the 
working classes "for employment on lower class lines, and 
with specially trained inferior teachers" [D.V. Glass, 1959],
The gap between childhood and adulthood was occupied by 
'youth' in the seventeenth century. Between the eighteenth 
and twentieth centuries there develped the conception of 
•adolescence'. This grew on two levels. Firstly on a social 
level where the period of attaining maturity became a dominant 
theme. Childhood was shortened and transformed by war, fashion,
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education, marriage, and economic and political power. The 
emergence of these various factors resulted in the social 
construction of a fairly homogenous group of young people who 
possessed a consciousness which was alternative to the 
existing social order [cf. T. Roszak, 1968]. Central to the 
genesis of such a sense of social structure, though largely 
covert within it, is the second level of growth for the
conception of adolescence. This knowledge concerned sex and 
anatomy.
For medicine and commonsense, sexual maturity in its 
relation to age is an important factor for defining 'normal* 
and 'pathological' development. Knowledge of the onset of 
sexual maturity [e.g. menstruation] and the problems associated 
with it [e.g. venereal disease] are widespread if sometimes 
obscure. Today knowledge about adolescence is far more 
specific than it was in the nineteenth century. Discharges 
from the genitals were variously thought to be brought about 
by ice-cream, bad weather, marshy regions, footwarmers, and too 
much coffee. Menstruation was thought to be begun because 
young women developed more rapidly than young men and produced 
more blood. The lining of the uterus was postulated as the 
weakest part of the vascular system, and under pressure from 
the over-production of blood was thought to rupture. Bleeding 
occurred until equilibrium was restored to the vascular system.
This explanation of menstruation was offered in 1 8 7 8 , over 
forty years after the discovery of the ovum and thirty years 
after the postulation that menstruation depended upon 
ovulation [R. Pearsall, 1969]. Twentieth century medicine 
is more certain and specific, defining puberty as the period 
when the gonads grow quickly, sex hormones lead to the 
development of secondary sex characteristics, and mature
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gametes [egg or sperm cells] are released for the first time 
[D.F. Horrobin, 1972]. The development of such specific 
knowledge, disseminated throughout everyday life, has meant 
that adolescence need not be speculated about. It can now be 
recognised [e.g. the growth of facial hair, the growth of 
breasts], and even be confirmed by medical examination.
IN CONCLUSION: Looking at the historical indexicality of 
'objective' phenomena shows that they are essentially related 
to specific usage in social institutions. The meaning of 
the world 'child' depended upon the specific historical 
situation in which it was located. As this applies for usage 
past, it also applies for usage present. Where sociologists, 
historians, and others examine developments and changes in 
phenomena [essentially indexical in character], they employ 
and trade off a sense of social structure which enables them 
to overcome the indexicality of their task and accomplish a 
satisfactory account for all practical purposes. Accounts 
are methodically organised and assembled in this way, which 
specifies what adequate knowledge 'in this case' consists of 
[cf. A. Blum, 1970].
It is just this procedural process in the production of 
knowledge, in relation to the treatment of children today, 
with which the next chapter will be concerned. One important 
element in occasioning a corpus of knowledge about children 
has been noted by David MacKay. He suggests that from both 
a cotnmonsense and a professional sociological position, to be 
adult is to be complete: mature, rational, competent, social, 
and autonomous. To be a child however is to be incomplete: 
immature, irrational, incompetent, asocial, and acultural. 
MacKay locates within this commonsense viewpoint a paradox.
As general terms [i.e. portraying a theorised social structure]
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'adult' and 'child' imply different, essential stages; 
different ontological orders of being. The consequence of 
this general view is that adults and children are fundamentally 
different in respect of communicative ability. Because of 
the gross difference in the two orders, adults and children 
cannot talk to and understand one another. Yet it is 
manifest both in sociological writings about children and in 
adult-child interaction at an everyday level that adults and 
children can understand one another [R.W. MacKay, 1974, 1973], 
The implication of connecting children with incompetence by 
adults, is that there is an area of silence between the two.
Yet the accomplishment of the very feature which raises this 
implication depends upon the ability for children and adults 
to interact. It is this topic which will now be examined.
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CHAPTER FIVE
LANGUAGE-USE AMONG PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN 
NORMATIVE AND INTERPRETIVE OUTLOOKS
I would like to show that a discourse is not 
a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, 
between a reality and a language, the intrication 
of a lexicon and an experience; I would like to 
show with precise examples that in analysing 
discourses themselves, one sees the loosening 
of the embrace, apparently so tight, of words 
and things, and the emergence of a group of 
rules proper to discursive practice. These rules 
define not the dumb existence of a reality, nor 
the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the 
ordering of objects. 'Words and things' is the 
entirely serious title of a problem; it is the 
ironic title of a work that modifies its own 
form, displaces its own data, and reveals, at 
the end of the day, a quite different task. A 
task that consists of not - of no longer - 
treating discourses as groups of signs [signifying 
elements referring to contents of representations] 
but as practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak.
[M. Foucault, 1977]
This chapter examines the relations between adults and 
children, and between children themselves, in a day-nursery. 
It seeks to show how in actual occasions of interaction, the
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conception of the incompetence of 'the child' is used and 
maintained. This means that in the engagement between 
theoretical resources and actual behaviours, 'the child' is 
produced as incompetent [i.e. made observable].
THE NURSERV: The day-nursery which forms the subject of 
this chapter was not selected at random. In fact it entered 
into my daily routine, as my daughter attended it. Permission 
to enter the nursery as more than a routine visitor was 
granted by the Social Services Department of the County Council. 
This permission was conditional upon not revealing the 
whereabouts of the nursery or the real names of the children. 
Gathering the data took place after my daughter had left the 
nursery, yet the majority of the children knew me as 'Vicki's 
daddy'. There were twenty children aged between two and five 
years old ["big ones"], in the nursery at the time the research 
was carried out, and five young children ["little ones" or 
"babies"]. The nursery had an "official" capacity of thirty, 
but the remaining places were held in reserve in order to 
handle any urgent cases presented by the Social Services 
Department.
The staff in the nursery at this time were: the matron, 
who was in charge; her deputy, the sister; four nursery 
officers [known to the children as "aunties"], who were the 
main ones to look after the children; one part-time nursery 
officer; two part-time cleaners; and a cook. The nursery was 
open from eight o'clock in the morning until half past five 
in the afternoon. The main group of staff [matron, sister, 
and nursery officers], was organised into two working groups. 
Each group alternated weekly between being "on earlies" or 
"lates"; working either from eight o'clock in the morning
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until four o'clock in the afternoon, or from half past nine in 
the morning until half past five in the afternoon.
The nursery consisted of a single storey building fenced 
in on all sides. The outside area was divided into two 
different sections by fences; one for public access, consisted 
of pathways and gardens; the other was a lawned play area for 
the children. Internally the nursery was organised with a view 
to containing the children, while providing space for the 
administration of their needs and the comfort of the staff.
The areas which the children were not generally allowed access 
consisted of the matron's office, the kitchen, the staff room, 
and toilet.
For the children there were two play rooms, one for each 
of the two groups of children. The signal for a child's 
passage from being a "little one" to a "big one" was loosely 
based upon age, depending upon the abilities and demands 
displayed by the child. When a child had reached the age of 
two, and could use the toilet and feed his or herself, then 
they would move into the "big ones". This move is not only 
related to a child's age, but is a measure of the care and 
insulation which the formal nursery setting afforded to 
children of only a few months old.^ As a child became more 
demanding of his nursery environment he was regarded as a 
danger to the other, younger children. Accordingly the "big 
ones" room offered slides, climbing frames, and a little play 
house. Another factor contributing to the benchmark [cf. J.A. 
Roth, 1973] of the move to the "big ones", was the children 
leaving the nursery to attend school. The judgement of whether 
a child was a "big one" or not had attendant upon it the 
number of children who had reached this higher level of
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development. In this way, a child's actions would be viewed 
not merely according to behavioural displays but through the 
filter of organisational priorities and constraints.
Places in the nursery were in short supply, parents 
having to put their child's name on a waiting list. This 
position was made more acute by the Social Services Department 
using the nursery as a partial remedy for people's problems. 
Though access to files and documents in the nursery office 
was denied me, from talk amongst members of staff 
classifications of entrants to the nursery based upon 
'problems' could be gauged. Though in everyday use as features 
of speech these classifications lacked a rigidity in that they 
might be used differently or in combination on separate 
occasions, they specified a particular form of social 
organisation: that which was officially problematic as 
specified by social work files. Staff referred to "unmarried 
mothers", "one parent family", "children who cannot mix", 
"criminal family", "child batterers", "neglected children", 
"depressed mother", and the ubiquitous catch-all "problem 
home".
References such as these, made in relation to specific 
people, were used as somehow covert indicators of a wider but 
unspoken system of interconnected events. In this way staff 
did not go into the intimate details of people's lives and 
biographies [at least while I was there], but relied upon 
mutual understandings as a structure to support the particular 
topic of their conversation [e.g. a particular child]. It 
appeared that though certain children might present problems 
of behaviour [e.g. biting other children], being 'problematic' 
was a formalised construct which depended upon official
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involvement of the social work agency.
THE ORGANISATION OF THE NURSERY; The nursery day begins 
at eight o'clock in the morning and ends at five thirty in the 
afternoon. At various periods between these times children 
may enter or leave the nursery. They may be brought later 
than the opening time because it is part of their daily 
routine or because of some outside reason [e.g. a visit to the 
doctor]. They may leave the nursery earlier than the closing 
time for similar reasons. Between entry and exit they are 
confined to the nursery grounds subject to a formally 
organised day.
As the nursery is a place of work, time is organised 
according to the tasks which have to be completed; this 
organisation is ideally towards the realisation of future 
states of affairs as a measure of the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the nursery [cf. A. Etzioni, 1964], From 
the point of view of such formal organisation, "time is [now] 
currency; it is not passed but spent" [E.P. Thompson, 1970],
The daily timetable for the nursery was as follows:
8.00.a.m.: Children enter the nursery and have 
breakfast in the "little ones"' room.
8.30.a.m.: The "big ones" move to their room and 
play; the "little ones" play.
11.00.a.m.: The "big ones" watch television.
11.30. a.m.: All children have a wash ["big ones" wash
themselves], and have dinner.
12.15.p.m.: Play. i
12.30. p.m.: One member of staff [one from each room]
has dinner; the other two supervise the
children.
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1.15.p.m.: The staff alternate for dinner.
3.00.p.m.: All children have a wash and have tea.
3.30. p.m.: Play.
5.30. p.m.: Nursery closes.
According to the nursery staff there was no set policy by 
the Social Services Department upon how the time in the nursery 
was to be organised. Yet they noted the generalisation that 
all the nurseries of which they had experience were organised 
in a much similar manner. This was accorded the status of 
tradition: the matron and sister implemented the regime they 
had experienced. The relationship between the type of 
organisation and implementation was located in a network of 
experience of other organisers: "We [matrons and sisters] more 
or less all know one another".
The formal organisation of the day can be contrasted to 
and depends upon the informal social organisation which takes 
place. Timetables, such as that found in the nursery, are 
not the sole determinants of action [on the informal use of 
time in an organisation cf. D.F. Roy, 19go]* As a "common 
set of cultural symbols" [T. Parsons and E.A. Shils, 1971], 
the way in which the nursery timetable is organised as a system 
of activities is the same thing as the way in which its 
organisational charcteristics are produced and maintained 
[H. Garfinkel, 1963]. The formal nursery timetable is both 
a product of interactive behaviour and a condition for the 
management of a day in the nursery for both staff and children.
The accomplishment for all practical purposes of the 
nursery timetable depends upon supervisors and children acting 
together in a concerted way. As such this interaction can be 
described. In another sense however, it is self-descriptive.
- 1 5 2 -
In carrying out activities, conversations arise which comment 
upon and construct the sense of the activity which is being 
engaged in. What this means is that the formal, objective, 
determinate timetable emerges in various socially constructed 
forms which may be deemed adequate for the purposes of the 
daily routine. But these forms are not included in a formal 
statement or description of nursery activities. The actual 
task structure can be provided by viewing actions as essentially 
satisfying the rules which is specifies [D. Zimmerman, 1970].
PATTERNS OF CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION: The accomplishment 
of the nursery task structure does not entail an examination 
of the practices whereby 'the job' or 'nursery conversation' 
gets done; or focus upon more general issues or implications 
which 'the job' and 'nursery conversation' carry with them. 
Because of the self-revelatory character of the informal 
organisation of activities upon which formal organisation 
depends, the description of the organistion of the nursery 
will concentrate upon the patterns of conversational interaction. 
The two predominant patterns are those of 'supervision' and 
[from a formal, organisational, adult point of view] 'play'.
Each of those breaks into various forms [e.g. supervising 
meal times, washing times, play talk, talk with supervisors].
In order to illustrate these patterns, a conversation will 
be presented. It is a sequence which occurred when the nursery 
had opened in the morning. Children were coming into the 
nursery for the first time that day; others were already 
there. All had the opportunity of having breakfast. This 
was an informal occasion; if the children wanted toast and tea 
they could sit around a table. If not they could play in the 
nursery or outside on the lawn. Although from the point of
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view of the timetable this occasion is an orderly one [e.g. 
"enter the nursery and have breakfast"], the data reveals 
two conterminous forms of interaction taking place: the 
administration of breakfast [supervision] and children's 
breakfast talk [play].
The conversation:
1
2
3
4
5
6 
7
Aunty 1: Would you like some toast Lisa?
Lisa: [Nods head] Yes.
Aunty 1: Keith. [Shouted outside], would you like 
some toast?
Keith: [Comes in and nods head]
Aunty 1: Come on then.
Mandy: Juliet's come in.
Aunty 1: Juliet, do you want some [3 secs.] toast?
[Juliet shakes her head] Du you want some 
toast? Sudi? [Sudi nods her head] Sit down 
then. [3 secs.] Do you want some milk as well 
Sudi? [Sudi nods her head - 6 secs.] Do you 
want some Juliet? [Juliet nods her head] I
thought you would. Do you want some milk? 
[Juliet nods her head] Hello Andrew.
8 Andrew: Hello.
9 Aunty 1: Would you like some breakfast?
10 Andrew: Naa.
11 Aunty 1: Would you like some toast?
12 Andrew: No thank you.
13 Aunty 1: Alright then.
14 Levon: [Comes in from outside] Aunty 1.
15 Aunty 1: What love?
16 Levon: David won't let me have me gun.
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17
18
19
21
22
23
24
25
26:
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
Aunty 1: You and David are at er...//this morning. 
Levon: He won't let me have it [ ] goin' to take
it home.
Aunty 1: [Walks outside] David why won't you give 
Levon his gun? [4 secs.] Is it Levon's? 
[Untranscribable talk - 45 secs. Aunty 1 comes into 
the nursery followed by David and Levon.]
Levon: He give it me back.
David: I 'ad a go now.
[Aunty 1 does not answer, and begins wiping tables.] 
Aunty 1: Do you want another piece of toast Lisa? 
Lisa: Yes please.
Aunty 1: Would you like a piece of toast Andrew?
[Andrew nods his head and sits at the table] 
[Untranscribable talk - 35 secs.]
Sudi: You have to stay there don't ya?
Mandy: [ ]
Andrew: Pardon?
Mandy: [ ]
Andrew: I thought you said Aunty...Aunty 2. 
[Untranscribable talk - 15 secs. Levon begins 
'shooting' the children at the table with his 
gun. Laughter.]
Andrew: He can't, he can't fire, with being his mouth 
full with his toast. [Laughter - 7 secs.]
He can fire now.
[Untranscribable talk - 20 secs.]
Andrew: Who maked that silly noise?
Mandy: Me.
Sudi: Not me.
Andrew: Is it Mandy?
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36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
Mandy: Yer.
Sudi: Not. Levon.
[Untranscribable talk - 37 secs. Rachel begins to cry.] 
Sudi: Give it her back.
Andrew: Who done it?
Mandy: Levon.
Levon: No.
Mandy: Oh yes.
Levon: Oh no, you.
Mandy: No. You. Oh no.
Levon: Oh yes, you.
[4 secs.]
Sudi: Levon made Rachel cry.
Aunty 1: Why? [3 secs.] What's he done?
Sudi: He's pullin' a purse off her.
Aunty 1: Levon, go outside. I don't want to see you.
If it's not you or it's David. Go on out.
Levon: [ ]
Aunty 1: Well don't come near us. Go away.
Levon: No.
Aunty 1: Yes. Yes. Everybody you've looked at you've
argued with. [Levon remains in the room. Aunty 
1 resumes cleaning.]
Pattern 1 - Supervisors and Children: In the above 
conversation this pattern can be seen in sections 1 - 13. In 
examining this part of the conversation attention will be paid 
to the motives which are displayed. Max Weber saw motive as 
a context of meaning which appears to either participants or 
observers as a meaningful ground for an action. This was
50
51
a m p l i f i e d  by Alfred Schutz who discussed the "in-order-to"
- 1 5 6 -
motive as a series of projected expectations concerning the 
status of an action [1972]. As a means to orderly organise 
and select the possibilities of social action, motive is an 
emergent property of talk [cf. P. McHugh et al, 1974],
Because attention is directed towards it by the participants 
in a conversation as the ground for understanding what is 
happening, it is not an incidental feature.
In the breakfast-time conversation Aunty 1 asks a series 
of questions, all concerned with whether the children present 
want breakfast. From the point of view of an observer the 
reasoning behind such questions would be to locate exactly 
who wanted breakfast as a condition for the distribution of 
toast and milk. The questions are also indicators of 
organisational time; part of the ongoing organisational day.
They are not 'personal' questions. They do not 'belong' to
/
the actual speaker, but are part of the nursery vocabulary 
for dealing with and ordering the day. It can be suggested 
that this, or at least some part of it, is what forms the 
background to hearing Aunty 1's questions. What of the 
answers? Firstly they complement the questions; they enable 
the accomplishment in some respect of the projected course of 
action to which the questions are directed. The answers like 
the questions, inform listeners about the motives of the 
speaker; "what he or she intends doing. In this respect, 
different possible courses of action meet. Though in everyday 
life a person is in many respects free to contemplate a course 
of action without question, for children in the nursery this 
is not so.
The questions which Aunty 1 asks of Lisa and Keith are 
answered in the affirmative. They are not questioned any
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fur ther . However when Andrew states that he does not want 
any breakfast, Aunty 1 reformulates the question and asks 
him again; he is also asked later in the conversation [section 
25]. The questioning of Juliet is taken further. Firstly 
she is questioned twice as to whether she wants toast, and 
twice indicates in the negative. After 'successfully' dealing 
with Sudi, Aunty 1 returns to Juliet with an emphasised 
question. At this third time of asking Juliet indicates that 
she does want some toast. Aunty 1 then displays her reasoning 
behind the questioning of Juliet: "I thought you would.". It 
indicates that although Aunty 1 had seen Juliet decline toast, 
this was not the 'real' state of affairs; that although Juliet 
refused toast she really did want it. The questioning and 
refusal to grant to children's utterances a display of motive 
at face value by adults can also be seen in the following 
example, where motive is directed.
Colin came into the nursery holding a packet of sweets:
Aunty 1: What do you want me to do? Urn?
Colin: Open them.
Aunty 1: Open them, huh, huh. Do you want me to give 
the children some, or do you want me to put 
them in the sweety tin?
Colin: No.
Aunty 1: 'No' what? Do you want to put some in the 
sweety tin? [Aunty 1 opens Colin's sweets 
and hands them round to the children; gives 
the rest back to Colin.]
Colin's answers clearly state his intention to engage in 
'eating sweets' rather than comply with the organisational 
choices of action; sharing or contributing to the communal
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"sweety tin". Colin's choice of action is inappropriate 
because it does not fit in with the organisational motives of 
the nursery supervisor. For the children in the nursery, 
eating sweets is a pleasant activity. Where some of the 
children have sweets and others do not, this leads [at least 
in the eyes of the staff] to disruptions in the normal 
routine. Rather than being engaged in 'normal' activity 
[e.g. play], the children would argue or collect around the 
child with sweets 'being friendly' in order to share them.
The immediate sharing of sweets under the orderly supervision 
of staff, or contributing to the communal "sweety tin" are 
the nursery staff's solutions to the problems of inappropriate 
nursery activity. In this case, these solutions are also 
related to wider mores concerning what is preferable; it is 
'good' to be 'kind' and 'share'; it is 'bad' to be 'mean'.
This can be seen in a further extract from the conversation 
between Aunty 1 and Colins
[Colin enters the nursery holding a packet of sweets.] 
Aunty 1: Colin.
Colin: I'm not sharing these are ur?
Aunty 1: Aren't you sharing them? [ ] Go on. Don't
be mean. Nobody'll give you any of their 
sweeties. [Takes sweets out of Colin's hand.] 
Aunty 1 contrasts Colin's evident intentions with the 
social impact which this would have in his communal world.
Such moral issues engage with the nursery rules; to comply 
with the rules is to be 'good'; to evade them is 'bad'. The 
nursery solutions to the possible problems brought about by 
the free possession of sweets [and more qenerallv by the 
possibility of the free choice of action by children], appear
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as perfectly plausible selections. However as Schütz 
emphasised, the child does not beqin his life in a vacuum. 
Rules and ways of acting are given to him as pre-existent 
properties of a 'natural' world. The nursery rules concerning 
sweets were in existence before Colin attended the nursery 
and will continue long after he leaves it.
The existence of nursery rules and the approximate 
invocation and satisfaction of them by supervisors, organises 
a communal response against the rule-breaker. The individual 
whose action is selected as an example of rule-breaking is 
verbally and visibly singled out from all those around him. 
Although in other situations an individual may be encouraged 
to implement a particular motive for his and others' actions 
[e.g. rights to property, the relations of exploitation - cf.
L. Althusser, 19T2], when he enters the nursery he has to 
comply with the nursery guides for action. He has only a 
contingent choice in the course of action which he will 
follow. The selective and contingent aspect of applying 
available rules and producing a rule-breaker needs to be 
emphasised.
For example, in what might be termed 'manners' or 
'etiquette' rules are not absolute. In the breakfast-time 
conversation one example of 'letting pass' a possible occasion 
for applying a rule has been shown. When Andrew was asked if 
he wanted breakfast he replied "Naa". At another time 
however, such a response may be selected as a case for
enforcing rules applicable to 'doing manners'. This is shown 
by the data below:
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[Aunty 1 is giving out further helpings of dinner.]
Aunty 1s Do you want some?
Jon: [Nods head]
Aunty 1: Well?...Well?
Jon: Thank you.
Aunty 1: You don't say thank you before you've been 
given anything do you, you silly boy?
Jon's nod of the head and evidently inappropriate response 
gained him a public rebuke. Yet it appears as if there were 
two different language-games in operation, and thus two 
different readings of what was occurring. The first is that 
of the supervisor's. Her questions "Well?... Well?" were 
designed to elicit a response from Jon in order to verbally 
complete his silent affirmation. Aunty 1 saw the response 
which she received as inappropriate, belonging to a different 
course of action than they were engaged in at that moment.
This produced Jon as 'going out of sequence' in conversation 
and consequently "silly". What Aunty 1 was probably seeking 
was the reply 'yes please'. In contrast to this language-game 
what Jon was engaged in was 'doing the work to get another 
helping of dinner'. With this motive as the ground to his 
responses they can be seen as 'appropriate selection'; his 
nod communicates his wish for "some more", and "Thank you" 
makes reference to 'doing manners'. From this point of view, 
to the question of "Do you want some more?", Jon answered 
'Yes. Thank you'. It also seems as if he located Aunty 1's 
questions of "Well?" as prompts for a display of manners, in 
that he responded with "Thank you". What he did not realise 
was that at that brief moment the question of 'more dinner' 
had been suspended. That he had to retrace the sequences of 
the conversation and 'fill in' his inappropriate response in
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relation to the motive of 'doing manners'.
So far in examining the supervisor-child pattern it has 
been the adult who has instituted interpretive and corrective 
action towards the children. There are other times when the 
children themselves appeal to the nursery staff [as 
representatives of the organisational nursery structure] to 
become arbiters in their world; in their finite province of 
meaning [A. Schütz and T. Luckmann, 1974]. Such an appeal is 
indicative for the staff of a disruption in the organised day 
of the nursery; it is a shift in respect of the expectancies 
of the staff concerning what should happen. These appeals 
represent to the staff a disruption in the self-organising 
processes of the children. Two instances of this are 
contained in the breakfast-time conversation [sections 
14 - 22 and 46 - 53],
The first disruption is brought to Aunty 1's attention 
by Levon. The accounted problem revolves around David having 
Levon’s gun and refusing to give it back to him. Aunty 1 
resolves this problem by ordering David to give the toy back. 
Prior to this she questions the ownership of the gun. Levon's 
account of the situation is not believed as a description of a 
state of affairs, but as an indication of trouble. Having 
settled this trouble by being satisfied of the ownership of 
the toy and ordering its return, Aunty 1 re-enters the nursery 
Levon tells Aunty 1 of the settlement of the disruption and 
David accounts for the event as a misunderstanding. His "I 
'ad a go now" attempts to locate the disruption as a mistaken 
'normal' event; that he had borrowed the toy and was merely 
using it. Aunty 1 does not respond to either of these 
utterances which are both directed at her. Levon and David
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are snubbed. The effect of the silence is to say: 'You are 
not not worth responding to-treating as person' [P, McHugh 
et al, 1974].
The second disruption builds upon the first because it 
follows it in time and also features Levon. Rachel begins to 
cry at the breakfast table and Sudi tells Aunty 1 of this.
Upon hearing from Sudi that Levon was "pullin' a purse off 
her", Aunty 1 orders Levon outside. The intention of her 
previous snub is verbalised and extended when she states: "I 
don't want to see you". Though David has nothing to do with 
this particular disruption, the history of trouble is 
mentioned by Aunty 1: "If it's not you or it's David". The 
community of children and staff is also invoked when she again 
tells Levon to go away. Levon both refuses to go outside or 
be spatially separated from the other children within the 
nursery. Aunty 1 contents herself with the comment which 
locates Levon as an inappropriate or 'abnormal* person 
["Everybody you've looked at you've argued with."]. This 
removes any credence or justification from Levon's activities. 
It is to say that his activities are disruptive because he is 
a disruptive person, providing the ground for Aunty 1 's 
references to informal exclusion from a community [cf. E 
Lemert, 1973].
These disruptions appear as relatively natural features 
of occasions in which children figure, and which the staff 
member settles in a routine way [i.e. 'more or less' 
consistent with the ways in which other adults settle such 
disputes]. From a sociological point of view - and in many 
respects from the point of view of the child - these occasions 
illustrate the ambiguous meeting of different finite provinces
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of meaning. In discussing these subuniverses of knowledge, 
Schütz and Luckmann describe them as cognitive styles. In a 
finite province of meaning are contained experiences which are 
assembled as meaning-compatible. Because it is of a particular 
style, sedimented experience is mutually harmonious [A. Schütz 
and T. Luckmann, 1974], The effect of belonging to a 
particular community which has a shared and existent [i.e. 
intersubjectivej history, is to place upon events a certain 
accent; a particular mode of being. Though inconsistencies 
in this always particular and always occasioned history can 
be found, this does not remove from reality the community's 
way of regarding it. As long as inconsistency only has a 
partially asserted meaning it is unproblematic. When it 
becomes a topic of interest however, the background assumptions 
which enable the production of a particular accent or sense 
of social structure can become problematic.
It is tempting to regard disruptions in the nursery of 
the organised day and the children's community in just this 
way: as a breakdown of the normal ways of acting. Such an 
approach would regard the disruptions as caused by incomplete 
socialisation of shared norms, where adults are faced with 
the task of reorienting the child towards these norms. There 
is another account possible however. Disruptions are not 
breakdowns of everyday life which result in an inability to 
act. They are a part of social actions which requires 
methodical negotiation. In other words, they are a part of 
might be termed 'normal, natural troubles'. Disruptions are 
produced by the problem of accomplishing actions, and are 
thereby resources with which members of a community further 
the experienced meanings of their finite province of meaning.
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Disruptions occasion a sense of a shared history for the 
'present' purposes of achieving a solution and instituting 
practices which are seen as achieving this end.
In reporting to Aunty 1, Levon and Sudi were instituting 
action by using their knowledge of the normative aspect of the 
organised nursery day. This is not to endorse that regime, 
but to use it as a solution to their troubles [e.g. to begin 
a new game, to carry on a conversation]. In this way the 
children produce disruptions as reportable phenomena for the 
staff as solutions to the circumstances in which they find 
themselves. What for the staff is a disruption [i.e. 
circumstances which require change], is not for the children. 
Likewise, circumstances which the children may want changing 
are not focused upon by the staff unless reported upon as a 
trouble. The staff do not have an interest in children's 
activities apart from their meaning in relation to organisational 
relevances. By instituting action by the nursery staff, the 
practice of reporting troubles both reinforces the finite 
province of meaning held by the staff and that held by the 
children. The two however do not become entwined. Though 
both the staff member and the child are attending to the 'same' 
event the way in which they address it is different. Their 
motives for engaging in such actions as they do are different, 
and the outcomes are seen as belonging to different moral 
orders.
In examining the supervisor-child pattern, the existent 
structure of rules and authority which limits the choices of 
action available to children has been demonstrated. This 
limiting factor occurs because the authority of supervisors 
lies in the belief in the everyday routine as an inviolable
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norm of conduct" [M. Weber, 1970]. Children are seen as 
having to comply with the nursery rules and commands or be 
judged as outside the community.
Berger and Kellner discuss marriage as "a nomos-building 
instrumentality': "a social arrangement that creates for the 
individual the sort of order in which he can experience his 
life as making sense" [P.,L. Berger and H. Kellner, 1971]. if 
the supervisory role in the nursery is viewed as having to 
provide a similar arrangement for the children, then a very 
condition for its accomplishment is the production of 
alternative cases. Otherwise the arrangement and the supervisory 
role would be seen as unnecessary. The role of supervisor 
by its very practices for making sense, produces contrary 
instances. In doing this the method is a selective and 
contingent one which demonstrates: motive cannot be asigned to 
an action; or its assignment puts the action in question. In 
terms of this programme, the child who carries out such an 
action [i.e. mere behaviour] is seen to be anomic, and because 
of the social effects of judgements and related actions the 
child may begin to feel anomic.
Looking at motive in the nursery leads to the conclusion 
that on a broad level the nursery is oriented to adapting 
individual motives to the organisational motives. Conceived 
as rules of conduct the nursery organisation is directed 
towards intended results. Stated as informal rules these 
intended results might be: ’accomplish orderly meal times';
'ensure that children eat enough'; and 'solve any disruptions’. 
Staff in the nursery methodically assemble and accomplish 
such rules and the concept of organisation which they occasion 
by selectively demonstrating for all practical purposes • a 
change of mind’ in the children, or providing the conditions
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for this 'change of mind' Le.g. exclusion from the group].
The rules in use Lthe organisational sense of social structure] 
are constructed on each particular occasion by judgements from 
the staff that a change of the motivational plan of a 
particular child has been accomplished; if not in fact then 
in practice. The examination of disruptions occasioned by 
children however suggests that they may not be as plastic as 
the ideal of remedial supervision either suggests or allows.
It is to this subject and interaction exclusively between 
children that we now turn.
Pattern 2 - Children; As a performative unity, this 
pattern of conversational interaction has two typical forms: 
that which takes place before adults; and that which occurs 
without the presence of adults. The breakfast-time conversation 
contains an example of the former, and an example of the latter 
will be given below.
The breakfast-time conversation [section 26 - 4 5 ] i3 
discretely organised around four topics produced by the 
researcher's dilemma of 'untranscribable talk'. What this 
dilemma does is to present a series of apparently incomplete 
and fragmented utterances. Treated in this way they become 
fairly trivial instances of data, gaining this definition 
through the conceptual relation with the aims of the research. 
For example, in terms of describing interaction in the nursery 
the breakfast-time talk appears to have little to offer. The 
children's conversation is jumbled, fragmentary, unclear, 
and incomplete; it appears to offer no insights into what they 
actually do. The consequence of such a constructive approach 
to data as this is to let pass such conversational instances 
because they are deemed unimportant. Yet such instances of 
conversation as the breakfast-time talk do display the
- 1 6 7 -
features with which children construct their world.
In order to regard children's utterances in this way it is 
necessary to treat what they say amongst themselves as 'natural 
conversation', and not to transform it into data. In this 
way the tape-recorder in the breakfast-time scene becomes a 
metaphorical hearer. Though the tape-recorder could not see 
what was happening, the form which it documented of what was 
said is a fairly accurate facsimile of what others heard.
Though certainly there would be a difference in what was heard 
among the children at the breakfast table because of location, 
interest, and the clarity and volume of speech, the quality 
of the conversation would have been apprehended in much the 
same form as that reproduced by the tape-recorder. In this 
way the transcript ceases to be an incomplete report of what 
was said. It can become to be regarded as a piece of 
naturally occurring conversation. The conversation is unclear, 
fragmentary, jumbled, and incomplete because that is what 
conversations are like, not because of a fault in data 
collection. The problem for all hearers to the conversation 
and for a sociological analysis of it is how it is to be 
regarded [i.e. how can talk be heard as making reference to 
something and in what way?]. Though for sociological analysis 
this problem is of theoretical interest, for those involved 
in the conversation it is a practical interest.
The first part of the conversation is begun by Sudi 
[section 26 - 30]. She selects Mandy as a possible 
conversationalist and makes reference to a taken for granted 
nursery rules that the children remain in their seats at meal 
times. Mandy's reply is indistinct. This applies not only 
for the facility of the tape-recorder, but for Andrew as well.
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Whether Sudi heard what Mandy said is unknown for Andrew 
uses the cultural symbol of "pardon" to formulate the question 
'what did you say?'. The appropriateness of this formulation 
depends upon an awareness of a social grammar for claiming 
certain forms of recognition and reference. The question 
'what did you say?' is made sensible by a background which can 
be recognised as providing the conditions for an inadequate 
receipt of an utterance [cf. "Snubs" in P. McHugh et al, 1974], 
In answer to Andrew's question it appears that Mandy either 
repeats or reformulates her previous statement. What this 
does for Andrew and others present who can hear is to clarify 
Mandy's utterance; it transforms it from what Andrew "thought" 
was said to what 'was' actually said. Having found out the 
exact content of Mandy's utterance, Andrew presents his 
reason for questioning her. He states that he thought she 
spoke about Aunty 2, when in fact she was speaking about 
someone or something else.
The occasionality of these expressions and their 
incompleteness does present difficulties for description. A 
similar difficulty is faced by hearers in actual situations. 
Andrew's response is to institute a practice for clarification 
which engages the one who spoke in a concerted attempt to 
establish what was actually said. Though the incomplete data 
does not reveal why this practice was instituted [e.g. it 
could have been because Andrew misheard, or because Mandy did 
say Aunty 2, or 'something else'], it does permit an examination 
of the ways in which 'topics get done' and 'data gets produced'.
In the second part of the conversation [section 31],
Andrew is the sole speaker, though not the sole participant. 
Levon pretends to shoot the children at the breakfast table,
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which Andrew describes and comments upon. The action of 
shooting is accompanied b y  'gun-like' noises. Andrew describes 
Levon's behaviour by juxtaposing two models of being; 
breakfast-time behaviour and playing. In doing this two 
different sets of assumptions for the adequate accomplishment 
of the separate modes are invoked. Andrew occasions the 
typical actions of 'play' and 'meal-times•, which as separate 
entities are characterised by different forms of intention.
In play, the children join together to suspend - or at least 
to attempt to delay - pragmatic interests in particular topics. 
Instead they reconstruct typical actions found in wider 
society. This depends upon knowledge of the ways in which 
actions or scenes are ordinarily assembled in normal situations. 
Meal-times however are of a different order. They belong to 
the mundane world of everyday actions, ruled by practical 
interests.
Andrew connects the suspended world of play with the mundane, 
serious world of meal-time activities. Levon cannot fire his 
gun because he is eating; having finished eating "he can fire 
now". What this juxtapositioning of different orders of reality 
does is to throw into relief the incompatibility of some 
situated actions. In the name of comedy Andrew treats the 
topics as resources for displaying the socially constructed 
nature of the children’s world. Though the matter of Levon 
being unable to fire his gun because he had toast in his 
mouth was treated as an occasion for fun and laughter, to be 
heard in that way depended upon focusing upon the ways in which 
social situations are ordinarily assembled.
To hear Andrew's remarks as situated humour depends upon 
focusing upon the social construction of different realities.
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This is also present in the third breakfast-time topic. Here 
it is treated not as an occasion for review but for play. 
Knowing about the social construction of scenes enables the 
suspension of the serious impact of a particular topic's 
features. In other words, a topic can be manipulated merely 
for the sake of that experience. Andrew was again featured in 
this exchange. Sitting opposite Andrew was Handy who banged 
her cup down on the table. In saying "Who maked that silly 
noise?", Andrew looked straight at Mandy. In answer to the 
question, Mandy answered "me". It would be conventional to 
assume that Andrew's use of the word "noise" corresponded 
to the forceful meeting of the cup and the table. This is not 
so. It is certainly true that the event of Mandy striking the 
table with her cup provided the opportunity for Andrew's 
remark, but he was not interested in that event as such.
This can be seen in his use of the word "silly" which 
established a "rule of irrelevance" ["Fun in Games" in E. 
Goffman, 1972], A taken for granted corollary of meal-times 
is 'meal-time' noise; it is an expectable attribute of such 
activity. To regard such a noise as out of the ordinary - 
when in fact it was ordinary - serves to occasion a different 
way of regarding it, it is an invitation to others to join in 
the construction of some other kind of event. Andrew initiated 
the nature of that event as a search for a person who had 
•done' something; a common topic in supervising children both 
in the nursery and elsewhere. In response to Andrew's question 
Mandy states that it was she who made the noise. Sudi states 
that it was not her. As the interest is in the topic 'who did 
it?' as a resource for playing and not for factual establishment 
Andrew extends the interaction. He recognises that Mandy has
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said that it was she who made the noise ["Is it Mandy?"], but 
offers this for further action. Monday again states that she 
made the noise, while Sudi places the 'blame' on Levon who has 
had nothing to do with the particular event.
Throughout the course of this conversation the matter with 
which the children were dealing was treated in a lighthearted 
way. It was evident who had made the noise, but this was not 
important. Attention was not directed to 'serious blame' 
but to detecting and apportioning 'blame' as an exercise 
interesting in its own right. To carry out such an enterprise 
as this involves producing talk as unfounded; as not referring 
to specific and particular objects. The recognition of such 
a production as grounded in some other order than the mundane 
world hinges upon regarding an 'ordinary' event or object as 
'extraordinary'. What happens after this form of production 
and recognition have occurred is a contingent matter; it 
depends upon the intentions and creative abilities of those 
involved and in the first instance, upon a willingness to 
participate. Some of the strands which contribute to and enable 
the accomplishment of play have been described here. In 
situations of use however, their recognition is not such an 
extended matter. The observer and potential participant often 
uses the "maximally appropriate unit of interpersonal 
observation" to recognise the situation around him. That is,
"no more than a glance" [D. Sudnow, 1912],
The final topic in the children's breakfast-time 
conversation is similar to the last one; ’finding out’ the 
person who has 'done' something. Sudi begins the public 
interest in the interaction between Levon and Rachel when she 
tells Levon to "Give it her back". Prior to this Rachel has 
begun to cry when Levon was "pullin' a purse off her".
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Andrew asks "Who done it?", and is told by Mandy that it is 
Levon. Levon responded by denying that it is he who is to 
•blame'; this attribution of 'blame' and denial between Mandy 
and Levon is twide repeated. Sudi then reports what Levon 
has done to Aunty 1.
Unlike finding out who made the "silly noise", Rachel's 
crying and locating who "done it" is a serious matter. There 
are related reasons for this. Crying is a condition which 
publicly indicates that something is wrong. Because of this 
the phenomenon of crying can be causally treated at its source. 
Where one person has caused another to cry, the 'blame' which 
accrues to him indicates a crossing of normative boundaries.
For the children it is a matter of some relevance to know 
quite clearly who caused a child to cry because the factual 
settlement of 'blame' may be the first step in the allocation 
of some form of punishment. As a practical procedure for 
accounting for an event's observable features, 'doing blaming' 
is a claim to know what happened. If such a claim is 
disputed it challenges a person's right to know what he is 
talking about.
For Levon, being 'blamed' for making Rachel cry was a 
serious matter since it may have led to punishment; hence his 
denial. The relevance of Levon's denials for Mandy were that 
they challenged her account of who was to 'blame'. If believed 
they would have possibly resulted in Mandy being regarded as 
'unreliable', and have lent credence to Levon's counter claim 
that it was Mandy who was responsible for making Rachel cry. 
These features of the children's social world are both the 
conditions and products of a breakdown in communication.
Because of the unspoken concensus about Levon's 'blame' and
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Lev o n 's entrenched denials, the only way in which the matter 
could be settled was by letting someone else decide 'what 
happened'. Because an adult member of staff is the ultimate 
arbiter in disputes, Sudi reported the matter to Aunty 1.
Because the focal point of attention in the conversation 
is doubt about reporting and describing 'what happened', the 
issue of who made Rachel cry is an instance of 'a normal, 
natural trouble' [for a discussion of 'normal, natural 
troubles in relation to documentary records cf. H. Garfinkel, 
1967]. It is produced as a trouble because those involved 
operate with senses of 'the right way of doing things'. These 
senses however are discrepant with the practical relevances 
occasioned by particular purposes and routines amongst the 
children themselves. Mandy's sense of 'doing things the right 
way' is based upon a definition of normal circumstances; she 
focuses upon 'what happened' as a concrete event and its 
meaning in the system of the children's and the nursery's 
rules and obligations. For Levon however, 'doing things the 
right way' was not bound up with 'what happened', but what in 
present circumstances 'will or might happen'. From within 
this position a denial is not another description of 'what 
happened', but a procedure for remaining within the children's 
realm of activities and outside the nursery's enforcement of 
rules.
The above discussion demonstrates some of the children's 
interactive abilities. This is not a claim for particular 
individuals, but for the social group who: 1] focus upon the 
social construction of the world; 2] establish and maintain 
conversational patterns and sequences; 3] manipulate the 
socially constructed nature of the world according to their 
own purposes; 4] recognise and locate actions and utterances
-TT4r-
as belonging to particular- social, orders and solve' the 
problems they present: according- to- situational1 circumstances. 
These features: of the children's talk reference particular 
forms and ways of acting. In the instance dealt with here the 
children are performing in front; of an adult supervisor, who 
may "become part of the interaction at any time. What occurs 
when supervision is a minimal consideration? This situation 
will, now he examined.
Utterances made hy the children: in the nursery make sensej 
they are not idiotic, extreme, or without reference. To 
illustrate) the competence of children's conversational, 
practices a precise example will he: examined "below. If is 
suggested that it is some such interactional, ability which: 
enables both children and adults to make sense of their 
surroundings, hut which adults distort through pragmatic 
motives, and institutionalised power and authority.
The organisational, time of day and the presence of adult 
supervisors; defines for the children what is happening (e.g. 
dinner time). Breaks in this organisation and supervision are 
exclusively covered hy the term'play'. The situation, to be 
examined here occurred, outside, in and" around the sand-pit.
Simon, Colin, and ¿Ton were playing when Andrew approached 
carrying- a toy helicopters
Simons Hey Andrew, you he the police covering
up with his feet. And you don't know; what 
he's- got behind his back, eh?
Andrew; What?
Simon? Tots, ernr, be the police covering his feet up.
With that spade, and you don't ktow what he's 
got behind his, or what he's holding there.
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Eh? Come on. Do it Andrew, like that. [7 secs. - 
Simon covers his feet up with sand.] Alright 
then I've done it then Andrew. You be the 
police covering me up. Eh? Eh? Shall we?
Colin: He...he...he isn't talking to ya.
Simon: Andrew. [5 secs.] Jon will you be the police//?
Jon: Yeh.
The utterance to be examined here is that made by Colin: 
"he isn't talking to ya". It is a product of the 
conversational interaction which precedes it and has 
consequences and implications for further interaction. Colin 
inserts his remark into the 'potential' conversation between 
Andrew and Simon as a description of 'what is going on'. As 
such its status is as an iptendedly true description. As 
Sacks has written: "the fact of its utterance in doing some 
action can [then] serve for us as a means of seeing its 
status as intendedly true. And the way it's dealt with can 
then be further evidence with regard to others' understanding 
of it." [H. Sacks, "Everyone Has To Lie", unpublished paper].
Colin's description was not taken by others present to 
be 'silly' or misguided. In fact Simon reformulated his 
selection procedure for engaging in play after what appears 
as 'testing out' Colin’s description. This was by shouting 
out the name of the person he had selected for play, to which 
he received no reaction. Colin's formulation of :"not talking" 
was adequate for the practical concerns of those involved.
The outcome of Colin's utterance was to bring to public 
awareness the incompatible intentions of the two possible 
co-participants in play.
As an outcome "not talking" was successful. But how was 
such a production possible? This is an important question for
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the outcome of an intendedly true statement can be seen in 
some part to depend upon the selections which are made from a 
number of possibilities. To inquire sociologically into these 
possibilities is to show how description can be accounted for 
• 'in terms of the use of conventional cultural procedures and 
presuppositions to present the "unavoidable procedures and 
presuppositions informing the utterances and interpretations 
which members can make" [ J . Coulter, IST3. ]. To present the 
procedures and assumptions available to describe the interaction 
between Simon and Andrew which were occasioned by that 
interaction, two strands of possibility will be examined:
1] the nature of, and the possibilities presented by, Simon's 
invitation to play; 2] the possible descriptions available 
where an utterance which selects the next speaker in a 
conversation is not replied to.
The nature and possibilities of play: It has been stated 
above that the crucial feature of play is the suspenstion of 
everyday interests. Instead some 'other' set of rules is 
brought into use to guide the intended activity. This may be 
very specific Le.g. chess] such that actions are regarded as 
rational strategies, or more or less loose and open to 
amplification and change by those involved. It is with the 
formation of the latter kind of rules with which we are 
concerned here.
Simon invites Andrew to join with him in play by supplying 
two of the controlling rules for beginning their game. It is 
suggested that Andrew 'becomes' a typical actor, and should 
control the actions of this actor in relation to an agreed 
upon extent of knowledge. The enactment of these rules is left 
vague by Simon, except in regard to the immediate action to be
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performed. Simon asks Andrew to treat him as a participant in 
the game, where as a function of the typical policeman's role, 
Andrew has control over him.
The adoption of these suggested rules would transform the 
situation in which the players found themselves, but it would 
only be for the duration of play. Playing does not radically 
change the surroundings, or result in the adoption of a new 
perspective on reality. In order to overcome the immediate 
environment [i.e. regard in a different way], and to enact 
their intentions, those who would perform this type of game 
have to adopt procedures for 'pretending'. These procedures 
are based upon 'common knowledge' and constitute for those 
involved the structural appearance of reality for the length 
of time which they engage them. Without the use of procedures 
for pretending, both in action and in language, play looses 
its sense of possibility and thereby its whole nature as a 
suspension of reality for 'now'. Simon's utterances are an 
attempt to engage in the procedure of pretending and to 
persuade Andrew to join him.
The possible descriptions of a lack of verbalisation: The 
first time Simon spoke to Andrew he answered "What?". After 
the second time, he never answered at all. This situation 
offers various descriptions of what is happening to account 
for the lack of verbalisation on Andrew's part: 1] not 
hearing; 2] not listening; 3] not talking. According to the 
rules of conversational practice [cf. H. Sacks ,*• '"Aspect of 
Sequential Organisation of Conversation", draft manuscript, 
and 1974. H. Sacks and E. Schegloff, 1974. E. Schegloff, 1973], 
Simon twice selected the next speaker and signaled the 
occasion for the transition of speakers. Any one of the above
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three possibilities is appropriate to describe the failure to 
comply with these conversational rules.
As McHugh et al [1974] have discussed, returning a greeting 
or some other utterance is dependant upon the condition that 
the person whom it is addressed to can complete such a programme. 
For example, unless it is known that a deaf or dumb person 
cannot reciprocate an utterance directed towards them, then 
they will be regarded as 'odd' or ’strange'. Normally it is 
a common and prevailing assumption that people can return an 
utterance. Where a greeting or question is directed at 
someone and the sequence of speaker change does not occur, 
then the lack of verbalisation means that either: there are 
conditions present which cause an utterance not to be received; 
or the person to whom the utterance is directed does not 
"acknowledge a public relation " [P. McHugh et al, 1974].
The second condition for the lack of speaker change 
itself is formed by two types which are distinguished by a 
fundamental criterion: intention. When spoken to, if a person's 
attention is directed towards something else, his failure to 
acknowledge the speaker is a product of his interest. He is 
not listening. Where a person intentionally ignores the 
conversational practices which select him as the next speaker 
then he performs a snub: "a refusal of recognition" [R. Turner, 
1971]. In this case, as Colin observed, the person concerned 
is not talking. Where conditions are present which result in 
an utterance not being received, the person is not hearing.
In all three types of description for a lack of verbalisation 
the location of intention is crucial in order to recognise 
the silence for 'what it is' and to judge what action should 
be taken. Because Andrew took up Simon's signal for transition
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and became the speaker, it was demonstrated that the conditions 
for impairing the reception of Simon's communication were not 
present. Not hearing could therefore only be a partial factor. 
It could only account for a lack of information.
Andrew asked Simon to repeat what he had said. Having 
done this and provided four signals for speaker change, Simon 
received no answer from Andrew. Prior to this, Andrew's 
answer of "What?" could have been accounted for by the 
description of not listening; he was playing in the sand-pit 
and because his interest was occupied, may not have received 
Simon's message. However because Andrew had once heard Simon's 
signal for speaker change, had requested that Simon repeat his 
message, and had been provided with this and still not 
responded, his lack of verbalisation could only be a refusal 
to recognise Simon's existence at that place and time. As the 
features which mitigate against an intentional silence are 
not present, Andrew is not talking to Simon. It is against 
this background of procedures for speaker change, the initiation 
of play and pretending, and the presuppositions which make an 
answer possible, that Colin's observation can be read. The 
consequence of it was for Simon to try a last time to make 
contact with Andrew by shouting his name. When this did not 
have any effect he recruited Jon to the game.
/\n Assessment of the Children's Utterances: When examined 
the children's patterns of conversational interaction within 
the nusery are not strikingly childish. They certainly contain 
references to activités which are typically regarded as 
belonging to children, but the conversational practices 
themselves are not naive. Their practices had to cope with 
knowledge of the existence of possible sanctions against them
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when their actions were viewed from a different perspective 
[i.e. an adult one]. In this way, though the children were 
constructing their social world, they had to be aware and 
accommodate wider normative boundaries. In the face of adult 
supervision and amongst themselves, the children in the nursery 
found it possible to manage their affairs and produce the 
features of an orderly and maintained social world.
OBJECTIVITY, t i m e , m e a n i n g , and n o r m a t i v e and i n t e r p r e t i v e 
0]JTL00KS: A description of the patterns of conversational 
interaction found in the nursery and as a consequence of this 
a description of its social organisation, has been presented.
It remains to consider the wider and more general implications 
which this situation has for similar situations and also for 
sociology. This is not to offer policies for concrete change, 
but to attempt to re-assess and re-view some of the constituting 
features of the social world which generally remain hidden.
It is to look to the conditions of reality in which adults and 
children act and view them as products of that action in order 
to make them visible. Following W.I. Thomas' famous phrase: 
it is to assume that people define situations for themselves 
as real, and to look to the 'real consequences' as social 
products in order to judge the ongoing status which these 
consequences [as conditions] present to members of situations. 
This will be done by examining: objectivity; time; meaning and 
assumptions; and two alternative methods for defining situations 
and their consequences for children. It is suggested that 
these features can be found in the nursery as already described, 
and are important factors in shaping the events which are found 
there.
The Objective.View of Children: In response to the idea
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■thai: -the concept of ►the child* is socially produced, adults 
would no doubt. object, that treating children1, as physically, 
intellectually, and socially inferior1 is a consequence; of the 
existence1 of such facts; that such treatment is in. accord with 
the state of the natural, world on- the order,1 of things. Taking 
facts for granted im this way, prominent both in everyday life 
and the methodology of social, science (cf. p. McHugh, 1970.
D. Walsh, 1972 and 1977) r posits a correspondbnce between;, 
what is said and the »real* world. There is seen1 to be a 
relation between what is said’ and the independent objects which 
make up reality, which can be evaluated as true or false. jjy- 
adopting this approach, certain; areas of action which are 
central, to the fact producing process, itself’ are disregarded.
An awareness of these failings, which will be discussed here 
im terms of' interaction; between adults and children1, would 
result im the radical transformation; or abandonment of the 
view of positive realisnr.
%  assuming knowledge of »how things are*- and measuring 
children’s actions according to the?principle of incompetence, 
adults fail! to comprehend! that interaction; with children is 
only possible through mutual praxis. The publicly voiced 
»private«- states (cf. L. Wittgenstein, 1972. C. dentes,. T977.) 
of the child go largely if not totally unacclaimed. The 
world of the child is treated as private so long as the 
actions of the child do not impinge upon the practical 
organisation of adult life. When this does happen, adults 
seek to eradicate the troublesome state. Yet; this does not; 
consist: of an understanding of the child's actions, for such, 
repair stems fhoim the disorganisation, of adult programmes 
and norms brought about by the child» s expressiveness.
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This approach towards children by adults has been 
sociologically regarded as a feature of children's actions 
themselves; as causally contributing to the physical abuse of 
children by adults. In reviewing studies of physical abuse of 
children in the United States, Gil has reported that a 
contributing phenomenon to this typology is: "persistent 
behavioural atypicality of child, e.g. hyperactivity, high 
annoyance potential, etc.". He further states that cases of 
such a type "may be considered as child-initiated or 
child-provoked abuse" [D.G. Gil, 1973]. Though interaction 
between adults and children depends upon the implementation 
by both of speech practices, the expressions of children are 
taken to be uninteresting except insofar as they conform to 
some conception of what childhood should consist of. This 
can be seen in the categorisations reported by Gil, who 
glosses the normative conception of 'the child' in his 
reference to non-childlike behaviour by children [persistent 
behavioural atypicality]. Such a viewpoint which measures 
actions implicitly against what they should ideally consist 
of not only cannot recognise the social practices of children 
as such, but finds it impossible to understand them in 
practice.
With the view of positive realism it is not possible to 
examine the processes for the accomplishment of understanding 
which occur in everyday life and in sociology. Not only are 
the practices by which children express themselves taken to 
be uninteresting by adults, but so are the very ways in which 
adults and children communicate and understand one another.
The social nature of a person's activities in unison with 
others, is unavailable to him except in terms of the positive
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motive, which is taken as a self-evident state rather than a 
social product. The 'good' or 'bad1 of an action, the ’truth' 
or 'falsity' of a statement, are to be discussed in factual 
terms [i.e. the state of affairs under which actions and 
utterances are taken to reside]. These terms are taken to be 
immutable. Though there may be conflict over what the facts 
really are, it is as if people doubt one another's perceptions 
but have faith that the truth of what they are talking about 
exists somewhere 'out there'. In this sense, when interacting 
with children, adult reasoning does not recognise its own 
reflexivity. The adult fails to recognise and examine that 
the ways in which he or she makes sense of the child's actions 
and talk - and vice versa - are the very ways in which those 
actions are talk are produced.
Children and Time; A dictionary definition of the word 
'child' approximates to the term 'a young person'. Central to 
this conception is the transforming and developing character 
of time. This view of time refers to cosmic or outer time, 
and not to inner time; the stream of experiences which connect 
'here and now' with 'then' and 'the future' [cf. A. Schütz, 
1972. M. Farber, 1967. H. Garfinkel, 1967]. Cosmic time is 
related to the positive correspondence theory of truth, where 
for the purposes of co-ordinating his and other people's 
practical activities the adult assumes "one big clock 
identical for all" [H. Garfinkel, ‘ 1967].
These two conceptions of time are recognised in interaction 
with children. Adults have Bn awareness of children's 
experiences [inner time], but because of the dominant world 
view [positive] and the practical organisation of everyday 
j f f sirs [cosmic time], these experiences are distorted.
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Rather than being regarded as unique features of a child's 
world in which and through which he must express himself, 
these experiences are seen as features of the child. A 
correspondence is built up between time co-ordinated events 
and the child for which he becomes responsible, and which 
eventually constitutes him. In this way events and 
experiences are distorted from being meaningful and unique, 
to ideal-typical references concerning an objective and 
universally understandable time-series. The continually 
experienced rupture and break of daily life is papered 
over to become a unified whole.
Within specialist disciplines such as sociology and 
psychology, inner time is not distorted. Rather an attempt 
is made to transform it. Whereas 'growing up'[cosmic time] 
and 'getting to know things' [inner time] are implicit 
assumptions in everyday affairs, within specialist inquiry 
they become specific topics such as maturation and learning, 
role play and socialisation. The experience and constitution 
of inner time would appear to be accounted for in these 
disciplines by such distinctions. However because learning 
and socialisation are approached in terms of concrete, 
objective indicators rather than social action and 
understanding they are transformed into cosmic experience.
For example, this can be seen in a quotation from a 
psychologist on the process of development in children: "a 
characteristic is said to be developmental if it can be 
related to age in an orderly and lawful way" [W. Kessen, I960].
Another view of- '"the process whereby the individual is 
converted into a person" is as a reinforcement history of 
particular situations [K. Danzinger, 1976]. Such a history
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links situational features and people's actions in a 
temporally causal succession. In sociology, Parsons' views 
socialisation as the Acquisition of the requisite orientations 
for satisfactory functioning in a role" [1970]. Moore sees 
it as learning the norms and role requirements for membership 
in a social system [W.E. Moore, 1963]. These four views from 
psychology and sociology on the process of becoming human, 
transform it. The unique, disjointed, jumbled experience 
becomes either a uniform, observable process or the straight, 
trouble-free transmission of a culture [cf. D. Wrong, 1969].
Meaning: Just as cosmic time has a constituting place in 
the maintenance of the socio-structural category of 'the child’ 
so have typical social meanings and assumptions. For example, 
adjectives associated with the word 'child' spring from and 
enforce the qualitative distinction between children and adults. 
The words 'childish', 'childlike', and 'immature' introduce 
and reference unstated assumptions and attributes which 
specifically belong to children. Such assumptions might 
consist of things like 'innocence', 'simplicity', or 
stupidity • All concentrate upon the undeveloped and 
socially incompetent nature of the child. Such typical 
meanings and assumptions often find expression as terms of 
derision for use against adults. For example, Dorothy Smith 
has presented an interviewer's account of how someone became 
mentally ill. The report stated that the person under 
consideration would make "childish inane remarks" ["A Sub-Version 
of Mental Illness", unpublished paper].
What Smith's teller of the story does is to produce a 
report upon a decaying social relationship. Neglecting the 
intricate details of the story, the theoretic approach of the
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account is to order events according to a notion of 
incompetence. From this basis what Smith calls "radical 
processes of selection" are carried out which order the 
detailed events and "provide a coherence for the reader which 
was not present in the events". In order to read the account 
as one which presents the process of 'becoming mentally ill', 
the ongoing assumption of incompetence is crucial. As with 
children, those branded mentally ill are treated and spoken 
about in terms which produce their linguistic and behavioural 
particulars as merely behavioural rather than meaningful 
social action.
The withdrawl of competence throws doubt upon and breaks 
up the normative expectations associated with doing and saying 
things; that people are entitled to claim that they know what 
they are doing and saying, that this is understandable and 
ought to be understood [H. Garfinkel, 1967], The language of 
relationships which produces the conceptions of 'the child' 
and 'the mentally ill' differ on a socially perceptive level. 
The location of mental illness depends upon the evaluation of 
utterances and actions on a topical level. Interest is in the 
status of scenic particulars as 'ordinary' or 'peculiar', 
and their relation to a particular person for his possible 
discredit. In relation to children, language-use is not so 
protracted or topical. Rather than being immediate it is 
embedded. The language of relationships within which children 
exist is a powerful one which discredits them from the 
beginning [on the distinction between being immediately 
discredited and the process of becoming discredited cf.
E. Goffman, 1976],
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Normative and Interpretive Outlooks; In order to clarify 
the relationship between the 'realness' of actions and their 
socially produced nature, the ideas of normative and 
interpretive outlooks can be introduced. These ideas are 
drawn from Wilson's exposition uf them in sociology, where he 
metaphorically regards them as paradigms. The purpose of using 
the term 'outlook' here, rather than paradigm, is to broaden 
the use of these descriptive devices to include not only 
sociology but other social situations, particularly those 
involving children, within them. As a result the specificity 
which Wilson’s paper has [T.P. Wilson, 1970], is to some 
extent lost. However these ideas do prove helpful in 
depicting the mechanisifts and resources available in social 
situations for establishing accomplishments and outcomes of 
action.
In sociology the normative outlook is characterised by 
two features: the view that interaction is rule governed; and 
that explanations of action should emulate natural science and 
be deductive. This outlook is present in everyday affairs 
though in a weaker and less specific form. In the ideas of 
the ability to 'know' and describe events as they have actually 
happened, the organising and orderly idea of time as "the 
successive positions of the hands of a clock" [H. Garfinkel, 
1963], and the grounds which occasioned knowledge of typical 
ways of acting brings to events, members of everyday situations 
account for events post hoc. The outcome of this reasoning 
is also a function of it; people are seen to act in terms 
specified by the adopted theoretical position. The world and 
events within it are indeed real, but it is in the position 
which people adopt towards them which produces the way in
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which they are real [H. Garfinkel and H. Sacks, 1970].
The interpretive outlook on the other hand is characterised 
by the use of the documentary method of interpretation. This 
is a method whereby an event is an indicator of a wider and 
underlying social pattern, so that it becomes meaningful in 
terms of pre-existing knowledge. The purpose in employing the 
documentary method is for all practical purposes to repair the 
indexicality of actions and utterances. This means that the 
conclusions which are reached in this way are provisional and 
contingent. They are open to reformulation and review whenever 
necessary. Because of this accounts of actions do not stand 
as correspondences to actual activities themselves. Instead 
such accounts are interpretive descriptions which can differ 
between people and change over time.
Though Wilson does not make this point obvious, the 
accomplishment of the features of the normative outlook [for 
all practical purposes] consists of the adoption of the
v
interpretive outlook. In everyday situations of use, combined 
as a mode of reasoning, these notions of the theoretic 
[normative] and the practical [interpretive] produce an 
orderly Stream of experience with stable outcomes. In 
situations in which children figure, as the examination of 
the nursery has shown, a central role in the normative outlook 
is occupied by the ideas of incompetence. Because the use of 
this concept transforms the identities of children in actual 
occasions of use and places them in an inferior position in 
terms of other social types [e.g. adults], a particular 
demonstration of the accomplishment of incompetence can be 
regarded as a "status degredation ceremony" [H. Garfinkel, 1956]
INT CONCLUSION? I'm looating the existence of incompetence 
(the normative outlook) in childrem, adults transform them 
and' their identities in terms of the motivational, grounds for 
actiom. At the same time,' im growing- up im an adult dbminated 
world childrem acknowledge their inferior- position; not in 
theory buifc im practice. Im an attempt to ’make out* they try 
to circumvent normative constraints, use them as solutions to 
their problems,, or attempt to keep a bread! of such constraints 
secret. This is while producing- and maintaining- social, 
relationships, amongst themselves and’ demonstrating- a competent 
use of understanding-im interaction with adults.
This chapter has attempted! to> show that the positiom of 
childrem im society is interesting im terms of the interactional, 
role which they occupy. Im focusing upom this role: we are lead 
to:.- questions of validity and reason; to inquire imto how 
taken for granted matters are possible and! what therm 
accomplishment depend^ upom. . This has consequences for both, 
everyday treatments of others and for sociological, inquiry; 
that appearances are not brute facts but the result of 
interpretive negotiations, Tb regard such outcomes as 
independent is to fail, to recognise their-uniqueness and to 
indulge im a language- which produces objects- and fails to 
understand people. On the other- hand, to focus upon the 
methodioitiy of how people achieve: the objectivity which they 
do is to look: to the possibility of reality, an3. not take 
for granted that it is possible. This topic, as a member»'s 
concern for ’how’ to regard, an eventt, is dealt with im the 
following two chapters.
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SECTION III
Practices- - Determinants In A Case OfAssgesirrg
»Justice»
Thw involvement with contact actors described- in Section: I 
demonstrated that the- practical, theorist is- not, so naive as 
professional theory allows, The everyday member- has knowledge of 
Ms. social surroundings, and can where and when necessary »play 
about* with that knowledge to produce differently structured social 
situations for others. This: may be regarded as a case of deceit. 
Perhaps so. Hbwever X would suggest that it does provide an insight, 
into the differential and shifting character- of interpretation: which 
is. of more general interest. Section II showed this-, where the 
assumption, of incompetence belonging-to- th® type »child*, as factually 
defined through historical', development by legal1,, political, and 
medical, means, overrode all. interactive considerations. This was 
while adults relied: on the social and linguistic competence of 
children in order to accomplish their type assumptions:.
The: analogy with professional theory is clear. Because of' a 
commitment to a specific tradition and a supposed relation to and 
reliance upon formal methods - more for- professional community 
recognition than revealing the- »truth» -  the professional, theorist 
transforms everyday, coherent: people into unwitting actors. Though 
these people have views, idteas., and' theories, on their surroundings, 
their development, and their-tradition, it is taken that it, is only 
the professional theorist who- can really judge the structure, 
texture, and importance of their world. Yet, while confining everyday, 
ordinary people to this unwitting role the professional1, theorist 
relien through and through, wholeheartedly on the sociality which 
connects people together. What would’ occur however- if the- privileged
position of tile theorist; were.. lost: to. him? If' his professional 
knowledge had to count for something- im the »“real*- world? Or again, 
what if the professional theorist's knowledge and utterances- were 
treated as. a child's are? How would his- professional knowledge and 
action© fare if they were subject; to the same doubt and scepticism 
as: a child’ s?
Section! H I  enacts the above questions; in a ’real life’ situation. 
It presents, am account; oT am experience with the police which r had* 
Having beem involved im am ’incident» I found that, I had been, 
charged with malicious wounding and carrying an offensive weapon.
Th® experience with the police and my experience© im court so 
unsettled m® and mad® m® question my and others’ accounts of' the 
event, that I have sought, to document what happened to m© and locate 
th® processes and features, involved im accounting for- and locating 
a definite sense of outcome. While focusing upon the processing of 
people suspected of a crime, Sectiom IIT shows that a concentration! 
upom the formal, theoretical, categories of typologies, results in a 
different order of events, than occurs im practice. In: other- words, 
as formal, theorists magistrates, policemen, and sociologists; do not 
focus, upom what is becoming, but upom what will be, and progress 
towards: that. This of course at times results im a shift, im reality 
such, that what was »supposed* to occur- dbes not* This im turn result© 
iin a reinterpretation of the earlier events. This chimerical 
character- of formal interpretation! is consistent with its concern 
to locate snd accomplish definite sens® iim relation! tc specific, 
methodological, and traditional concerns rather tham a loose, 
wait-and-see sense as in everyday life* or alternatively indicates 
a. reflexive sense which locates, the texture of a particular order 
in th© here-and-now system, of relevances, expectancies, and utterances.
-190-
CHAPTER SIX
AN EXPERIENCE WITH THE POLICE
I am suggesting that the routine problems, 
which law-enforcement agents encounter in 
accomplishing their daily activities, provide 
excellent sources of information for understanding 
how researchers come the characterize objects and 
events in particular and general formulations 
over time.
[A. Cicourel, 1976]
I take it as axiomatic that for any set of actual 
events, there is always more than one version 
that can be treated as what happened, even within 
a simple cultural community. This is because 
social events or facts at the level of those I 
am analyzing here involve a complex assembly of 
events occurring in different settings, at 
different times, sometimes before different 
collections of people; and that secondly the 
moment of actual observation is at that point 
where the consciousness of the individual is 
and that any process of assembly from the past 
can no longer draw on the total universe of 
resources which were successive "moments" 
present to the observer.
[D. Smith, unpublished.]
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INIRODUCTIONI: In this chapter and the one which follows 
it» there are two underlying themes. Firstly there is the 
ever present feature of indexicality. This, as was shown in 
the examination of contact magazines, may be remedied by 
members for all practical purposes by the practice of 
constructing and transforming ideal-typical patterns of 
action. This is essentially the documentary method of 
interpretation [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. The second theme is the 
reliance by actors upon the constructive character of their 
descriptions for accomplishing the practical adequacy of 
their everyday affairs. The fundamental importance of this 
reflexivity for the orderly outcome of actions was shown in 
the discussion of interaction amongst children.
The area of social practice which the two chapters will 
focus upon is that of 'breaking' and 'enforcing' the law.
It has been written that people become criminal "because of 
an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over 
definitions unfavorable to violation of la»*-"'[E .H. Sutherland 
and D.R. Cressy, I960], As Cicourel has pointed out [1976] 
such a view as this imposes an order upon activities rather 
than seeking out the nature of the social organisation and 
production of 'criminality' and 'crime rates'. Rather like 
the topic of suicide [cf. J.M. Atkinson,1973. J .  Douglas,
1967], the decisions made in actual instances about what 
constitutes a violation of law, what does not, and the 
methodical assembly of such decisions are generally neglected 
and treated as a passing matter of fact by both sociologist 
and everyday member alike.
These matters will be dealt with in the following chapters. 
Here will be shown some of the components which go into
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making up an entry in conviction and acquittal rates by 
documenting a case of 'malicious wounding and carrying an 
offensive weapon'. Chapter Seven juxtaposes the roles of 
policeman, magistrate, suspect, and sociologist as alternative 
and competing theoretical positions, in order to focus upon 
the texture of practical reasoning.
A NOTE ON METHOD: The methodological principle which is 
being used here is interesting. As Zimmerman and Pollner have 
argued [1970], sociology generally assumes that it is fully 
competitive with accounts in everyday life. It also assumes 
that it is superior to those accounts. These professional 
views are contained within a sense of social structure 
[occasioned here in an ideal sense], which posits a gap 
between professional and everyday life. Though the researcher 
seeks knowledge about some order of life, his professional 
stance 'makes sure' that he has no personal interest in it.
This mistaken duality of interests is not present in the 
situations of the policeman and the suspect. Their interests 
are eminently personal and practical, because they are 
concerned with 'doing a job' and 'going to court'. Interests 
are tied together because the pathway to court resides in 
the policeman's judgements over the comparative competence of 
the suspect's account and his own for producing 'what happened' 
Where conflict over accounts does arise, the subsequent 
appearances in court becomes a competition of accounts.
Noting this competitive character of accounts is helpful 
because it focuses upon the constructive nature of descriptions 
Seeing accounts in a possible case of 'breaking the law' in 
this way leads to an attempt to make sense of formal courses 
of treatment and outcomes by recourse to the properties of
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practical reasoning.
Whether like Cicourel the sociologist's focus is upon 
practical reasoning, or like Sutherland upon definitions 
operating when a crime is carried out, his allegiance is to a 
system of relevance radically different to those of the 
policeman or the suspect. He is not concerned with ’getting 
his shift done’ or with having a description of what happened 
believed because punitive measures depend upon it. Rather the 
sociologist is concerned with producing a report which is an 
authoritative version of events. This is produced over some 
time and with much thought. The assessment of his account 
does not depend upon a few moments of paper work prior to 
going back to his beat or going home; or to verbal answers to 
a policeman's questions.
It would be interesting if it were possible to place the 
sociologist in the suspect's place; in other words for the 
sociologist to experience the police and courts from the 
'inside', in order that his account should be not only assumed 
to be competitive but to protect his personal freedom should 
have to be competitive. For the sociologist this would 
result in a shift of emphasis and attention. The sociological 
account would not be based upon the 1 'thought o b j e c t s o f  
people in daily life as they would from the traditional 
position of observer, but would have to meet and come to terms 
with them face to face [A. Schütz, 1962].
By fate this was the position in which I found myself. I 
witnessed and took part in a series of actions which were 
later formalised into offences: three charges of malicious 
wounding; one charge of malicious wounding and carrying an 
offensive weapon. The event concerned five participants and 
two policemen. Consequently there were seven accounts of
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what happened. These were differentiated into three different 
'schools of thought' by the apportioning of blame and 
intention: three participants laid blame upon the other two; 
similarly the accounts of two of those involved blamed the 
other three; finally there were the policemen’s accounts 
[available only as verbal representations, and incomplete].
Below will be documented the interaction which occurred 
between these accounts and the outcomes which followed. 
Initially this will be done from the position of a suspect.
The story which will be told is not that of how the police 
acted as seen by an observer, but how they behaved in regard 
to an apparent witness and possible law-breaker. In this way 
it will be possible to identify some of the police and court 
practices which members have to attend to. Furthermore, it 
will also enable a reconstruction of 'what it was like' to be 
suspected of a crime; a feature which is normally outside the 
sociologist's grasp. Looking at my story in this way enables 
an examination of the structures which make formalised 
statements possible [e.g. sociological reports, police charges, 
court findings].
The account which follows is my description of what 
happened. It is partly a reconstruction of the story which I 
told to the police. It is also a further 'first time' telling;’ 
it structures various actions into a scenic and temporally 
progressive unit so that they can be seen to occur 'again' in 
this telling. The account is also more comprehensive than that 
which was presented to the police; outcomes which were not 
then known, are known now, as are various 'bits and pieces' of 
information which enable a more comprehensive story to be told. 
The problem which had to be faced in presenting the account
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to the police, and in its presentation here, is the remedy of 
indexicality. Consequently it contains details of 'who?', 
'where?', 'why?', and 'when?' in order to make observable 
each time it is occasioned its sensible character. Scenes are 
revealed as understandable and actions as reasonable, in the 
presentation of the account. These features for the practical 
remedy of indexicality are regarded as enabling an account to 
be presented; as being present in my interaction with the 
police, and in this presentation.
ACCOUNT PART ONE - SATURDAY NIGHT AND SUNDAY MORNING; I was 
walking along Park Street on a Saturday night; in the police 
statement the precise time and date were called for. Ahead of 
me at the junction of Park Street, Park Lane, and Old Park 
Lane I saw a group of people. Earlier that evening, together 
with a neighbour and my dog, I had been to a public house. We 
had gone to see the landlord to contribute to a collection for 
some flowers for the funeral of a man who had recently died; 
an ex-employer,and friend. Upon leaving the public house I 
decided to take my dog for a walk on the way home and chose 
a longer route home than my neighbour, Roy.
As I approached the group of people, who I could now see 
consisted of four young men [although in the darkness they 
were indistinct], I left the footpath and walked in the side 
of the road as they occupied the footpath. All the time 
walking along Park Street my dog had been running free, off 
the lead. As we had approached the group of youths my dog 
had gone onto the triangle of grass which formed the junction 
of the three roads. As I drew level with the young men some 
kind of disruption occurred which for a moment I could not 
grasp. What had happened was that one of the group had come
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from the centre and was shouting me by name. He cried 
either "For God's sake help me" or "For Christ's sake help 
me". He went on: "These three have got me". It was my 
neighbour Roy, who had blood running down the side of his 
face.
As Roy had moved towards me, the three other members of 
the group began to move away. I moved to stop the nearest one 
to me, C, but he jumped over a wall and ran across the triangle 
of grass towards Old Park Lane. The two other youths moved 
left and began to run up Park Lane. I began to chase them.
The dog was running by my side and as we began to approach the 
first youth, A, the dog snarled and jumped at him. Running as
fast as he could in the centre of the road A turned to see
what was happening behind him. As he did so he fell to the 
floor.
I reached A and pulled him to his feet by his coat. As I
did so he struggled and struck out with his fists and feet.
I struck him two or three times in the face and he stopped 
struggling. When this happened I told him to stay where he 
was. With hindsight ordering A to stay where he was seems 
childish, yet at the time it seemed perfectly feasible. I 
then went after B who had begun running up Park Lane. He had 
been standing further along the road than A and myself, 
presumably having stopped when I caught A. Though I tried to 
catch B, he was too far in front. I stopped and shouted for 
him to come back. Upon turning round I saw that A was no
I
longer in the middle of the road. Instead he was lying on 
the pavement outside a newsagent's shop. With his feet on 
either side of A's body and holding his head up by the hair 
was Roy. He was hitting A in the face with his fist and 
counting out loud each time he did so. When I first saw this
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Roy had counted up to sixteen. By the time I reached them 
the count was eighteen. I pulled Roy off the youth, helping 
him to his feet. He struggled a little to get away but after 
I took tight hold of his arm A became quiet. His eyes were 
cut and blood was running down his face.
Having caught A and with the other two youths out of sight 
I told Roy that we should get the police. We walked down 
Park Street towards a public telephone box. As I kept hold 
of A, Roy pointed to a garden where the three youths had 
given him "a kicking". On reaching the telephone box Roy 
held A while I telephoned the local police station. I told 
the officer who answered what had happened, and that we had 
caught one of those involved. He asked where we were and upon 
being told, said that someone would be down. As I turned to 
leave the telephone box a police car pulled up outside. I 
later learned that the swift appearance of the police was due 
to a telephone call made by a lady in whose garden Roy had 
been kicked. The police officer got out of his car and I told 
him what had happened. He asked where B and C were. On being 
told that they were somewhere around Park Lane, he [Glyn as I 
later came to know him] told Roy and A to get into the car. 
Glyn began to get in himself and I asked whether a statement 
would be wanted from me, and whether I should walk to the 
police station. He said that I should go to the station 
and began to drive up Park Street. I turned and together with 
the dog began to walk to the police station.
As I approached the police station there was a police van 
and car outside. A, B, C, and Roy and three policemen were 
entering. I went into the station and stood at the desk. A 
policeman asked me what I wanted. When I toljd him that I was
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involved with those who had just come into the station he 
asked me what had happened. When I told him the story he 
asked me to wait. A few minutes later a police constable 
[Nigel] came into the foyer and asked me to go with him. We 
went down a corridor and entered an interview room. Sitting 
down at a table Nigel asked me what had happened. Having gone 
through the story once more, we proceeded to make out a 
statement. I told the story piece by piece while he wrote it 
down, leaving out parts of it [e.g. where I had been, where I 
was going]. The exact names of the streets where the incident 
occurred were unclear so Nigel went to get a map. On his 
return he was accompanied by two other men, both dressed in 
suits. Nigel stood by the door, one of the men leant against 
some cabinents behind me, while the other man sat on the table 
with his feet on the chair once accupied by Nigel. The feeling 
in the room had somehow changed; there was a presence of 
suspicion, doubt, aggression and in me, fear.
The man sat on the table did not ask what had happened, 
but asked what I had been doing. Taking this as a question to 
do with a possible act which may have been an offence [e.g. 
hitting A], I answered "nothing", and began to tell the story 
once more. He stopped me short by asking if I had a dog lead.
I answered in the affirmative and he asked me where it was.
I replied that it was in my pocket, where it had been since 
we left the public house. I took the lead out of my pocket 
and the detective [for that is what I presumed the man to be] 
took it from me. He looked at it, got up from the table, and 
walked around the room with the ends of the lead held in each 
hand. The dog [a labrador] jumped to get the lead and the 
detective pushed him down. I told him not to do that as the
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dog thought he was playing. The lead was then handed to the 
other detective while the first one asked if I had hit anyone 
with the lead. I answered that I had not, and the detective 
asked if I was sure. After I repeated that I had not hit 
anyone with the lead the detectives and Nigel left the room.
Nigel returned some minutes later. I asked him who the 
two men had been, and he said they were "C.I.D". When I said 
that they were not very pleasant he said that it was because 
of the job where they»"have to deal with not very pleasant 
people". We then continued with making out the statement.
Part of the way through doing this I asked where the toilet was 
so that I could wash my hands. Nigel said that he would show 
me, and we both went to the toilet. It was only later that I 
realised that Nigel would not have let me leave the room 
unaccompanied; that the purpose behind my exit from the room 
was under suspicion. On our return we finished the statement.
I asked Nigel if I would be charged with anything given the 
interview with the detective. He said that he thought not, 
and they had just been checking. When the statement was 
finished he said that I could go and accompanied me down the 
corridor. As we walked along, B and C with Glyn came out of 
a connecting corridor. I could see A waiting at the desk in 
the foyer. B and C began shouting. It was something likes 
"There he is the bastard. We'll bloody get you. Where's your 
dog lead now?". As they did this they moved towards roe.
Glyn and a sergeant who came from behind the desk pushed them 
back. I was then allowed to leave the police station. It 
was three o'clock on Sunday morning.
When I arrived home my wife knew what had happened. Roy 
had called and told her. When I had been home for a few
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minutes there was a knock on the door; it was Roy. He told 
me that at the police station he had told them what had 
happened and had been asked to sign a complaint against A, B, 
and C. A constable had then driven him to the hospital where 
he had been treated and told to return on the Monday. He 
returned to the police station and asked about my whereabouts. 
Roy was told by the police that I had gone home. This was at 
two o'clock in the morning. Roy also told me what had happened 
prior to my arrival in Park Street.
Roy said that he had been walking along Park Street and 
A, B, and C were a little in front of him on the other side 
of the road. They were walking along eating chips. He could 
hear them talking but not what they were saying, when C threw 
his chips into the gutter and ran across the road. C said to 
Roy: "Give us a fag". Roy said that he did not have any 
cigarettes. C grabbed hold of Roy by the neck.of his jumper 
and hit him in the face. By the time C had hit Roy and they 
had begun fighting, A and B had crossed the road to them. 
Somehow Roy and C went over a garden wall into a garden, 
where they were joined by A and B. All three youths then 
began to kick Roy, counting the kicks as they delivered them. 
Roy said that he rolled up into a ball and lay still. The 
kicking stopped and the youths picked Roy up, carrying him 
out of the garden and up Park Street. They sat him on a stone 
wall which bordered the triangle of grass and began to discuss 
what to do. According to Roy there were three suggestions: 
to take him round the back of some shops and "dump him"; to 
"do him again"; and to get an ambulance. As this discussion 
was going on Roy saw my dog, knew that I must be near, and so 
jumped up and shouted me.
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I was also told by Roy what had happened as I walked to 
the police station. The police car containing Roy and A had 
driven along Park Street and onto Park Lane. As they moved 
along Park Lane a police van came from the other direction.
B and C were outside a shoe shop from where they had telephoned 
the police, because we "had" A. They had knocked on the shop 
door and asked the owners if they could use the telephone. In 
the police van were Nigel and another constable. B and C were 
shouting and threatening Roy as he sat in the police car. They 
were then placed in the back of the van, and both vehicles 
drove to the police station.
When Roy had gone to the hospital he had twelve stitches 
put in a cut in his head. Injuries to his chest were 
supported by bandages. On returning to the hospital on the 
Monday he had X-rays taken, and was told that he had a 
fractured rib and fractured arm. This was in late September.
In November I was issued with a summons to appear in court 
charged with malicious wounding and carrying an offensive 
weapon; section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 
which carries a maximum sentence of five years [E.E. Baker 
and F.B. Dodge, 1976].
SATURDAY NIGHT AND SUNDAY MORNING REVISITED: How can the 
policeman's jnb be characterised? What form of consciousness 
goes along with it? What is the essential problematic which 
faces those with whom I was involved in the police station?
As reported in the press, the image of the policeman has 
changed in recent years. He is now no longer characterised 
as a folk hero, but is now subject to scrutiny and investigation 
of a critical nature [cf. S. Chibnall, 1977]. In sociology 
the dominant conception of the policeman is of his coming
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to t e r m s  with individual actions in accord with the general 
values of society. It has been suggested that because of this 
he draws public co-operation and esteem [M. Banton, 1964].
Jock Young's view is that the police Mismanage» encountered 
actions and produce deviance: that which is dangerous to the 
individual and wider society. This process is based upon 
"false concepts" held by the police which generate stereotypical 
conceptions of the criminal [1975]. Because of the overt 
organisational nature of the police, Young argues, they tend 
to negotiate reality so that it fits these stereotypical 
preconceptions [1973], Such shared definitions and norms of 
behaviour enforce highly integrated and defensive structural 
properties which are prescribed by the police's formal 
organisation [M. Cain, 1973].
In an examination of the American police, Wesley has noted 
a feature of a policeman's life which may be transcultural.
This is that the policeman sees the public as a threat. O n e  
aspect of this is that the majority of people he meets and 
deals with are subject to the legal powers of the police and 
because of this are antagonistic towards policemen. Sharing 
the theme of the public as enemy builds and binds policemen 
together in a secretive and isolated group. For the new 
recruit to the police, experiencing what he has been told 
about the public as enemy can result in a •' '"specific shock" 
as his accent of reality is shifted from one finite meaning 
province to another [A. Schütz, 1962]. Wesley calls this 
leap "reality shock" [W.A. Wesley, 1970],
The historical development of th- police as an organisation 
through industrial capitalism and liberal democracy, has led 
today to pre-emptive policing. This is characterised by the
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assumptions that criminals are likely to commit further 
crimes, and that knowledge about people who are likely to 
commit crimes should be collected [T. Bunyan, 1977], These are 
two examples of the police's formal organisational protocols 
which have to be accomplished through the everyday work 
activities of policemen. Such protocols have both prospective 
and retrospective qualities: they have to be both followed 
and accomplished [A. Cicourel, 1976].
The relation between the formal organisation of the police 
and the informal stereotypical preconceptions in operation in 
actual situations is formed by everyday work practices of 
policemen. This view treats the rational, planful, and formal 
concept of organisation as a commonsense construction; as an 
element in a sense of social structure. As such the meaning 
of organisation can only be located by an examination of its 
determination in actual cases of action; as produced by those 
persons who are judged to be socially competent to do so [E. 
Bittner, 1974]. In order to do this I want to now examine 
the above account of what happened to reveal what it has to 
say about the work practices of the police. This is not to 
regard the account as a sign and what follows as its 
sociological referent. It is not to distinguish between what 
was said and done and what was 'actually' taking place [H. 
Garfinkel, 1967]. In this common sociological practice, the 
former is regarded as an incomplete version of the latter 
[i.e. the 'complete' sociological account].
This section is seen rather as a continuation of the 
above account, and a complement to it. It seeks to examine 
how those involved spoke and acted. As such the section 
consists of one set of instructions for understanding what
occurred. Though -the focus here is more upon?, how -the policemen? 
involved carried out their job, a more fundamental' interest is in 
the resources and contexts which enables them to do soj 
the constructive methodicity of language im action. This 
feature, located hy the maxim ’the sense of' a statement 
resides im seeing how it was spokem’ (B. Garfinkel, 1967), is 
not confined to sociological, analysis. As a basic method for 
locating- what happened and anticipating future developments 
in people’s actions, seeing how someone spoke consists of' am 
intersubjective meaning context, available to interactants for- 
interpretation?(A. Schütz, 1972),
The Method Of Doubt: In all the dealings which1 I had with 
police officers, they stressed three dominant features in 
relation? to accounts of what happened. They consistently 
maintained that i) they must be impartial and ’sit om the 
fence’ until 2) they had located what happened so that charges 
could be made. This had to be 3) done and completed according 
to the protocols of ’paper work’. In articulating these 
requirements of organisational, procedure,, the officers 
presented, a method of impartial, and professional doubt which 
extended to the factuality of the accounts of those involved 
im the event;. The formal, sense of this, procedure was seen in 
its usefulness; for locating ’the truth*. By this assembly of 
documents concerned with what happened, it was assumed that 
’what really happened’' would become- self-evident. Thatt this 
process was dependent upom a multitude of judgements and upon? 
exactly which document's were extended credence to, were issues 
not formally recognised or mentioned by the officers. Bowever- 
im conversation with Glyn after? the case had been settled im 
court, he? •’supposed” that he should have taken? a statement 
from the woman who had telephoned the police, and who had
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seen the initial fight take place in her garden.
As a means to locate the sense of an event, the method of 
doubt has been noted on separate occasions by Zimmerman [1970] 
and Sacks [1972a], For Zimmerman examining the work of a 
welfare agency, the method of doubt is an ♦"investigative 
stance". It consists of a - 'thoroughgoing skepticism". Sacks 
in examining police work, has called it 'tin incongruity 
procedure". This consists of treating routine appearances with 
doubt, which results in viewing stories and scenes as "not 
what they seem". The focus is on the way appearances and 
stories are presented; their style, ease of presentation, and 
so on. Sacks sees the general warrant for this method as 
lying in its plausibility for Anyone: "Its warrant in 
particular cases is that the inference made is one which 
ordinary persons would make".
From Sacks' description, the method of doubt provides 
for the accomplishment of two general features of police 
work. As described by the officers involved in the incident 
being examined here, it provides for an 'objective' state of 
affairs or at least the assumption of 'objectivity'. Secondly 
the method of doubt enables the feature of self-evidency to 
be located. Officers treat the search for the facts as a matter 
of location [i.e. as residing in documents and stories, 
waiting to be found], rather than as accomplishment [i.e. a 
product of the activities instituted in the search for 
self-evidency, impartiality, and rationality]. The idea of 
self-evidency has it that the conclusions reached upon a 
certain incident involved little or no choice on the part of 
the police officers; the consistency and texture of an event, 
in line with the idea of impartiality, are seen to select 
themselves.
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Though the method of doubt I gleaned from police officers 
I was involved with was connected with fairly formal police 
work practices, it is possible and perhaps probable that it 
takes other less savoury forms. For example, when briefly 
questioned by the C.I.D, officers I felt that rather than 
standing back and being impartial [i.e. the formal statement 
of the method of doubt], they actively disbelieved me and 
were prepared if necessary to use pressure to challenge my 
story. The accounts presented by the uniformed officers are 
themselves suspect as descriptions of actual police practices. 
When first at the police station I met an officer I already 
knew, Ian. We talked and I told him what I was doing there.
In my conversation with Nigel I asked him whether I would be 
charged, and he said that this was unlikely. Ian later told 
me that on this same night he had asked Nigel whether I would 
be "done". Nigel had replied:""Bloody well right he will".
The method of doubt appears to have two aspects. It is 
first of all a part of the formal police ideology as displayed 
by the police themselves. As contained within a body of 
knowledge concerning 'normal' police practice, it connects 
actions and mundane practices with a wider set of meanings 
or sense of social structure [cf. D. Apter, 1964]. From 
this aspect individual actions stand not only as documents 
of this wider set of meanings [e.g. seeing the policeman at 
work as 'protecting' the wider society], but are justified by 
that set of meanings [e.g. C.I.D. officers acting oggresively 
because they have to deal with people who are not "pleasant"]. 
In this form the method of doubt is a theorised entity. In 
its second aspect it is a situated practice of language and 
judgement, of question and style. Though here one label has 
been used for what occurs between suspects and policemen, it
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is highly probable that the manifestation of the method of 
doubt in each separate case is subtly different. Whether a 
policeman questions a suspect calmly or aggressively, whether 
he decides the action he can take on a few hearings of the 
story or decides to question it further and more fully are 
matters which arise and become resolved in an interaction of 
social characters. The formal features of impartiality and 
self-evidency have no place in such a situation; they are 
post hoc considerations.
At the stage of questioning a suspect a policeman is 
concerned with doing his job [i.e. finding out what happened] 
and is not as such concerned with matters of formal organisation 
The policeman is more concerned with assessing and possibly 
challenging the plausibility of a story and its teller in 
relation to the set of legal rules available, and which he 
may judge to have been broken. This seems a fairly rational 
enterprise: matching the story with the rules and in comparison 
coming up with a logical outcome. For this model of action to 
exist as a rational strategy, it is crucial that before a 
choice is made the conditions governing the selection of 
alternative choices should be known [A. Schütz, 1953]. However 
in respect to the deliberations of jurors, Harold Garfinkel 
has suggested that people may be more concerned with 
justifying the outcomes of actions than with engaging in the 
process of rational selection and decision making [1967]
Going along with this view, it may be more accurate t o  s e e  
the decision to make a charge against a person by police 
officers as an initial step, and not as an outcome of a 
process cf r a t i o n a l  c h o i c e .  As a result of this, the 
procedures of questioning and amassing documents seeks to 
construct the conditions for and confirm the decision to
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press charges.
Schütz [1953] suggested that the model of rational action 
was ideal-typical and absent from daily life. In talking to 
coroners, Atkinson found that the mode of a person's death 
was a key determinant in the selection or search for further 
evidence [1973]. From Atkinson's description it is as if the 
coroner makes a decision 'more-or-less' , and then looks for 
a particular kind of evidence to substantiate it. In his 
study of juvenile justice, Cicourel similarly noted that 
decisions made by the police were retrospectively interpreted 
and justified [1976], Such sociological ideas and reports as 
these suggest that a decision to institute charges against me 
came fairly quickly after I entered the police station. This 
is made clear by two things that happened: Nigel telling Ian 
that I would be charged while I was still in the police 
station; and A and B being asked to sign a complaint against 
me [C refused], again while I was in the police station making 
a statement. Both these events I only learnt about later and 
they resulted in the reinterpretation of what occurred to me 
that night, which forms my account above. I had decided what 
the situation consisted of [i.e. being a witness], and 
interpreted events and instituted actions according to that 
conception. It was only later that I discovered that my 
actions were being monitored according to the mode 'suspected 
of a crime'. This is perfectly transparent from the number of 
occasions I asked police officers if I would be charged, to 
which they insisted that they did not know. Yet on the night 
in the police station they had charged me with malicious 
wounding and carrying an offensive weapon.
The method of doubt has a place both in the official 
police ideology and organisation, and in routine police
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practice. Though the sense of the method changes with the 
occasion, the formal and informal instances of it are related. 
The fcrmal conception provides the informal employment of the 
method of doubt with a sense of structure and history; with a 
sense of place and direction. At the same time and on each 
and every occasion, the informal situation provides a case 
for the accomplishment of formal ideological states. As 
Zimmerman described it in his study of a welfare agency, 
these informal activities are consulted "in order to decide 
what the formal plan might reasonably be taken to mean"
[1970]. Alongside this judgemental work are ideas on what 
rational outcomes should be like [i.e. a further impact of 
the existent police ideology]. The police officers that I 
spoke to had a sense of the future in dealing with cases in 
respect of the formal organisational constraints which they 
had to satisfy. They were concerned with legality and 
rationality in the form of rules [cf. M. Weber, 1970], as 
the legitimate parameters of their work activities.
Related to these concerns were other features which Weber 
termed rational. Police officers followed the legal code as 
embodying their work objectives and values, seeking to apply 
that code in specific cases. In this work they saw their 
duties as limited to specific tasks [cf. M. Albrow, 1970]. 
These features of rationality found in the formal method of 
doubt can only be produced by everyday methods and practices. 
This is a distinction similar to that made by Weber between 
formal and substantive rationality. The former relates to 
general laws or rules which apply to everyone, while the 
latter consists of free-flowing practical judgements and 
decisions [M. Weber, 1970]. The situated problematic consists
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of the production of rule-bound formalism from the basis of 
everyday morality and instincts. The task of the substitution 
of context-free for indexical expressions for the practical 
purposes of police work uses, references, and relies upon 
informal and situated methods and knowledge.
Paper Work: It is a formal characteristic of organisations 
that they form and produce protocols for the collection and use 
of paper information and records. The factuality and 
objectivity which is accorded to a document may differ from 
occasion to occasion, from organisation to organisation. Here 
one instance of the production of a document will be examined. 
This is the production of a written statement.
A naive idea of what happens in being involved with the 
police and one which is regularly given in newspaper reports 
might run something like this: 'something happened, those 
involved went to the police station, and they were/were not 
charged'. Though this is an essentially correct description, 
it glosses the process of production which occurs in the 
bringing of charges by the police. The apparently unproblematic 
gap between going to the police station, making a statement, 
and being charged is far from unproblematic. It consists of 
the negotiation of an event's features into a legally and 
organisationally admissable form. The story is not set down 
verbatim, but is worked out between the police officer and 
the story teller.
The story is repeated section by section and reformulated 
into formal language by the police officer. In this way 
factors are inserted, such as time and the number of people 
involved or observed, and other factors are left out because 
"they don't matter" [Nigel]. Though the direction of this 
negotiation is controlled by the police officer, in
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interpreting the verbal story he seeks agreement from the 
teller on the formal pieces of the statement. There is 
however a paradox. The statement that is produced is going 
to be the version of the person named at its head, yet it is 
produced in its 'objective' form.by the police officer [cf.
A. Cicourel, 1976],
A statement is essentially tied to the context of its 
production. Though it may 'speak' about an event such as a 
fight, as a version of an event it is constructed according 
to the relevances operating at the time. The features which 
are glossed and let pass become a requirement for accomplishing 
a legally admissable and objective document and not features 
of the actual event. In order to understand written statements 
they have to be viewed against some background; readers as a 
condition of understanding have to introduce a version of 
context. It is here, in the production and reading of a 
statement, that an important disparity exists between the 
police and suspects which is crucial for organisational 
outcomes.
In producing both the verbal and written accounts of an 
event, the suspect is not concerned with the requirements of 
literal description. He rather displays to those concerned 
how the people concerned in the event spoke and acted. The 
policeman on the other hand is interested in another situation; 
that of the workplace. He is interested in how the suspect 
speaks and acts in the police station and in making his 
statement in order to evaluate the kind of person he is. In 
this way a suspect becomes a cultural dope of the police's 
practice of simplifying "the communicative texture of his 
behavioural environment" [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. By the
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concentration upon the behavioural structure of an event 
without regard to the intentional content that defines ’action’ 
a situated understanding of the event in its own terms becomes 
impossible. Statements can thus be read, judged, and 
understood in strictly behavioural terms by the police to see 
if they 'fit' into a category of crime.
Truth and Doubt: In order to get his job done and to 
satisfy the formal features of police organisation, the police 
officer uses an informal method of doubt in order to assess 
the type of person who has been involved in an incident. 
However, to what extent is the use of this method a matter of 
choice over and above other methods? Or could this method be 
f o r c e d  u p o n  t h e  p o l i c e m a n  a s  a condition of the reality of 
his job? For the informal method of doubt to be a forced 
rather than a selected aspect of the policeman’s work, an 
invariant property of accounts is required. This is that all 
accounts, and the people presenting them, are truthful.
Though there are exceptions to this [e.g. jokes as a means 
for the introduction of 'taboo' subjects, cf. 3.P. Emerson, 
1973], when accounts are presented and in all subsequent 
changes t o  them a very condition o f  their seriousness is that 
they present the truth. As Harvey Sacks has written, the 
fact that something is uttered immediately constructs intended 
truth. F o r  the policeman faced with a number of differing 
accounts of the same event, the status of intended truth is 
problematic. Because of this, doubt becomes a feature of the 
policeman's job situation and, moreover, a relevant means for 
locating the actual status of accounts.
The fact of differing accounts of the same event means 
that the background expectancy that the event in question can 
be routinely known in common with others disappears. One
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feature of this expectancy as Schütz discussed, is that 
people assume,[assume that others assume, and that as they 
assume it of others, others assume it of them] that the 
elements which an account documents are 'natural facts' [A. 
Schütz, 1964]; that accounts display objectively determined 
scenes. For the policeman faced with different accounts, 
this background expectancy is breached. It ceases to be a 
normative rule for the management of everyday affairs, and 
is replaced by a rule of doubt. In this way the rule of 
doubt, produced by socially structured conditions, is for the 
policeman a 'natural fact' of his workplace.
This feature of a policeman's scheme of interpretation 
contrasts with that operated by suspects. As has already been 
suggested, accounts by suspects carry with them the status 
of intended truth. At the same time a description of how an 
event occurred relies upon the normative rule of a display of 
scenic particulars against the background expectancy of 
naturally determined fact. The suspect has to operate at the 
everyday level of presenting an account which hinges on the 
sanctioned use of doubt; that a story has an undoubted 
correspondence with the objects which it 'intends' in a 
particular way [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. This means that there 
is social distance between the policeman and the suspect as 
a condition of the interactional and structural roles which 
they occupy. The suspect is excluded from 'normal' forms 
of communication and information on his views and accounts 
because the collectivity into which he is drawn operates with 
a scheme of interpretation which focuses directly upon such 
views and accounts.
Exclusion is accomplished by the police not only by the
method of doubt , but also by visible means of ’not belonging’; 
police officers wear uniforms and the suspect does not. Also 
the very place ini which' the suspect finds himself is unfamiliar, 
while it is not for the policeman-. Farther to these ecological 
aspects of exclusion there are features of solidarity and 
loyalty displayed between policemen? they may be om the; same 
shift, know one another*s names, and be dealing- with the; same 
case (cf. E. Lemert, 1973). There is a paradoxical, 
arrangement of feelings: im this structure of doubt, truth, 
and exclusion-. The policeman’s task is to examine and make 
judgements om a variety of materials im order to arrive at; 
a decision or series of decisions which, can count, as a true 
account of what, happened. In order to dir this he uses the- 
method of doubt. Whereas the policeman moves from doubt to 
apparent truth,- the suspect, begins with making the claim of 
iniencfóáL truth, which because of the- structural, arrangements 
of the situation; im w M e h  he is. im, is transformed into doubt.
The suspect occupies the position; of not knowing what; is 
occurring or what may happeni to him; not knowing that is 
until, he is charged and held to appear in court or until, 
some months, later wliem a knock on: the door heralds a summons 
to appear in court.
The work of the police is towards a specific end? finding 
out exactly what happened when an event occurred and, where 
appropriate, heinging-charges. Im this progression; where; a 
person; is found guilty the police have been successful; where 
he is not they have been mistaken-. This simplified description 
of court-room, conclusions points to the issue that within; the court 
situation it is not relations between indisputable facts which 
are im question, but the very facts themselves. This is to 
say the different and competing accounts- of what happened are
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in competition. The final section of this chapter will 
detail this competition in relation to the event in which I 
was involved.
ACCOUNT PART TWO - AND SO TO COURT: I was summoned to 
appear in court in December. Prior to this I went to see my 
solicitor to whom I told my story. Upon hearing it he said 
that he thought that something had "gone wrong", and that "we 
have a very good chance". He filled in a form for me to apply 
for legal aid. All I had to do was to sign it and leave it 
with him. I was also asked to request Roy to be a witness for 
me.
In December Roy did not attend the court because as I was 
pleading not guilty, the case would not be heard then. When I 
arrived A, B, and C were there, charged with malicious wounding. 
I sat with my solicitor while other cases were dealt with.
After an application for an extension of a liquor licence all 
our names were read out. I stood in the dock in front of the 
magistrates together with A, B, and C. The charges were read 
out by the clerk of the court and we were asked individually 
how we pleaded. I pleaded not guilty. A, B, and C did 
likewise, and we were bailed on the sum of twenty five pounds 
each. The cases were then adjourned until a later date. My 
solicitor informed me later by letter that this was to be in 
February. He also asked me to write down any reasons I could 
think of for the unjuries to A's face, since he had discovered 
that a doctor had made a statement saying that their appearance 
was consistent with that of being hit with a blunt instrument. 
This I did [e.g. A had fallen over in the road, I was wearing 
a ring, Roy had hit him numerous times]. Meanwhile I had been 
granted legal aid, having to contribute the sum of fifteen 
pounds.
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At the second court appearance both I and Roy were 
present. He was a witness in the prosecution of A, B, and
C. I was to be prosecuted. On the evening of the incident 
Roy had not made a statement, but had gone straight to the 
hospital after telling his verbal story. Later Glyn came to 
my house to go through my "antecedants " [e.g. previous 
convictions, colour of eyes, even whether I had false teeth], 
and while doing so asked me if I thought Roy would make a 
statement. I said that I did not know, and that he should 
ask Roy. By this time Roy had been to see a solicitor who 
had said that in any dealings with the police, he should refer 
them to him. Consequently Roy refused to make a written 
statement. Also, he had not been charged with any offence.
The court-house contained two court rooms. One was old 
and used for cases which were relatively minor and took up 
little time. The second one was new and used for cases 
which took up time. Our cases were to be heard here. Prior 
to the cases being.heard, C changed his plea to guilty. His 
case was heard in the older court room. A police inspector 
read out the charges, C pleaded guilty, and the magistrates 
had a word with the clerk of the court. He was fined fifty 
pounds. A few minutes later the cases of A, B, and myself 
began in the second court room. A and B were sat with their 
solicitors at tables facing the magistrates' bench. I was 
seated with my solicitor behind them. The clerk of the 
court read out our names, we stood up, the charges were read, 
and we were asked how we were going to plead. We all pleaded 
not guilty and the case of A and B was to be heard first. I 
was to be dealt with after them. After four and a half hours 
A was found guilty and fined pounds., B was likewise
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found guilty and fined twenty pounds. There was not enough 
time for my case to be heard and it was fixed for the coming 
April.
The events in the court room were something of a dream to 
me. This was only the second time I had been in a court 
before, and I felt as if the ceiling were pushing my head 
down. At first it was all I could do to glance upwards, but 
after some hours this diminished to some extent. I had the 
same feeling when my case was dealt with in the April, though 
this time more acutely. The case of A and B itself .'consisted 
of Roy giving evidence for the prosecution, and then being 
questioned by A and B's solicitors. A's solicitor was also 
acting for C. She told the magistrates that C had pleaded 
guilty to the event in question, and did not want to be called 
as a witness. However the magistrates insisted that he gave 
evidence. A and B gave evidence in defence, and were questioned 
by the prosecution. Nigel and Glyn had given evidence for the 
prosecution, stating what they had seen and been told. After 
the prosecution and defence cases had been put, the magistrates 
retired and later gave their verdicts.
The details of what happened did not concern me directly 
as the event in question happened prior to my involvement.
Roy's evidence stated that he was attacked initially by C, 
and then A and B joined in and all three proceeded to kick 
him. The story presented by A and B was different. They said 
that there had been a fight between Roy and C, and that was all. 
When the fight had finished they had carried Roy with them 
[and away from the nearest telephone box], in order to get an 
ambulance for him because he appeared to be quite badly hurt.
The magistrates became interested in who could be identified
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as having kicked Roy. While he was giving evidence they 
asked him about the type of footwear his attackers were 
wearing while he was being kicked. Roy stated that all he 
could remember was that one of those kicking him wore shoes 
with white on them.
A and B were questioned about their shoes but denied 
wearing shoes that, had any white on them that night. When 
C was called to give evidence, because he had been outside 
the court room, he did not know of the shoe issue. The 
magistrates asked him about the shoes he had worn on the night 
and he replied: " Brown stack-heel boots" . He was asked if 
they had any white on them, to which he replied that they had 
not. The magistrates asked about the kind of shoes the other 
two were wearing. C said that A had been wearing brown 
stack-heel boots with white fronts. There seemed to be a 
silent gasp around the court room. The magistrate nodded his 
head, with his questioning over. The doctor, though he was 
not concerned with the cases of A and B but only with my 
case, should have been present in court. I learnt this in 
the recess for lunch when I overheard Glyn and Nigel talking. 
Nigel said that the doctor would not be attending court as 
" he's had to go to Crewe" .
When I appeared in court in April, Roy was the witness 
for my defence while A, B, and C were witnesses for the 
prosecution. Again the clerk of the court read my name out 
and I stood up. He then read the charges against me and I 
pleaded not guilty. The clerk then said that for the charge 
of carrying an offensive weapon I could elect for a trial 
by jury at the Crown Court. I declined, saying that I wanted 
the matter to be dealt with then. The clerk said that if I 
was found guilty and the magistrates decided that a more
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severe sentence than they had powers to give was deserved, 
then I would be sent to the Crown Court for sentence. I then 
sat down and the prosecution began the case.
A said that he thought that I had hit him with the dog 
lead, but that he could not be sure. He said: " I saw 
something in his hand" . C was called, and he said that I 
had hit him with the lead. My solicitor asked why he had not 
made a complaint against me [it was then that I learnt that 
the complaint had been made by A and B]. C replied that as 
far as he was concerned the " whole thing" had finished on 
the night in question. Of the three prosecution witnesses 
B was the most precise. Whereas C said that other than hitting 
him, he had not seen me hit anyone else because he had run 
away , B said that I had struck both C and A. He said that 
having struck C with the lead I ran after A. While chasing 
him I struck him with the dog lead which caused him to fall.
B said that I then wrapped the lead around my fist and struck 
A about the face numerous times. Before we had entered the 
court room my solicitor told me that the doctor would not be 
present to give evidence on A's injuries because, as it was 
stated in court, " h§ is out of the country" .
The section of the doctor's statement which said that A's 
injuries were consistent with being struck by a blunt 
instrument, were removed by the police; the rest of the 
statement was offered as evidence apart from this section.
The two policemen concerned in the case were not present to 
give evidence. Nigel was supposed to be on holiday, yet I 
saw him on the morning the case was heard wearing police 
uniform under an overcoat. Glyn it was said had influenza, 
yet that evening I spoke to him while he was sat in his
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police car. While I was giving my evidence and being 
questioned by the prosecuting solicitor, the magistrate raised 
the matter of the dog lead. He asked where it was. It was 
at this point that the non-appearance of the t*o policemen 
was explained. As Nigel was said to have the lead, his 
non-appearance meant the non-appearance of the lead too. 
Consequently the magistrates asked me to describe it, which 
I did.
In relation to the dog lead, the prosecuting solicitor 
referred to the precedent of a prior case, making the point 
that if I had struck out with the lead not realising it to be 
there, then that was admissable. I told the magistrates that 
at the time of telling the police what had happened and making 
a statement I was convinced that 1 had not struck anyone with 
the dog lead, and that I was still certain that this was so.
I can remember the phrase which came to me and which was 
reproduced in local newspapers later: " I have never hit 
anybody, at any time, anywhere with a dog lead" . My 
solicitor concentrated on making the point that I was aware 
that an offence had been committed, and that my actions were 
directed towards apprehending those involved for the police.
After I had appeared before the court, Roy gave evidence 
for me. He said that he had not seen me hit anyone with the 
dog lead, and also that he had struck A in the face sixteen 
or seventeen times. After Roy had given his evidence the 
magistrates retired. During the course of the hearing one 
of the magistrates, a woman [the other two were men], kept 
catching my eye. She was middle-aged, wore glasses, and a 
blue suit and hat. At various points in the case she would 
give a look and a little nod to me. As the magistrates were
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leaving the court room she again looked at me, gave a nod, 
and a little smile. Roy and myself went into the corridor.
A, B, and C were there as well. Just as Roy and I had begun 
to light cigarettes the clerk of the court asked those 
present in court to rise, as the magistrates were coming 
back. As this happened I heard A say " not guilty" . We then 
moved back into the court room and the magistrates entered.
With everyone seated, the clerk of the court called my 
name and I stood up. The magistrates then said that they had 
found the case " not proven" . I thanked the magistrates, 
receiving a smile from the lady in the blue suit. The 
prosecution solicitor then rose and asked about costs. The 
magistrate asked about my situation and was told that I had 
been granted legal aid after paying an initial fifteen pounds. 
On hearing this he said: " Give him his money back" . The 
magistrates then stood, the clerk said rise, and they left the 
court. My solicitor shook my hand, and I went over to the 
prosecuting solicitor. He had his back to me, so I tapped him 
on the shoulder and offered him my hand. He took it, we shook 
hands, and I offered him my thanks. While I was doing this 
Roy was behind me. After having shook hands the prosecuting 
solicitor pointed at Roy and said: " It should have been you" . 
We then left the court room, with the matter finally over.
IN CONCLUSION: The relation between my suspect's account 
and the more formal sociological account is an essential one; 
the former underlies the latter. Yet the relation with the 
account of the outcome of being involved with the police is 
more problematic. The sociological account could not predict 
or state with any probability greater than a commonsense guess 
or judgement which of the competing versions of what happened
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would prove to be 'sufficient' to provide for that night's 
event as a rational outcome. The sociological account had to 
'wait and see' what the outcome would be.
The suspect's account in actual engagement with the police 
was not 'sufficient' to construct the event as a 'witnessed' 
event; other accounts constructed participation and involvement. 
The police could thus account for my version of what happened 
as showing and being in-accord-with-the-rule malicious 
wounding and carrying an offensive weapon. The account of 
the resolution of what happened in court stems from a comparison 
of accounts. However, what is the relation between the 
suspect's accounts and the outcome in court, and the sociological 
account? This will be examined in Chapter Seven.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
POLICE, MAGISTRATES, AND SOCIOLOGY
The actual events are not facts. It is the use of 
proper procedures for categorizing events which 
transforms them into facts. A fact is something 
which is already categorized, which is already 
worked up so that it conforms to the model of what 
that fact should be like. To describe something as 
a fact or to treat something as a fact implies that 
the events themselves - what happened - entitle or 
authotize the teller of the tale to treat that 
categorization as ineluctable. " Whether I wish it 
or not, it is a fact. Whether I will admit it or 
not, it is a fact." If something is to be constructed 
as a fact, then it must be shown that proper procedures 
have been used to establish it as objectively known.
It must be seen to appear in the same way to anyone.
[D. Smith, unpublished.]
The recognition of sociological knowledge as 
subject-bound to a self-interpreted field of experience 
is the first step in assuming responsibility for 
social science knowledge at the same time that it 
renews the necessity to inform it with moral vision. 
Sociological detachment built upon methodological 
dualism of subject and object must yield to a 
Reflexive Sociology more concerned with 'soul 
searching' than 'soul selling'.
[J. O'Neill, 1972]
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MAGISTRATES, POLICE, AND SOLICITORS - WILL THE ACCUSED 
PLAY THE GAME?. In England today the majority of criminal 
cases such as the one described in Chapter Six are heard in 
Magistrates' Courts. Such a court is defined by the Magistrates 
Court Act, 1952, section 124, as any justice or justices of 
the peace acting under any enactment or by virtue of his o r  
their commission or under common law [R.J. Walker, 1977], The 
process which is followed in such a court is that a charge is 
made and defended before magistrates who decide whether the 
charge is appropriate or not, and what punitive measures are 
required if any.
In deciding whether a charge is proven magistrates may 
follow various precedents: that which is laid down in English 
law; that which is set by a court for itself [e.g. dealing with 
similar cases in a similar manner [G. Schubert, 1975]. Whichever 
precedents are used in a particular moment, it is interesting 
that the underlying assumption in the judicial process is that 
magistrates can decide whether the bringing of charges by the 
police is a correct measure or not. It is assumed that versions 
of an event can be examined and decided upon in relation to 
their 'real' occurrence.
This background assumption of objectification, by which 
Cicourel [1976] means a person's attempts to persuade others 
of the credibility of what is being attended to as a basis 
for further a c t i o n  a n d  inference, is to be found in the 
structural-functionalist view of the court. For example, the 
resources or 'inputs' for the purpose of deciding guilt or 
innocence consist of adaptive, goal-pursuance, and pattern 
maintenance features. Court room decisions require an 
examination of cause and effect terms; the court has to decide
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upon "the character- of the past relationship between the- 
alleged offence of the defendant: and counter clairrr of then 
plaintiff, and the effect of any decision upon those involved.
The court also requires standards by which to evaluate the 
competing claims of what happened and the effect of a court 
decision upon the wider society. These standards are in terms 
of what a system- is organised for and the goals towards which 
it is directed, along with the situation to be created of 
maintained by the court’s exercise of power-. The pattern 
maintenance feature can be located as a willingness by the 
people dhawn into the court to accept and abide by its decisions 
in accord with which it dispenses ’justice*. The adaptive 
and goal-pursuance ’outputs’ of the court are an abiding 
interest in the pursuance of rights and obligations in the 
interests of efficient organisation, and the interpretation, 
of a particular- case in terms of the' formal language of the 
law and society’s ideal's (H»C. Bredemeier, 1975)« Durkheim 
saw this functional, ’input - output’ process as enforcing 
the collective sentiments of society through "authorized 
interpreters”, who judged upon issues which were criminal, 
because they shocked the common conscience (1964).
Bbth magistrates, the police, and sociologists’ decisions 
of fact rest upon this kind of taken for granted assumption 
that they can engage in ’pure observation’* view things ’over 
there’ independently of the act of observation in order to 
make the ’real’ facts publicly available (cf. M. Phillipson,
19 7 5) • I*1 order to attain this rounded off and abstract
reinterpretation of an original event, the sociological and 
legal view of society removes or smoothes off the contingent, 
features of everyday affairs to correlate- relationships between 
focused upon actiom and sociological and legal rules (A. Cicourel, 1976).
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As distinct from formal aspects of legal and sociological 
thinking, in court I was concerned with what was happening to 
me and what was to happen co me finally. Though in this sense 
there was a concern with 'inputs' and 'outputs ' , in a 
fundamental sense the texture and structure of court room 
events depended upon deeper forms of intersubjective relations 
of a fleeting and transitory kind. For example, though a 
decision of fact for A and B rested upon an amalgam of stories 
and reports, it was the way in which the hearing was conducted 
in terms of forms of address, questions, answers, and 
persuasive practices which gave sense to the body of assembled 
knowledge; it was occasioned in a particular form [i.e. 
supporting guilt] through court room interaction.
The major types of court room personnel are magistrates, 
policemen, solicitors, and the accused. As separate groups, 
police and magistrates enjoy an analogous position in terms 
of interpretation. Both are confronted by the task of 
interpreting the 'true' character of an event and instituting 
some form of action [e.g. prosecuting someone, dismissing a 
case, fining or imprisoning someone]. Magistrates however 
are distant in time from the action in question. The police 
themselves are often not witnesses to an actual event, but 
magistrates are even more removed in time. Though they have 
the same set of materials and people as the police from which 
to make their decision of guilt or innocence, magistrates do 
not compile those materials themselves as the police do, or 
have the same length of time to question and assess the people 
involved. Whereas the police can question people within the 
private confines of a police station without the presence 
of legal representatives, the magistrate has to carry out
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judgements and assessments before an audience. He is involved 
in the public demonstration of 'justice', which is reportable 
in public terms [e.g. newspapers].
This public - private distinction between magistrates and 
the police can be seen in what the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, Sir David McNee, had to say about present police 
practices of detention of suspects and the detention rules 
which the police would like. The Commissioner admitted that 
police hold suspects without access to solicitors for longer 
than three days without charging them. He also proposed that 
the police should be allowed to hold people without charging 
them for seventy two hours, and then have the duty to ask a 
magistrate for permission to detain for a further, similar period 
[:•" The Guardian" , 21st. August, 1978].
It appears that magistrates and the police are distinct 
groups. The magistrate is not part of or subject to the 
authority structure or work ideology of the police. He is 
separate and apart from the police organisation, in a position 
where he can cast a critical eye over police practice. However 
there may be a greater affinity between the police and justices 
of the peace in terms of shared values and norms of behaviour 
than the outward structure of each group indicates. For 
example, Bowes [1966] has presented a case for regarding the 
accused in court as at a disadvantage in regard to the joint 
forces of police and magistrates. He states that there are 
many instances of police conduct being condoned by magistrates 
without proper regard for and examination of that conduct.
This is because of the belief that the police will not 
prosecute without proper cause; that magistrates should not 
hinder or interfere with the job of apprehending law breakers.
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As a result of experience- on the Fencfit, unfavourable attitudes 
against the accused are "built up and the "belief that the police' 
are hindered in seeking- a conviction "By the restrictions of the 
accused’s legal, rights is formed-
Cohen (’1972) has noted a shared purpose between magistrates 
and the police in-defining possible criminal, populations. Im 
his examination of the creation of mods and rockers,. Cohen 
reports that the poli ere and courts joined together in viewing 
non-criminal acts under certain circumstances, as situationally 
improper-. Furthermore, cases which appeared in court were the 
result of police discretion!. This idea consists of the police- 
having to make a choice between reporting a ’crime* or 
letting it pass (C.P- Freidland'er and'E. Mitchell, 19740» 
Because all violations of the law cannot be dealt with, this 
concept provides for a concentration upon more serious offences 
and a selectivity in enforcing minor violations, in relation 
to changing societal, values (e.g. ’"mugging* , cf. S- Hall, et al,
1978). Via the mechanism of police discretion magistrates 
receive and endorse- particular relevances about what 
non-desirable behaviour is. At the same time-, from-their 
position om the Bench they can transmit; the court’s views on 
the relevance of some actiom over another-, if only through 
the severity of sentences imposed (cf. R- Hood, 19^2).
In the court room- the policeman is a professional at work, 
The magistrate on the other hand is there as a leading member 
or the community. However, in court this professional, and 
non-professional', disparity is dissipated. Even though the 
magistrate is partially trained im law, and is advised by the- 
clerk of the court, hearings are dependent upon cemmonsense.
I'm order to accomplish an obvious demonstration of causality
and what happened, police, magistrates, and solicitors employ 
what Cicourel has termed a two-valued logic [1976]. Everyday 
and taken for granted aspects of the common world are formalised 
and ambiguities in language are closed while judgements are 
made and decisions validated in terms of taken for granted 
assumptions concerning everyday life.
In this matrix are embedded the central problematics for 
police, prosecution, and magistrates. For the police and the 
prosecution the task is synonomous; the prosecution operates 
with the version of events selected by the police, and attempts 
to demonstrate in respect to a particular person what 'this 
man did'. In reviewing an unfolding case from the Bench, the 
magistrates face the question: 'could this man?'. In organising 
the court's social scene around this indexical area, the 
court's personnel constitutes the 'original' scene through 
methods for producing rational appearances and clear and 
coherent fact [H. Garfinkel, 1967],
To produce 'this man did' as a plausible outcome the 
prosecution for the police assembles witnesses as a series of 
relevant facts. Witnesses are not in court to tell all they 
know. They are there to be led by the prosecuting solicitor 
into revealing certain pieces of information which the 
prosecution knows about beforehand, and which are relevant 
to the version of events which he is attempting to construct. 
Each bit of information is brought out by a questioning 
procedure on the part of the prosecuting solicitor, and 
consequently the witness tends to confine himself to the 
questions rather than reflect upon the 'original' event.
What this means is that there is no conscious attempt at a 
presentation of the 'whole' or 'complete' story by 
witnesses.
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In the questioning procedure the prosecution not only 
attempts to present a version of what happened, but also 
to demonstrate the 'kind' of person the accused is in relation 
to the charge against him. In other words the prosecutor 
attempts to present to the magistrates a character which 
testifies to the police's claim of 'this man did'. It is 
difficult to say whether this strategy is consciously 
adopted by the prosecutor or a result of a concerted attempt 
to 'get at the truth' in court. However it is certainly a 
consequence of the questioning procedure: cajoling; using 
sympathy and irony; berating the suspect; making accusations; 
interrupting people while they are speaking. Though the 
solicitor's knowledge consists of a grouping of legal norms 
and rules for their application, his competence is only 
indirectly connected with this legal knowledge. In respect 
to changing situations, contexts, and an awareness of the 
intersubjective interpretation of events the solicitor has to 
employ 'non-rationalised' skills [D. Rueschemeyer, 1975]; to 
flexibly ad hoc various strategies and approaches in order to 
achieve his ends [i.e. prosecution or defence] through the 
'objective' legal code.
At the moment the prosecution has presented its case against 
an accused in the Magistrates' Court, the onus probandi or 
burden of proof comes into play. This has two meanings.
Firstly it is a rule of law which requires the prosecution to 
prove the accused's guilt. In this definition the burden of 
proof lies wholly with the prosecution. However in practice 
the more general meaning of the burden of proof is that it lies 
upon the party who would fail if no further evidence were 
called at that point in the proceedings. Because of this,
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unless it is decided that the prosecution has not presented 
a case, it becomes the defence's problem to demonstrate the 
state of innocence; or at least to show the accused's actions 
cannot be confined within the legal boundaries specified by 
the charges against him. In this sense, innocence is not a 
condition of an original event but a negotiated and contingent 
feature of a specific here-and-now situation. It is defined 
not by objective indicators, but by constructed, interpersonal 
relations which are played out in terms of persuasion, rhetoric, 
and argument.
In rebutting the prosecution's case, the defence solicitor 
has to reconstruct and replace the facts and character which 
have been awakened in court, under a different sense of 
possibility. He may attempt to show or hint that a mistake 
has been made by a witness; that a statement is not plausible; 
or that a witness's character is unreliable [e.g. " This was 
after you had savagely attacked Mr. X?" ]. Cicourel [1976] 
has described the task of prosecution and defence solicitors, 
set by the adversary principle of law, as " minimizing or 
maximizing the problematic features of decisions" contained 
in the descriptions and facts presented in court. The 
solicitor has to present a coherent version of a social reality 
which he is seeking to persuade others was the case. He seeks 
to show the relevance of a general rule [e.g. helping the 
police] as the accent of social reality in respect of which 
he organises the rationality of everyday and legal actions.
This is with regard to the plausibility of an outcome as a 
widely shared decision of what should have happened or been 
done.
Though both prosecution and defence solicitors have to 
face this task with a strategy of free-construction, they are
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not without restrictions. For example, Sudnow has described 
that those involved with settling matters of fact in court 
have a regard for a body of knowledge and recipes for deciding 
outcomes. In negotiating outcomes in court solicitors and 
magistrates operate in respect to such a body of knowledge; 
comparing for example between a described event in the past 
and shared conceptions of 'normal' crimes; typical knowledge 
of the typical forms crimes display, how they usually occur, 
and the type of person who carries them out [D. Sudnow, 1975].
The magistrate has to decide a case in terms of addressing 
the question 'could this man?'. The prosecuting solicitor 
has to show that 'this man did', while the defence has to 
counter this with 'this man could not'. Amid this unfolding 
triadic relationship of argument, counter argument, and decision 
stands the accused. He is in an unfamiliar situation both 
in terms of place and process relative to other court personnel. 
Arranged to discuss him and deal with him are a series of 
people he does not know. Both because of a lack of experience 
and [or] the structural position in which he finds himself, 
the accused is an outsider. He is in this position because 
the court is a closed community. It is bureaucratically and 
structually organised to process people, and is filled with 
personnel who share professional, economic, intellectual, and 
social ties. Because of such ties, coupled with pressure 
from the high number of cases to be heard and a sense of 
belonging antagonistic to criticism, Blumberg has called a 
court's social structure " an organised system of complicity"
[A.S. Blunberg, 1975].
In court the defendant has to rely upon both the advice 
and actions of his solicitor, though free to specify his own
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personal decisions [e.g. pleading guilty or not guilty, electing 
for trial at a Crown Court]. However even before he has said 
anything, the accused is under scrutiny. Sitting in court 
his dress, manner, and behaviour are available to all present 
as a possible example of what he is accused of. In order to 
dispel and counter any thoughts or claims that this is so, the 
accused must from the outset begin and continue to act and 
speak as if he fits in with the court's organisation. In 
Goffman's terms, both examiners and examined must attend to 
normal appearances; rather than appearing out of place the 
accused must appear in place [E. Goffman, 1971], Like 
Goffman's perrenial actor [1969], the accused needs to become 
engaged in the art of impression management. However, whether 
or not he does so or the extent to which he succeeds or feels 
comfortable doing so is a contingent matter.
Unlike the continual dramatist the accused experiences a 
split between the natural flow of things and the court 
situation, rather like a person labelled mentally ill 
experiences his behaviour and the hospital organisation as a 
disjunction [S.L. Messinger, 1968]. Being under test, the 
accused experiences his surroundings and character as a 
constructed or "assembled object" [H. Garfinkel, 1967], 
whose management presents unknown and untold difficulties.
This is in distinction to both other court personnel and the 
dramaturgic theorist; court personnel are grounded in the 
routine and natural court room attitude, while the dramaturgic 
theorist attributes to all actors the strategy of staging 
basic and fundamental qualities [cf. S.L. Messinger, 1968.
H. Garfinkel, 1967. J. O'Neill, 1972]. The accused on the 
other hand has had the natural attitude of everyday life
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[A. Schütz, 1953. A. Schütz and T. Luckmann, 1974. J. Heeren, 
1970. D.L. Altheide, 1977], disrupted and in order to 
counter the bewilderment which this engenders and re-establish 
some sense of order, is required to manufacture a semblance 
of belonging.
The interactional structure of the court produces 'fitting 
in' and 'being yourself' as a great problem for the accused. 
For the magistrates another structural property of the court 
room situation has predominance in relation to the accused's 
behaviour. This is: is he being himself or merely acting? Is 
he sincere or not? Whereas the accused has to establish and 
maintain his character as an appropriate and moral one, the 
magistrate has to monitor this activity in relation to the 
problematic of 'could this man?'. An historical example of 
this problem has been edited by Foucault [1978], which 
presents documents concerning three murders carried out by 
Pierre Riviere in 1835.
The crux of the case was whether Riviere was mad or not.
A series of behaviours was assembled which showed that 
irrationality was a feature of his character. Riviere 
himself produced a detailed memoir of his circumstances and 
the events surrounding the murders, which the judge described 
as being written with "clarity, order, and precision" .
Though it would seem that the 'rational' memoir would throw 
light on the 'real' character of Riviere, it c o m p l icated it.
He stated that his first explanation for carrying out the 
murders [" God made me do it" ] which was accepted as an 
indicator of madness by some doctors, was an act. Fontana 
[1978] summed up this situation by posing the problem which 
Riviere presented to doctors and judges: " if one is mad' and
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one pretends to be rational, and if one is rational and one 
pretends to be mad, which is one in reality?" . Present day 
magistrates share this problem, though in a different form.
They have to take documents and their own perceptions of the 
accused and use this as evidence of some underlying reality.
The problem resides in whether or not to treat behaviour as 
what it 'seems': does appropriate court room behaviour 
indicate allegiance to an acceptable moral order, or is it a 
mask constructed in order to escape punishment?
The accused in court walks a judgemental tight-rope. His
i
behaviour and speech are monitored to assess the form of social 
order in which his character is grounded. To appear as a 
moral person, the accused has to engage in the rules of 
rational discourse which are in operation at the time. He has 
to use official titles and forms of address in talking to 
magistrates; his speech has to be clear and concise; in relation 
to the police he has to use acceptable terms rather than slang; 
he has to demonstrate his character in answering questions as 
honest and plausible by offering logical and rational argument; 
by being calm and not shouting. In doing these things, he has 
finally to be persuasive. This strategy as a series of acts, 
places him as belonging in the court; as a 'good' person who 
shares the form of social order which the court is meant to 
implement. Yet if his construction of the moral person in 
court is seen as a construction and the magistrates regard 
it with doubt, he will formally find himself labelled as an 
outsider.
POLICE, MAGISTRATES, AND SOCIOLOGY - DECISION MAKING: Harold
Garfinkel has proposed that sociology should cease treating*
the rationalities of science as methodological rules for the
interpretation of human action; (1967)., Rather-he suggests; 
that' social. situations should "be examined im order to account; 
for the presence of such rationalities. Fot only is such a 
direction of thought rare in sociology, hut in the; work of 
the- polices and magistrates such a self-consciousness for the 
related" forms; of ’action’' and ’inquiry' is absent. Though 
these three areas of inquiry are different ways of 
deciding upon the texture of" a state of affairs, they are 
comparable. This is to say that though sociologists, police, 
and. magistrates differ at a practical level, they share 
fundamental characteristics as theorisers about the world in1 
which they live.
Whereas the substantive ends which police, sociologists, 
and magistrates seek and the situational, means a.nrl resources 
which are available for them to do so differ, the process of 
reasoning which is employed, in accomplishing ’truth*, ’justice*, 
and", ’fact’ can be examined in similar terms. This is to see 
the professional, sociologist’s programme extended into areas 
other than social science. The sociologist has to describe 
and" account for others* actions and knowledge, and cannot 
avoid" working with some conception of rationality. This is 
equally true for the police and magistrates. An examination 
of these three groups; as comparable theorisers should enable- 
a review of the taken for granted processes in the production 
of ’truth' and ’justice* and contribute to the re-examinatiom 
of the common features which sociology shares with othen- 
enterprises. These common features are not taken into account 
by sociology though fundamental, to its accomplishment of 
'superior* fact.
In ordter to locate similarities between the reasoning of'
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the police, m agis-trates, and sociology it is necessary to 
examine the various layers of consciousness which fuse 
and mix together. The most fundamental layer is that which 
is most commonly sharedr the attitude of everyday life. Eüilt 
onto this corpus of knowledge about, interpersonal and 
interactional relations is a further layer of consciousness 
which characterises the form of what is ’real' at a particular 
moment. So for example, the concerns about the, world and how 
that world is seen are: different between those who experience 
chronic pain and those who are homosexual (of. J~*A. Kotarba, 
197?. C*A.B* Warren and B. Pense, 1977). Similarly, the views 
and relevances which- A, H, and (T mobilised in court about 
*howf the event in question, happened were much different than 
that shared by Roy and myself. Heidegger described these 
degrees, of the representation of reality as "the constancy 
of the continuous", where the form, of reality is produced by 
a particular kind of representation for itself (M. Heidegger,
1975).
Fbr law. and social science this second level of 
consciousness is concerned with formality and order; they 
are formality and order* Arising out; of this specification 
of how the world'tisr and how it is to be? treated and 
approached are particular concerns which form, both the daily 
and the ongoing goals, and purposes, of the theoretic approach 
to reality (i.e. that which characterises Man)* It will be 
suggested here that within this layer, sociology is concerned 
with- scientific- rationalities, which are shared at a comparable 
level, by police and magistrates.
The Attitude of Everyday Lifer Schütz. (1974) described 
the world of everyday life as. "man^s fundamental and paramount;
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reality" , which is taken for granted in the attitude of 
commonsense. Within this attitude, events and actions are 
experienced as unquestionable and unproblematic " until 
further notice" , and the constitution of the world is one 
of a coherent arrangement of objects within determinate 
properties. This self-evidency of the daily world is 
embodied in an assumption that it is essentially the same for 
all men, both in terms of the experience of objects and 
consciousness. Because of this, a feature of the natural 
attitude is its recognition of intersubjectivity; that reality 
is fundamentally shared. It is assumed in the natural 
attitude that as knowledge of the experiences of others can 
be gained, it is just as self-evident that the reciprocal 
relation holds for the person. Similarly it is assumed that the 
objects in the world are experienced and held in significance 
in similar ways. These assumptions are pervasively present in 
experiences with the police, magistrates, and sociologists, 
and in the account presented above of my experience of the 
police and the courts. These assumptions also make it 
possible for the evaluation of accounts, to see if they 'ring 
true' as typical descriptions of normal events.
The dominant motive of the natural attitude is pragmatic, 
where actions follow in accord with personal goals towards 
modifying reality. At the same time however, because the 
world is experienced as a natural and existent object, a 
person's actions themselves can be modified and changed. The 
understanding and explication of events is based upon a 
prior corpus of experience and knowledge, so that new 
situations are faced and brought into relief in their typical 
character. It is assumed in the natural attitude that this 
process of explication and understanding is continually
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possible through the validation of prior experience and the 
ability to act upon the world.
The situation of certainty which the natural attitude 
surveys is bounded by an horizon of indeterminancy, but which 
in principle it is assumed is capable of explication. This 
situation comes into actuality once the experienced horizon 
'surprises' the already existent corpus of knowledge and calls 
into question what has previously been taken for granted. The 
process of resolving the discrepancy between prior and immediate 
experience is carried out with regard to practical 
considerations; the job at hand and the discomfort brought 
about by the discrepancy of knowledge itself are the prime 
forces for the resolution of conflict. New experience is 
included into the existent corpus of knowledge by modifying 
it [e.g. the continual reviewing of the above account in 
respect of subsequent outcomes], but only to the extent that 
practical considerations dictate. This means that the 
explication of some problem is only partial, being suspended 
until further notice [i.e. until it again becomes relevant].
A consequence of the pragamatic motive is that the 
knowledge available to the natural attitude is not a logically 
integrated system. Rather it is opaque. It is directed 
towards the routinisation of action; towards accomplishing ends 
again and again. The corpus of knowledge is opaque in this 
way because the natural attitude has no interest in the 
transparency of knowledge as such. The natural attitude 
proceeds to continue accomplishing practical acts and encompass 
new situations with regard to practical ends, from the 
standpoint of a series of assumptions about the world. These 
are: the bodily existence of other people; the sharing of 
similar ponsciousnesses; the similarity of experience and
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meaning of the world; that communication and action can be 
carried out with others; that the person can be understood by 
others; that a natural, historical, social, and cultural 
world is transmitted as a common frame of reference; and that 
situations are as a consequence socially, historically, and 
culturally determined with the individual only creating a 
small part of it.
The Formal Attitude: The formal attitude corresponds to 
the attitude of scientific theorising described by Schütz 
[1953, 1971, 1972], and Garfinkel [1967], though in a form 
found in other areas of inquiry. For example the theoretic 
attitude of both the police and magistrates like that of the 
scientist seeks to follow an interpretive procedure of 
'official neutrality'. Unlike everyday life where the actor 
manages to order events while sustaining a belief in the 
reality of the world, in the formal attitude actors have no 
interest in the belief that events and situations are as they 
appear. A result of this is that those who adopt the formal 
attitude do not recognise or abide by the normative constraints 
imposed by social structures, but use an ideal of doubt with 
regard to those structures [H. Garfinkel, 1967].
A similar situation occurs within the formal attitude in 
relation to deciding the sense or appropriateness of an 
explanation. Whereas in the natural attitude it is assumed 
that actions can affect the person and be affected by his 
actions, the formal attitude is conceptualised as a withdrawl 
from involvement. The sociologist, policeman, and magistrate 
within this attitude can be seen as attending to andmeasuring 
an event 'as it really is'. Though it is the theorist who 
acts, the interpretive rules of the formal attitude somehow
-241-
are seen to guarantee that the place, value, and disposition 
of the theorist and his relation to the character of an event 
are not a part of the process of inquiry. By seeing the sense 
of their actions through the formal attitude sociologists, 
policemen, and magistrates are engaged in attempting the
dramaturgical process of suspending the relevance of their
\
knowledge and place in the world in relation to the judgements 
which they make.
The central and most pervasive characteristic of the formal 
attitude is the attempt at the production of objective, 
non-indexical knowledge. The process of inquiry is thereby 
attuned to accomplishing knowledge, results, or findings which 
can be seen as clear outcomes of fact by Anyone. Deciding 
what is objective is not seen as being done according to the 
intersubjectivity of the world and a sharing with others of a 
common scheme of interpretation. Within the formal attitude 
decisions about the status of an event or fact should be made 
according to abstract notions of proper procedure. The actor's 
part in the process of inquiry is to reveal what a situation 
is, rather than to have a part in its construction. The 
resulting outcome of knowledge is therefore not seen as tied 
to the context of its production, but a 'true' account of 
what happened which is transparently obvious. It follows that 
in situations where the formal attitude is employed, notions 
of secrecy or private knowledge have no place. Interactional 
relations between the practitioners of formal inquiry are, 
for them, a public matter.
The public character of formal inquiry can be seen at one 
level in such things as a marking out from others by specific 
modes of dress and the use of special titles, where the holder
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of the office is approached according to the interactional 
conventions which that position specifies. Within the theoretic 
l e v e l  of the attitude itself, all relevant facts and matters 
are regarded as 'on the table' and open for use, discussion, 
and publication. This is in direct contrast to the form of 
relations which is assumed in everyday life. There the scatter 
of knowledge is not regarded as universal or public. It is 
assumed that a gap exists between the knowledge that others 
have of a person which he attributes to them, and the knowledge 
which a person has of himself in front of others. This 
assumption progresses a little further in that it is also 
assumed that this same disparity of public and private knowledge 
exists for other individuals with regard to the person. Along 
with a shared common world there goes an area of non-public 
knowledge which may be the grounds for action; that is, 
rather than seeing existent knowledge as producing an action, 
the everyday theorist searches actions for their meaning; for 
a display of motives and interests which are not 'on the face 
of it' available. In the theorising of the formal attitude no 
such disparity exists. It is taken that for deciding 
objectivity and matters of fact all knowledge is publicly 
available; or at least in respect of the formal attitude, 
publicly available in principle.
Rationality: Everyday life and more specialised branches 
of inquiry are populated by rational actions. It is a 
condition of contexted life that some action appear normal and 
proper, while some other does not. It is the same between 
domains of knowledge; what is rational to a community of 
drugtakers may not be to someone outside that community.
This itself may be part of a problem of understanding [cf.
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K. Stoddart, 1974]. Between different courts and branches 
of the police force, what is appropriate action or response 
within one context may be out of place in another. It would 
seem that as rational action is a feature of being in the 
world, so is its unequivocal nature. Alfred Schütz listed 
some meanings of the terms rationality [1933], which have 
been used by Garfinkel [1967]. This list of rationalities 
conforms to two distinct groupings which are tied into the 
contrasting everyday and formal theoretic attitudes. Everyday 
meanings of the terms rationality may be located within the 
formal attitude, but the natural attitude of daily life is 
marked by the absence of formal meanings of rationality.
An everyday understanding of rationality may refer to an 
examination of one situation in relation to another in terms 
of typical features or characteristics. Within this meaning 
a process of comparison and categorising occurs whereby 
existent types are located within new situations and made 
deliberate sense of. Or as Schütz has described this meaning 
[1953], it is "the applicability to a present situation of 
a recipe which has proved successful in the past" . A further 
and related meaning of what is rational is the degree of 
attention which a person pays to the relation between an 
experience and a theory by which experience is formed as a 
sensible object. So for example, one situation may be 
characterised by a high degree of attention to the consistency 
of an observation while in another,such intensity may be 
wholly inapprorpiate.
Further concerns with rationality in everyday life may be 
to do with: the consequences of a decision from among a set 
of alternatives; the strategy which is adopted in relation to
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alternative courses of action and future states of affairs; 
and a concern for the timing and predictability of a decision. 
Rationality can also be to do with the rules of procedure under 
which actions are viewed. For example, abstract talk requires 
the selection and use of non-partisan or universal rules while 
group talk [i.e. practical talk] abides by the use of partisan 
rules. What is rational may refer to both the appropriate 
selection of a set of rules, and to having a concern for 
non-partisan rules [e.g. being a 'fair man']. Central to all 
meanings of the rational is another. This is an awareness of 
choice, and the grounds from which a choice is made and can be 
justified. The grounds of choice and the extent to which a 
decision may be held to be rational may be seen to stem from 
a rigorous body of knowledge, embody loose or fine 
characteristics, or may be found through a post hoc examination 
of the context of an action.
In everyday terms the word rational may mean reasonable, 
planned, predictable, or likely. All these meanings congregate 
around or have crucial to them the selective process of 
choice. Schütz [1953] noted that rational choice can only be 
accomplished if a person has sufficient knowledge of the goal 
to be realised and the different means available for this act. 
This ideal of selection for Schütz had certain implications.
It would imply for the person: knowledge of the desired goal 
in relation to a framework of plans; a knowledge of the 
interrelations, compatibility, or incompatibility between 
other goals; knowledge of the consequences of the realisation 
of the goal; knowledge of all means available for the 
accomplishment of the goal; knowledge of the interference, 
consequences, and effects of available means with other goals
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and means; and knowledge of how available certain means are.
This situation is further complicated where the ideal of 
rational choice is adopted as a measure of interactional 
situations. The person must be aware of right or wrong 
interpretations of an act, the reactions and motives which an 
act elicits, and the extent of knowledge about the social world 
and what rational action consists of which others possess. The 
rigour of this ideal conceptualisation of rational choice, both 
as a selective and an interpretive device, contrasts sharply 
with the accent which is found in everyday life. More properly 
the ideal of rational action and choice belongs within the 
formal attitude, and underlies specific strands of meaning 
which endow events with a specific formal sense of being.
The formal attitudes of sociology, police work, and judging 
others are adorned with specific interests. There is a 
concern for comparability of an outcome with rules which define 
proper procedure as a series of means-ends relations. Also 
concern is with the conceptual and methodological clarity of 
a body of knowledge and rules of procedure as a task in its 
own right. Finally, projected actions are required to stem 
from verifiable assumptions based in and compatible with the 
formal corpus of knowledge.
A Mode Of Reasoning: The discussion of the natural and 
formal attitudes and the senses of rationality which attach to 
them has been necessarily distinct. These 'objects of 
thought' have been examined as if they were individually 
occurring phenomena. Is this the case? This question prompts 
a contexting operation. It requires in the case of the topics 
under examination the formation of an answer to a variety of 
situations. Questioning the relation between the natural and
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formal attitudes is of sociological interest. Addressing the 
relation between being a member of daily life and a policeman 
or magistrate is of topical interest. To look to the 
connections between being a sociologist and a suspect, between 
ordinary accounts and sociological accounts of what happened 
is of reflexive interest; here there is a distinction between 
a thing being reflexive in terms of interest and an action 
being reflexive. In the former the question is being posed as 
to how an account is constructed, while in the second it is to 
assert that reflexivity is a part of its construction.
Though these interests are highly varied, they come 
together through the focus of the resourceful texture of 
theoretic life. Whereas sociological and topical interests 
are primarily of a practical nature, they gain sense and order 
from the reflexive assembly work which members do. An attempt 
to account for the differences between and within these 
separate interest situations does not require a chain of 
different answers. Their separation can be found through 
focusing upon a shared theoretic stance towards events which 
is used and modified by actors from situation to situation.
Garfinkel [1967] has written that passing between the 
natural and formal attitudes produces different sets of social 
order for the actor. Thereby the sociologist may apprehend 
'delinquents' as the product of practical decision making 
[A. Cicourel, 1976], rather than inherently bad or 'plain 
daft'; a policeman may locate a fight as a Section 20 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act rather than a disagreement; 
and a magistrate look upon a person as a football hooligan 
rather than a football fan. Such formal categories gain their 
sense not from the situations in which they are 'seen' to
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reside, but from the formal context of examination with its 
associated forms of rationality. As a result of the kinds of 
categories and findings which are produced, there is a viable 
distinction between everyday and formal attitudes. On the 
other hand, the move from daily member to specialist member 
does not require a radical reorientation towards the subject 
matter.
The attitude of daily life is modified by the specific 
concerns of the formal inquiry. What this means is that both 
attitudes are in simultaneous use; commonsense models of types 
of action and actors form the material from which judgements 
and decisions of what happened and 'really was the case' can 
be made. Such decisions and judgements however have to pay 
particular concern to the sense of inquiry; for the production 
of particular forms of objective, non-indexical meaning in its 
own right. In this way the 'loose' concern of the natural 
attitude is transformed. The formal attitude is attuned to 
locating scientific fact, truth, and justice. At another 
level the natural and formal attitudes interact. Whereas an 
event is inquired into according to pre-existing formal 
properties, the extent to whch this formal inquiry goes is not 
or need not be strictly controlled by those properties 
themselves. As a course of action, once the process of inquiry 
into an event has progressed sufficiently to satisfy the prior 
stipulations or assumptions of the formal properties, then 
other material or avenues for investigation may be let pass 
or glossed over.
It is at this point that the prescriptions of formal 
inquiry meet the 'good sense' of everyday life. While it may 
be the case that letting pass pertinent evidence or glossing
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details and arguments is a product of inadequate or 'bad' 
inquiry, it is more genrally a feature of the pragmatic motive 
of everyday life. Thus even in social science, police work, 
and judging others there are parameters and degrees of inquiry 
which are taken to be sufficient or otherwise from a commonsense 
point of view.
The formal attitude and its attendant concern with 
rationality has as its central topic the remedial treatment of 
the topic of indexicality. If this is not explicitly stated, 
it is certainly the topic within a topic around which the 
particular inquiry revolves. In everyday terms the occasionality 
of expressions and scenic particulars is a feature of daily 
life which need only elicit interest so long as the pragmatic 
motive remain unfulfilled. Being unconcerned with a form of 
language which Anyman can understand and attaining objective 
truth in his inquiries, the daily member uses his activities 
to accomplish the rational properties of indexical expressions 
in relation to his practical concerns. For the member inquiring 
into social topics through the formal attitude, the indexical 
texture of practical actions and interrelations are a huge 
probelmatic to the orderly and uniform objective metatheory.
When a person does not subscribe to the formal attitude and 
comes into contact with it, reactions may vary depending upon 
the kind of situation within which this meeting takes place.
For example, reactions towards sociologists collecting data 
may be treated with little interest at all, or perhaps mild 
concern for close attention to trivial issues, or even panic 
if the topic of inquiry is somewhat secretive. In situations 
which involve the formal attention of the police and magistrates, 
because of the powers over the person which both groups have, 
the accused as a daily member [i.e. using the natural attitude]
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is forced to pay attention to the ways in which the police and 
courts operate.
The suspect's interest is both in terms of what will or 
might happen 'next', and the forms of reasoning and treatment 
which police and magistrates employ. These two areas of 
interest are related, for clues or hints towards future 
developments may be gained from what officers and magistrates 
do or say. By being in the situation where the formal attitude 
is in use, suspects have to pay attention to it and the concerns 
which it displays. Because the concerns of proper procedure, 
conceptual and methodological clarity, and planned actions 
based upon verifiable assumptions are sanctionable ideals and 
stable properties only in the case of situations governed by 
the formal atttitude [H. Garfinkel, 1967], the suspect 
experiences something of a 'culture shock'. Actions based in 
the natural attitude do not have regard for the formal ideals 
as either stable properties or sanctionable ideals. Yet in 
dealing with the police and being in court the suspect has to 
pay attention to such rational properties as a condition not 
only for deciding what happened but for the possible allocation 
of punishment to him.
Because the formal attitude, in contrast to the natural 
attitude, makes use of the principle of unlimited doubt, the 
suspect experiences bewilderment and a lack of trust in his 
actions by others and consequently distrusts others' actions. 
This results in facing the relations and interactions with 
police and magistrates as anomic patterns of time. Being in 
the police station and court are crystallised as specific times 
of unease; as periods of breakdown of daily normative relations, 
characterised as a loss of belief in the substance of reality
and a iack of a sense of purpose. It may be that the unsafe 
position which the structural mix of the formal attitude places 
the suspect in, can- only he eased by a lengthy period of 
familiarity with police practice, legal procedures, and 
assessing what happened; this is a post hoc review both of the 
original, event; and the subsequent experiences. During this 
period the suspect may be able to orient himself to the 
procedures of the formal attitude, and' thereby appear in court 
willing and able to demonstrate an attention to matters which 
display his * reasonableness »; to present an account of his 
person, history, and experience which makes his judgements and 
decisions understandable as normal, and appropriate to Anyman.
This description of what can happen to a suspect in his 
dealings, with the police, and courts, and the way in which he' 
might begin- to establish relations in order that he can- have 
a creative part in the- situations, locates a particular mode 
of reasoning. Moreover, it is suggested that assigning sense 
in a post hoc manner is a mode of reasoning shared by police, 
magistrates, and sociologists. For the- formal attitude this 
is an important, area, for it is to do with the nexus of ideal 
properties, formal decisions, and the practical actions of 
others. Formal decisions must be made about actions, such as 
who did what or what »really» was.the case, which satisfy the 
ideal.properties of the formal attitude. This means transforming 
peoples actions; they are measured not in their own terms 
(i.e. as methodic, making situations »visible»), but according 
to the rational properties, of the formal attitude. This results in 
a person’s actions being viewed and measured in terms 
of a universal and ideal", acton (i.e. the rational man).
Accounts of what happened are in this way compared with
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what should have happened if decisions had been made according 
to rational choice. Yet as suggested by Schütz and discussed 
above, the ideal of rational choice cannot be found to be a 
feature of everyday decision making and cannot, as a consequence, 
be used as a measure or interpretive device of social action 
by inquiry. It may be more fruitful to look rather to the 
occasionality of everyday contexts to see just how formal 
categories are accomplished, rather than imposing these 
categories without respect to the integrity of social phenomena.
Looking at the suspect's methods for making sense or at the 
employment of the natural attitude in everyday life as typical 
of t h e  w a y in which decision making gets done is to question 
the accomplishments and findings of the formal attitude. The 
rational properties to which sociologists, the police, and 
magistrates subscribe are behavioural ideals. Though they 
are ideal there nevertheless operates some pragmatic standards 
of accomplishment: for the sociologist, statistical tests 
and critical community examination; for the policeman, the 
'fit' between organisational rules and actual work practices; 
and for the magistrate, the satisfaction of legal rules through 
evidence, documents, and behavioural displays. Though there 
are these means for satisfying the formal rational properties, 
it is open to question whether or not the formal attitude 
stipulates the kinds of decision required in a variety of 
situations.
It is more the case that situations in which the formal 
properties are found to be satisfied, are based upon 
•irrational' features [i.e. irrational because they are not 
within the c o n f i n e s  o f  the formal attitude]. So for example, 
the formal category 'deviance' may be found through methods
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such as random choice, using 'hunches' and 'guesses', invoking 
imagination, and the use of cognitive mock-ups of 'what it is 
like'. Such features as these are ways and means for approaching 
the temporal problematic which faces the formal attitudes 
the reconstruction of the past.
It is clear that the majority of materials with which the 
police, sociologists, and magistrates are concerned with, have 
happened already; the topic of inquiry is in the past. This 
is evident for the police and magistrates in dealing with an 
event which is referred to them, but applies to sociologists 
inquiring into existent social formations and structures. 
Exploring the past has also a stricter meaning, where " actual 
observation" occurs » at that point where the consciousness 
of the individual is" . Assembling what happened therefore 
cannot " draw on the total universe of resources which were 
successive moments present to the observer" [D. Smith, 
unpublished]. This means that the details which an inquiry 
is concerned with [e.g. who did what action, what someone said] 
are never present, but always in the past.
The police reconstruct the past by documenting an event. 
Magistrates locate what happened through reading documents 
and hearing people's stories. The sociologist's account draws 
on such things as surveys, attitude tests, or recording what 
people have to say. In doing this reconstruction of history, 
each group is assigning a legitimate history [i.e. a 
satisfactory account] to a settled outcome; something is 
already in existence and a series of connections are established 
which 'fill in' the past and provide for its production.
The practice of assigning legitimate histories may however be 
taken a step further.
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Garfinkel expressed the idea [1967] that in everyday 
situations of choice whose features are largely taken for 
granted, decisions are not made as required. He suggests that 
people engage in retrospectively defining the decisions which 
were made ’then'. Or as Garfinkel more succinctly states it:
" The outcome comes before the decision." . What has this to 
do with the formal attitude at play in sociology, police work, 
and judging others? It consists in the possibility that the 
formal attitude is a programmatic task faced by sociologists, 
policemen, and magistrates which is essentially satisfied 
through a form of 'irrational' decision making. The formal 
attitude instructs its users to see a rational world. In using 
the formal attitude as a means of inquiry, that inquiry is 
somehow 'detached' from topical matters in the world. It 
does not have involved with it such as sexual desire, 
resentment, infatuation, competition, or fear [cf. J.M.
Johnson, 1977]. Yet is it not the case that the rationalities 
are merely prescribed by the formal attitude, and not a 
description of what actually occurs?
Over and above this ideal view of formal decision making 
is one which sees the judgements and decisions of sociologists, 
policemen, and magistrates being carried out in a manner more 
like that of daily members. Like everyday members, do not 
formal theorisers routinely 'come up' with decisions on states 
of affairs upon which they can institute a course of action 
prior to or simultaneous with inquiring into such affairs?
From this point of view it may be more correct to see the 
policeman as 'knowing' that he is to make a charge against a 
person, and then assembling evidence for the charge.
Magistrates likewise can be seen as looking upon a suspect as
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guilty or innocent before the legal process has been completed. 
Labelling people according to type in this way marshals 
documents and evidence according.to that type. Amongst 
sociologists it is conventionally the case that 'tests' of 
null hypotheses or outlines of projects to be carried out 
contain well formed ideas about what will be found or 
'discovered'. In this view formal outcomes, objective 
categories, and lists of statistics are produced by a commonsense 
form of decision making made in relation to the ideals of the 
formal attitude which require fulfilling in order to achieve 
'official' status.
Accounts: Where an account is produced it constructs a
way for seeing an event or action; the dialogue of such a
report with the reader-hearer states 'see it that way'. in 
my involvement with the police and the subsequent outcome there
were four main forms of account: mine; the police's; those of
A, B, and C; and the magistrates'. Subsequently there has 
been another account: the sociological one presented here.
The sense of the actions which were presented by A, B, and 
C consisted of two temporally separate understandings. They 
had to account firstly for their involvement with Roy, and 
then their involvement with me. This separation of meanings 
was concretely replicated in the court appearances: A, B, and 
C appeared at different times as the accused and as witnesses 
However this separation of meanings was not a successful 
strategy in court. My version of the history of the event as 
'the apprehension of wrongdoers' depended upon the prior 
assumption that they were in fact wrongdoers. This 'fact' 
had already been settled by a court when my case was heard.
This meant the problematic was not whether my actions were
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legitimate as such, but whether their degree attested to 
legitimacy. In a similar way, when A and B appeared in court 
because C had pleaded guilty the question which the magistrates 
addressed was not whether they were involved, but the extent 
of their involvement.
My lay account and that which the police provided in the 
form of a charge and prosecution, assembled the outcome of the 
events of the Saturday night under different provinces of 
meaning. Mine presented a version of inescapable involvement 
in terms of apprehending participants in Bn attack on another 
person. The police's account reported my actions as criminal 
themselves. Yet why did the police fail to present a case 
against me, even to the extent of not having the 'offensive 
weapon' in court? This can only be explained in terms of 
formulating a person according to type and then collecting 
and assembling evidence to substantiate that typing and the 
related action as a legitimate one. In constructing that 
history for use in court however, the police have time to 
evaluate what the outcome of the presentation might be [i.e. 
what the situation 'was' when the charge was made]. As a 
consequence, the original formulation is reviewed; in effect 
the actions of the night of all those involved are re-examined.
All accounts of the Saturday night fight sought to 
attribute to a completed series of action a history which 
would report that series as rational and understandable. By 
the nature of the situation, that the accounts provided 
different 'kinds' of history to the series of action, some had 
to come to be regarded with scepticism and doubt by the police 
and magistrates. The relation between my lay and professional 
sociological accounts is conceptualised here as a reflexive
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one. In making the scenes which they do observable, they do 
this in the 'doing*; this is reflexivity. The sociological 
account in Chapter Six and in this chapter, focus upon the 
ways in which my lay account was made possible in interaction 
with the police, magistrates, solicitors, witnesses, and the 
other accused. It also, as a product of this, discusses 
reflexive features which have made possible, the sociological 
account itself.
IN CONCLUSION: Without having regard for the ways in which 
the common social world is constituted, and the inedequacy of 
'rational method' for dealing with that world, the formal 
attitude of theorising can only make limited claims to 
knowledge about social situations and social actors. The 
suspect's post hoc analysis of what occurred to him and the 
assessment of why something was or was not done, concentrates 
upon the ways in which meaning is established within a social 
situation and how it changes between situations. The sharing 
of the mode of post hoc reasoning by police, sociologists, 
magistrates, and the suspect is subject to a difference of 
crucial importance not only for understanding social action 
but for the very act of focusing upon it. The difference is 
this: the police, magistrates, and sociologists operate from 
within the comfort of their sense of the orderly world 
through the formal attitude. Their interest is thereby only 
of a topical nature. The suspect on the other hand finds 
himself in an anomic situation which forces him to look to
the part played by practical actions and practical circumstances 
in constituting the settings which they are a part of [H.
Garfinkel, 1967]. In short, the suspect is forced to have a 
reflexive interest in his surroundings.
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Professional accounts and decisions by police, magistrates, 
and sociologists methodically erase the socially theoretic 
character of the constitution of a meaningful situation. What 
emerges are coherent and consistent reports, decisions, and 
outcomes which have only an anomic relation themselves [like 
the person in the position of the suspect] with social reality. 
Forms of professional inquiry regard the persons with whom 
they deal as theoretically unsophisticated. This is not so.
What such formal modes of inquiry do disregard are the practical 
means which they employ to establish and repeat 'professional 
reports' and 'theoretic sophistication' which lie outside 
their methodological prescriptions of what constitutes 
'rational action'. In relation to this, Chapter Eight will 
examine a feature of professional theorising which was noted 
in the discussion of the formal attitude and rationality: 
the concern which professional theorising has for clarity.
SECTION TV
Theories - Difficulties In? The Constructionv Of
T h e o r y  -
The forgoing sections have dealt primarily- with, practices 
Tocated1 through an examination of specific areas, of social life 
as substantive sociological, topics. Throughout them selective and 
ad ho® instances- of professional, theorising- have been used.
Hbwever the general feeling- towards: professional theory which 
the thesis embraces; has. largely traded off and assumed the readers 
knowledge of sociologically theory and »what is meant here». This 
is net; so much a confession, of limitation, hut. a valid observation 
cf how accounts »get dona*. The following Section will, focus 
directly upon professional, theorising, and in particular how its 
accounts »get dbne* according ton professional, ideals.
It is a fundamental, assumption here that everyday social 
practice is hy analogy- a. model, of theorising* a version of how 
theory »gets done», which, has implications for how professional 
theory- operates* As-, a  consequence of this view, professional, 
theory as well as being an icom of belonging to a specific form- of 
life cam itself be regarded as- am instance of social, practice 
given that it is in, shares, and seeks, to understand the: social, 
world* The specific problems which professional, theoryraddresses, 
can he examined, in order to see the- relation between the particular 
theoretical, concerns and the means hy which these concerns are 
takemto be accomplished. It must be stressed, that this approach 
is. not the same as a. formal, methodological, examination* It is. 
rather am examination! of the shared grounds which enable the 
accomplishment of professional theory which is generally taken, 
ta be outside its formal prescriptions and categories.
because professional -theory attends to its own- ideals and 
accomplishes them foir- all. practical, purposes: through unrecognised 
grounds.-, it is a further- argument:, here that its attainments are- 
illusory and transformational. They are illusory "because what lis 
’"being- showm* iin a reading depends upon ’"going along* with the 
taken for granted auspices that; are occasioned,' "but which are not 
the only possible version of »what happens*.. Further, they are 
transformational "because the- purpose of professional theory is- ideal 
im its own termss encapsulation of all knowledge according to 
scientific principles.. Theoretical, inquiry is thus not, directly 
concerned with am examination and- description of ’things* 
themselves-,, "butt with, the ordering of phenomena in terms of 
professional, theoretical categories. Much like the adult iin 
interaction with the child described in Section IX, the professional 
theorist depends upon but at the same time is undone by shared, 
everyday social practices;» The professional, theorist*s world is 
not a separate reality,’ but a version - granted it is different in 
substance —  of everydhy life and its assumptions, constructions-, 
and neglects.
The; features, of everyday, practical, reasoning located in the 
above sections can be regarded as: an example of the means whereby 
professional theorists are able to orient themselves towards a 
»subject matter* in a particular- way. This is for the everyday,, 
practical, member- and the professional, theorist to consent together 
to- present a. situated version of events, without concern for the 
ways im which such a version is constituted.. All that la known 
by each - and for professional, sociology they consist of on® and 
the same person —  is: that if, is constituted ’in som© way'.
Having constituted reality in common with- others,, the professional 
theorist ©an. then proceed to reconstitute this pregiven »data*
according- to Ms: particular, professional, concern©*
It is with respect; to this constitution?* and reconstitution?, that 
the chapter© of Section IT are concerned* The- first part- of the 
Section is: am exposition of professional. theorising*s- ideal, of 
edarity in relation to the indexieality of actions: and utterances. 
T.S. Kuhn’s. Postscript to hi© hook "The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions*’* is taken a© am occasion for the examination of this: 
topic* Kuhn.’© inclusion? of the Postscript to hi© original, work 
amounts: not only to his stated concern to comhat previous criticisms, 
hut a further attempt to accomplish clarity. The instruction© 
which Kuhm present© om how tD address,, locate, and »see’ clarity 
im a piece of professional, theorising — M s  own? —  are diemonstrated, 
Kuhn*© remedial, formulations', im M ©  Postscript show that §© am ideal, 
of dbing professional, theorising, clarity become© a. problem of 
accomplishment. This is because it© attainment depends upon 
overcoming the occasionality of everyday construction©, while using 
and being a part of those self-same constructions. Because: the 
accomplishment of the ideal', of clarity cannot be granted by a.
»being- outside* socialL life, it is? a problem, which can? be satisfied 
only for all. practical purposes.* The dynamic behind seeking its. 
accomplishment is. another ideal of professional theorisings the 
superiority of professional theory*© knowledge* Through natural, 
language and" it© practices, professional, theorising seek© to 
accomplish, its locutions, a© clearer than, those of everyday life.
In doing this, professional, theory-has necessarily tO' differentiate 
betweem structural, realities and im this: constructive way place a 
specific value on the knowledge which members to those realities 
produce. In other words,, in seeking to establish the perspicacity 
of it© knowledge as. a superior accomplishment professional 
theorising has* to confine other form© of reasoning to an inferior
position?»
flte second, part of Section XV takes? the superiority of knowledge 
as? a topi© and examiners: it in relation to Plato’s dialectic. This, 
is. in order' to locate the texture of its: possible accomplishments 
Is; professional, theorising' superior pear se,, or is. it a social 
accomplishment?' The? ideals of clarity and1 superiority are 
obviously related. Xm order to accomplish the structural, division 
between knowledges;,, professional, theory must demonstrate a concern 
for the clarity- of its: insights: and methods» Within, this, relation 
the ideals: founder upon a disparity between the adopted formal 
methods, the outcomes of theorising, the phenomenon of indexicality, 
and. the situatedines.s. of each particular theorising.. The ideals of 
professional, theorising can only- be attended to' and attained within 
a non-ideal situation. The methods for their attainment, however, 
are social and shared and by definition unclear, contexted, 
elliptical., and above; all reflexive. The? final part of the Section 
involves: the examination of this central, problematic for all formal 
social inquiry:: that professional, theorisers are themselves, 
constituent members of the social scenes which they- seek to present.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE PROBLEM OF CLARITY
theory is essential to practice, to the 
forms of practice that it helps to birth 
or to grow, as well as to the practice it is 
the theory of. But the transparency of this 
sentence is not enough; we must also know 
its titles to validity, so we must pose the 
question: what are we to understand by theory, 
if it is essential to practice?
[L. Althusser, 1977. His emphases.]
It is clear...that the idea of a fixed method,
or of a fixed theory of rationality rests on
too naive a view of man and his social surroundings.
To those who look at the rich material provided 
by history, and who are not intent on impoverishing 
it in order to please their lower instincts, their 
craving for intellectual security in the form of 
clarity, precision, 'objectivity', 'truth', it 
will become clear that there is only one principle 
that can be defended under all circumstances and 
in all stages of human development. It is the 
principle: anything goes.
[P. Feyerabend, 1978. His emphases.]
INTRODUCTION - THEORY: The previous chapters of this 
thesis on sexual contact, children and adults, and the police 
have all been concerned to demonstrate the theoretic nature of 
practical life. In the latter part of the thesis we are
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concerned with the exact reverse} the other side of the coin. 
This is the practical nature of the act of theorising-. It is- 
to demonstrate that and how theorising is irremediably 
enmeshed in social practice.
The use of the world theory i's common,and it varies in 
application! from; loose to fine meanings. In everyday 
situations this usage may approximate to a relatively 
unexplicated notion, or idea, while in the methodological 
language of science it may refer’ to a system of explicated 
thoughts or-the abstract principles of' a subject. Inherent to 
the topic, of theory itself is the theme- of speculation! rather 
then practice (i.e. conjuring up new ideas rather than 
producing socially structured conceptions). Theory 
produces new ideas in a realm separate from; those mundane 
actions which are socially organised. Its development is 
viewed' as independaantt of society.
Alan BTum(l974) has described, the production! of theory 
as the attempt to voice the experience of thought. The theory 
begins froim "the Oneness of Being" which lies beneath men* s 
mutual and common orientations. Slumps view of theory is 
clearly at a metaphysical, level. At the other1 extreme is 
Ernest; Nhgel’.'s approach (l97l) to social1 action. Soaial. 
phenomena for Nagel have a comparable theoretical, status with 
concepts in natural science and can be systematically 
organised’ to reveal’, regularities. The build up o f  such 
knowledge into social theory stems froim the process of discovery 
via controlled inference that something is a sign of something 
else. This process is seen as. statable i n  the form of 
propositions which cgn be verified.
Harold Fallding (1971) has made the distinction between
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'true' theory which is explanatory [which Nagel see as 
•scientific method'], and theory in terms of sociology which 
he sees at a stage of developing concepts about the world.
This means that sociology is in the pre—scientific process 
of producing analytical theory and not explanatory theory 
about empirical events. Parsons' work is cited by Fallding 
as an example of analytical theory, and this is a description 
which Parsons himself endorses. He has written [197Q] that he 
has intended to produce a systematic theory, by which he means 
a "logically articulated conceptual scheme" which neither 
attempts to codify available empirical knowledge or to 
critically evaluate work on theory construction. Rather, 
Parsons' conceptual scheme depicts a prison of constraints 
upon the social actor. The societal norms of Parsons' 
systematic theory are seen as being internalised by the actor, 
who as a consequence is constrained by them [cf. B. McSweeney, 
1973]. Parsons' systems theory occupies a position between 
Blum and Nagel; it seeks to avoid idealism brought about by 
unrestrained theorising and the rigorous emphasis on objectivity 
stemming from scientific method.
Blum and Nagel represent the two extremes of emphasis with 
regard to speculation in sociology: the free reign of , 
theoretical thought and the concentration upon the verification 
of theory through method. Though radically different, these 
two types of approach share the limitation that they do not 
examine the texture or constitution of what is given as 'real'. 
I n  particular by concentrating upon either 'the essence* of 
reality in a metaphysical sense or the universality of 
scientific method as a pregiven structure for interpretation, 
the sense of particular realities and the consequences of
actions; within them are lost (cf. A.. Gouldner, 1973). 
Particular realities are transformed, and this is a function 
of the theorist’s situation.
What is this situation, and how does the act of theorising' 
take place? These questions have largely been ignored, 
though some sociologists have taken. to examining what are in 
fact sociology*s conditions of productions (cf. IT. Garfinkel, 
1967. J- O ’Neill, 1972. A. Gouldhem, 1973. D. Walsh, X9TTT.
P. Filmer.- et al, 1972). Barnes (1974) has noted that the 
majority of sociologists ignore the question; of theory 
production, which he; describes as "a difficult and highly 
constrained, process" which is related to cultural factors and 
••irate gifts»'. Yet acknowledging that theories stem- from 
specific backgrounds and are formulated by more or less 
talented people goes no further iir approaching how theorising 
gets done. It dhaws attention to contingencies surrounding 
theorising, but, does not touch upom the process of the 
production of theory itself.
This activity presents a fundamental problem for scientific, 
sociology? om its accomplishment depends the attainment of 
•science*, yet this attainment is negated if the very activity 
of the accomplishment of theorising cannot be described.
Such a description; depends om. pointing to the methods used in 
generating- knowledge of social behaviour. However theory 
and method are interdependent. Phillips (1973) has described 
this dilemma as "a viscious. circle". What is known about 
social, action (i.e. theory) depends upon the methods which are 
available? the methods for the generation of knowledge depend 
upon existing knowledge of social action. Fbr Phillips, the 
problem consists in. that to formulate ’better* theories of
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social action 'better' methods are needed; and to formulate 
'better' methods more theoretical developments are required. 
Unfortunately Phillips does not offer a solution to this 
circle, opting for the production of further, more radical 
theories.
From the present point of view, it should be noted that 
Phillips presents the dilemma as a problem in search of a 
solution. Let us consider it as an inherent contradiction in 
the act of theorising. In this context, just to raise the 
question of how theorising is.done, is to challenge the ideal 
of the enterprise. What becomes clear is that sociological 
theory and method are not engaged in a clear-cut, explicated 
relation. Viewing this not as a problem for the accomplishment 
of sociological theory, but as a condition of it [i.e. 
theorising consists of it as an activity], produces an interest 
in how particular pieces or formations of what can be called 
•theory' hold that position. In this formulation, theorising 
is an activity which proceeds according to a socially organised 
programme of practices which produce knowledge. Whatever 
subject is focused upon, the phenomena are set within this 
normative order and can only be understood and made sense of 
in terms of it [D. Walsh, 1977],
This view has interesting associations. It means that in 
terms of the accomplishment and understanding of forms of 
social phenomena, professional sociology and those who inhabit 
the multiple realities which characterise everyday life are 
engaged in similar activities. Also, where someone is engaged 
in the act of understanding [and thereby methodic, practical 
theorising], they are faced with the task of interpreting 
language which distinguishes the particular form of theorising.
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This is because of the features of indexicality and reflexivity.
In order to more deeply address the question of how an 
act of theorising is accomplished, the Postscript to T.S.
Kuhn's 1974 edition of " The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions” will be examined. There are three interrelated 
themes in this examination. Firstly, the points which Kuhn 
makes in his Postscript are regarded critically as a response 
to the epistemological problem produced by the ideals of 
description and theorising to which he subscribes; seeking a 
definite, objective, recognisable ground for his model of the 
way in which science works. Secondly, the Postscript will be 
examined as a social document in order to highlight the 
difference between what Kuhn claims to be doing and the 
unaccounted for methods which enable this. The interrelation 
of these two features results in describing Kuhn's Postscript 
as an act of theorising which is itself an interesting and 
examinable topic, whereby a remedial programme for the 
attainment of the ideal of clarity is instituted.
It must be stressed from the outset that the examination 
of Kuhn's work is not an antagonistic one. Though the 
observations which are made upon his philosophy of science 
may present a 'fresh' way of looking at Kuhn's perspective, 
the concern here is not so much to contribute to the corpus 
of knowledge on scientific practice, but to that on method.
In this sense Kuhn is used as a means for a cathartic 
exercise which attempts to reveal the bases whereby theorists, 
writers, and readers attain a form of understanding.
The topic around which Kuhn's Postscript is organised is 
not an arbitrary one. He is concerned with " gratuitous 
difficulties and misunderstandings" , which he seeks to
eliminate. The Postscript; can thus he described as a 
programme foir the attainment of clarity, and examined with 
regard to how ft institutes and organises this programme.
We must hegim our examination; of this programme with the 
original text, of "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions"* 
the point of departure of Kuhn*s attempt at self-clarification.
A SUMMARY OP PARADIGM ANALYSIS: In "The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions", Kuhn uses the idea of’ shared 
paradigms. These? commit the practitioners of science to 
agreement* sharing- the same ideas and standards of scientific 
practice. The structure of science as a universal reality 
and in its sub-realities is specified, by a dialectic which 
provides for anomaly, crisis, discovery, and change.
Kuhn recognises various definitions of the word ’paradigm*. 
Tm effect he has paradigm referring to various instances of 
scientific practice. Paradigm refers to the list of beliefs, 
values, and techniques common to the’ practitioners of' a 
science. It also refers to the concrete puzzle-solutions 
which have a place' in that list. Further, Kuhn recommends 
the use’ of the, term "disciplinary matrix" as a, remedy for 
the various meanings of the term. A disciplinary matrix is 
made up of all those components and objects of' the scientific 
community*s commitment. Such a list consists ofr symbolic 
generalisations and techniques* shared commitment to beliefs* 
values which provide for a sense of community* concrete 
problem - solutions as exemplars, the difference between sets of 
which accounts for the community fine-structure of science.
Scientific research is based upon’ a paradigm. Researchers 
who share that paradigm are committed to the same standards 
and rules of practice. The "genesis and continuation of a
part icul air research ‘tradition”, which is styled, as '»normal, 
science" (vlT, 1974)» depends upon the? sharing, commitment, 
and consensus produced "by a paradigm. As a science*s paradigm 
specifies and prescribes the »things* which are to stand as 
problems for that science, normal, scientific research consists 
of providing solutions to those problems (p24, 1974).
She,process of change between paradigms is instituted by 
an awareness of anomaly (pp52-53, 1974)* that in nature there 
exist structures of conditions not specified by.normal science 
Im such times of crisis, the practice of science- shifts to 
accommodate the new-found peculiarity. Problems and normal, 
sciences are related by networks of conceptual', theoretical, 
instrumental1, and methodological, commitments. These networks 
constitute a relation such that they inform practitioners of 
the state of the world and of science itself. These networks 
formi a taken for granted basis from- which to do scientific 
work. Though they provide scientific practitioners with rules 
of procedure, they do not specify everything that scientists 
have in common. The ideal of a paradigm locates the source of 
a research1 tradition im normal, scientific- practice.
Rules are specified by paradigms, but in the- absence of 
rules of practice, research can still be guided by a paradigm 
(p42, PIT, 1974). As Kuhn-states its "Rales, I suggest, 
derive from paradigms, but paradigms can guide research evem 
in' the absence of rules.". With anomaly, crisis specifies 
the need to '»get the practice right* such that there- is a 
concentration upon the rules of practice (p47, T974).
Anomaly is closely related to disoovery. This displays 
the following typical, structures an awareness of. anomaly* the 
emergence of conceptual and observational, recognition of that
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anomaly; and changes within the categories of normal science 
to which practitioners may display resistence [p62, 1974],
As a consequence of anomaly and discovery, theory change is 
required. There is large-scale paradigm fragmentation and 
moves in the problems and techniques of normal science [pp67- 
68, 1974]. Such changes of paradigm and theory are the result 
of judgements made by practitioners which involves the 
comparison of paradigms with nature and with each other [p77, 
1974]. In this framework the process and development of 
science cannot be by articulation and the extension of knowledge. 
The development of science here becomes one of the 
reconstruction of the taken for granted auspices of the 
enterprise from new fundamentals. This results in the change 
of what were the most elementary propositions, generalisations, 
paradigm applications, and methods [pp84-85, 1974],
PARADIGM AS AN ANALYTIC METAPHOR; Kuhn's concept of 
paradigm in its original form must be seen not as a precise 
definition of a specific phenomenon but as an analytic 
metaphor; as a decoding device. To treat Kuhn’s use of the 
word paradigm as an analytic metaphor is not to elucidate 
the features of 'concrete' formations, but to see it as a 
describing device which enables the user to engage with 
certain features in a somewhat new and different way.
Kuhn has been criticised [cf. M. Masterman, 1970.
I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, 1970] for his ambiguity and lack 
of clarity. Rather than take this merely as a criticism, it 
can be asked how such a problem arises. What does it consist 
of? A central concern in the genesis of clarity as a problem 
is the relation between the theorist and his subject with 
regard to time. So for example, Kuhn uses paradigm as an
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analytic metaphor- to gloss the temporal, nature of the 
processes lie examines. Even small movements of history present; 
dilemmas of rohjectivity’ to those who study and document 
them; a study which occurs in everyday life as well as 
professional life. The unordered and problematic- nature of 
action requires that people focus upon it in an attempt to 
obtain order, clarity, and objectivity; in order to make 
sense. However, apart fronr the difficulties in objectifying 
change, social, investigation’ has a structure which makes the 
*thing-like' treatment of its subjects peculiarly problematic. 
This structure is a relation between different phenomenal 
levels of investigation.
When one ’goes along* with Kuhn-, topics are addressed in- 
a specific way. For example, asking whether sociology is 
governed1 by a ’mature’ paradigm, or not. Being involved ini 
framing questions about people’s activities from this particular 
position, consists of the different phenomenal levels of! 
investigatiorr. There is. firstly the level' of the ,topio under- 
investigation-; this can be said to consist of members’ 
descriptions of this level. Secondly there is the level of 
investigation characterised by the theorist’s taken for 
granted assumptions and background; these play a part ihi 
specifying the parameters of an investigation (i.e. the 
relevant areas of concern). Itt would seem to be obvious 
that these two levels are not independent of each ether. The 
ground level of people’s descriptions is filtered through- the 
theorist’s initial. understanding ( just like .^’another’ member- 
of a situation), and professional, conceptual concerns. The 
levels of the subject and the investigation are in a most 
intimate relation; this unspecified linkage is an- essential 
proprty for the production Gf ’results’ and conclusions, and
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constitutes a third level of investigation which is 
coextensive with the production of 'findings'.
These levels of concern which are involved in the theorist's 
investigation can be expanded.- Firstly, as already noted, 
there is time and history; as a condition of making sense all 
members engage in documenting some version of reality.
Involved within this level is settled knowledge about the past 
which stands as a resource for interpretation. For each 
particular involvement of a person [whether everyday member or 
theorist], there exists knowledge of the types of situations, 
investigations, and methods which may possibly be available 
in particular cases.
A further and related level is that of knowledge of 
everyday life and social structures. Through their linguistic 
practices people 'know' and find their way around situations, 
and in this methodic process constitute them. Between historical 
and everyday knowledge there is an intermeshed engagement.
Within this involvement, through historically constituted 
knowledge of linguistic practices, methods, systems of 
relevancies, and expectations, the typical nature of different 
situations and actions is produced. The accomplishment of 
this form of understanding takes place on a further level 
which is a concern for the theoriser's investigation: context.
Any context of interaction provides the observation that 
the course of its structure and constitution 'belongs' to 
other people as well as to the individual. Any 'conclusions' 
which a person constructs as to the nature or typical 
character of a context is thereby the result of an interplay 
between already held and constituted knowledge and the actions 
and utterances of other people. In this there is an almost
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constant interchange between existent knowledge and context, 
causing a subsequent review within that corpus. The 
accomplishment of understanding a particular context is thus 
carried out through an assembled corpus of knowledge; and this 
understanding results in changing that corpus; and so on.
These related though different levels of concern for a 
theoriser's investigation can be illustrated in relation to Kuhn
Context
History
Members1 Level
Specific scientific 
activity-topic.
Pre-scientific 
knowledge; the 
history of the 
community as 
taught and 
documented; 
members' personal 
knowledge.
Findings
Paradigm: the state of 
the community; the 
maturity, beliefs, 
values, exemplars, 
and puzzles of the 
community.
Pre-scientific 
[pre-paradigm]; the 
specific values, 
techniques, beliefs, 
and exemplars of a 
science as specified 
by historical 
development and 
examined in 
retrospect.
Analyst's Level
Specific
investigative
activity-topic.
Pre-investigative 
knowledge of 
'this type of 
analysis'.
Everyday Members'
Knowledge knowledge of
everyday life and 
social structures.
The analyst's 
knowledge of 
everyday life 
and social 
structures.
- The vertical levels in this diagram are, in actual
situations, integrally enmeshed together. The theorist has 
the problematic of disentangling them in order to produce what 
his system of relevancies defines as useful findings and 
conclusions. One idea of this sorting process is the location 
of the constituent features of the selected topic. In this 
case, the horizontal 'findings' and 'members'' levels of the 
diagram should replicate one another. The vertical 'analyst's 
level' should be in a statable form in order that its relation
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to the other levels can be assessed. The 'findings' are the 
conclusions of a syllogism; the analyst's theory constitutes 
the premises and the 'members'' level the conditions under 
which they must apply.
In fact however, theorising is in far from this ideal state. 
The underlying basis of everyday knowledge which both the 
studied member and the théoriser share in some sense is in 
Kuhn's work ignored. The position found by cross-matching 
'findings' and 'everyday knowledge' is left unexamined and 
unstated. It is only through the shared methods and practices 
at the level of everyday life that the theorist [Kuhn] can 
produce the level 'findings'. Further, as readers it is only 
through the methods and practices located in the 'everyday' 
level that the 'findings' level can be examined as sensible 
achievements and productions. This reading however requires 
supplementing with regard to the particular contextual form 
of language employed [e.g. talking in terms of paradigm 
analysis]. Everyday knowledge, specified in particular by the 
context, arms the théoriser [Kuhn] with a set of propositions 
with which to view his subject [science]. Events within the 
subject are understood and transformed through this resource; 
they are assembled according to Kuhn's formally stipulated 
theoretic perspective via unrecognised and unexamined means.
CLARITY; The work of Garfinkel [1967] has shown the 
importance of the idea of reflexivity. Given that the sense 
of an utterance or statement depends upon where and when it 
was provided, who its author was, and its serial placement, it 
is reasonable to suggest that professional theorists should 
experience 'clarity' as a problem. Because of the constancy 
of the indexical nature of language and action, the concern
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with clarity for professional theory is ever present; there 
is a tension between the ideals of social science and the 
resources through which these must be attained.
Two programmatic concerns for professional theorists in 
the face of this situation can be recognised. Firstly, 
strict frameworks of procedure for operating upon the world 
can be devised and adopted. Secondly, theorising can be 
ordered not through using an uncompromising model of operation, 
but through a conceptual reorganisation of the experiential 
world. This latter approach recognises what the former uses 
but does not recognise: that to produce accounts theorists 
must at the outset 'know' the settings in which they are to 
operate, and that the form of this knowledge derives from the 
social practices through which these settings are experienced.
Theorists' language and their social practices are 
grounded in and are derived from the structures of practical 
action in everyday life. This is taken for granted within 
professional theory, though methods are employed which seek to 
warrant the authority of conclusions and findings. Durkheim 
for example, as well as providing rules for viewing action 
[e.g. treat social facts as things], held that it was only 
through sociological training that social life could be fully 
understood. A professional ideology of theorising requires 
that the theoriser must be seen as stepping outside the social 
world in order to understand it [E. Durkheim, 1964],
In perennially relying upon the essential reflexivity of 
language, theorists have to attempt and accomplish for all 
practical purposes the antithesis of the very properties which 
they make use of and experience through their work. The 
possibility of science, or the study of what Durkheim called
"the objective reality of social, facts” (1964)» fully depends 
upon. the? transformation’ of the indexical properties expressed, 
im language, into objective? formations. The reliance of 
theorists' constructs upon? the reflexive organisation’ of 
settings, means that practices have to he used which are 
located outside the formal ideal of theorising} they are im a 
sense, the very features which this, ideal seeks to transform. 
Faced with these problematics, and im conjunction with their 
ideals, theorists have a course of social reorganisation 
'forced' upom them. Either they abandon their concerní for 
undterstanding the social, world, or' they seek to clarify that 
world and thereby reach understanding of its constitution.
KUBH*S' POSTSCRIPT:- Im his Postscript, Kuhn seeks to- 
"articulate the intuitive notion of community" which underlay 
his original work (pI76, 1974). Kuhn attempts to present the 
ideas of community which he used in producing his original work, 
and to show how that' idea is intuitively linked in with and 
helps to constitute scientific practice. In this second sense, 
the paradigm linked and intuitive notion of community enables 
practitioners of science to have a full yet unstatable basis 
of knowledge. It permits them to operate without being 
dependent upon articulated rules (pI9T, 1974). For example, 
scientific problems are solved by analogy-. Kuhha notes that 
it is tempting to regard such a process as being located in 
the use of rules (ppl89-I90» Pl94* X9T4:)« He states that this 
temptation results "because our seeing a situation as like 
ones we have encountered before must be the result of neural, 
processing, fully governed hy physical and chemical laws," 
(Pr94, 1974). Via neural, processing and programming, actions; 
can.be'interpreted without scientists and presumably others
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being aware of how that interpretation functions. In 
retrospect, these accomplishments are then regarded as if 
done-in-accord-with-a-rule.
This view makes it possible for Kuhn to say that once a 
recognition of similarity has been done and learned it becomes 
a 'natural process': " as fully systematic as the beating of 
our hearts" [p194, 1974]. In this outlook recognition is 
involuntary and cannot be "properly conceived" as having its 
source in the use of rules. Any reliance on rules involves 
different applications: mistakes; possible perversions of them; 
ignoring rules at will; disobeying them; having 'fun' or 
playing about with them.
Acts of recognition, because they are involuntary in the 
way Kuhn conceives of them, cannot have the properties of rules. 
They cannot be mistakenly applied, experimented with, or 
broken. For Kuhn they have a stable character across situations. 
For example, Kuhn notes that the history of scientific 
discovery displays the characteristic of theory change and 
goes further to say that there is evidence that this is built 
into the nature of the perceptual process [p36, 1974], In 
relation to this, forms or acts of recognition have a stability 
which is difficult to shift and reorient [p64, 1974].
There is clearly a relation between acts of recognition 
and rules. For Kuhn, rules are applied retrospectively after 
an act of recognition; the perception of a sensation. 
Interpretation is an exercise of choice among alternatives 
which comes after and distinct from perception. The process 
of interpretation is based by Kuhn in neural processes which 
" are therefore governed by the same physico-chemical laws
that govern perception on the one hand and the beating of
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our hearts on the other." [p195, 1974. His emphasis.]. To 
maintain the stable and involuntary nature of acts of 
recognition, Kuhn states that there is " no reason to suppose" 
that the n e u r a l  apparatuses of perception work in the same way 
in interpretation. Though there are differences among views 
this is not due to differences in perception, which is 
involuntary and stable, but in interpretation. This is an 
opposition to the view which regards perception as an 
interpretive process; Kuhn wants to deny analysis which has 
it that perception is an unconscious version of what is done 
after acts of recognition [i.e. for Kuhn, perception proper] 
t P195, 1974].
The incommensurable viewpoints of the different community 
members which Kuhn talks about [p198, 1974] can be resolved 
he says through their recognition of themselves as different 
language-community members ]p201, 1974]. Here the resolution 
of communication breakdown is by translation [p202, 1974],
This is facilitated by features of nature itself; the stimuli 
which impinge on members of different communities are 'the same* 
the neural apparatuses of those members, no matter how 
differer,tly programmed, are 'the same'; because such communities 
share a common history, neural programming must be more or less 
'the same'. Given these features of nature, it is possible 
for different community languages to be translated enabling 
a change of community affiliations.
For Kuhn, perceiving changes stimuli to sensations via 
the neural apparatuses employed which contain past experience. 
This, as an " aopropriately programmmed perceptual mechanism" 
can perform as a functional pre-requisite for interpretation 
and be transmitted through history. The number of such
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mechanisms however is limited, due to the fact that it is 
only those which are useful and functional which survive 
[pp195-196, 1974]. These mechanisms have the characteristics 
of knowledge in that: they are transmitted through time; have 
been found to be effective; and are subject to change [p196, 
1974]. One characteristic however is lacking; these mechanisms 
are not available for examination; there is " no direct access 
to what it is we know, no rules or generalisations with which 
to express this knowledge." [p19 6, 1974]. If one were to 
attempt access to these mechanisms this would be through rules 
which would refer to objects [stimuli] and not feelings 
[sensations]. Furthermore, these objects can only be known 
through elaborate theory [p196, 1974]. Kuhn concludes that 
in the absence of such a theory, " the knowledge embedded in 
the stimulus-to-sensation route remains tacit" [p196, 1974].
Kuhn's discussion establishes a difference between acting 
in the world and receiving it. By having perception as stable 
and general, Kuhn can institute it as underlying his production 
of the original text and integrally running through and 
common to all the various communities which he references.
As a remedial formulation this should then enable Kuhn's text 
to be read in a different way [more clearly], and make more 
observable the situation which he seeks to describe.At the 
same time the stress on the neural basis of paradigms offsets 
the relativism implicit in the original text; even if the 
content of paradigms differs, their genesis is universal to 
the neural condition. Remedially Kuhn accounts for differences 
of viewpoint through a general and shared level of perception 
which allows relative viewpoints to be dissolved.
„This approach can be represented diagrammatically:
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j-- Problematic -----------) Interpretation —------- ^Resolved
Non-problematic — — -- y  Intuitive notion {-
' of community
Sensations {- Acts of recognition 
as perception
Neural processes 
and programmes
Physico-chemical
laws
Stimuli
Before discussing the above model of Kuhn's perceptual
process, it may be interesting to present his idea of the
process of change within science:
/
.-—'^Crisis-- -----  --- ) Discovery ----- ^Resolution of anomaly
Anomaly ^ Paradigm community :exemplars, puzzles, #— Change of or in * 
solutions paradigm V
These models bear a striking resemblance to one another. 
There is a 'state of the individual'. This results in a person 
being programmed for certain eventualities such as doing normal 
science, and seeing in a community way. In the event of being 
faced with a problem [e.g. something not 'seen' before] or an 
anomaly [e.g. something not specified or expected], recourse 
in both cases is to a form of resolution through discovery; 
that a new and different set of ideas enable a problem to be 
accommodated at a level of belief within the scientific 
community and the individual.
These models of Kuhn's approach towards perception and
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change in science are not only similar; they are linked.
Inherent in the idea of paradigm development and change is 
the intuitive notion of community. Any change or development 
in paradigms involves a subsequent change in the intutive 
notion of community via the model of perception. Similarly, 
changes and developments brought about through acts of 
recognition of anomaly through the model of perception, require 
reviews in the model of science.
In order to avoid confusion, it must be pointed out that 
these statements are being made in relation to what Kuhn has 
to say in his Postscript, and brackets exactly what it is that 
scientists actually do. Given this, it can be suggested that 
as a methodic consequence of his overall perspective and as a 
condition for its survival [to some extent], Kuhn requires 
scientists to act according to his assembled observations.
For the sake of the continuation and use of paradigm analysis, 
those actors involved must possess the perceptual features 
suggested by Kuhn.
Turning to Schütz [1953], he stated that each person 
considers himself at the centre of his world. Every actor 
assembles this world around him according to his own interests. 
In the pursuit of professional knowledge and theory however, 
a change is brought about in the structural perceptual position. 
The inquirer has to put the subject of his interest at the 
centre of this world. As a consequence of this shift of point 
of view, the théoriser replaces observed people with puppets 
which are created and manipulated by him. It is this situation 
in an acute fashion, in which Kuhn finds himself in his 
Postscript.
Schütz can be quoted on this process of puppeteering, as
a comment, upon how Kuhn has proceeded? "Ho observes certain 
events as caused by human activity and he begins to establish 
a type of such proceedings. . Afterwards he co-ordinates with 
these typical acts, typical actors as their performers. He thus 
ends up by constructing personal ideal types which he imagines 
as having consciousness.” (1953). Schütz makes a further 
comment pertinent to Kuhn's model of perception.when he states 
that such a construct is a model of a conscious mind without 
the ability of spontaneity and without free will. It can be 
objected that Kuhn, does not determine his actors' actions 
in. this strict way by the introduction of a laxity in terms 
of tacit and taken for granted knowledge (pI9, p44» pI9I> 1974). 
However where Kuhn speaks of the tacit and the taken for granted 
he references the intuitive^. This usage according to the 
v position it occupies in a stable model of perception, 
takes away from.these terms their social, nature which is 
produced by people in and through situations.
If one were to attempt to attach a label to the underlying 
conceptual base which Kuhn attempts. to articulate in the 
Postscript, perhaps, the most suitable would be some form of 
social behaviourism. This is because Kuhn orders his 
theorising in terms of the reduction of social phenomena; 
he locates 'overt behaviour' qs stemming from stimulus and 
response situations. Such an approach fails to accommodate' 
the character of the social worlds its meaningfulness (cf.
D. Walsh, 1972a).
UNDERSTANDING’ PARADIGM ANALYSIS: RULES FOR READING: In 
"The Structure of Scientific' Revolutions” and the Postscript 
Kuhn is quite obviously presenting a set of propositions about 
the concrete world of scientists. The accuracy or factuality 
of these propositions is not as such in dispute here. Rather
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concern is with how Kuhn constructs and constitutes this set 
of propositions; with how they can come to be seen to be a 
sensible corpus of knowledge; with the methodicity that is 
employed as a means to assembling paradigm analysis as a 
viable way of looking at things. Though this is not to counter 
Kuhn's claims with an alternative argument in an attempt to 
replace it, an examination of the means used for the 
construction of a specific reality does have consequences for 
his views on another level.
In order for interpretation and understanding it is 
essential that the participants in some situation or enterprise 
talk the same kind of language, in order to mobilise specific 
and occasioned methods for the all-practical-purposes remedy 
of indexicality. As Schütz has described the situation to be 
faced from the perspective of the person: " Our knowledge 
remains incoherent, our propositions occasional, our future 
uncertain, our general situation unstable." [1953]. Whereas 
in everyday life the remedy of indexicality is occasioned and 
for-all-practical-purposes only, theorising and inquiry 
suggest and promise the complete remedy of indexicality} the 
substitution of objective for indexical expressions and 
particulars [H. Garfinkel, 1967].
Like all would-be social scientists - O'Neill has called 
the study of people " a human pastime with pretensions to 
science" [1972] - Kuhn is faced with this problem of remedy , 
and substitution, and his Postscript can be seen as a further 
attempt to attain this. In order to see this, Kuhn's reaction 
to apparent difficulties [criticisms] with his original work 
can be examined. For example, Kuhn writes of " locating a 
particular community of specialists by techniques" , of
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" isolating" such communities, and articulating " the 
intuitive notion of community" [p183, p176, 1974], If these 
suggestions are taken seriously, they have the following 
consequence: Kuhn presents instructions on how to regard 
scientists' practice; and with instructions of how to 
understand [read] what he is writing.
The instructions and observations drawn from Kuhn's work 
and listed here, constitute normative prescriptions for seeing 
scientific practice. This is not in the sense that 'good' 
scientific work is done'so', but that scientific practice 
should be regarded 'so'; and that they are to be seen as 
concrete descriptions of that practice. There is a duality of 
effect in such a list of instructions, which is an indicator 
of a pervasive feature of language: such instructions manage 
to prescribe a social world while claiming to be description. 
This testifies to the reflexivity of language. A requirement 
to provide further instructions in order that one should be 
'more fully', 'properly', or 'completely' understood [e.g. 
a Kuhnian Postscript], provides an instance of the fallability 
of remedial constructs and the central concern for the ideal 
of clarity.
Below are a list of rules drawn from Kuhn which have been 
constructed. It will be indicated how they provide for a 
problem of clarity as contexted utterances. In this list of 
rules, the constituting and stratifying element is contained 
within brackets. The prescriptive-descriptive guise is 
outside the brackets:
1: [In its situated use] 'paradigm' is [to be read as] 
'collection', 'exemplar', 'disciplinary matrix'.
2: [In its situated use] 'patadigm-etc.' is [to be read
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as] 'that which the members of the community share' [p176, 1974],
3: [In its situated use] 'community' is [to be read as] 
'those who share a paradigm' [p176, 1974].
4: [In its situated use] 'community characteristics' 
is [to be read as] 'not being able to be grasped without reference 
to the shared paradigm' [pl78, 1974].
5: [In its situated use] 'transitions of paradigm' is 
[to be read as] 'moves towards maturity and changes in the nature of 
paradigm' [p179, 1974].
6: [In its situated use] 'normal science' and 
'revolutions' are [to be read as] 'community based activities' [p179, 
1974].
7: [In its situated use] 'analysis of paradigm-directed 
and paradigm shattering events' are [to be read as] 'the work of 
locating those groups responsible enough to facilitate analyses'
[p180, 1974].
8: [In its situated use] 'scientific communities' is 
[to be read as] 'being isolated without prior recourse to paradigm' 
[p176, 1974].
9: [In its situated use] 'paradigm' is [to be read as] 
'being discovered in the behaviour of community members' [p176, 1974],
The elements of the list of rules outside the brackets are, 
on the face of it, remarks upon the practice of science and 
scientists. However an examination of this list shows that 
there are certain features and properties which are problematic. 
Rule 1 gets its sense from the underlying structure of rules. 
Rule 2 states that a paradigm is what a community shares, and 
Rule 4 that common characteristics cannot be grasped without 
reference to the shared paradigm. It is further stated that 
normal science and revolutionary activities for science are
based in communities (Rule 6). Transitions' are moves towards 
maturity and in the nature of paradigms (Rule» 5)» Yet Rule 8 
states that communities should he isolated without reference 
to paradigms. Rule 3 specifies the paradigm defined nature 
of reading ’community*. Rules: 7 and 9 specify the temporal 
nature of investigation in relation? to scientists’ practice, 
where paradigms should he located in members' behaviour (Rule 
9) after those members’ community has been located via Rules 3 
and 8.
Circularity is involved here. Kuhn recommends the correct 
methodological practice of 'locating' a community and'then, 
-’discovering* a paradigm. Yet this process is predicated 
upon''community’ already being defined and specified by that 
paradigm. The specification of the community by theorisers 
and the subsequent discovery of the paradigm is, &s described 
by Kuhn, an elliptical process. It could be suggested here that 
Kuhn is involved in- separating out his argument too much, 
which results in this circular logic. However, Kuhn's way 
of attempting to specify how to locate communities and 
paradigms^ may not be so trivial; and nor may the circularity 
of his argument. What Kuhn attempts to do in the Postscript 
is to state how to recognise paradigms and communities. This 
involves documenting the means and methods: available for 
perception and interpretation (i.e., that which Kuhn? writes 
about in relation?, to scientists’ practice), to Kuhn, and others 
doing paradigm analysis. Yet because Kuhn does not recognise 
the constitutive nature of language in forming relations of 
meaning, but rather adopts a ’scientific' stance of vague 
to-be-discovered physico-chemical, laws, he cannot recognise 
what he has stumbled upon.
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In short, the task Kuhn sets himself in clarifying his 
earlier position is the documentation of the methodic way for 
the constitution of 'seeing' paradigms. This requires that 
he become interested in the taken for granted ways in which he 
approaches and mundanely analyses the materials with which he 
is associated. If Kuhn were to become interested in this 
dimension of inquiry, rather than being disinterested, he 
would ultimately focus upon the incarnate expressiveness of 
language and its inherent reflexivity. Further, it is a 
feature of language which is being dealt with in the examination 
of the rules drawn from Kuhn.
These rules present a programme for the attainment of 
clarity. They seek to attain an agreement from the reader; 
that Kuhn's propositions are for-all-practical-purposes an 
adequate and warrantable portrayal of events. The accomplishment 
of this agreement is crucial for the location of Kuhn's 
'description' in concrete settings; it makes available and 
observable scientists' practical activities in a 'paradigmatic 
way'. The use of Kuhn's rules is not as a judgement upon the 
correspondence between them and features of reality. The 
establishment of such a correspondence is tied into the 
socially organised occasions of language use. The list of 
rules as 'accurate description' depends upon their constitution 
as competent speech through social practices.
Certain features are also displayed by the list of rules 
drawn from Kuhn. In prescribing the conditions under which 
they are to apply, they are law-like. These rules are also 
spatio-temporally restrictive [to paradigm development and 
scientific communities]. Further, they are 'necessarily loose' 
because their characteristics cannot fully be given [e.g. " I
shal’I therefore here assume that more systematic- means for 
their identification will he found." (T.S. Kuhn, pT76, 1974)» 
Kuhn’s list of rules permits theorists to assemhl’e and 
understand scientific' communities and practices subject to 
the features of the- rules. The features of being law-like, 
spatio-temporally restrictive, and ’necessarily loose’ are 
features of language. They are part of a theorist’s actual 
practices for accomplishing am objective description of the 
parts of the list; of rules contained within brackets; they 
are reading" devices with which- to make certain events 
accessible to members and make them observable Im a certain 
form.
PARADIGM ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL PRACTICES:- It has been stated 
that Kuhn’s list, of rules for the location of paradigms and 
scientific; communities depends upon the use of social practices. 
These practices are seen as underpinning the rules of 
correspondence, and im the act of engaging in paradigm analysis, 
enabling1 the assemblage of that project. Kuhn’s Postscript 
contains a number of sucfr practices which will be listed 
below.
There are instances in Kuhn’s writing where he establishes 
a state of the taken for granted. That is, instances which can 
be taken ’as if’ fully known-, from-which.that being discussed 
ferives its,sensible character. This practice consists of 
both positive assumptions (e.g. "Communities in this sense 
exist, of course, at numerous levels.", pI77> 1974. My emphasis.),
and assumptions concerning what the future has to hold (e.g.
• \ \ '
"I take it that the job can and will' be done...", pI78, 1974), 
as well as referencing the expectably normal (e.g. "ordinarily 
more than sufficient;", pl77» 1974). Kuhn also seeks to treat
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what he is writing about 'as if' it were the case, in order 
to further pursue his argument [e.g. " Grant for the moment 
that something of this sort does occur." , p194, 1974].
It is through practices such as these that Kuhn is able 
to state: " Communities of this sort are the subject of this 
book." [p178, 1974, My emphasis.]. It is also through such 
practices of language that a background of unstated 
understandings is constituted through which the writer has 
the reader understand that he is reasoning rationally.
Via these practices Kuhn subscribes to a version of language 
which furnishes its own understandings, one of which is 
'letting pass' possible contrary instances and not granting 
them credence as actual situations [H. Garfinkel, 1967].
It has been demonstrated that language exhibits the 
practice 'if not, except when' [H. Garfinkel, 1967], Kuhn uses 
this linguistic practice to establish the line of thought or 
form of reasoning which he wishes the reader to partake in.
This has the effect that what may possibly have been a 
problem is dissolved through the application of such a 
practice. For example Kuhn states: "Any study of 
paradigm-directed research must begin by locating the 
responsible group or groups...in that way, several difficulties 
which have been the foci for critical attention are likely to 
vanish," [p180, 1974. My emphasis.]. Here the practice is 
established whereby the "unanimity of scientists" [p180,
1974] is guaranteed. Kuhn disposes of criticisms of a lack 
of unanimity among scientists by aligning unanimity with 
" responsible" . In this way, evidence of a lack of unanimity 
is evidence of non-responsibility [i.e. notlassociated with 
paradigm directed research].
In effect Kuhn is stating that
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'unless' responsibility occurs among a group of scientists 
then unanimity will not be found; if responsibility c a n n o t  b e  
found the criticisms hold, except when responsibility can be 
found. This practice thus provides for locating paradigms, 
and dissipates criticisms of a lack of community characteristics 
for that feature through an indicator of something other than 
a paradigm based community [i.e. non-responsibility].
An indication of the shifting nature of realities and the 
prevalence of indexicality, which can only be remedied for the 
practical purposes at hand through the reflexive constituting 
of social practices, can gained from the examination of Kuhn's 
work. A further practice which demonstrates the indexical 
and occasioned character of language and action is the 
'et cetera' clause [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. Through its use 
unstated understandings are referenced and established in a 
way that " much of what is reported is not mentioned" [H. 
Garfinkel, 1967], This is attained through the establishment 
of the agreement or understanding that what is said or written 
references much more than is actually said or written. In 
this way the ideal of a state of strictness or clarity is 
traded off through such an understanding.
Some of Kuhn's uses of this device are: " Among other 
things" , " Though" , " sometimes" , " they usually do" 
"Usually", and "Probably" [pp183-184, 1974], Through these 
diffusing and pervasive elements of language Kuhn seeks to 
institute his programme for the attainment of clarity while 
at the same time necessarily blurring his delineations around 
the edges. In everyday situations these instances of the 
'et cetera' clause occupy an expected and routine place in 
furthering conversations and actions, and countering
- 2 8 7 -
disruptments. In cases of professional theorising however, 
the use of the 'et cetera' clause provides another example 
for the theorist of the practicality and sociality of his 
own work. Such examples are for the theorists 'uncomfortable' 
and point up the irony of attempting to attain rational ideals 
based upon occasioned and occasional social practices.
Kuhn employs another practice which temporally orders 
the descriptions and consequently the events about which he 
writes. This is done through the practice of 'stating before 
the doing'. That is, by stating what is to be done, which 
prepares the reader for 'seeing' what the text claims it is 
making available. 'Stating and doing' does not refer to an 
actual, concrete occurrence, but to what is observable in 
relation to this particular practice. It is a gesture to 
the reader which states 'see it this way'.
Kuhn operates the practice of 'stating and doing' in such 
ways ass " I suggest" , " indicate how this may be done" ,
" discuss some significant consequences" , " consider what 
occurs...by examining the behaviour of the members of a 
previously determined scientific community." [pp174-175,
1974. My emphasis.]. The device of 'stating and doing' 
has its place in such as introductions, prefaces, and as in 
this case, clarifications.
Its use is in the impact of instructing the reader what 
will be found, not what might be found.' As such, practices 
like 'stating and doing' are "recipes for the social 
construction of worlds" [B. Sandywell et al, 1975],
However, the majority of professional theorists do not 
recognise and show little interest that 'actual situations' 
are established through the reflexive use of social practices. 
Contrary to this, 'actual situations' are viewed as
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concretely available in the correspondence of a form of 
language with reality.
IN CONCLUSION: Kuhn's approach to clarity is an encounter 
with indexicality. It is also in a more material way an 
attempt to come to grips with being a professional theoriser. 
The way in which Kuhn exemplifies an attempt to remedy the 
problems which these features bring starkly demonstrates that 
his actions [the act of theorising] are not guided in the 
same way as he prescribes for the practitioners of natural 
science. In an attempt to ground his notions of paradigm at 
an interpersonal and interactional level Kuhn looks to 
physico-chemical laws and a theoretic process of social 
behaviourism. Yet his own theorising demonstrates the very 
ways in which 'talking the same language' can be attained, 
and through this the construction of a particular way of 
regarding a topic. Kuhn's paradigm analysis is not a paradigm 
of itself.
This examination of Kuhn's remedial formulations has 
treated them as an occasion to demonstrate an ideal of the 
formal attitude of professional theorising and its attempted 
accomplishment. Another and related ideal which professional 
theorists regard as adhering to their productions will be 
examined in Chapter Nine. This is the ideal of superiority.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE PROBLEM OF SUPERIORITY
The materialist doctrine concerning the 
changing of circumstances and education 
forgets that circumstances are changed by 
men and that the educator must himself be 
educated. This doctrine has therefore to 
divide society into two parts, one of 
which is superior to society.
[K. Marx, 1845]
INTRODUCTION: The search for truth is an historical quest 
which will endure. However, for all those who search for 
such a briqht thing, no matter their standing, the ways in 
which they formulate their actions and how they justify them 
as accomplished are problematic issues. This chapter attempts 
to examine this topic in relation to the act of theorising.
It examines theorising, as documented in the examination of 
Kuhn's work, in a deeper, more fundamental manner. The 
problematic is taken of examining theorisers' remarks and 
propositions and demonstrating how they can come to be seen as 
a set of procedural rules which govern methods and findings 
as the grounds for further inference [H. Garfinkel, 1967].
The basic assumption in this chapter is that the factual 
status [i.e. whether or not further thoughts can be based 
upon an idea] of any findings, remark, or proposition is a 
constant source of trouble for anyone involved in the act of 
theorising.
To accomplish the task of being factual, and thereby to 
be seen as doing warrantable theorising, it is necessary to
demonstrate that the particular- subject; under examination is 
in the form of a ’moral necessity’. What a theoriser presents 
must he regarded not as being compiled how he would], like’ to 
see it, hut ’as it really is’. This contextual, and situated 
accomplishment; is problematic. It represents to the theoriser 
the promise of success or’ the threat; of failure..
As such- the factual status of knowledge is a critical 
concern for theorising. This is im a double sense. Firstly, 
it is of literal concern’ im that one demonstration of being a 
professional theoriser is a ’critical attitude’. Secondly, 
it is a matter for concern; because factual, status has to be 
established before any progress can be made. The occasion of 
theorising then faces the duality of ’revealing' independent 
social features and, in that doing, accomplishing that act; of 
theorising as having moral worth, and high regard.
SUPERIORITY AS A CONSTITUTIVE PARAMETER: Lay and professional 
theorising face a similar problem of knowledge iim their 
inquiries* its-accomplishment. However, professional, theorising 
is generally regarded as superior in fact. Mennel'l for example 
recommends* •’’Science can-, and must seek to correct commonsense.” 
(I97?)• The- expressions of the superiority of’ ’scientific’ 
construction as corrections of more mundane activities is 
the expression of a deeply embedded difference between the 
commonsense member and the professional; between the layman 
and the priest. Historical development has required that Han 
is alienated from himself. The concern with and truth of 
knowledge, and knowledge itself, is appropriated by select: 
and differentiated groups. ”JTust as he estranges from 
himself his own activity so he confers to the stranger activity 
which is not his own»" (K„ Marx, 1844)» Though this
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differentiation and positioning of theorising as an 
appropriating activity is an historical production, its 
continuation and accomplishment is as a situated and occasioned 
activity.
Theorising warrants the presentation of its subject matter 
as morally worthy through practices which it shares with 
people who constitute that subject matter. In this sense, 
ideas on superiority form some part of a collection of 
parameters that are constitutive of theorising's problems and 
remedies [e.g. clarity] [H. Garfinkel, 1967], To regard the 
idea of superiority as a defining parameter of theorising is 
to look to the integrity of the idea. If theorising's 
remarks and propositions are taken to be displays of the 
parameters of theorising, then a move is made away from 
merely regarding them as presentations of fact towards the 
constitutive status of ideas in inquiry.
From this viewpoint, differences between commonsense and 
science are not differences between 'worlds'. To legislate 
for what is 'sense' in everyday life from the realm of science 
requires that the professional theoriser has at the outset 
knowledge of the very social structures he seeks to 'discover' 
and describe from the 'outside*. The difference between 
commonsense and professional theorising is one of degree, 
which is apparent in claims to knowledge and the concern for 
those claims. These claims are operable in the lay and 
professional theorisers' 'here and now', but the concern 
is differentiated between meaning contexts: between 'just 
about' and 'quantification'; between 'more than likely' and 
'probability'; between 'points of view' and 'conceptual 
frameworks'; between 'ideas on the future' and 'prediction'.
The relation between producing and accomplishing 
propositions about the social world and the integrity of the 
idea of superiority as a parameter of theorising, is an 
engagement which cannot he suppressed in the act of theorising.
•All occasions of theorising have as a source of energy a belief 
in the concrete and the actual, nature of the topics which they make 
available. Factual superiority is the expected and relevant 
outcome of theorising, where superiority as a parameter is 
in engagement with the social practices of inquiry.
SUPERIORITY AS A CLAIMING ACTIVITYr Though science and 
commonsens6' can be discussed for the purposes of analysis as 
distinct, empirically they are fused and intertwined. Though 
there is some disagreement (of. F. Hindess, 1973), it is 
generally agreed that there is no sharp discontinuity between 
scientific and everyday knowledge, and that the commonsenee 
world is the starting point; of all scientific knowledge (of.
K. Pepper, 1972. F„ G'arfinkel, 1967» E. Furkheim, 1964). Some 
theorists however take this much farther, stating the massive 
problems which face the possibility of an objective social'
.science.
Harold Garfinkel for example, has suggested that the 
difference: between the "exact" and the "inexact" sciences 
is one of the accomplishment of the substitution of objective 
for indexical expressions; for the former this is achievable, 
while for the latter it."remains unrealizably programmatic"
(T96T}. Ob the other hand,those theorists, who see' their 
programme as following natural science and its model, of inquiry 
reject the idea of the equality of science and commonsense 
as specified by an approach which fully accepts, the 
ethnomethodological bases of acting socially as its topic.
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It concerns a conversation: "between' a doorman and a young couple 
over entry to a private park. The young- man asks the doorman 
whether it would "be possible to look round the park? ”What do you 
think we have rules for?*, yells the doorman, suddenly...
’If we let everybody ’just step right inside for a minute’, 
we might as well not have any rulesl Right?”. Like Wolfe’s 
doorman, sociologists have' a collective commitment towards 
their domain of reference which is ’their’ business. They have 
a normative and' moral concern for the- ’state of" the- art*, and 
uphold that concern through defining situations as in 
accord with this moral1 superiority as a constitutive idea.
The^ promised remedy of commonsense and its substitution 
by objectivity can only be upheld as an ongoing concern by the 
continued formulation of sociological theorising’s claims.
To continue to remain socially viable as an enterprise and 
practically adequate, requires the resourceful and artful use 
of practical reasonings commonsense and specialised knowledge 
(i.e. what sociology regards as its" ’own’ methods) occasioned 
and assembled through language. It is through the institution' 
of this programme rather than following the edicts of a 
scientific methodology that sooial theory can assume a sense 
of importance. Because theorising is a public activity, im 
that what it produces to gain any importance' has to ba 
proclaimed by other- professionals, it has to portray itself as 
producing new and socially" viable conclusions and findings. 
Whether or not it does so will, not be argued here} interest is 
rather in the way in which it establishes itself.
The act of theorising is faced with the problems presented 
by its structural position. It has to face the tasks of 
remedying commonsense, and producing ’better’, usable knowledge
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in the process. In this situation, to question the viability 
of professional theorising is a suicidal activity because it 
at once questions its importance as a source of knowledge.
To produce and protect that knowledge, professional theorising 
must as a consequence of its structural position in society 
and its remedial programme make immediate claims to a select 
epistemological form of life. To make such a claim is not 
merely to state that some knowledge is possessed; it is to 
claim that some knowledge is possessed which is superior to 
commonsense knowledge [and incidentally, which is competitive 
with other theorisers' claims to knowledge of the same subject]. 
Claiming is not the mere stating that something is known. To 
claim is to stake a title to ownership.
EIDETIC FORMS OF CLAIMING IN EVERYDAY LIFF; Claims to 
superior knowledge have outcomes; they are either influential 
or they are not. Such an outcome is the result of a set of 
facts having sought to secure election as the 'right' 
description of a subject or event. Where such a claim is 
upheld, it is done so at the expense of other theorisers' 
claims. In everyday life, the existence of competing claims 
has two possible outcomes: they can be forgotten or they can 
be maintained.
'Forgetting' and 'maintaining' claims are eidetic, 
ideal-typical strategies towards the ordering of conversation 
and interaction. Forgetting a once made claim consists of 
letting every possible occasion for stating that claim go by; 
for letting conversational signals for speaker change remain 
the interest of other participants in a topic based conversation. 
Motorcycle maintenance provides an e x a m p l e A f t e r  two 
sentences on the subject his eyes go completely glassy and he
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changes the conversation or just looks away. He doesn't want 
to hear about it." [R. Pirsig, 1974]. This description is 
based upon competing claims as to the best way to approach 
motorcycle maintenance. Deciding to forget a claim is a 
contingent matter. It may turn upon the inability to finally 
reach a satisfactory conclusion, because of the argument that 
nothing in everyday life is fixed. Claims are not always 
matters of opinion. Related to this, it may be that a person 
cannot be bothered or is too sensitive to engage in the 
necessary argument required to establish a claim as 'the best'. 
Whatever the reasons, forgetting removes from public scrutiny 
a particular claim to knowledge; it then only remains as an 
experience or memory of a once held view.
In everyday life the relation between differing claims to 
knowledge does not generally assume great importance. People 
regularly dismiss differences between claims as 'matter of 
opinion', and leave it at that. There are times however, when 
conversationalists maintain that their social perspective is 
the correct one. When at least two differing claims are 
operated in conversation in this way, it produces a context of 
•issue'. Conversation, as a managed and ordered outcome of 
speakers' devices [cf. H. Sacks, 1974], is unsettled. It 
becomes instead, a scene of disruption. Before the normal, 
expected, and commonplace features of conversation can be 
resumed the issue of controversy which the differing claims 
provoked must be settled. This outcome can have many empirical 
forms [e.g. one of the claimers leaving the scene of the 
conversation].
M a i n t a i n i n g  d i f f e r i n g  c l a i m s  p r o d u c e s  a  c r i s i s  o f  d i a l o g u e .  
C o n v e r s a t i o n a l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  h a v e  t o  a d d r e s s  a n d  p a y  a t t e n t i o n
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to materials which are rarely questioned and examined 
throughout ordinary, perceivedly normal frames of awareness.
This situation is not a 'normal' one; disruption means that 
it is not 'known in common with others'. The background 
features of everyday life which inform claimers of the real 
and factual nature of their claims [H. Garfinkel, 1967] are 
breached.
The background features of normal life, reported by Schütz 
[1974] and summarised by Garfinkel [1967], are based on the 
reciprocity of perspectives. This concept suggests that 
people hold the assumption that if places were changed with' 
other persons in society, similar experiences would result:
" if he were here where I am now, he would experience things 
from the same perspective as I." [A. Schütz, 1974]. It is 
in respect of this perspective that claims are made. A person 
making a claim makes certain assumptions which he regards others 
as making; he assumes that as he makes these assumptions so 
do others.
These expectancies are: a claimer's version of knowledge is 
required as such by the 'facts of nature'; a taken for 
granted version of the facts is the sanctioned relation between 
the 'actual' and the reported scene; a factual version is 
felt to be 'real'; a standardised process of naming produces 
the meaning of events; facts are identically intended across 
time; an interpretation of a version of facts has as its 
context a standardised system of symbols and an existent 
corpus of socially warranted knowledge; the determinants and 
constituents of a factual version are obvious and available 
to persons other than the claimer; differences in biography 
are irrelevant, where the elements of a factual version are 
selected in an empirically identical manner between persons
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for all practical purposes; a disparity exists between 
persons' private determinations such that a factual version 
means for the witness and others more than they can say; 
that a claimer can freely alter this disparity [H. Garfinkel, 
1967 ] .
An occasion of maintaining competing claims of the same 
event breaches these expectancies [unless they are organised 
in institutionalised terms - e.g. in court]. Because orderly 
conversation and accounts depend upon them, a 'strange' 
displacement for those involved results. Harold Garfinkel 
has demonstrated the quality of background expectancies in 
everyday life through disruption procedures. These were based 
upon a particular condition: that where " the natural facts of 
life" are made incongruous a person will experience confusion. 
It is this situation which arises when competing claims are 
maintained. In effect the differing claimers question one 
another's factual demonstrations of knowledge. They thereby 
question the other's self-esteem, competence, and the right 
to manage everyday matters without interference [H. Garfinkel,
1967 ] .
There are various social forms of resolution to this 
disruption. Often the claims bond the other members involved 
into a group with a coherent perspective. The resolution of 
controversy then has an array of possibilities available due 
to this social bonding. These range from the exchange of abuse, 
the withdrawl of negotiations, to physical violence. There 
are also management devices which are available to minimise 
confusion. The situation can be redefined such that the 
context is no longer one of confrontation. The 'real 
circumstances' of the issue can also be redefined in order
that claims are no longer im competition; they do not exist 
as alternative versions.
Maintaining alternative versions of knowledge does, of 
course, not have to he settled in- just this manner. Fecause 
the more severely background assumptions and expectancies are 
vioiated, the less socially ordered the reaction' of members, we can. 
expect devices to be built into interaction which will organise and 
accomplish, order in the event of competing claims. Thus they who 
participant, in opposing-versions of knowledge may institute 
resolution through recourse to a belief in the authoritative 
condition of »nature»- and the availability of this condition. The 
tension which has its source in the opposing claims of the 
participants is agreed to be. settled through some independent 
source o£ extra-situational means, where each claimer makes 
publicly available the loss of his claim. The situation is 
changed from one in which an. ordered resolution depends upon 
the overt movements and approaches of the claimers, to one 
where another source of fact and authority is employed which 
the participants agrees will not be disputed.
Recourse to independent nature has another variation.
The loss of the authority of a claim?may be expressed in
tangible form through gaming (e.g. making a bet). Gaming can
subtly change controversy into a form of play where
opposition can come to be regarded and conceptualised as
»-betting talk* rather than »serious talk*" or »arguing'. Por
example, a 'friendly' card game can exhibit the conversational
feature of accusing other players of deceit. Yet because oF
the indexicah grounds of language, this feature ceases to
occupy something which might expectably be categorised as claiming
knowledges "You'11 say something to the rest like 'nobody here is telling 1
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truth. Everybody is a phony.' Well, some of the guys may hit 
you on the head with something if you said that anywhere else." 
[card player quoted by L.A. Zurcher, 1973]. A betting occasion 
preserves as its serious outcome the settled nature of 
competing claims. The controversy and conflict possibly 
available through opposing claims is institutionalised into 
t the bet' in order that the route to resolution is presented 
as a play or game.
'Betting talk' thus stands as a resource for accounting 
for the disparity between claims in an orderly manner. Factual 
status can turn on the device 'I bet it is', or some such 
like it. Further, the event of a bet not being taken up can 
settle the opposition of claims.
A claim is an accounting procedure [H. Garfinkel, 1967].
It seeks to make reportable the socially organised activities 
of an environment. Where the members of a situation have 
regard for this feature of accounts [i.e. their orderly 
nature], controversy can be resolved through concerted work 
for the establishment of order; towards managing the situation 
as a well-ordered one. In this case, the competing character 
of claims is negated through for example, members' constructions 
of them as equally possible and factual outcomes; as two groups or 
forms of the 'same' thing. Within this formation there are 
quite obviously other possibilities. The members can agree to 
disagree and resolve it later, to forget it, or to gloss over 
their separate claims for the sake of order. Such possibilities 
are tied into the constitution of the context and the systems 
of relevance which are in operation. Whichever possibility is 
actualised, its essential structure is directed to the management 
of situated problems as accountable phenomena through a
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programme of language and devices which settles claiming 
matters for all practical purposes.
CRITICAL DEBATE AS PROFESSIONAL CLAIMING - PLATO'S DIALECTIC 
In everyday life the disruption brought about by competing 
claims is generally regarded as critically unimportant, and 
is accounted for in this manner. The continued maintenance 
of claims without respect for the orderly nature of social 
situation erodes the background expectancies of everyday life 
and undermines the intersubjective bases of language and its 
accomplishments. At the level of professional theorising 
critical debate is an icon which exists as a structually 
proclaimed form of professional development and practice.
This feature is part of the tradition of science. It is 
one which goes back into the history of philosophy. One example 
of critical debate is the power attributed to the practice of 
the dialectic claimed by Plato. The views put forward by 
Plato in " The Republic" [Books V - VII] are here being used 
as an exemplary case of the treatment of critical debate 
in the act of theorising. This is not to attempt to present 
a comprehensive or inviolable account of Plato's work. Even 
for those who are involved in the production of such accounts 
there are various disparities of agreement [cf. G. Ryle, 1966. 
Cornford, 1970].
It might be objected that treating Plato's work as a 
resource for approaching one of the constituents of theorising 
is to do unnecessary damage to the work of a great philosopher. 
However, this approach is consistent with one aspect of Plato's 
thought which has been noted by Cornford [1970]. Analysis is 
not bound by the historical fact of what someone actually meant, 
but can accommodate various interpretations. To incorporate
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competing interpretations iwt® the analysis: is fully in accord 
with- Plata* a dialectical method*
As: a philaspM'eal method,' the> practice of' dialectic, 
required the process of question! and answer as the route to­
ss riouc. Knowledge. Plato saw that the- finest forrm of knowledge 
was reached through "the discourse of reason**, independent 
of the senses. It consisted of approaching "the essential 
reality** and grasping: "the very nature of Goodness itself.
This jjoumey is what we call, the dialectic."' (Comford, 3T966).
The dialectic method! then led to the pure ideas of reason; 
dialectic was seem as the- discourse; of reason. The location.' 
of'these; ideas, as the essential, reality^ resulted ini the; 
apprehensions of the absolute good; the dialectic led to- 
Goodness itself and not to mere perception.
For Plato; there was a division, in reality between intelligence 
and- appearance, "between knowledge; and "belief. What marked off 
eaoh division and made them more or less available was the 
dialectic method, inon-dialectical studies were regarded as 
accounting for some version of reality. Fet because such 
accounts were seen as leaving assumptions unquestioned, Plato 
regarded them as obscure and "dream-like". Hie reasoned 
that if premise, conclusion, and the steps in between were not 
really known, and even if the reasoning were consistent with, 
itself, "how can it ever amount to knowledge?". The 
alternative to this obscure reasoning was the dialectic,, which 
questioned all assumptions and proceeded "up to- the first 
principle of’ all, so as to make sure of confirmatiom there.
When the eye of the soul, is sunk in a veritable slough of 
barbarous ignorance, this method gently diraws it forth..."..
The use of the dialectic led to the apprehension of true 
knowledge; as opposed to locating mere appearance* It also
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provided a formal way of looking at the world. As a route 
to knowledge is provided a map of the possible degrees of 
reality.
Dialectic as the journey towards the essential reality 
provided Plato with the contrast between appearance and belief, 
and that which was eternal. This map of the degrees to which 
the world could be known was represented by Plato in the 
allegory of the line, and its four stages of cognition: 
imagining; believing; thinking; knowing. The lowest stage of 
cognition was seen to be imagining, because it took for 
granted sensible appearances. This state of mind, in accepting 
mere appearance as reality in an unquestioning way, could only 
apprehend images of images. As with prisoners in the cave, it 
recognises " as reality nothing but the shadows of those 
artificial objects" [Cornford, 1966].
This images-of-images situation arose because appearance 
was seen to be an image of reality and not reality itself.
If what the senses perceive is taken to be reality, what 
happens is that an image of appearance is given this status. 
Since appearance is itself an image, the perceived reality is 
an image of an image. It is only when the essential forms of 
reality have been located that a move back to appearance can 
be made to locate in it what is real: " you will recognize 
every image for what it is and know what it represents, because 
you have seen justice, beauty, and goodness in their reality." 
[Cornford, 1966].
The next stage of cognition was commonsense belief.
Plato saw this as belief in the reality of that which was 
visible, tangible, and substantial: " the actual things of
which the first are likenesses" [Cornford, 1966], In this
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stage are included those beliefs which are correct as strategies 
for action, but whose bases are not known. This is expressed 
where Plato has Socrates state that opinion without knowledge 
is blind: " One who holds a true belief without intelligence 
is just like a blind man who happens to take the right road." 
[Cornford, 1966],
The cognitive states of belief and imagining and their 
corresponding objects for Plato made up the visible world of 
appearances. Composed so, these states of mind could not locate 
the absolute ideals which Plato regarded as constituting the 
real: " So if the real is the object of knowledge, the object 
of belief must be something other than real." [Cornford, 1966]. 
An object of belief both 'is' and 'is not'; it lies between 
the perfectly real and unreal. Plato's view was that belief 
was an intermediate faculty with a particular field which 
produced a particular state which lay between pure knowledge 
and ignorance. He pointed this out in describing people who 
could see " beautiful things" or " just actions" without 
apprehending "Beauty" or "Justice" as merely having 
beliefs, " without any real knowledge of the objects of their 
belief." [Cornford, 1966]. Belief was regarded as fallible 
produced by persuasion. It could thus be changed by further 
persuasion, and could not examine or reveal the bases from 
which it sprang.
Plato's ascending intelligible world consisted of thinking 
and the higher section knowing. At the level of thought 
which was that of mathematical science, " the mind uses as 
images those actual things which themselves had images in 
the visible world" . Thought was conceptualised as beginning 
with assumptions and moving towards a conclusion rather than 
a principle [Cornford, 1966], Plato points out that thought
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procedures use diagrams and models which are imperfect and 
distorted attempts at representing true knowledge: " they make 
use of visible figures and discourse about them, though what 
they really have in mind is the originals of which these 
figures are images" . Alan Blum has called this feature a 
failure to hear origins [1974], because attention is with 
icons and not originals. As such thought concerned with 
icons is concerned with reflections of thought's ground. In 
the mode of thought however, icons are treated as actual 
representations; as objects of faith.
Another feature of thought procedure which Plato 
revealed was that It proceeded from unquestioned assumptions 
and deductively reasoned from them. In the form of thought 
data was seen as known and self-evident: " Then starting 
from these assumptions, they go on until they arrive, by a 
series of consistent steps, at all the conclusions they set 
out to investigate." This aspect of thought's procedure 
is a failure to hear foundations [A. Blum, 1974]. Thought 
does not seek to question or to reveal the grounds upon which 
it depends.
The highest section and state of mind in Plato's map is 
knowing the true reality through the power of the dialectic.
At this level there is a contrast with the deductive reasoning 
of thought. Dialectic dialogue was seen by Plato as providing 
the logos of true being. The unquestioned assumptions which 
underlay the other stages of cognition, in the dialectic 
method constitute a beginning for dialogue. The philosophic 
move is not from premise to conclusion, but through the 
premise to the essential principle; to the Forms of the Good.. 
From this procedure, Plato envisaged the movement being
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completed by grasping a conclusion through the use of 
the Forms which could be apprehended in dialectic dialogue.
Plato s dialectic method sought to treat its assumptions 
as " hypotheses" rather than first principles, and proceed 
to "the first principle of all" . Having reached this position 
the inquirer could then " descend at last to a conclusion, 
never making use of any sensible object, but only Forms, 
moving through Forms from one to another, and ending with 
Forms." [Cornford,1966]. In this way Plato depicts the method 
by which the escape can be made from the world of appearances 
through that part of the intelligible world characterised by 
deductive thought, to knowing true reality. The hierarchical 
map which this method provides [through the allegory of the 
line], places the object which it locates at a higher level of 
truth and reality than the other objects-of-mind in the 
structure [Cornford, 1966],
The rational intuiting of the method of the dialiectic is 
" unaided by any of the sense»'* and does not make use
of "any sensible object" . In the "Phaedo" Plato describes 
Socrates' last moments. Socrates reflects that thought is 
better when involved and reflected in itself; when mind is 
gathered into mind. In this state thought is not distorted 
by the elements provided by the faculties of perception and 
can leave the body and attempt 'true being'. Only in this 
way through rational intuiting can intellectual vision, truth, 
and wisdom be attained. Plato wrote that using the body for 
perception led to the changeable. Yet when the soul reflected 
on itslelf, this led to " the region of purity, and eternity, 
and immortality, and unchangeableness." . The soul, "being 
in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. And this state
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of the soul is called wisdom." [B. Russell, 1961],
The relation between the method of the dialectic and the 
knowing state which it produces would appear to be a:reciprocal 
one. It is clear that Plato saw that engaging in dialogue 
led to the most superior kind of knowledge. However, that 
engagement as well as being Plato's central epistemological 
principle is at the same time knowledge itself. Ideally the 
dialectic leads to true knowledge} but that requires the 
state of knowing to be in existence before dialogue is 
engaged in. The problem is where to ground the central 
epistemological principle of the dialectic; how to require it 
as an a priori. What Plato did was to look at each level in 
his hierarchy, each state of mind and the objects which they 
produced, as faculties; those powers which enabled people to 
accomplish what they did. In looking to a faculty, Plato 
reasoned that he could " only look to its field of objects 
and the state of mind it produces, and regard these as 
sufficient to identify it and distinguish it from faculties 
which have different fields and produce different states. " 
Plato's reasoning was that a faculty enabled people to 
recognise objects in a certain form which were expressed 
through language. For example, through dialecic dialogue the 
philosopher could locate and recognise the absolute Forms of 
the Good which stood as an indication of the recognition of 
the state of mind of the performer [e.g. knowing].
To do recognising a faculty is then to apprehend the 
objects of that faculty; the underlying reasoning is that 
objects correspond to a state of mind, the power of which is 
the faculty. Though Plato's structures of states of mind and 
the corresponding objects has a necessary tension between
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each stage such that object and state of mind can be said to 
produce one another, to account for the original flow 
towards knowledge of the Good he has to turn towards inborn 
dispositions and natures [e.g. philosophic nature]. This 
represents two central pillars of Plato's philosophy. The 
first is that of anamnesis, which holds that knowledge is 
gained by the recollection of the soul of truths and realities 
which were known before incarnation. Secondly, is the belief 
in the real existence of the intelligible Forms, separate 
from the objects of perception [Cornford, 1970].
The dialectic becomes the method of those who display 
certain characteristics which are congruent with what Plato 
saw as becoming the philosopher. That is, documentary 
evidence for the existence of the state of anamnesis as 
knowledge of the Forms. This evidence illustrates philosophic 
nature and the faculty of true knowledge. Examples of such 
documents listed by Plato are: a passion for knowledge; a 
love of truth; a love of wisdom; " temperate and free from 
the love of money, meanness, pretentiousness, and cowardice" ;
" fair-minded, gentle, and sociable" ; " a good memory"
CCornford, 1 9 6 6 ] .  Having the faculty for knowing, as attested 
by such characteristics, the holders can then via the 
dialectic method of dialogue begin to rationally intuit the 
absolute Forms of reality.
As an exemplary instance of professional theorising, Plato's 
work revolves around and is constituted by the idea of true 
knowledge. It provides for the demarcation of possible 
realities and states of mind, placing this procedure [itself] 
above all others. The substantive differentiation between 
these states of mind is not so much a fact as an operation.
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High placement and the accomplishment of Plato's programme 
I depends upon the idea of superiority and the successful 
accomplishment of that idea through claiming.
The point of taking Plato's remarks on the dialectic as 
an ideal example of theorising is a varied one. It demonstrates 
the essential relationship which the theoriser has with his 
work and the world through his adopted method, and how he can 
effect structural divisions amongst phenomena as a central 
part of his project. This is not to deny that a theorist's 
remarks are 'real', but to point out that those remarks 
themselves are contexted and occasioned. As a successful 
accomplishment a piece of inquiry has object status; it can 
be passed on and taught. The dialectical method of Plato has 
also been used to example critical debate. In assuming the 
status of an object Plato's work itself is open to the method 
of critical debate which it projects. Amongst professionals 
and initiates it is available as a resource for their 
constructive approach, in order to provide an account which 
accomplishes a version of knowledge as superior. This 
demonstrates the division between that which is being theorised 
about [i.e. the subject], and the means that are used for 
that action [i.e. methods]. The constructive and structural 
potential of the idea of superiority which Plato demonstrates 
in his work, is prevalent throughout all occasions of professional 
theorising. Indeed, the characteristic of making claims to 
superior knowledge is a typical and essential characteristic 
for defining the term 'professional'.
THE IDEALS AND ATTITUDE OF PROFESSIONAL THEORISING; The 
location, accomplishment, and assessment of superiority lies 
in the idea of superiority; in the absolute Forms of reality
-3IT-
which ensure -that where this idea is drawn upon, it will 
present the features of high locution:, high valuation, and 
high assessment:. A theoriser’S interest is in the; place which 
an idea occupies;• it is in the production! of superior' 
knowledge, enabled by the context: of situated .undèrstandings 
mobilised between professional, theorisers. These provide for 
superiority as a warrantable condition, while at the same time 
bestowing- om other forms of knowledge the quality of 
inferiority. The provision! of these conditions stems from- a 
concentrationa upon a versioni of language' which, constructs and 
projects them. The idèa of superiority ini professional 
theorising has two- momentss firstly the production of 
knowledge through the use of the idea which makes it transparent, 
(clarity) in that knowledge; secondly the use of the idea as 
a resource for viewing and reading a piece of theorising.
Both these value moments express a commitment and' interest 
in inquiry. A concern for the status of knowledge: is a 
constant feature of professional theorising. It stands as a 
further resource for: the production! of' superiority, for as 
commitment: and interest are constant; features of professional 
theorising, their presence and location- in a piece of knowledge 
provides for locating that presence im the’ quality of" 
superiority. In a similar- sense the production of’ superiority 
stands as a socially and communally available instance for the 
replica-tiam of that quality (e.g. Platons qualities of 
’’philosophical nature" and. formal, map of reference- of the 
stages of cognition).
TU claim superiority and.attribute inferiority is both to 
seek eleation towards am ideal, and to forget how: this ideal 
is accomplished. This neglect's, the activity of claiming as
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in attempting to correct the indexicality of knowledge. The 
social relation between a theoriser and his work remains 
unexplored. Topic is recognised, but not resource. This 
means that a claim towards superior knowledge consists of 
questioning the grounds upon which other knowledge rests 
[i.e. as a function of 'critical debate'], while at the same 
time using as a resource similar intersubjective grounds which 
are not regarded with interest.
By taking for granted the grounds which language provides, 
professional theorising is purposeful in producing superior 
representations of nature and the inferiority of other knowledge. 
In terms of accountability the operation of the idea of 
superiority is a thoroughgoing practical matter. This 
accountability is not analytic; there is no interest in 
revealing the structure of understandings which produce and 
accomplish the idea of superiority. The organisation of this 
idea is based in social actions which from the perspective of 
theorising are sanctionable and warrantable. A theoriser 
must have regard for the social and communal grounds from 
which his theorising begins and in regard to which i1 will be 
judged. The prospective theoriser is thus constrained by the 
existential formations of theorising, and by the possible 
position his work will occupy in those formations.
The accomplishment of superiority and the structures 
upon which this depends are equally normative orientations of 
theorising and the conditions for the production of knowledge. 
This accomplishment is a consequence of professional 
theorising's communal character, and is a requirement which 
reflexively shows the quality division between different forms 
of knowledge.
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It must be remembered that to follow the grounds of 
professional theory is to be constrained to grant as problematic 
that which those grounds specify. The provision of such 
problematics is carried out through ways which ensure their 
remedy, and by furnishing a practical system of relevances 
and expectation which specify the methods available for such 
repair and how this can be recognised. The theoretic grounds 
provide the concrete and practical understandings which are 
located in versions of language, and enable the demonstration 
of what 'a 'good' version of language is like. A version of 
language aimed at the manifestation of superior knowledge, 
carries with it the assumption that it can represent its 
subject matter in a way which is 'better' than other versions 
in producing an accurate copy of nature [e.g. the presentation 
of the Forms],
The superior, genre of professional theorising is a necessary 
consequence of the dominant conception of science. The notion 
of the hierarchic relation between superior and inferior 
knowledge is practically replicated in the concrete production 
of theorising work. Scientifically influenced theorising, 
because of its ideal of the superiority of objectivity, has to 
provide for the very thing which it seeks to correct. In 
effect, 'inferior knowledge' represents a violation of the 
grounds and form of life of the stance which has faith in the 
superiority of objectivity. In practice, 'other' knowledge is 
seen as a contravention of nature in order to reassert 
theorising's grounds as a remedy of such an 'unnatural' view.
Plato's propositions on the dialectic and the formal map 
of reference display as an exemplary case the embedded 
structures which function as a framework for the possibility
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of doing superior theorising. Plato's case provides for 
various communities of theorisers, structures their experiences, 
and locates exactly where and how superior and inferior 
knowledge can be found. This is supplemented by conceptual 
formations which enable the recognition of instances of 
knowledge as superior or inferior [e.g. objects, states of 
mind]. Plato thus provides through his language an hierarchic 
structure based squarely upon adequacy as superior being.
The 'doing' of being superior turns upon providing for some 
sense of inferiority in need of correction; to claim superiority 
is to point to inferiority.
To produce 'better' knowledge requires methodicity [e.g. 
the power of the dialectic]. This aspect of theorising 
consists of publicly sanctioned methods for the demonstration 
of such knowledge. A central factor is that sanctioned methods 
require the establishment of agreement; it is this feature 
which establishes sanctionability. There must be shared 
agreement over the grounds of theorising for 'fine' aspects 
of this form of inquiry to be accomplished. The formation of 
this agreement is through the essential indistinguishability 
between what is written and how it is being written [e.g. a 
charge made by the police - H. Garfinkel, 1967]. Shared 
agreement on substantive matters cannot be taken to explain 
a particular feature of theorising. This is because to 
invoke such a notion would require that what was being written 
would have to be distinguished from how it was written. Since 
the sense of a written formulation comes from the methodic 
demonstration that what was done was done according to a rule, 
to fracture this essential relationship is to multiply the 
problematic features of formulation [H. Garfinkel, 1967],
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In pointing out the linkage between the 'how' and 'what' 
of written [and spoken] formulations, shared agreement 
consists of locating 'what' was written in respect of 'how' 
it was written according to a rule. That matter of shared 
agreement is then based in the morality of language. That 
something can be demonstrated according to a rule brings with 
it the idea of rational language and its sanctionable character. 
Harold Garfinkel has discussed that matter of shared agreement 
in respect of everyday life: shared agreement " does not consist 
in demonstrated measures of shared knowledge of social 
structure, but consists instead and entirely in the enforceable 
character of actions in compliance with the expectancies of 
everyday life as a morality." [1967]. For theorising on the 
other hand, sanctionable features consist of the rationality 
of language, a natural, objective order of facts, and 
professional accounts as expressions of such states of affairs.
From Garfinkel's remarks it can be suggested that 
superiority as a stable outcome and property of professional 
theorising confirms the methodic social organisation of that 
activity. As a public outcome, superiority is a production 
which warrants the background expectancies of theorising, 
which consists of at least the background expectancies of 
everyday life [outlined above].
The accomplishment of professional theorising depends 
fully for its sensible character upon the expectancies of 
everyday life, which defines the rationality of actions in a 
number of ways: categorising and comparing; tolerable error; 
the search for means; the examination of alternatives and 
consequences; strategy; timing; prediction; procedural rules; 
choice and the grounds for choice. Professional theory is
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distinguislied by supplementing these means for judging the 
rationality of action with four' others? compatibility with 
formal logic-; semantic clarity and distinctness; the compatibility 
with scientific knowledge; clarity and distinctness im  
themselves as ideals (H.. Garfinkel, 1967).
These latter* rational, ideals, are warrantable properties 
based in the formal, attitude of scientific theorising. This 
attitude consists of then following propositions? professional1, 
theorists hold that their relation! to the* normative social 
structures, is one of official, value neutrality. Theorists» 
commons ense* knowledge as a resource for judgement is seen as 
capable of separation front the production and' assessment of 
scientific findings. These findings are expressed1 in terms 
of a standard scheme of temporal determinations; standard time.
In theorising all matters of sense; and warrant are taken to be 
only and entirely public, with, no- disparity between the 
théoriser*s private knowledge and others» knowledge. Théorisera, 
tafe it that they need only know that which, they have extended 
credence* to through the abstract, ideals of »competent 
membership' and 'proper procedure». Actual works of theorising 
are taker as. forgiveable approximations of independent nature:
(H. Garfinkel, 1967).
As; a public accomplishment superiority depends upon the 
existence of shared agreement and common understandings as to 
the form of theorising? and that in each particular case the 
condition of 'competent membership* is approximately fulfilled 
so that instances of theorising are seen as in accord with the 
rules and ideals of professional theorising. To carry this 
out requires a subscription! to and recognition of the ways 
of language-use, where theorising provides the methodicity of
a communal. grouping-. This is to apply for and! to subscribe 
to ssome particular form of' membership (i.e. professional 
membership). The language; of theory is: then the nexus 
around.' whiclji practitioners gather and recognise themselves 
as. particular practitioners: who cam “be named as to their 
authoritative grounds and1 who' follow oir "believe im those 
grounds as. practical ideals..
To take part: in? the use; and development of these ideals- 
is: to he seen as implementing rational, forms of action 
towards rational ends. This commitment goes beyond the hounds 
of' the practical ideals which the attitude- of everyday life 
grants as rational, and requires the modification of that 
attitude (i.e. the concerns with logic, semantic clarity, 
and scientific knowledge are hoth ideals to he attained1 and 
the means, for transforming everyday knowledge). This is 
because the maxims of conduct which the rational ideals, 
specify if' performed in daily life and under the natural1 
attitude would result, as* Garfinkel. points out (1967), in 
status changes (e.g. sickness or incompetence). Im order to 
approximate the rational, ideal's of theorising, the practice 
of theory requires insulating from, daily^ life. By modifying 
the attitude of daily life, groups and communities of 
professional theorisers produce and provide presuppositions 
for practice. They display their grounds for sensible practice 
which provides communal agreement; upon rational, ideals as 
relevant ends, attributes, and accomplishments. McHugh et all 
have written that »‘im showing its unity with nature;, positive 
speech also shows its; superiority, for it (unlike nature) 
can show, its own constitution as the organised, becoming that 
is method." (X974). The idea of superiority is thus
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fundamental to professional theorising; it constitutes and 
pervades the attitude of professional theorising, its ideals, 
and its methods.
SUPERIORITY AND THE POLITICS OF THEORISING? For professional 
theorising the idea of superiority is a fact of life. It is 
also a demonstration and outcome of professional expertise as 
the 'fine' structure of theorising. Lastly, it is a rational 
ideal of theorising; an 'end' towards which the practice and 
development of theorising is dedicated. As a parameter of 
theorising superiority is also constitutive of its problems 
and remedies. Because the rational ideals of scientific 
theorising are too strict for the purposes of conducting 
affairs in everyday life, for one who wishes to follow them 
the division between superior and inferior knowledge is 
forced upon him. It is a fact of life.
For Plato to claim the state of knowing, he needed not 
merely to express that belief but had to demonstrate 'true 
knowledge' of the 'true reality'. In doing this he located 
and provided for pathological forms of knowledge. His claim 
extended to and rested upon the power of dialectic dialogue 
as superior method, and its users as the possessors of 
superior philosophical nature. Plato also saw the utility of 
his form of philosophical reasoning: " unless, that is to say, 
political power and philosophy meet together... there can be 
no rest from troubles... for states nor yet, as I believe, 
for all mankind" [Cornford, 1966]. Given the character of 
superior knowledge, it is perhaps no surprise that Plato 
describes practitioners of dialectic dialogue as philosopher 
kings and recommends them as political rulers.
Today there are still political facets, at various levels
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of meaning, involved in the act of theorising. As Louis 
Althusser [1977] has stated, social practice is structured 
and consists in part of theoretical practice and political 
practice. Though sociological theorists are, no doubt, 
politically minded at the level of allegiance to forms of 
power, they are also involved politically at the level of 
knowledge and language; they are concerned with the domination 
of a form of knowledge and version of language over others.
In this sense, theoretical practice is political practice.
What does the situation of theoretical practice as political 
practice consist of? Harold Garfinkel's discussion of 
indexicality [1967] stands as an authoritative insight into 
the constitution of the social world and the problematics 
that theory faces. Because indexicality references the 
situated nature of speech and action, the topics which 
theorising approaches thus pose an unlimited number of 
problems.
Faris for example [1973], has noted some of the problems 
faced by ethnographic studies such as the specification of 
" the cognitive processes or principles necessary to produce... 
empirical sets" , and the " circumstances in which the 
[native classification] processes become operative" . The 
primary problem which theorising revolves around is that of 
overcoming these features of indexicality in relation to the 
ideals of scientific theorising. Faris states this when he 
describes as "one major focus of attention" of ethnographic 
studies as " the objective description of native taxonomies 
and folk classification." [1973]. This problem becomes more 
attenuated when the sociological focus stands back from such 
a ground level approach as ethnography, and concentrates 
instead on statistical analyses.
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The problem is one of satisfying programmatic ideals 
while in principle doing justice to the topic of study. The 
issue then, is the extent to which the indexical nature of 
'native' phenomena will be examined. This is because any 
examination which ignores indexicality as a topic denies the 
purpose of its inquiry [i.e. to describe 'native' phenomena].
Yet a concentration on the situated nature of accomplishments 
makes it plain that the ideal of objectivity cannot be 
attained. The theorist is in somewhat of a dilemma: whether 
to remain loyal to the phenomena or to the ideals of professional 
theorising. In order to accomplish his acts of theorising as 
warrantable however, the theoriser must do so in relation to 
a collectivity of theorisers who are organised in respect of 
a set of ideals. He is thus constrained to order his theorising 
in relation to such a set, at the expense of 'native' 
phenomena, or be seen as an incompetent theorist. Keeping 
faith with a set of ideals ensures the repair of indexicality 
albeit incomplete, because such repairs are limited, with 
contrary instances.
Faris has pointed to the specifics of one such attempted 
repair in ethnography: " the overwhelming concentration on the 
ordering of perceptual domains or concepts whose boundary 
definitions are assumed" [1973. His emphasis.]. In ways such 
as assuming, glossing, letting pass, and the et cetera clause, 
theorising seeks to repair indexicality for its own practical 
purposes of providing an objective account. However, theorising's 
productions are just as indexical as 'native' accounts, 
trading and depending for their sense upon members' knowledge 
[i.e. presupposing a relevant community of readers]. For 
theorising to be regarded as 'adequate' depends upon the
demonstration of the rational nature of inquiry, through 
artful persuasion by reference to shared grounds. Within 
this situation 'inferior' knowledge is a requirement which lies 
in two assumptions.
The first is that through the education and socialisation 
which a person receives in learning to be a professional 
théoriser, he is taught that the people whom he studies cannot 
produce such clear and objective accounts of themselves as he 
can. Inferior knowledge is thus seen as a condition of the 
social world which can be corrected by professional theorising. 
Inferior knowledge here is a construct of professional theorising 
as specified by its ideal of superiority. The second 
assumption is that the particular school of thought within 
professional theorising in which a theorist has faith, is the 
most appropriate for examining the social world. For a theorist 
to accomplish acts of theorising and to pursue a career as a 
professional theorist, means that he has to have affiliation 
to communal grounds of authority. The idea of superiority is 
present here, for the theorist's faith in his particular 
communal method of theorising demonstrates and claims that it 
is better than other available methods. The adoption of 
communal method requires the critical examination of other 
methods in respect of it as the most superior; this is to 
charge inferiority in other methods. Inferiority is thus a 
charge of the incompetence of method.
The concrete situation of claiming superiority and pointing 
out inferiority lies in the belief placed in the quality of 
language. To accomplish superiority is to reveal 'the world'; 
to be inferior is to be seen as displaying unauthoritative self. 
This is the distinction made by Plato between knowledge and
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belief. That which presents true knowledge reveals, copies, 
and pictures the real world and is selfless. That which is 
mere opinion and belief and is inferior cannot apprehend the 
real world because of the inappropriate nature of its method.
Such presentations are thus selfish because they either 
disregard the notion of appropriate method or forsake the 
notion of method at all. In such a circumstance the theoriser 
is conceptualised as either incompetent or not understandable.
McHugh et al have made a similar point, where they point 
out that to be analytic is to have a language that is authored 
by nature. To be unanalytic on the other hand, is to be seen 
as projecting a version of language which does not represent 
nature and is no more than an illusion; it is inferior. For 
a theorist to have a 'good' version of language comes about 
through the claim as to the natural character of what he 
writes or states; as warranted by the structure of expectancies, 
understandings, and presuppositions of professional theorising 
[McHugh et al, 1974]. Charges of inferiority reference the 
inauthentic character of a version of language. What prompts 
this charge is the violation of what professional theorising 
regards as authentic language. Further, an account is not 
merely inferior because it is seen as misrepresenting nature, 
but because it does not respect either some particular community 
grounds or the dominant idea of scientific practice.
To be inferior is to contravene both the ideals and methods 
of professional theorising and thereby the sensibilities of 
committed practitioners. Non-communal language is that which 
is regarded as anti-social, and so disrupts the non-indexical, 
objective icon of theoretical practice that communities 
dedicated to producing 'true' knowledge endorse.
The development and progress of -theorising is based in 
a political, contexts that of the dominance of one set of 
knowledge: and ideas oven- others. This is accomplished through 
professional language and the structure of meaning which 
methodical language constructs for itself in assuming 
dominance, as political practice»
HF CONCLUSIONS The following remarks are' not conclusive in 
deciding matters, of fact. Rather they finalise these 
discussions. Their purpose is to attempt to capture and elicit 
the feelings which the above discussions have provoked} that 
which these discussions have created. In this sense these 
remarks appl^r to what has been stated above as well, as coming 
from there. If one wants, to be sociologically reflexive, these 
remarks, also apply to themselves.
In mundane argument the topic of critical debate undermines 
the- background expectancies upon: which factual nature depends»
Xrr order- to escape this breakdown of the accomplishment of 
social reality, professional critical debate modifies and adds 
to the attitude and ideal's of everyday life. One central and 
integral, feature of this modification is the place occupied by 
the idea of superiorityr as a production of theorising 
inherent in an act, as a constitutive parameter of that act, 
and as a description of the social world which it addresses (i.e. 
superior-inferior realities). To accomplish its work, 
theorising has to bring about the division between acceptable 
and unacceptable realities while still preserving the mechanism 
of background expectancies, and understandings, and the 
reciprocity of perspectives by which understanding and 
agreement are brought about.
The description and discussion of superiority provided
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an examination of the constitutive features of professional 
theorising which, via the appropriating and aggrandising 
character of its devices, takes the truth for itself. By 
the encapsulation of ideas on what constitutes true knowledge 
in the structural caucuses which the dedication to professional 
theorising provides, the knowledge which every man possesses 
is taken from him. What he has is only a mere shadow of the 
truth which can be found at the higher social, intellectual, 
and structural level of professional theorising. This activity 
surely takes for itself activity which is not exclusively 
its own. In that very taking it neglects to accord to its 
'subjects' the status of competent users, producers, and 
assessors of knowledge. This is perhaps because, as Marx 
states, those members themselves have faith in and give to 
professional theorising the grant to produce the real and true 
knowledge. Whether or not lay members are conspiritors in 
the appropriation of knowledge it is most apparent that as 
a structural force professional, scientific theorising 
wrenches its subject-matter from its indexical grounds and 
subjects it to the cosmetic process. This results in 
'authoritative' versions of contexted and sensitive realities. 
The professional production of such authoritative versions 
converts the essential reality into 'thingness' which as 
institutionalised knowledge can stand as a resource for 
institutional action upon those realities on behalf of 
'society'.
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CHAPTER TEN
THE PROBLEM OF REFLEXIVITY
In indefinitely many ways members' inquiries are constituent 
features of the settings they analyze. In the same ways, 
their inquiries are made recognizable to members as 
adequate-for-all-practical-purposes...In the actual occasions 
of interaction that accomplishment is for members omnipresent, 
unproblematic, and commonplace. For members doing sociology, 
to make that accomplishment a topic of practical sociological 
inquiry seems unavoidably to require that they treat the 
rational properties of practical activities as 'anthropologically 
strange'. By this I mean to call attention to 'reflexive' 
practices such as the following: that by his accounting 
practices the member makes familiar, commonplace activities 
of everyday life recognizable £s familiar, commonplace 
activities...That accomplishment consists of members doing, 
recognizing, and using ethnographies. In unknown ways that 
accomplishment is for members a commonplace phenomenon.
And in unknown ways that the accomplishment is commonplace it 
is for our interests, an awesome phenomenon, for in its 
unknown ways it consists [1] of members' uses of concerted 
everyday activities as methods with which to recognize and 
demonstrate the rational properties of indexical expressions 
and indexical actions. [2] The phenomenon consists, too, of 
the analyzability of actions-in-context given that not only 
does no concept of context-in-general exist, but that every 
use of 'context' without exception is itself essentially 
indexical.
[H. Garfinkel, 1967]
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INTRODUCTION: The topic of this final chapter is that of 
reflexivity. It will seek to demonstrate that throughout 
the preceding chapters the idea of reflexivity has been used, 
made available, and addressed in order to enter into and 
examine the never clear engagement between theory and practice. 
The fundamental use of the resource of reflexivity by people ' 
in situations has been most profoundly introduced and examined 
by Harold Garfinkel [1967]. Other sociologists such as O'Neill 
[1972] and Gouldner [1973] have begun to examine this 
fundamental element in the production of senses of structure, 
knowledge, action, and experience.
Such moves towards a reflexive sociology, as distinct 
from the social conception of reflexivity, will be examined 
below. Following this, the chapter will examine the elements 
revealed in the above chapters as reflexive features in 
relation to the sociological concept of 'culture'. Finally 
the conclusion will be drawn that within the very practice of 
sociology itself, or any other practical activity, lies the 
possibility of a more fundamental understanding of the social 
world than has so far been realised. This is a sociology which 
is not [though this is essentially impossible] sociologically 
reflexive, but which is reflexive sociologically. Firstly 
however, the relation between theory and practice will be 
discussed.
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND REFLEXIVITY: Garfinkel's view of 
reflexivity regards it as residing in the fact that people's 
methods of inquiry and resolution in social scenes are 
constitutive of those scenes themselves. John O'Neill, in 
the language of phenomenology, has described the social 
existence of reflexivity "as tied to the textual structure 
of temporality and situation through which subjectivity
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and objectivity are constituted as the intentional unity and 
style of the world." [1972], In the interaction between ideas 
about the social world and forms of situational action, 
reflexivity as such occupies a crucial and fundamental role 
in praxis. This can be seen in cases of mental illness where 
the routine reflexivity of people's utterances are transformed 
into a diagnosis of illness [cf. E. Goffman, 1971. D. Smith, 
unpublished.]. For sociology this reflexive praxis between 
theory and action is central to its attainments, though of no 
interest for examination in its own right [cf. H. Garfinkel 
1967. P. Filmer, 1975. Below.].
Conventionally for sociology there is a separation between
theory and practice, between theorisers and actors, which
ignores the unity of reflexivity. In order to illustrate
the inescapable relation between theory and practice, where
one presupposes and involves the other, they can perhaps best
be discussed in terms of a subject-object dichotomy. In effect
this dichotomy seeks to display the integrated and mutually
dependent aspects of definite [object] and commonplace
[subject] knowledge for both professional sociology and
everyday life. The idea of object knowledge for sociology
is that it is taken to be independent of contexts; it consists
of existent formations of actions and actors which are related
in determinate ways though with varying degrees of depth and
clarity. This depends upon the interest in and relevance of
these formations. So for example, it can be taken that there
\
are differences in knowledge between sexual contact actors, 
adults involved with children, and the police in comparison 
to professional theorists who are concerned with assessing 
the quality of knowledge itself and who consequently develop
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specific concepts for dealing with it.
But is this the case? Is what is being discussed here 
more to do with degrees of articulation as defined by 
situational factors [e.g. for all practical purposes], rather 
than different 'kinds' of knowledge. When one looks to 
subject knowledge, it can be seen to consist of an interest in 
the construction and constitution of actions and actors in 
context. The subject aspect of an action is open itself to 
varying degrees of articulation again depending upon interest 
and relevance, but actions can be further understood again 
and again according to the extent the sense of an action as 
subject is pursued [cf. A. Schütz, 1972. B. Holzner, 1978].
This can be seen in a comparison between the situated interest 
a person has in routine actions and that displayed by 
phenomenologists [i.e. a 'more-or-less', commonplace interest 
in relation to an essential, constitutive interest].
The element of interest which unites object and subject 
knowledge is that of reflexivity, whereby lay and professional 
renderings of accounts are in that very doing " constituent 
features of the settings they make observable." [H. Garfinkel, 
1967]. Reflexivity transforms what appears as separate and 
discrete areas of theory and practice into a complex web of 
articulation and accomplishment. For the everyday member of 
a situation the reflexive relation between object knowledge 
and subject knowledge results in the demonstration of " the 
rational properties of indexical expressions and indexical 
actions" while interpreting essentially indexical actions in 
context [H. Garfinkel, 1967],
What occurs is that people understand and account for events 
and actions as settled and rational' matters, while being aware 
of and relying upon the 'wait and see' and occasioned nature
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of all actions. This results in definite and rational 
outcomes [object knowledge] to occasions of interaction, whose 
members have a reliance upon the commonplace, 'more or less' 
known practices whereby accounts get done. This reflexive 
relation between existent knowledge, the production of 
knowledge, and the essentially indexical grounds of interaction 
produces: a rational and definite sense of what happened; the 
sedimentation of knowledge as experience [culture], resulting 
in the existence of folk-tales, anecdotes, and stories; and 
an awareness that the rational character of actions depends 
upon the reflexive nature of accounts [e.g. emphasis and over 
emphasis, 'leaving out' pieces of information, euphemism, 
comparing, and ordering disparate events according to a 
standard procedure of occurrence].
From the reflexive connections between object knowledge 
and subject knowledge, the everyday member produces an 
occasioned corpus of knowledge, the features of which are 
" temporally situated accomplishments of parties to the 
setting" [D. Zimmerman and D. Pollner, 1970], There is however 
an important distinction to be made between the professional 
sociologist's senses of object and subject knowledge. Like 
the everyday member of social situations he routinely engages 
in making sense of his environment. This is 'prior' to 
engaging in professional work, because it is 'routine sense' 
which underlies professional constructions. In the Schutzian 
perspective the sociologist as commonplace member of situations 
produces " first level constructs" upon which the social 
scientific " second level constructs", are based [1962]. Yet 
it is just this relation between the production of the rational 
properties of indexical expressions [object knowledge of the 
first order] and the analysis of actions in context [subject
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knowledge], with formal methodological and professional 
principles [object knowledge of the second order] which is 
problematic for the professional theorist.
This problem is more thorny for the sociologist than it 
first appears. Conventionally it involves the subscription to 
one of two schools of thought. The one represented by Weber 
and Schütz makes use of the postulate of adequacy whereby 
constructs of the second order must be compatible with the 
constructs of everyday life [M. Weber, 1949. A. Schütz,
1972]. The other approach is represented by Hempel and 
Nagel [1952. 1963], where the subjective elements of action 
are seen as outside social scientific explanation. Interest 
is rather in " overt human responses to a variety of 
conditions" which allows "the formulation of regularities" 
of such responses, and the " systematic organisation of 
manifest data" [Nagel, 1963].
Schütz argued [1962] that it was possible to accomplish 
such a structure of constructions as this, while including 
members' intentions and motives through the postulate of 
adequacy. Nagel has stated that it is not necessary to take 
notice of such subjective states, where " overt behaviours" 
make it possible to discover that " something is the sign of 
something else" [1963].
In contrast to Nagel, Weber's work presents the possibility 
of an interest in reflexivity; this is not to say that Weber 
was involved in producing a reflexive sociology, rather that 
in his work there lies that possibility. For example, he 
writes [1970]that an essay in the sociology of religion is 
dedicated towards making a contribution to " the typology and 
sociology of rationalism" . Accordingly Weber's method is to
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proceed " from the most rational forms reality can assume; 
it attempts to find out how far certain rational conclusions, 
which can be established theoretically, have been drawn in 
reality. And perhaps we will find out why not." [1949. My 
emphasis. ].
From Weber's remarks can be constructed the view that his 
theoretically derived conclusions and findings should be 
examined as the conclusions and the findings. This is not in 
the sense of the correspondence theory of truth, where findings 
are a mirror or accurate representation of what actually 'is'. 
Rather in adding to the sociology of rationalism Weber is 
producing ideal findings, and in that sense they are the 
findings [i.e. sociology's object knowledge, which must be 
distinguished from subject and object knowledge of the first 
order - cf. A. Schütz, 1972].
In contributing to rationalism Weber was taking part in 
the production of sociology's stock of knowledge. This is also 
to constitute and extend knowledge found in everyday life; the 
rational forms are located in everyday life as typical 
instances and examples. However Weber was not merely content 
to extract from routine knowledge, but was aware that having 
produced his rational forms, his constructs of constructs, it 
was necessary to proceed to examine his topic and his findings 
in relation to the theorising which had been carried out. In 
raising the question of the non-occurrence of theoretical 
conclusions in reality, Weber directed attention the bases of 
inquiry. The concern is not only with topic and data, but 
with the activity of theorising in its relation to the social 
world. The focus on the status of theoretical formulations 
and the relations between them and everyday knowledge raises 
the situatedness of making sense.
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Web e r expressed his awareness of the contexted nature 
of practical reasoning where he wrote: "There is no absolutely 
'objective' analysis of culture...[or ] of 'social phenomena' 
independent of special and 'one-sided' viewpoints according 
to which...they are selected, analyzed and organised for 
expository purposes." [1949]. The realisation of the importance 
of context in assembling social constructs necessitates a focus 
on the act of theorising and its relation with the production 
of conclusions and the topics which it addresses. However 
Weber did not pursue his insights towards an examination of the 
reflexive relation which sociology had with the social world, 
but amended his practical sociological programme in respect 
of the postulate of adequacy whereby his object knowledge had 
to be compatible with the object knowledge of everyday life.
Neither the empiricism of Nagel nor the subjective sociology 
of Weber approaches the routine construction of practical action 
and circumstances as topic. This is rather a means for the 
demonstration and accomplishment of the topics which they 
address. Both members of actual situations and professional 
theorists accomplish sensible practical actions and utterances 
through the ways in which they make these actions observable.
Yet because of the practical nature of sociological inquiries 
the sociologist cannot address the constitutive topic of 
reflexivity and still be seen as doing sociology. Though the 
sociologist relies upon the constructs of the first order 
brought about by the situated praxis of object and subject 
knowledge, because the practical nature of his inquiries are 
already specified by existent object, knowledge of the second 
order which provides his tradition and orders his professional 
language, the reflexivity of his and others' accounts are 
produced as uninteresting [H. Garfinkel, 1967. P. Filmer, 1975],
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Reflexivity however can cease to be treated as a resource. 
Instead it can become a topic for study by the sociologist 
regarding the situations in which he is interested and interacts 
as self or situated organisations of understanding. Further, 
that it is in this way and in these situations that the 
rational properties of indexical expressions and actions are 
continually demonstrated. This has the impact of making the 
sense of all the previous chapters, and this one, reside in 
just these social means for assembling demonstrations of 
particular senses of social structure and knowledge. An 
awareness of the problematic of the continual demonstration 
of the rational properties of indexical expressions and actions 
has led to an attempt to show the ways in which reflexive 
engagements occurred for those whom I was involved with, 
which unavoidably means myself and this piece of sociological 
work. This realisation leads to a reorientation towards theory 
and practice.
The conventional division between superior professional 
theory and mundane everyday practice disappears. Instead one 
apprehends the different forms of situated theory, produced 
by different kinds of sociologists [e.g. sexual actors, adults 
and children, policemen, philosophers], which are through and 
through of a practical nature. Professional theory does not 
have a monopoly of knowledge [though it might think it has], 
nor is it lacking in mundane social practices. Theory and 
practice are in an unavoidable engagement brought about by 
reflexivity, which is only capable of being apprehended
0
through the topic of reflexivity.
SOCIOLOGY AND REFLEXIVITY: The connections between the 
rational properties of indexicality, the interpretation of
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actions in context, and professional theorising's constructs 
of the second order are of interest to sociology. However 
they have not been seen as an interest in themselves, but 
rather as a threat to sociological work and as a problem to 
be overcome. The widespread faith in sociology with scientific 
method typically characterises the relation between the 
practitioner and his subject as problematic in terms of 
'methodology'. On this view unless care is taken with method, 
observations can become contaminated by subjective elements 
and opinion be result rather than fact.
Lachenmeyer for example [1971] sees the non-scientific 
status of sociology as capable of remedy through increasing 
the precision of theory language, dealing with observable 
phenomena, and replicating research. He further states that 
sociologists "must be more concerned with the referential 
meaning of their terms. They must use explicit and rigorous 
definitions. They must formulate disposition concepts and 
definitions while using the most appropriate predictive form. 
Furthermore, they cannot be satisfied with conventional grammar 
as their systematizing device; they must express their 
theoretical statements in more precise form." [1971].
Lachenmeyer articulates a concern for the status of 
sociological language, arguing that while it uses conventional 
language it cannot be scientific. Similar concerns with the 
reliability of language are shared by other members of social 
situations. They are concerned with producing their 
utterances according to their practical purposes in an 
uncontaminated state; as authored by nature. Within situations 
members construct embedded relationships of understanding as 
to the purpose of their inquiries. In general terms, these 
consist of ideas on what reliable knowledge should 'look'
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like even though there may be disagreements on particular 
forms of production [e.g. different kinds of game or play, 
different stories about an event].
Polanyi [1973] has recognised the relation between 
scientific ideals, commonsense conceptions of science, and the 
basis and effect of that relation. He writes that the 
dominant conception of science is based upon the split 
between subjectivity and objectivity, and seeks to eradicate 
from its programme humanistic explanations of its theories. 
Polanyi sees that: "modern man has set up as the ideal of 
knowledge the conception of natural science as a set of 
statements which is 'objective' in the sense that its 
substance is entirely determined by observation, even while 
its presentation may be shaped by convention." [1973].
Because the possibility of a scientific sociology is based in 
a conception of a scientific methodology, it seeks to 
assemble the properties of social relations and situations in 
terms of this. This is an attempt to capture the social, 
through what are regarded as asocial means. However, both 
commonsense and sociology are grounded in a cultural 
understanding of language for producing reliability and 
objectivity.
For example, the topic of "the impact of work on leisure" 
is attended by the more fundamental concern for language. This 
can be seen in a statement made by Kando and Summers, 
contemplating a paradigm and research strategy. They state 
that an "obstacle to a systematic theory relating work to 
non-work has been the widespread tendency to overlook the 
complexity of the possible relations between outward appearances, 
or forms of work and leisure, and the way they are experienced
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and interpreted by participants in them." [1971. My emphases.].
Kando and Summers are not commenting upon a small thing.
They are expressing interest in the relations between the 
quality of language idealised as "systematic theory", and the 
nature of the topic under study. This interest lies in the 
mastery of the topic through quality language, such that a 
fitting together of topic and theory takes place [i.e. 
describing members' actions 'fully' o_s_ systematic theory].
But it is this fitting together process which is so problematic. 
Kando and Summers invoke the idea of the complexity of 
relations in order to overcome this; it provides for an 
agreement that where a theory can be seen as consisting of a 
complexity of social relations [i.e. what are taken to be 
members' methodic relations], it is then possible for that 
theory to be regarded as systematic.
Kando and Summers pose the question of how quality language 
is possible, yet the very ways in which they and other 
sociologists assemble this question precludes its actual 
accomplishment, whether or not it is possible in any case.
Asking how quality language can be achieved ignores the 
fundamental question of how language itself is made possible? 
This redirects inquiry away from the location of the invariant 
methods for inquiry, towards taking "members' own practices 
as the rule of the social construction of reality"; it is "an 
appeal for the elucidation of the everyday ways in which we 
know one another and the contours of the situations in which 
we find ourselves." [J. O'Neill, 1972].
It has been suggested that a sociology which uses and 
continually reassembles an idea of a fixed scientific tradition 
and outcome can have no interest in the topic of reflexivity 
as such. Instead, because reflexivity is constitutive of
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the indexical character of rational properties, a sociology 
which seeks to follow a scientific tradition in fact encounters 
it as a problem. This is because as the rationality of a 
tradition is itself indexical, it has to be continually 
produced and demonstrated through sociological members' 
accounts. Because of indexicality, these accounts face their 
own problem of production: how to establish a fixed, objective 
tradition of inquiry. This can be attained for immediate, 
practical purposes in and through accounts [i.e. reflexively] 
but this is a contravention itself of the establishment of an 
objective tradition. Thus professional theory seeks to 
establish itself through a specialised language; but what it 
reveals about the social world is reflexively produced.
Because of the inescapable use of the social feature of 
reflexivity, the programme for an objective, scientific form 
of inquiry is always beyond it. It is no wonder then that 
attempts at an objective sociology face not only indexicality 
as a problem for remedy, but the escape from reflexivity as 
well.
The prevalent remedy to this situation has been through 
formulated ideas on 'objective phenomenon' and 'observed 
regularities'. There have been other attempts to come to 
terms with the engagement which an inquirer has with his 
surroundings, his discipline, and himself. Some of these will 
now be discussed.
Edmund Husserl reasoned that wisdom is the personal affair 
of the inquirer, which must be self-acquired. He must be able 
to answer for it from the beginning and at each step through 
the facility of his own act of inquiry. Husserl states that 
a decision to begin in this way means that inquiry begins 
with an absolute lack of knowledge: "anyone who seriously
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intends to become a philosopher must 'once in his life' 
withdraw into himself and attempt, within himself, to overthrow 
and build anew all the sciences that, up to then, he has been 
accepting." [1960]. Starting in this way leads on to a search 
for a method which develops and progresses towards "genuine 
knowing".
What Husserl recognises is that anything that can be called 
wisdom or knowledge resides in and consists of the actual 
practices of those who would produce it. The decision to take 
part in such production then ideally requires the reformulation 
of the practical world as previously known. It is in these 
terms that Husserl speaks of "an absolute lack of knowledge"; 
it is as a reknowing and recognising of the previously known. 
With this beginning goes the search for a method of knowing. 
Husserl's ideal formulation posits a tension between knowledge 
of the world, the decision to know it anew, and the emergence 
of a method for true and genuine knowing.
However at this point, which offers for examination the 
process of how knowledge is formed and methods are used in 
reflexive interplay, Husserl turns towards the programme of 
constituting a transcendental phenomenology. This is through 
the theoretical attitude and the reduction or bracketing of 
practical interests [1965]. The topic of reflexivity is 
thus passed by in Husserl's phenomenology by ignoring the 
practical character of actions and circumstances. By seeking 
a method which wants to "reveal the essential and irreducible 
presuppositions of knowledge by providing an access to the 
essential structures of experiences and the basic patterns 
of interrelationships obtaining between these experiences"
[E. Pivcevic, 1970], Husserl does not inquire into the
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construction of contexts through the language of social 
relations. Instead he intentionally inquires into the 
constitution of pure consciousness.
The method of reduction or bracketing seeks to 'put the 
world out of play', in order to reveal the essential objects 
of consciousness. Vet it must be asked whether this method 
can escape the reflexivity of its own observations. Given 
that the language of Husserl's phenomenology is part of a 
socio-cultural formation, and can only express its intended 
'escape' and method through that formation, it would appear 
that bracketing is more of a helpful device to the theorist 
to aid him in his theorising than an actual method of negating 
the influence of and reliance upon the social world.
Merleau-Ponty adopts this position in relation to bracketing.
He sees it rather than being a movement from existence to 
essence, as a heurism for locating the relations of experience; 
for setting the world in relief against a background of essences 
[1962].
The idea of bracketing has also been used by Alfred Schütz 
in his phenomenological sociology. For Schütz the phenomenological 
sociologist suspends his belief in the existence of the outer 
world for the purposes of his inquiry: "to refrain intentionally 
and systematically from all judgements related directly or 
indirectly to the existence of the outer world." [1962]. As 
with Merleau-Ponty, Schütz accepts Husserl's work but with 
changes. Returning to Husserl, it can be seen that the 
inquirer must perform the reduction on himself and become 
the 'single ego', which has the effect of transforming all 
subjects into phenomena. This requires that accounting 
practices as existent and intersubjective features, are 
transformed into and are grounded in the transcendental ego.
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This position then has as its problematic: how does the 
transcendental ego intentionally account for the existence of 
others?
Schütz argued that the problem was deceptive. 
Intersubjectivity is not a problem, he suggested, of 
constitution which can be solved in a transcendental manner. 
Intersubjectivity is rather the pre-given baseline of the 
life-world which can be inquired into [1966], At a mundane 
level, intersubjectivity consists of certain typical instances 
or "vacillating approximations" [1970], where the essence is 
preconstituted in terms of the type through experience and as 
such essence and type differ in degree [A. Schütz, 1966. Heap 
and Roth, 1973]. Experience is the ground of essence and the 
inspiration for typicality; types stem from members' pragmatic 
purposes. When the move is made from the transcendental 
sphere to the pragmatic, practical sphere as Schütz recommends, 
inquiry does not need to formulate intersubjectivity in 
absolute terms but should require its constitutive elements 
in terms of descriptions of their own practical purposes.
Schutz's programme was thus one of the constitutive 
phenomenology of the life-world, which sought to amalgamate 
the method of bracketing the social world with the postulate 
of adequacy derived from Weber. The arguable use of the 
method of bracketing in Schutz's case was to enable the 
production of the constitutive features of the life-world, 
which could then be compared with members' conceptions.
Yet bracketing the social world shuts off from examination 
exactly how members and theorist construct and establish the 
baselines of intersubjectivity as a practical programme.
Whereas such as Nagel, Weber, Husserl, and Schütz have 
sought to counter and overcome the reflexivity of their
accounts -through such concepts as .»observable- phenomena*,
‘•the postulate of adequacy*, and ‘the method of bracketing», 
other sociologists have approached the. reflexivity of 
sociology*s accounts with interest. G'ouldner (19 7 3) for 
example has stated that a reflexive sociology "is concerned 
with what sociologists, want to do and with what, in fact, they 
actually do in- the world.". In order to attain this kind of 
sociology, Gouldner makes a number of points*
It The: sociologist needs to be: transformed in- 
order to acquire self-awareness and "hew sensitivities",,
2s A reflexive sociology needs to be a radical 
sociology, because of the awareness that the advancement of 
knowledge stems from the sociologists situation in the world 
which he must address not merely in terms of how to work but 
how to live. In this way (Jouldner’s reflexive sociology is 
radical, because it seeks both to transform the »outside» 
world and the '’inside' world of the sociologist.
3r A- further aspect of this reflexivity is that 
the sociologist, must "acquire the ingrained habit of viewing 
our own beliefs, as we now view those held by others." (a ,
Gouldner, 1973« His emphasis»). Consequently,this means*
4t The abandonment of the professional view 
that those studied act out of need while sociologists proceed 
out of belief and study in logic, method, and, evidence. For 
Gouldher the adoption of .these points would result int
5* Sociologists: creasing to formulate their 
programmes in terms of subject and object (i.e* layman and 
professional). Rather the topic of study for reflexive sociology 
would consist of empirical, researches "about sociology and sociologists, 
their occupational roles, their.career .'hangups’, their 
establishments,power systems, subcultures, and their place in
- 341-
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the larger social world.".
Glvent Gouldner's programme for the establishment of a 
reflexive sociology, is it correct to state that he is 
interested in the reflexivity of accounts? With reference to 
his stipulations concerning the researches which such a 
sociology would carry out, it seems that Gouldner is more 
concerned with documenting the concrete situations in which 
sociologists find themselves. As to his other concerns about 
radicalising and transforming sociologists themselves, he 
ignores the question of how this is to be done. John O'Neill 
has pointed out that Gouldner neglects the philosophical 
foundations of reflexivity, and so is obliged to tie his 
programme into society's infrastructure [1972]. This neglect 
can be seen in what Gouldner has to say about Harold Garfinkel 
and his studies into ethnomethodology: "The task Garfinkel 
sets himself is to destroy this taken-for-grantedness and to 
strip the cultural foundation of its cloak of invisibility." 
[1973]. Yet Gouldner does not mention the constitutive features 
in social action of indexicality and reflexivity which are 
predominant in Garfinkel's writing.
Whereas we are here concerned with reflexivity as a 
constituting phenomenon of the social world, Gouldner's use 
of the word references a concrete sociology of sociology; the 
sociologist documenting his social world in concrete fashion. 
Also, Gouldner's sense of what is reflexive does not extend 
to a shared method of constituting situations, made use of 
by members and sociologists alike. Rather, he sees his 
concrete reflexivity as a means of reviewing his world.
The sociology of Harold Garfinkel is in direct contrast 
to that of Gouldner's. He seeks to examine "everyday
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activities as members* methods for making those same 
activities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical- 
purposes" [1967]. Garfinkel sees this feature of reflexivity 
as pervading practical actions, circumstances, commonsense 
knowledge of social structures, and practical sociological 
reasoning. He is thus concerned to see how in their 
activities people construct and make sensible those activities 
'for what they are'. Unlike Gouldner who sees his task as 
transforming sociology, Garfinkel is concerned only and 
entirely with the situated methods of practical reasoning which 
he does not seek to correct or quarrel with [1967].
From this it can be seen that Garfinkel entertains two 
distinct though related forms of reflexivity. Firstly is the 
notion of social reflexivity, whereby the way a setting is 
organised is identical with the procedures used by members to 
make it reportable and observable. Secondly, by establishing 
this as a concern, Garfinkel focuses upon the ways in which 
practical reasoning is accomplished. As all sociology is a 
practical accomplishment, including Garfinkel's, this means 
that he is engaging in an examination of the methodic 
procedures used to accomplish knowledge but which are commonly 
taken for granted. In other words, by focusing on social 
reflexivity Garfinkel engages in a reflexive sociology.
In order to approach reflexivity as a topic, and as a 
condition specified by the fundamental organising features of 
this resource, everyday activities have to be approached as 
"anthropologically strange". In making this point Garfinkel 
outlines the requirements that for the sociologist to examine 
the constitutive properties of everyday life, it is necessary 
to question or disrupt situations. This is in order to reveal 
members' accounts of practical activities as constitutive,
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practical accomplishments of those activities.
A further recommendation towards studying practical 
activities has been given by Garfinkel and Sacks [1970]. With 
regard to the adequacy, value, and importance of practical 
activities they have no interest, seeking rather to describe 
them. This stance is termed by Garfinkel and Sacks as 
"ethnomethodological indifference". In conjunction with the 
procedure of regarding mundane activities as strange in order 
to set them in relief, the recommendation of enthomethodological 
indifference seems to have a strong resemblance to 
phenomenological bracketing. There.is a difference however.
Schutz's approach is designed to facilitate and contribute 
to a phenomenological sociology; it is to accomplish accounts 
which provide and add aims and achievements to that sociology's 
theory and research. Bracketing is seen as a means of doing 
this. Yet it is a means which is dedicated towards 
methodological development, and not a description of practical 
activities. On the other hand, where the concern for 
sociological method as a superior form of knowledge and 
knowing is of little or no concern it is possible to 
concentrate upon members' practical activities as practical 
accomplishments; as produced by 'our own' methods and practices 
of accomplishment. In effect, regarding everyday scenes as 
'strange' and adopting ethnomethodological indifference 
results in a concentration upon practical sociological 
reasoning as a continual presence within and constructive of
contexts and not a 'special' method available only to professional 
sociologists.
It is within this network of allegiance to either practical 
sociological reasoning or professional sociological reasoning,
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that the possibility and future of a reflexive sociology lies. 
Garfinkel states in the Preface to "Studies in Ethomethodology" 
that research into practical sociological reasoning is "not 
directed to formulating or arguing correctives.". He further 
states that although such studies "are directed to the 
preparation of manuals on sociological methods, they are in 
no wax supplements to 'standard' procedure, but are distinct 
from them." [1967], The crux of the matter lies in "arguing 
correctives". What does this consist of?
Professional sociology is taken up with the related and 
dual concerns of its methods and the knowledge and conclusions 
which it produces. This focus on and concern with its methods 
and status of its knowledge stems from the fact that to 
accomplish being professional,its accounts must formulate 
superiority as a feature of its activities. As a consequence 
of this, professional sociology becomes involved with the 
dominance of its methods and knowledge, continually attempting 
to refine the former and producing the latter for official and 
institutional use within society. In this sense it is 
correcting and seeking to make 'better' its methods, while 
presenting the definitive account of the practical, everyday 
activities of members. The central concern of this 
professional form of life, even if not immediately apparent, 
is the correction of commonsense conceptions and theories 
about practical circumstances and activities. This is why 
reflexivity is a problematic phenomenon for sociology, for it 
unites the division between lay and professional in terms of 
practical reasoning. To become interested in the constitutive 
place of reflexivity in inquiry leads for the professional 
sociologist to a negation of his superior professional position.
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Why is this? Garfinkel has written that for sociologists 
and other members of society to become interested in 
reflexivity "would consist of their undertaking to make the 
reflexive character of practical activities observable; to 
examine the artful practices of rational inquiry as 
organisational phenomena without thought for correctives or 
irony." [1967], To become engaged in such an undertaking as 
this however, is not to be doing sociology as it is 
conventionally understood. As Paul Filmer has stated its 
"sociologists trying to be reflexive are sociologists doing 
work which is not understandable as sociology; whose sense is 
not grounded in sociology's tradition of [scientific] discourse." 
[1975]. Thus, the immediate effect of this is to place any 
attempt at a reflexive sociology outside of the professional 
form of theorising.
THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE AND REFLEXIVITY: In a paper 
concerning the concept of trust [1963], Garfinkel points out 
that Talcott Parsons' theoretical formulation of incorporating 
the common culture into the super-ego results in the 
interpretive consequence that an organised system of activities 
means the same thing as the way its organisational 
characteristics are produced [i.e. reflexively]. The 
implication of this interpretive formation is that sociology's 
concerns with 'culture' and members' actual practices as 
'culture' are reflexively produced. Regarding sociological 
concerns with culture as reflexive accounts of members' 
activities as sociologically assembled, means that these 
activities may be differently assembled by other observer-members 
according to context. This comparison between different 
contexts of demonstration enables the location of the reflexive 
character of practical sociological reasoning.
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The Sociological Concept of Culture: Within sociology and 
anthropology the concept of culture is general and non-specific. 
Accordingly, particular uses of 'culture' tend to be assemblages 
of contingent concerns [i.e. according to the concerns of the 
theoriser], which results in the consequence that defining the 
meaning of 'culture' consists of invoking and accomplishing 
'a general concept'. Because of this it is perhaps more 
appropriate to term what is being examined here as a sense of 
culture. This formulates it as a product and an observable of 
professional sociological reasoning, rather than a concrete 
existent.
In anthropology Kroeber and Kluckhohn [1950] have defined 
culture as: "patterned ways of thinking, feeling, and reacting, 
acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the 
distinctive achievements of human groups, including their 
embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture 
consists of traditional [i.e. historically derived and 
selected] ideas and especially their attached values.". The 
sense of this definition locates culture in structural 
regularities or patterns of predominant forms of action or 
behaviour [e.g. plow agriculture - A.L. Kroeber, 1948].
Another definition of culture has located it in historically 
generated systems of "explicit and implicit designs for 
living" [C. Kluckhohin and W.H. Kelly, 1945]. The explicit 
culture is made up of regularities of behaviour which can be 
apprehended by perception. On the other hand, the implicit 
culture is an abstraction by the anthropologist or sociologist, 
who 'recognises' common features which underly a variety of 
cultural contexts. In this formulation, the explicit culture 
consists of both structure and content [i.e. a sense of meaning 
and organisation], while the implicit culture is made of
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pure or essential features [applicable to a culture].
For a sociologist such as Parsons, culture is regarded 
as "patterned or ordered systems of symbols which are objects 
of the orientation of actors, internalized components of the 
personalities of individual actors and institutionalized 
patterns of social systems." [1970]. Like anthropologists 
[cf. L.A. White, 1949], Parsons' definition locates the 
transmission of culture in the movement from sign orientation 
towards shared symbolic systems and the production of a 
cultural tradition. Symbolic interactionists such as Rose, 
regard culture as "the related meanings and values by means 
of which individuals interact." [1972]. Shibutani [1955] 
similarly pictures culture as "the perspective that is shared 
by the people in a particular group.".
A consequence of having 'culture' as a general and existent 
frame of sociological reference, is that its application to 
and production as specific realities results in the paradoxical 
appearance of various cultures [i.e. paradoxical because as a 
general concept of sociology it appears to have many specific 
and indexical instances and applications]. For example 
Friedson [1972] writes about 'doctor culture' and 'patient 
culture'. Similarly at the level of group interaction, Becker 
and Greer [1960] have differentiated between the forms of 
conventional understandings shared by the participants in an' 
organisation; between different forms of culture. The 
understandings which originate from a group's problems are 
termed by Becker and Greer as manifest culture. Where 
membership to another 'outside' group is shared by the members 
of a culture, they also share a structure of understandings as 
latent culture, which has the potential to transform group 
behaviour and effect understandings.
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These general recognitions of culture [i.e. general 
because culture is located between and among groups and 
individuals which go to constitute a whole 'society'], can be 
amalgamated for the present purposes as a list of features 
which professional theorists take to constitute culture.
This list is drawn from Herkovits [1940]:
1: Culture is learned.
2: Culture stems from biological, psychological, 
and historical factors.
3: Culture has a structure.
4: Culture is dynamic.
5: Culture is variable.
6: Culture exhibits regularities that permit 
scientific analysis.
7: Culture is the means for individuals to 
adjust to the total society and for creative expression.
These features account for a professional theorist's 
sense of culture; for a way of regarding actions, instances, 
behaviours, and scenes as 'cultural'. In a way this is 
paradoxical since according to definitions of culture and 
this reflexive list of cultural attributes, cultural analysis 
can itself be seen to an instance of its own analysis [i.e. 
it is itself an instance of what it is addressing]. This 
provides for an unrecognised problem, in that to be scientific 
cultural analysis must cease itself to be a cultural activity.
In regarding the above list as providing for a sense of 
culture, the feature which is being addressed is that faced 
by the theorist who would 'do' cultural analysis. It is to 
seek to account for the provision of 'total' or 'whole' 
objects [e.g. society, belief systems, knowledge], while
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having to rely upon contexted and limited viewpoints, which 
themselves are fundamentally problematic. This means that 
the sense of 'culture' has to be continually produced in the 
work of theorising. This consists of the formation and 
demonstration of a specific cultural tradition [i.e. the 
theorist's, which because it assembles 'culture' is the only 
'true' cultural tradition], through negotiations between 
specific cultural concepts [e.g. patterns, traits, items] 
and actual actions-in-context. In addressing the problematic 
of the sense of culture, the theorist formulates these 
negotiations as providing for 'culture' in their doing. In 
this way, regarding 'culture' as learned, dynamic, variable, 
and regular formulates actual behaviours as learned, dynamic, 
variable, and regular [i.e. as reflexively 'cultural'].
Regarding culture as a solution to the professional 
theorist's problem of accomplishing accounts of context-in- 
general from the point of view of an essentially limited and 
indexical context, can perhaps best be seen in Pasrons' 
definition of culture [above]. He regards culture as an 
organised and structured system of symbols which provides 
three features: a focus for the orientation of action; a 
generalised and conventional organisation of objects which 
consists of society's structure; and components of people's 
personalities. It can be seen that Parsons' definition of 
culture provides for the accomplishment of a context-in-general 
[i.e. culture itself as "institutionalised patterns of social 
systems"] by providing this as the perspective of attention 
[e.g. "objects of the orientation of actors"] through 
internalising the general culture in the actor.
Because Parsons fails to recognise that the production of
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senses of occasion [i.e. a sense of culture] depends upon the 
practical orientations with which members address topics of 
concern, he totally constrains people in situations to act in 
accord with the culture [e.g. for the doctor to be "affectively 
neutral"]. Parsons does not concern himself with the practical 
accomplishment of such contexts-in-general as culture, which 
he himself is involved in producing. By basing his sense of 
culture upon an ordered system of symbols, Parsons 
standardises people's common understandings towards actions.
He shares this theme of standardisation with other theorists 
of culture [e.g. T.S. Kuhn and Plato]. They use the notion 
of standardisation [e.g. paradigms, the Forms] "to conceive 
the character and consequences of actions that comply with 
standardized expectancies. Generally they have acknowledged 
but otherwise neglected the fact that by these same actions 
persons discover, create, and sustain this standardization."
[H. Garfinkel, 1967].
In conceptualising culture, cultural; theorists begin at 
the 'wrong end'. Garfinkel can be quoted again: cultural 
theorists "portray what the member's actions will have come 
to by using the stable structures - i.e. what they came to - 
as a point of theoretical departure from which to portray the 
necessary character of the pathways whereby the end result is 
assembled." [1967]. This results in theorists such as Parsons, 
Kuhn, and Plato treating people as 'cultural dopes'. Garfinkel 
uses this idea to point up the procedure used by theorists of 
having people act in compliance with the theoretical 
structures o£ sociology. The idea of the 'cultural dope' 
makes reference to "the man-in-the-sociologist's-society who 
produces the stable features of the society by acting in
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compliance with preestablished and legitimate alternatives 
of action that the common culture provides." [1967]. This 
procedure embodies the concept of culture in the 'real' 
world by assembling types of event which are regarded as 
signs of the general concept; the 'real world' refers to and 
validates the sociological structure of culture [cf. D. Smith, 
1974].
The sociological concept of culture provides an occasion for 
seeing it as an event for the demonstration of culture. Upon 
every occasion of the demonstration of such sense, the 
overriding rule of construction and interpretation is 'see 
it that way'. To 'find' culture, to examine it, to rearrange 
it, and draw conclusions from it, the theorist must necessarily 
seek to bridge the gap between his own and others' indexical 
actions and utterances, and the context-in-general which is 
to be accomplished as demanded by his tradition [i.e. science] 
and topic [i.e. culture]. The way in which this is done is 
by specifying what, if it were found to exist, 'culture' would 
consist of. Having formulated the kinds of event which would 
be taken to be and accepted as cultural, the theorist proceeds 
to incorporate actions and events into his theoretical work 
as 'actual' cultural instances.
It is only through juxtaposition and comparison in terms 
of professional theoretical relevancies, expectations, and 
formulations that indexical actions can be regarded as 
representations of and belonging to the general sense of 
culture. It is not the case that 'culture' as a context-in­
general exists as a determinate object. It is the case that 
in the construction of his theoretical work, the professional 
sociologist makes this situation available for all practical 
purposes. 'Culture' is a sense of what can be done in terms
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of the adopted form of practical reasoning.
A Member's Concept of Culture: The above section has 
located the professional treatment of 'culture' as an assembled 
object of sociology's ways of producing a sense of culture.
In this section will be examined lay members activities for 
producing senses of occasion [culture] - particular and 
occasioned accounts which give structure, temporal progression, 
and social organisation to indexical actions-in-context. The 
position is taken here that an examination of members' activities 
and accounts as sociological formulations [i.e. activities and 
accounts of sociological theorists], permits the location and 
presentation of how objects, conclusions, findings, and facts 
get 'done'. The difference between this view and conventional 
constructive theory is a distinction between focusing upon 
actual practical circumstances and activities which lay and 
professional sociologists share, and taking these for granted 
in producing sociological accounts.
In relation to the activities of members of situations, 
what can a sense of culture be taken to be? We can again use 
Parsons' formulation because it is perhaps the most 
comprehensive and is not essentially at variance with other 
cultural theorists' formulations. Rewriting Parsons' 
definition, culture for the present purposes can be regarded 
as: [1] inside people's heads as a resource for [2] the 
orientation of their actions [culture-as-action-in-context], 
which [3] produces knowledge of the structure of the social 
system [culture-as-context-in-general ]. The dynamic of this 
sense of culture is provided by natural language and its 
practices.
In essence Parsons' definition of culture states the
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problem faced by the member of a situation; the accomplishment 
of culture as a sensible outcome and context-in-general. 
However rather than impose a structure of professional 
understandings here, I want to examine members' practices as 
ways for producing and their actions as accomplishments of, 
a sense of culture. By following Parsons and locating 
culture within people, it means that the elements of a sense 
of culture are also the conditions of the social world which 
have to be fulfilled. Members' activities as an organised 
system of events are thus produced according to the sense of 
occasion through which they are addressed. Accordingly, the 
relation between the constitutive features of a sense of 
culture for members and the organised means by which they are 
attained will be examined.
This will be done in respect of reflexive features 
encountered in the above chapters concerning sexual actors, 
adults and children, and policemen, magistrates, and suspects; 
this is distinct from the professional sociological notion of 
culture as a list of items [e.g. the above list]. Rather it 
is suggested that people described in the above chapters, and 
the chapters themselves, attended to 'culture' as a condition 
for and a production of actions-in-context, in relation to a 
general context. In this way, contexted events were 
established as of general and interrelated significance to 
'wider society'.
In accounting for settled and past matters, people make 
use of the practices of relevance, comparison, unity, and 
difference. These features are used to assemble the texture 
and structure of a situation according to determining and 
formulating a legitimate history to that situation. As such 
the use of these practices consist in the use, construction,
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and development of types and typologies of action and 
people.
The formation of such a typology and its subsequent changes 
was discussed in the examination of sexual contact actors, 
though without doubt the use of the reflexive features for 
assembling typicality was present both in the situations 
examined in other chapters and in those chapters themselves.
For example, like sexual contact actors, and myself, the police 
and magistrates compared settled matters with 'new' events, 
related these to one another in terms of similarities and 
differences, and formulated a specific, singular type in 
relation to a context-in-general [i.e. a cultural actor].
This kind of accounting however neglects its own procedures 
for doing so. So for example, the part played in this 
process by persuasion, ambiguity, need, attraction, formulations 
of use and attributes, and quality relations are not recognised. 
Such features however are available for the fabrication or 
'mock-up' of a cultural actor [e.g. the male contact actor as 
'a bisexual female', the witness as 'a criminal', the suspect 
as 'a witness'], and provide the means for the establishment 
of culture in general in relation to which the 'made observable' 
actor has sense.
Establishing the typicality of events, actions, and 
people by making them observable as cultural phenomena [i.e. 
types which go to make up the context-in-general of culture], 
people thereby construct experienced events into a [self 
organised] social order. Stemming from the procedure of 
assembling an event [e.g. a fight, a contact advertisement, 
a child's utterance] typical as a cultural item or trait 
[e.g. 'wounding', 'prostitute', 'incompetent'], the demonstration 
of a social order consists of the structuring of contexts-in-
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general [e.g. law enforcement, sexual contact, child rearing]. 
Thereby, various levels, differences, and relations of 
cultural phenomena are established which consists of an 
indisputable and overriding consciousness of the existence 
of a wider scheme of 'things'. Yet the relation between the 
'natural order' and the contexts within which this order is 
'found' to occur [for it is only within specific contexts that 
the general culture can be apprehended] consists of the 
organisation of these two contexts in terms of one another.
In this way order is a continual problematic and 
accomplishment of contexted actions, which though routinely 
done and known is only fully realised when the background 
assumptions of daily life [i.e. the social world is orderly] 
are disrupted. This form of disruption as a normal, natural 
trouble is a constituent feature of the contexts in which 
suspects, children, and the sexually ambiguous find 
themselves. Because of the omnipresent nature of culture, 
these actors have to face the choice of 'going along' with 
the intersubjective sense of culture [i.e. engaging in its 
production themselves], maintaining their deviant positions 
in respect of the sense of culture and face sanctions, or 
focusing upon and proclaiming the socially constructed 
condition of cultural identities. In this latter case they 
would risk some form of categorisation and remedial treatment.
Members' construction of social order as a shared 
feature of social life results in the demonstration and 
accomplishment of the rational properties of indexicality 
according to the formulation of the order as a corporate 
construct of organisational motives. By methodically 
assembling and constructing rules and a sense of social order,
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people in everyday life provide and demonstrate the conditions 
to be met and provided for the accomplishment of bona fide 
activity and membership. This is done for example, by enabling 
and judging that individual motives concur with organisational 
goals. This occurs most obviously where adults provide the 
conditions for a 'change of mind' in children, and regard 
the subsequent behaviour as satisfying [or not] those conditions. 
In a similar manner the organisation and social order of the 
court consists of the conditions in the form of language 
[e.g. address, explanation, description], to which the suspect 
must attend and replicate to produce 'good' character.
For those involved in sexual contact the production of a 
sense of organisation through contact argot is crucial. This 
is because unless the advertiser-replier constructs the 
expected socio-sexual attributes of the order, no contact 
will be made. The contact order is thus reproduced through 
the demonstration of use-value, commodity-for-exchange, 
reciprocal use, attributes for use, and the formulation of 
relations in terms of qualities [i.e.the contact order itself]. 
Through their reflexive language practices [e.g. 'discreet', 
•kind', 'appreciative', 'genuine'], contact actors make 
observable their relations as material objects through the 
formulations of use, value, and exchange. This is a reflexive 
relation between theoretical products which construct and 
reflect the social order of the producers.
The features of structure and fact are produced in the 
construction of typical actors and a social order. This is 
brought about through the use and establishment of presuppositions 
which form a context. So for example, particular language 
patterns of particular cultural actors can come in for
examination merely because of the self-conceptions shared and 
involved hy the members of a situation. As a consequence of 
this, such reflexive practices as questioning, checking, 
doubting, and ordering construct a context where an actor is 
seen at odds with the wider cultural, context which such as 
the adult' (in relation to the child) and the^  policeman (in 
relation to the suspect) are- seen to represent. The provision 
of structure and fact through the demonstration of 
presuppositions by such reflexive practices as doubt and 
questioning, is founded upon other practices which produce 
the typical, and orderly cultural tradition which is documented 
by the rational properties of indexicality.
By regarding the resolution and outcome of actions-in-context 
as members* accomplishments of a sense of culture, we aro 
led away from the professional sociological assumptions 
upon the orderly nature of culture and into the actual sense 
which- a context has for its members, and the ways and methods 
which are mobilised for the construction of that sense.
Looking at members* practices as producing a sense of culture 
as context-in-genera! involves the examination of the 
resources which people use and share- in constituting their 
(cur) first order constructs. Because these constructs and 
the practices for their attainment are shared, it is a 
difficult, complex, and.often ambiguous topic to approach 
and examine. However by seeking to regard the resource of 
reflexivity itself as a topic-, the senses through which 
people (we) engage in a social and cultural life can be 
examined.
TFT COWCLUSIOEr This thesis, draws to an end. . What are its 
findings and conclusions?' This is a difficult question to
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answer, but it is perhaps best to approach it through a summary of 
the structure of the thesis. Its findings are particular points 
made xm relation: to particular areas of ' practice; and theory im the 
forgoing- sections. What the conclusions are is nruah more difficult 
to state, because the thesis has, not sought to deal iin, objective 
matters, of fact and quantitative measures. The basic point of the 
thesis, is. better seen as an attempt to depict and to awake a 
realisations that mem im concert construct their own realities, 
and that the capability exists for a humane understanding of this 
being-im-the-worl'd through a reflexive sociology.
The structure of the thesis seeks to demonstrate this as. a 
reflexive biography,, and to lead towards it through the particular 
examinations, of the intimate relation: between: theory and practice.
Th® ability to categorise and typify events, to ascribe and accomplish 
type elements., and to differentiate between and judge the structural 
and cultural appropriateness:, of events, actions, and utterances are 
the routine attainments, of social practice. They are mundane and 
taken for granted. Yet they- consist; of a rich and varied network 
of sociological knowledge upon, which the theoretical relations of 
the coirtext-in-particular and the side-awake world depend. Im 
demonstrating this im the sections devoted to practices, the thesis 
sought to inspire the conceptual re-ordering of general assumptions: 
about the relations, between everyday social practice and professional 
theory, rt suggested that not only do routine and taken for granted 
practices, underly professional theorising, but that they do so in. 
a critical way. Taken seriously everyday social practice can be 
found to consist of formulationa which present an alternative to 
professional theorising? that everyday social practice Is more 
illuminating upom the procedures, and programmes of professional 
theorising than1 vice versa.
The final Sectiom of the thesis has showm. through the examination
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of particular examples of professional, theorising that not only are 
its; ideals or knowledge unobtainable im absolute terms, but that 
their possible attainment is an' intimate occasion of taking up, 
using, and abiding by social', practices- for- the practical purposes 
of the accomplishment of those ideals.. Cast as they are in absolute 
terms, which? makes, them problematic, to obtain, these ideals are 
paradoxically only realisable iim specific contexts and readings 
through, the very methods, and practices which the dedication to those 
ideals seeks to subvert. This final. Section, has sought to show 
the incorrigible? character off everyday social, practices, for 
profe-ssional. theory}- ii* constantly does battle- with them while 
always depending upon them’. Because of this the resource of 
social, reflexivity is the nub of' the problem for the accomplishment 
of the ideals of professional sociology.
Trri doing professional sociology, the use of reflexivity is 
inescapable and cannot be overcome. Yet because reflexivity 
forms? the accomplishment; off the substance of accounts it is not 
easily managed iim terms of professional inquiry. A3- such it forms 
the antithesis of any professional sociological thesis unless it is 
addressed as. a topic. . Without a reflexive concern, tho professional 
theorist continues to partake, of and contribute to a pre-theoretical 
view, of the common; culture which is occasioned and structured 
according to the central placement, of social scientific knowledge.
As. the final, part of Section IT demonstrated in comparing lay and 
professional, approaches, to common culture, professional, theory 
differs from everyday reasoning in relevanoe, orientation, and 
expectancy} yet it is really another- mode of reasoning and not am 
objective, separate one. It is rather- an abstracted and formalised 
form of everyday reasoning whose approaches- can be found in a 
►natural* form in everyday life (e.g. Sections I - III), via a
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reffexive notiom of theory as practice. Regarding- the work: and 
accomplishments of professional theory as actual practice rather 
than a special, and superior form of life- results in approaching 
them as. topics; for- inquiry,, and viewing the idea of reflexivity 
as a means for developing a sociology concerned with practicality 
and methodidty (alheit »outside»- conventional sociology).
Im a world where expert knowledge is highly praised, professional 
sociology is at fault in disregarding its very own- ways for 
inquiring into the social world. Where agencies and institutions 
perform- actual actions against, towards,, and in respect of everyday 
people which is either directed or influenced! hy professional 
theorists, the effects, brought about by transforming social 
realities through the- filter- of professionalism can be harsh, 
cruel1, and misguided. It is against the; mistaken claim of 
professional, sociology to be describing member».» activities that,
X recommend the- topic of reflexivity- as a means for inquiry.
ffbt only do r regard the topic; of reflexivity as a means for 
a more complete description! of social, realities, but the 
se1f-examinatiom which it requires in; terms of the sociologist 
doing his sociology- provides: the opportunity for the examinatiom 
of what it is to live and exist socially? for the discussion and 
analysis of how people relate to one another. This of course 
forces, the sociologist' to examine and review his own power and 
authority for making claims: to knowledge about others. It makes 
him question his ktowXsdge- of himself and his surroundings which 
is. the true topi® of sociological, inquiry as a human activity.
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